

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY


APPENDIX TO HEARINGS BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

VOLUME XII
CONSPIRACY WITNESSES IN DEALEY PLAZA
OSWALD-TIPPIT ASSOCIATES
GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILDT
DEPOSITIONS OF MARINA OSWALD PORTER
THE DEFECTOR STUDY
OSWALD IN THE SOVIET UNION: AN INVESTIGATION OF
YURI NOSENKO


MARCH 1979

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations





**BOSTON
PUBLIC
LIBRARY**



INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

APPENDIX TO HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

VOLUME XII

CONSPIRACY WITNESSES IN DEALEY PLAZA

OSWALD-TIPPIT ASSOCIATES

GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILDT

DEPOSITIONS OF MARINA OSWALD PORTER

THE DEFECTOR STUDY

OSWALD IN THE SOVIET UNION: AN INVESTIGATION OF
YURI NOSENKO

MARCH 1979

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1979

43-792

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

Stock No. 052-070-04983-9

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, *Chairman*

RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina

WALTER E. FAUNTROY,

District of Columbia

YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE,
California

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee

FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana

ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania

*Subcommittee on the
Assassination of*

Martin Luther King, Jr.

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, *Chairman*

HAROLD E. FORD

FLOYD J. FITHIAN

ROBERT W. EDGAR

STEWART B. MCKINNEY

LOUIS STOKES, *ex officio*

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, *ex officio*

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio

STEWART B. MCKINNEY, Connecticut

CHARLES THONE, Nebraska

HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan

*Subcommittee on the
Assassination of*

John F. Kennedy

RICHARDSON PREYER, *Chairman*

YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD

CHARLES THONE

HAROLD S. SAWYER

LOUIS STOKES, *ex officio*

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, *ex officio*

STAFF

G. ROBERT BLAKEY, *Chief Counsel and Staff Director*

GARY T. CORNWELL, *Deputy Chief Counsel*

(II)

DEALEY PLAZA CONSPIRACY WITNESSES

CONTENTS

	Page
Conspiracy Witnesses in Dealey Plaza.....	1
Oswald-Tippit Associates.....	33
George de Mohrenschildt.....	47
Depositions of Marina Oswald Porter.....	317
The Defector Study.....	435
Oswald in the Soviet Union: An Investigation of Yuri Nosenko.....	475

(III)

CONTENTS

General Introduction	1
Chapter I. The History of the	10
Chapter II. The History of the	20
Chapter III. The History of the	30
Chapter IV. The History of the	40
Chapter V. The History of the	50
Chapter VI. The History of the	60
Chapter VII. The History of the	70
Chapter VIII. The History of the	80
Chapter IX. The History of the	90
Chapter X. The History of the	100

DEALEY PLAZA CONSPIRACY WITNESSES

Staff Report

of the

Select Committee on Assassinations

U.S. House of Representatives

Ninety-fifth Congress

Second Session

March 1979

(1)

CONTENTS

	Paragraph
Foreword -----	(1)
I. Presence of two men in the upper floor windows of the Texas School Book Depository -----	(3)
II. Presence of possible gunman on grassy knoll -----	(24)
III. Accounts of persons fleeing from Texas School Book Depository -----	(34)
IV. Accounts of persons fleeing Dealey Plaza -----	(44)
V. Accounts of bullets hitting Plaza area -----	(109)
VI. Accounts of smoke in Dealey Plaza at the time of the shots -----	(126)

FOREWORD

(1)* In addition to the information from witnesses regarding what they heard in Dealey Plaza at the time the shots were fired at the Presidential motorcade, the committee examined the statements of witnesses in the Plaza, who provided information about the possibility that other individuals were present in the area who may have been involved in the assassination. The committee attempted to locate each of those persons; the search was hampered, however, to a great extent since the last known information on their addresses and whereabouts often dated back to 1963 or 1964. Nevertheless, each witness who was located was asked to read all prior statements he had made to the Warren Commission or law enforcement officials in connection with the assassination and then to indicate in an affidavit prepared by the committee whether those statements were a complete and accurate record of the information related by the witness. Each witness was given the opportunity to either refute, correct or delete inaccurate information contained in the statements and testimony.

(2) In the case of those witnesses who could not be located, the committee still examined their existing statements to form an opinion about the nature of the information provided as it related to what had been verified by other witnesses.

I. PRESENCE OF TWO MEN IN THE UPPER FLOOR WINDOWS OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY

(3) Three witnesses gave statements to law enforcement agencies after the assassination that they saw two men at the sixth floor window of the Texas School Book Depository (TSBD) from which they believed the assassin had fired.

(4) In an FBI interview on December 5, 1963, Mrs. Ruby Henderson related that at the time of the motorcade, she was standing on the east side of Elm Street "just north of Houston Street."⁽¹⁾ She said that right after an ambulance left the area with a man who had suffered an epileptic seizure, she looked up at the Texas School Book Depository; she saw two men in the window on one of the upper floors.⁽²⁾ She could not recall exactly which floor they were on, but stated that she did not recall seeing any other persons on any floors above the two men.⁽³⁾

(5) Mrs. Henderson described one man as being dark-complexioned, possibly either Mexican or Negro.⁽⁴⁾ That man had dark hair and a white shirt.⁽⁵⁾ The other man was taller and was wearing a dark shirt.⁽⁶⁾ According to the FBI report, she also said that "she could

* Arabic numerals in parentheses at the beginning of paragraphs indicate the paragraph number for purposes of citation and referencing; italic numerals in parentheses in the middle or at the end of sentences indicate references which can be found at the end of each report or section.

not definitely state that one of the men * * * was not a Negro." (7) Mrs. Henderson said she only saw the men from the waist up and therefore could not further describe their attire. (8) They were standing back from the window, but looking out toward the motorcade. (9) (6) Mrs. Henderson said she saw the two men in the window before the motorcade reached the corner of Elm and Houston Streets, but did not know how much before it reached the corner that she saw the men.

(7) Mrs. Henderson was not called to testify before the Warren Commission.

(8) Mrs. Carolyn Walther was interviewed by the FBI on December 4, 1963, and stated that at the time of the motorcade, she was standing on the east side of Houston Street, about 50 or 60 feet south of the south curb of Elm Street. (10) After the ambulance left with the epileptic, Mrs. Walther looked up at the windows of the Texas School Book Depository and saw a man in the southeast corner window of the fourth or fifth floor; according to the FBI report, Mrs. Walther was "positive" the window was not as high as the sixth floor. (11) She described the window as being the "most easterly" on the south side of the building. (12)

(9) Mrs. Walther said the man was holding a rifle in his hands; the barrel of the rifle was pointing downward and the man was looking toward Houston Street. (13) Both his hands were extended across the window ledge. (14) She described the man as having light brown or blond hair and wearing a white shirt. (15) She described the rifle as having a short barrel and being possibly a machine gun. She noticed no other features of the rifle. (16)

(10) Mrs. Walther said also that she saw at the same time a second man standing in the same window to the left of the man with the rifle. (17) This man was wearing a brown suit coat; she could only see his body from the waist to the shoulders and his head was hidden by part of the window. (18)

(11) Mrs. Walther told the FBI that almost immediately after she saw the second man in the window, the presidential motorcade approached on Houston Street. (19)

(12) Mrs. Walther was not called to testify before the Warren Commission.

(13) Arnold Louis Rowland testified before the Warren Commission that he and his wife standing near the corner of Houston and Main Streets at the time of the motorcade. (20) Rowland said that at about 12:15 p.m. he looked up at the Texas Book Depository and saw a man in a sixth floor window in the west corner of the building holding a rifle. (21) The man was standing back from the window. (22) Rowland described the rifle as a "fairly high-powered rifle" with a scope. (23) He thought it might have been a .30 size six rifle. (24) Rowland said he noted also that two windows were open where he saw the man standing. (25) According to Rowland, the man was holding the rifle in a "port arms" military position, with the barrel at a 45° angle downward across his body. (26)

(14) Rowland described the man as being "tall and slender in build in proportion with his width." (27) He also said the man could have weighed 140 to 150 pounds. (28) He appeared to be light-complexioned

with dark hair, possibly "light Latin" or Caucasian, and his hair was closely cut. (29) Rowland said the man was wearing a very light-colored shirt with an open collar and a T-shirt beneath, and he had on either dark slacks or jeans. (30) The man appeared to be in his thirties. (31) Rowland said that he mentioned to his wife that he had seen a man in the window, but the man was gone when they looked back. (32) Rowland estimated the man was standing 3 to 5 feet back from the window. (33)

(15) Rowland testified also that before he saw the man with the rifle, he saw another man in another window of the sixth floor. (34) He said that window was in the east corner of the building, "the one that they said the shots were fired from." (35) Rowland said he believed it was a "colored" man and that the man was "hanging" out the window. (36) Rowland said that at that time he noticed there were several people hanging out of windows; it was then that he looked again and saw the man with the rifle in the western window. (37) He said he saw both men at about 12:15 p.m. (38)

(16) Rowland described the man in the window of the southeast corner of the sixth floor as an "elderly Negro," but could give no further details on the man's appearance. (39) Rowland said the Negro man in the window remained there until the motorcade reached the corner of Main and Ervay Streets at about 12:30 p.m. (40) Rowland said he last saw him about 5 minutes before the motorcade approached; when he looked a minute or 30 seconds before the motorcade had reached the corner of Main and Ervay, the man was gone. (41)

(17) In an FBI interview on November 22, 1963, Rowland repeated that as he stood on Houston Street at the west entrance of the sheriff's office at approximately 12:15 or 12:20 p.m., he saw a man standing in the window of the "second floor from the top"; (42) there was no further information in that report about the location of that window. The man was standing 10 or 15 feet back from the window and was holding a rifle which appeared to have a scope. (43) The FBI report described the man's position as "parade rest." (44) According to that report, Rowland described the man as a white male of slender build with dark hair. (45) He was wearing a light-colored shirt which was open at the neck. (46)

(18) Rowland told the FBI that he heard the first shot about 15 minutes after he had seen the man with the rifle at the window. He said he did not look at the window again after the shots began.

(19) In an FBI interview on November 23, 1963, Rowland was quoted as saying that the window in which he saw the man with the rifle was in the southwest corner of the sixth floor, which is nearest the overpass on Elm Street. (47) That report contains the description of the man as wearing a light-colored shirt and the rifle as being a .306 with a telescopic sight. (48) Rowland said he was not close enough to identify the man and could not say if it was Lee Harvey Oswald. (49)

(20) Rowland also gave a sworn statement to FBI agents on November 24, 1963. In that statement, Rowland again recounted that he saw a man with a rifle at about 12:15 p.m. on November 22, 1963. (50) He described the location as the area of the two rectangular windows "at the extreme west end of the Texas School Book Depository on the next to the top floor. * * *" (51) He said again that the man was stand-

ing 10 to 15 feet back from the window.(52) The description he gave at this time was consistent with his earlier reports: Slender in proportion to his height, wearing a white or light-colored shirt, which was either collarless or open at the neck.(53) The man had dark hair.(54) Rowland also described the rifle as having a scope and said that the man was holding it in a "port arms" position.(55) He also said again that he would not be able to identify the person because of the distance.(56)

(21) There is no mention in any of the FBI reports that Rowland said he also saw another man in a window on the eastern corner of the building. Nevertheless, in his Warren Commission testimony, Deputy Sheriff Roger Craig stated that soon after the assassination on the afternoon of November 22, 1963, Rowland gave him a description of two men in sixth floor windows of the depository before the assassination.

(22) Craig testified that after the shots, he began talking to witnesses in the area of the depository.(57) This is Craig's description of his conversation with Rowland:

I talked to a young couple and the boy said he saw two men on the—uh—sixth floor of the Book Depository Building over there; one of them had a rifle with the telescopic sight on it—but he thought they were Secret Service agents on guard and didn't report it. This was about—uh—oh, he said, 15 minutes before the motorcade ever arrived.(58)

Craig said he remembered the boy's name to be Arnold Rowland.(59) He said the conversation with Rowland took place about 10 minutes after the shots were fired at the motorcade.(60) Rowland told him that the man with the rifle was located on the west end of the depository in the second window from the corner.(61) Rowland also told him that the two men were "walking back and forth" on the sixth floor.(62) Rowland related that when he looked back a few minutes later, only the man with the rifle remained.(63) He was holding it at his side and looking out the window in a southerly direction.(64) Craig said Rowland's wife said she had not seen the men.(65) Craig also said that at the time he talked to Rowland, there had not yet been a report that the shots had come from the depository.(66) In fact, Craig testified that he had at first assisted officers searching in the area of the railroad tracks before he returned to the area of the depository building to talk to witnesses.(67)

(23) Rowland also gave a report to the sheriff's department on November 22, 1963. According to that report, Rowland said that at about 12:15 p.m. he saw a man with a rifle in a window on the second floor from the top of the depository.(68) The man was about 15 feet back from the window and was holding the rifle at a "parade rest" position.(69) He described the rifle as high powered because it had a scope on it.(70) He described the man as white, wearing a light-colored shirt which was open at the neck; he said the man appeared to be of slender build with dark hair.(71) There is no mention in that report that Rowland described a second man on the sixth floor before the shots.

II. PRESENCE OF POSSIBLE GUNMAN ON THE GRASSY KNOLL

(24) The committee also examined information about the presence of a man near the concrete structure on the grassy knoll near the area where some witnesses said they believed gunfire had originated.

(25) The photographic evidence panel examined photographs made by Phillip Willis of the area of the grassy knoll and concluded that a photograph taken by Willis did show a person standing behind the concrete wall on the knoll.(72) The panel determined that that photograph was taken at approximately frame 202 of the Zapruder film, which was after President Kennedy received the neck wound but before the fatal head shot.(73) According to the results of the panel's photographic enhancement and analysis, the figure in the Willis photograph was consistent with that of an adult approximately 5 feet 6 inches to 6 feet in height(74) and wearing dark clothing.(75) The panel also noted that in another photograph by Willis, which was taken after the Presidential limousine had left Dealey Plaza, the figure standing behind the concrete wall had disappeared.(76) The panel concluded that that movement by the object was consistent with the presence of a human being.(77)

(26) The photographic evidence panel also noted that in the first Willis photograph, which shows the person standing behind the concrete wall, there is visible, near the region of the hands of the person at the wall, "a very distinct straight-line feature," which extends from lower right to upper right. (78) Nevertheless, because of the blur of the object in the photograph, the panel was not able to determine the actual length of the object and could not conclude whether it was or was not a weapon.(79)

(27) The committee interviewed Willis' daughter, Rose Mary Willis, on November 8, 1978, at her home in Dallas. Ms. Willis stated that she was present with her father and a sister in the area of the grass section of the plaza at the time of the Presidential motorcade on November 22, 1963.(80) Ms. Willis explained that as the President's car approached, she ran alongside the limousine almost to the triple underpass.(81)

(28) Ms. Willis stated that during that time, she noticed two persons who looked "conspicuous." (82) One was a man near the curb holding an umbrella, who appeared to be more concerned with opening or closing the umbrella than dropping to the ground like everyone else at the time of the shots.(83) The other was a person who was standing just behind the concrete wall near the triple underpass.(84) That person appeared to "disappear the next instant." (85) Ms. Willis further described the location of this person as the corner section of the white concrete wall between the area of photographer Abraham Zapruder's right side and the top of the concrete stairway leading up to the center of the grassy knoll.(86)

(29) Ms. Willis said she was aware of three shots being fired.(87) She gave no information on the direction or location of the shots, but stated that her father became upset when the policemen in the area appeared to run away from where he thought the shots came from: that is, they were running away from the grassy knoll.(88)

(30) Committee investigators also interviewed Ms. Willis' sister, Mrs. Linda Pites, on November 7, 1978, in Dallas. Mrs. Pites explained

that she was also present in the plaza at the time of the shots. (89) The only information she provided relevant to the shots was that she had a distinct impression that the head wound to President Kennedy was the result of a front-to-rear shot. (90) She also heard three shots and saw the President's head "blow up." (91)

(31) Mrs. Pites testified before the Warren Commission on July 22, 1964. (92) During her testimony, she said that she heard three shots and that she saw the President grab his throat after the first shot. (93) She was not asked by the Commission about any other activity she may have seen in the plaza at the time of the shots.

(32) Phillip Willis also testified before the Warren Commission on July 22, 1964. He had positioned himself on the curb in front of the Texas School Book Depository at the time the President's motorcade passed. (94) Willis stated that he took 12 pictures of the motorcade, including one of President Kennedy when he was first hit. (95) Willis said he was certain that three shots were fired and that they came from the direction of the depository. (96)

(33) During his testimony, Willis was asked if at the time of the shots he looked in the direction of the railroad tracks which go across the triple underpass. (97) Willis stated that he saw policemen and spectators there, but that he saw no evidence of shots coming from that area. (98) Willis was not asked during the testimony about his film, which shows a figure behind the concrete wall on the knoll.

III. ACCOUNTS OF PERSONS FLEEING FROM THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY

(34) Richard Randolph Carr stated to the FBI on January 4, 1964, that he saw a man looking out of a window on the top floor of the depository a few minutes before Carr heard shots. (99) He described the man as white, wearing a hat, tan sportcoat and glasses. (100) He said that at the time of the motorcade, he was standing on about the sixth floor of the new courthouse which was under construction at Houston and Commerce Streets. (101) Carr said that from that spot he could only see the top floor and roof of the depository building. (102) It was from that location that he observed the man in the depository window. (103) Carr said that after the shots he was going toward the direction of the triple underpass; when he got to the intersection of Houston and Commerce Streets, he saw a man whom he believed to be the same individual he had seen in the window of the depository. (104)

(35) Carr was not called to testify before the Warren Commission. He did testify on February 19, 1969, in the Parish County Criminal District Court in New Orleans in *State of Louisiana v. Clay L. Shaw*, a case involving charges of conspiring to assassinate President Kennedy. According to the transcript of his testimony, Carr stated that he saw the man in the fifth floor window of the Texas School Book Depository. (105) He said he later saw the man going down Houston Street; turning at Commerce Street. (106) Carr also described the hat worn by the man as felt and said his glasses were heavy-rimmed with heavy ear pieces. (107) He had on a tie and a tan sportcoat. (108)

As the man ran, he was continually looking over his shoulder as though he was being followed. (109)

(36) During his testimony at the Clay Shaw trial, Carr also reported seeing men in Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination who were not mentioned in the report of his FBI interview in January 1964. Carr was asked during the Shaw trial if he noticed any movement after the shots which seemed "unusual." (110) Carr then said that he saw a Rambler station wagon with a rack on top parked on the wrong side of the street, heading north and facing in the direction of the railroad tracks, next to the depository. (111)

(37) Carr said that immediately after the shots he saw three men emerge from behind the depository and enter the station wagon. (112) He gave a description of one of them: he was "real dark-complected" and appeared to be Spanish or Cuban; he drove the car away, going north on Houston Street. (113)

(38) During the Shaw trial testimony, Carr said he had reported this information to law enforcement officers and that someone had told him not to repeat this information. (114) At that point, defense counsel objected to hearsay by Carr, and no further details were elicited about the reported coercion of Carr, other than his statement that he did what the FBI told him to do, "I shut my mouth." (115)

(39) Committee investigators did not locate Richard Carr to discuss this information with him.

(40) James Richard Worrell also reported to the FBI on November 23, 1963, that he saw a man leaving the TSBD and running from the area after the shots. Worrell told the FBI that he saw the man leave the depository building and run in the opposite direction; at the time, Worrell said that he was running from Elm to Pacific Street along Houston. (116) He described the man as white, 5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 10 inches in height, with dark hair and wearing some type of jacket and dark clothing. (117) According to the FBI report, when Worrell later saw Lee Harvey Oswald on television that night, Worrell believed Oswald was the person he had seen running from the depository. (118)

(41) In an affidavit for the Dallas Police Department on November 23, 1963, Worrell also related seeing the man run from the depository in the opposite direction from Worrell. At that time, he said the man was wearing a dark shirt or jacket which was open down the front and that he did not have anything in his hands. (119)

(42) When Worrell testified before the Warren Commission on March 10, 1964, he said he was running along Houston Street when he saw the man "come bustling out of the door" of the depository. (120) At that time, Worrell described the man as 5 feet 7 inches to 5 feet 10 inches in height, weighing 155 to 165 pounds, in his early thirties, with brunette hair. (121) He was wearing a dark sports jacket, which was open, and light pants. (122) Worrell said the man came out of the "back entrance" of the depository building. (123)

(43) Richard Worrell died on November 5, 1966, in Dallas from severe head injuries sustained when his motorcycle went out of control. (124)

IV. ACCOUNTS OF PERSONS FLEEING DEALEY PLAZA

(44) After the assassination on November 22, 1963, Mrs. Jean Lollis Hill of Dallas gave a notarized statement to the sheriff's department regarding what she had seen in Dealey Plaza at the time the shots were fired at the motorcade. Mrs. Hill said that she was standing at the curb on the south side of Elm Street halfway to the triple underpass during the parade. (125) After the last shot was heard and the Presidential limousine sped away, Mrs. Hill looked up the hill of the grassy knoll and saw a man running toward the monument. (126) She said she began running toward the man; she was turned back by policemen who had arrived on the knoll when she got up to the railroad tracks. (127) In the sheriff's statement, there is no description or further details of the man seen by Mrs. Hill.

(45) An interview report dated November 23, 1963, by the FBI gave only this account for its total report on Mrs. Hill:

—Jean Hill, 9402 Bluff Creek, telephone EV 1-7419, stated that she on November 22, 1963, was standing on Elm Street in the vicinity of Texas School Book Depository observing the Presidential party composed of the President of the United States, his wife and Governor Connally of Texas, pass, and accompanying her was Mary Moorman, residing 2832 Ripplewood, telephone DA 1-9390, who with a camera took pictures of the Presidential party passing down the street.

—Jean Hill advised she heard something like a rifle shot and observed President Kennedy crumple in his seat in the automobile. She was standing nearby, as the vehicle was passing the spot where she stood at the time. (128)

(46) The FBI reinterviewed Mrs. Hill on March 13, 1964. In that report, Mrs. Hill was quoted as saying that after the shots she noticed a white man in a brown raincoat and a hat running west away from the depository in the direction of the railroad tracks. (129) The report states that Mrs. Hill said she was stopped by a motorcycle policeman and lost sight of the man. (130) It also states that she did not get a good look at the man, but that she described him as being of average height and heavy build. (131)

(47) According to that report, Mrs. Hill said that men who were either FBI or Secret Service agents were present later that afternoon when she was being questioned in the sheriff's office. (132) Mrs. Hill related that one of the men referred to a bullet hitting the ground near her feet; she told him she did not recall such an incident. (133) When she told the men that she had heard four to six shots, one of them said: "There were three shots, three bullets, that's enough for now." (134) The report states that despite that remark, Mrs. Hill said no law enforcement officers attempted to force opinions or statements from her. (135)

(48) Mrs. Hill testified before the Warren Commission 11 days after that FBI interview, on March 24, 1964. At that time, Mrs. Hill recounted again the events in Dealey Plaza at the time of the shots. As she discussed the reaction of the crowd to the shots, she volunteered that she saw a man "running, getting away or walking away or some-

thing—I would say he was running.” (136) She said the man was at the top of the slope near the west end of the depository building. She repeated that the man was wearing a brown raincoat. (137) She said her attention was drawn toward him because he was the only thing moving after the shots rang out. (138) Mrs. Hill also said that at the time she thought, “that’s the man that did it” and began running toward him. (139) She did not recollect seeing his hands and did not see a weapon. (140)

(49) Mrs. Hill testified that she ran up the hill toward the railroad tracks after the man. (141) She said when she got in the area of the railroad tracks, she lost sight of him. (142) At that point she thought she heard someone say: “It looks like he got away,” or words to that effect; she said that was consistent with the thought in her own mind that the man she saw running was involved in the assassination. (143)

(50) When Mrs. Hill was first asked during her Warren Commission testimony by Counsel Specter if she could give a description of the man she saw running, Mrs. Hill said she did not want to. She was concerned because she had earlier given statements that the man looked like Jack Ruby in build and thought this would be viewed as “using a figure and converting it to [her] story.” (144) Later in her testimony, Mrs. Hill said she had been bothered and laughed at because of the information she provided, specifically because she had once said she saw a dog on the seat in the limousine between President and Mrs. President (145) Nevertheless, she continued to say that the man was about Jack Ruby’s height and wasn’t any bigger than Jack Ruby in weight. (146) She said also at that time that the man had been wearing a brown hat. (147) She estimated that he was middle-aged, approximately 40 years old, and Caucasian. (148) When asked by Counsel Specter if she thought the man was in fact Jack Ruby, Mrs. Hill replied that she didn’t know. (149)

(51) Mrs. Hill explained in her testimony that when she mentioned to the law enforcement officers at the sheriff’s office that she had heard four to six shots, one of the men responded that he had also heard more than three shots, but that they had three wounds and three bullets, so they were not willing to say that more than three shots had been fired. (150) She repeated also at that time that a Secret Service man asked her about a bullet hitting the ground near her feet, but she had not seen a bullet hit the ground. (151) She said she was not coerced into any statements by the law enforcement officials. (152)

(52) Mrs. Hill said she had been contacted by Attorney Mark Lane a few weeks before her Warren Commission testimony. (153) Among the things she related to Lane was that she had been told by a man from the FBI or Secret Service not to mention the man she saw running in the area of the depository. (154) At that point in her testimony, Mrs. Hill also said that a reporter named Featherstone from the Dallas Times Herald had told her she was wrong about seeing a man running up the hill from the depository, and not to mention it on the air. (155) It was not further clarified in her Warren Commission testimony whether it was in fact law enforcement officers or the reporter, or both, who advised her not to mention again seeing the man running.

(53) Mrs. Hill said in her testimony that she had been reinterviewed by the FBI on about March 16 or 17, 1964 because of statements Mark

Lane had made about her when he testified before the Commission. (156) Mrs. Hill said she had talked to Lane about 4 or 5 weeks before; she said he took down correctly what she said, but that it was reported out of context because his account did not reflect his questions. (157) (54) Mark Lane had testified before the Commission on March 7, 1964. Lane gave this account in his testimony of information he had been given by Mrs. Hill of the events in Dealey Plaza:

—She said further that after the last shot was fired, she saw a man run from behind the general area of a concrete facade on that grassy knoll, and that he ran on to the triple overpass. (158)

(55) Mrs. Hill was not located by the committee.

(56) In another voluntary statement to the sheriff's department dated November 22, 1963, Jesse C. Price of Dallas was quoted as saying he also saw a man fleeing from the plaza after the assassination. Price said in his notarized statement that at approximately 12:35 p.m. on November 22, 1963, he was on the roof of the Terminal Annex Building and saw the Presidential motorcade proceeding west on Elm Street until it was a short distance from the overpass. (159) After hearing the volley of shots, Price saw a man run toward the passenger cars at the railroad siding. (160) In the sheriff's statement, Price described the man as about 25 years of age with long, dark hair. (161) He was wearing a white dress shirt with no tie and khaki-colored trousers. (162) Price said the man was carrying something in his hand and that it may have been a "head piece." (163)

(57) Price was interviewed by the FBI in Dallas on November 24, 1963. However, that report quotes Price only as saying he looked in the direction of the overpass at the time of the shots, but "saw nothing pertinent." (164)

(58) The committee learned that Jesse C. Price was deceased.

(59) Lee E. Bowers, Jr., reported to the FBI after the assassination on November 22, 1963, that he had observed three cars parked in the lot west of the depository building before the assassination. He said the first arrived at about 11:55 a.m.; it was a 1959 Oldsmobile station wagon, blue over white, with an out-of-State license plate consisting of six black numbers on a white background. (165) He noted that the car was extremely dirty. (166) There was one white male in it, who Bowers said could have been middle aged. (167) The second car arrived at about 12:15 p.m. (168) It was a 1957 Ford Tudor, black with a gold stripe on the sides, and had a Texas license plate. (169) Bowers said he thought the man in that second car was a police officer because he was talking into a radio telephone or radio transmitter in the car. (170) Bowers described him as white, about 30 years old. (171) The third car was a 1961 or 1962 white Chevrolet Impala four-door and it arrived at approximately 12:22 p.m. (172) Bowers said the license on the third car was like the out-of-State license on the first, with six black numbers on a white background. (173) That car, too, was very dirty. (174) The man in it was a white male about 30 years old, with long, dirty blond hair, wearing a plaid sports shirt. (175)

(60) Bowers told the FBI that after the shooting he did not see any of these cars in the parking lot. (176)

(61) Lee Bowers, Jr., testified before the Warren Commission on April 2, 1964, and gave the same account and descriptions of the three cars. (177) Nevertheless, in his Warren Commission testimony, Bowers also stated that the first car first drove in front of the depository, circled the area of the tower in the railroad yard "as if he were searching for a way out, or was checking the area," and then left at the Elm Street outlet. (178) Bowers stated also that he noticed the car had a "Goldwater" sticker on its bumper. (179) About 15 minutes later, Bowers noted the second car; it drove in front of the depository, cruised around the area for 3 or 4 minutes, and then left. (180) The third car appeared about 8 minutes before the President's motorcade; it circled the area and probed in the area of the tower, and then slowly cruised back in front of the depository, at which point Bowers lost sight of it. (181)

(62) Bowers testified that at the time of the motorcade on November 22, he was located in the Union Terminal Tower in the railroad yard. (182) When asked what people he noticed standing between the tower and Elm Street at the underpass on the high ground, Bowers stated that he saw two men standing within 10 or 15 feet of each other. (183) One of them was middle aged, heavy set, and was wearing a white shirt and dark trousers. (184) The other man was in his mid-twenties, wearing either a plaid shirt or a plaid jacket. (185) Bowers said those two men were directly in his line of vision toward the mouth of the underpass and appeared to be watching the progress of the motorcade. (186) Bowers said he saw the man in the white shirt standing there at the time of the shots, but that he could not see the younger man in the plaid clothing because of the trees, which made him harder to distinguish. (187)

(63) Bowers said that at that point a motorcycle officer ran up the incline toward the trees in the general area of where the two men were standing; Bowers said there was some kind of commotion at that place, but that he did not know what had happened. (188)

(64) The committee was told on November 11, 1978, by Bowers' parents that he died from injuries sustained in a car accident 3 years ago. (189) Mr. and Mrs. Bowers, Sr., were unable to provide any additional information about the events reported by their son; they mentioned that he was reticent by nature and told them practically nothing of what he had observed on November 22, 1963. (190)

(65) In a sheriff's department notarized statement dated November 23, 1963, Malcolm Summers of Dallas reported that he saw a car speeding from the area of the plaza immediately after the shots. (191) Summers stated that he was located on the terrace of the small park on Elm Street when the Presidential motorcade passed in front of him. (192) After the shots and the President's car had sped away, Summers went to the area of the railroad tracks because he "knew that they had somebody trapped up there." (193)

(66) After about 20 minutes, Summers returned to his truck, which was parked on Houston Street. (194) As he began to pull away from the curb, an automobile traveling in what Summers described as a "burst of speed" passed his truck on the right, which Summers thought was dangerous. (195) Summers said the car then slowed when it got in front of him, "as though realizing they would be conspicuous in speeding." (196)

(67) Summers said there were three men in the car; he described them as of slender build.(197) He said they appeared to be "excited" and were motioning to each other.(198) He described the car as a 1961 or 1962 Chevrolet sedan, which was maroon in color.(199) The car went across the Houston Street viaduct, turned off on Marsalis Street, and continued in the direction of Zangs Boulevard.(200) Summers said he did not believe he could identify the men again, but that he would recognize the car.(201)

(68) Summers was not called to testify before the Warren Commission. No FBI files concerning this information have been located. Summers was contacted by the committee on October 30, 1978. At that time, he confirmed the substance of the information provided to the sheriff's department and signed a statement indicating that the information was accurate and complete.(202)

(69) The Dallas County Sheriff's Department had also received another report of a car speeding from the direction of Dealey Plaza on the afternoon of November 22, 1963. In a report dated November 22, Deputy Sheriff Jack Watson reported that he had received information through the sheriff's office radio about the car. Watson reported that the Carrollton, Tex., Police Department called in that they had received a citizen's report that a car had been parked near the Harry Hines Circle for several days before November 22.(203) According to the information from the Carrollton police, "very shortly after the shooting" that car was seen traveling north on Harry Hines Boulevard "at a very high rate of speed."(204) The Carrollton police described the car as a red 1963 Chevrolet Impala with Georgia license plate 52J1033.(205) Watson's report stated that the information on that car was broadcast to all stations north.(206)

(70) The committee was unable to locate Jack Watson to get further details of the car report received by the Dallas County Sheriff's Department.

(71) According to an FBI report on the car with the Georgia license plate, the Dallas County Sheriff's Office had received the call on the radio between 1:54 and 2:11 p.m., and it reflected that the car had been spotted speeding along Harry Hines Boulevard just prior to that.(207) The FBI was advised on March 27, 1964, by its Atlanta office that the 1963 Georgia license 52J1033 was listed to J. C. Bradley of Twin City, Ga.(208) That license was issued for a four-door 1960 Chevrolet.(209)

(72) The owner of the car and license, James Cecil Bradley, was interviewed by special agents of the FBI on May 14, 1964. At that time Bradley informed the FBI that he owned a 1960 Belair Chevrolet.(210) The color of the car was not given, but Bradley stated that he has never owned a red 1963 Chevrolet Impala.(211) Bradley said that in August or September 1963 his 1963 license plate was stolen from his car as it was parked overnight with a flat tire on Highway 80 between Swainsboro and Twin City, Ga.(212) Bradley said that he reported the theft to law officers in Twin City and Swainsboro.(213)

(73) The FBI interviewed the friend who was with Bradley when Bradley returned to his car to repair the flat and noticed that the license plate was missing. That friend confirmed that the plate was in fact missing from the car and that he had advised Bradley to report it stolen.(214)

(74) Official records also confirmed the report by Bradley. Charles Oglesby, the chief of police in Twin City, Ga., stated to the FBI that he recalled Bradley reporting the stolen license tag some time in 1963.(215) According to records of the Georgia State Motor Vehicle Registration Bureau, the original 1963 license, 52J1033, was issued to Bradley on March 28, 1963, for a 1960 Chevrolet with the vehicle identification number 1619A154729.(216) A duplicate or replacement tag was issued to Bradley on September 10, 1963, for use on the same vehicle.(217)

(75) The committee has been unable to locate any further identification of the persons or car with whom that license was reported in Dallas on November 22, 1963.

(76) In an interview in Dallas with committee investigators on August 26, 1978, Tom Tilson reported that he saw a man running from the plaza immediately after the shots. Tilson stated that on November 22, 1963, he was off duty from his job as a Dallas Police Department patrolman.(218) At the time of the motorcade, he was driving east from Commerce Street and was approaching the triple underpass.(219) He had already heard the report on his police radio that there had been shooting at the motorcade and had seen the Presidential limousine travel at high speed from the underpass.(220) As he was in the area of the triple underpass, Tilson saw a man "slipping and sliding" down the embankment on the north side of Elm Street west of the underpass.(221) Tilson said the man appeared conspicuous because he was the only one running away from the plaza immediately after the shots.(222) Tilson said that because of his speed, the man rammed against the side of a "dark" car which was parked there.(223) Tilson said he then saw the man do something at the rear door portion of the car, like "throw something inside, then jump behind the wheel and take off very fast." (224)

(77) Tilson told the investigators that his 17 years of experience as a policeman, combined with the radio broadcast of the shooting and this conspicuous man, caused him to "give chase" to the man speeding away from the direction of the plaza. (225) He then saw the same "dark car" going south on Industrial Boulevard, and he followed it. (226) As the car approached a toll road toward Ft. Worth, Tilson was within 100 feet and called out the license number, make, and model to his daughter, Dinah, who was riding with him. She wrote it down on a slip of paper. (227)

(78) Tilson described the man as white, 38 to 40 years old, 5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 9 inches in height, with a round face. (228) Tilson said he had dark hair and was wearing dark clothing. (229) Tilson said he knew Jack Ruby, and the man looked enough like Jack Ruby to be his "twin." (230) That impression was so strong in Tilson's mind that he noted that Ruby showed a lot of "resourcefulness" in arranging to be identified in a newspaper office at the time of the assassination with a lot of influential witnesses. (231)

(79) Tilson said he called the homicide office of the police department and reported the information on the car that afternoon. (232) He said he never heard any more from the Dallas police homicide squad about his report. (233) Tilson said he kept the slip of paper with the information his daughter had written. (234) Nevertheless,

Tilson believes he threw it out about 3½ years ago when he discarded many items in his home upon the death of his wife. (235) Tilson explained that he never followed up on the report with the homicide squad because of his perception that the homicide office was run as a kind of "elite," which resented any encroachment on its authority. (236)

(80) The committee also examined the allegation that other men were in Dealey Plaza before the shots were fired at the motorcade, which was related by Julia Ann Mercer. Ms. Mercer gave statements concerning the men, including one who was carrying a gun case, to law officers right after the assassination. Ms. Mercer's report continued to receive much attention by writers, but has never been resolved. This committee has been unable to locate Ms. Mercer for further examination of the reports.

(81) In a sheriff's department notarized statement dated November 22, 1963, Ms. Mercer is quoted as saying that on November 22 she was driving in the area of the plaza going toward the overpass. (237) When she got to a point just east of the overhead sign for the right entrance road to the overpass, she noticed a truck parked on the right-hand side of the street with its hood up. (238) The truck was described as a green Ford pickup with a Texas license. (239) According to the sheriff's report, Ms. Mercer said the truck had a sign on the driver's side in black letters which said "Air conditioning." (240)

(82) In the report, Ms. Mercer was quoted further as saying that a white male, approximately 40 years of age, was "slouched" over the steering wheel. (241) He was described as heavy set, with light brown hair, and wearing a green jacket. (242)

(83) The statement also describes another man who was standing at the rear of the truck; he was reaching over the tailgate into the truck and took out what appeared to Mrs. Mercer to be a gun case. (243) She described the gun case as about 8 inches wide at its base, 3½ to 4 feet long, and 4 or 5 inches thick; it was brown. (244) The man walked up "the grassy hill which forms part of the overpass," and that was the last Mrs. Mercer saw of him. (245) As he walked up the hill with the gun case, the case appeared to become stuck momentarily in the grass. (246) She described the man as a white male, 20 to 30 years old, wearing a gray jacket, brown pants, and plaid shirt. (247) He had a wool stocking cap with a tassel on it. (248)

(84) In the statement, no time is given for the incident observed by Ms. Mercer. Nevertheless, she noted also that at that time three policemen were standing near a motorcycle on the overpass bridge. (249)

(85) In a letter to committee staff dated July 15, 1977, former New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison stated that he had interviewed Julia Mercer and transcribed corrections made by her to the purported notarized sheriff's statement. (250) According to the corrections on Garrison's copy of the statement, Ms. Mercer claimed she never said in the sheriff's statement that the truck had "air conditioning" written on its side, and the signature at the bottom of the statement was not hers. (251) Further, she never said that she did

not see the driver's face too clearly.(252) According to the corrections, Ms. Mercer said that she looked right in the man's face.(253) She also said that "this is why I was able to recognize him when I later saw him shoot Oswald on TV." (254) Garrison's copy included Ms. Mercer's signature at the bottom of the corrections.(255) The corrections were dated January 18, 1968.(256)

(86) In an FBI report dated November 23, 1963, Ms. Mercer was again quoted as giving the account of the truck parked near the knoll and of the two men she had described in the sheriff's report, including the same information of their physical descriptions and the gun case.(257) That report also stated that Ms. Mercer said the truck had the words "air conditioning" printed on the side.(258) The time given for the incident in the FBI report is 10:50 a.m. on November 22, 1963.(259)

(87) The copy of that FBI report provided to the committee by Jim Garrison also included corrections dated January 15, 1968, and the signature Julia Ann Mercer.(260) In the corrections, Ms. Mercer was quoted by Garrison as saying that she did not tell the FBI that there was writing on the truck; she stated that she told them in each interview that there was no writing on the truck.(261) Her corrections contain this statement:

—Furthermore, even before Ruby shot Oswald, when the FBI agents showed me pictures I selected Jack Ruby's picture as one of those which appeared to be the driver. When one of the agents turned the picture over I saw "Jack Ruby" on the back.(262)

On that statement, in the margin in the same handwriting as the Julia Ann Mercer signature, it says that it was on November 23, 1963, when she selected the photograph of Jack Ruby.(263)

(88) In another FBI report dated November 28, 1963, Ms. Mercer is said to have been shown a group of photographs in an FBI interview on November 27, 1963.(264) According to that report, Jack Ruby's photograph was among those viewed by Ms. Mercer.(265) The report states that Ms. Mercer could not identify any of those photographs as being the picture of the man she had reported seeing at the driver's wheel of the truck.(266) Regarding the picture of Jack Ruby, Ms. Mercer is quoted in the report as saying that the driver had a round face similar to Ruby's, but that she could not identify Ruby as that person.(267) The report also states that Ms. Mercer was shown a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald, and that she said the second man she had seen at the truck with the gun case was the same general build, size and age as Oswald, but that she could not identify Oswald as that man.(268)

(89) In the corrections taken by Garrison, with a Julia Ann Mercer signature dated January 15, 1968, Ms. Mercer is quoted as repeating that she had selected four photographs of the driver of the truck and that one of the photographs was a picture of Jack Ruby.(269) She stated again that she selected the picture of Ruby on November 23, 1963, the day before Ruby's murder of Oswald was shown on television.(270)

(90) Dallas Deputy Sheriff Roger Craig reported on November 23, 1963, that after the shots, he saw a man run down the grassy knoll and

get into a light-colored Rambler station wagon with a luggage rack on its roof.(271) Craig said in the report that his attention had been drawn to the man because he heard a shrill whistle.(272) The station wagon pulled up to the curb. Craig described the driver as a dark-complected white male.(273) There was no description of the man Craig reportedly saw running down the hill.(274) Craig said he tried to stop the car and talk with the two men, but was unable to reach it because of heavy traffic.(275)

(91) Craig said he immediately reported it to a Secret Service agent in the area.(276) Later that afternoon, Craig was told to come to city hall; he said that when he arrived at city hall he identified the "subject" they had in custody as the same person he saw running down the hill and entering the Rambler station wagon.(277)

(92) When Roger Craig testified before the Warren Commission on April 1, 1964, he repeated his account about the running man. Craig said that the man was in line with the southwest corner of the depository building, and he started to run toward Elm where it curves under the overpass.(278) Craig said the station wagon was driving "real slow" on Elm Street and that the driver was leaning to his right looking up the hill at the running man. (279)

(93) During his testimony, Craig described the man running down the hill as a white male in his twenties, 5 foot 8 inches to 5 foot 9 inches in height, with medium brown, sandy hair. (280) He was wearing medium blue trousers and a light tan shirt. (281)

(94) Craig described the driver of the car as very dark complected, with real short dark hair, Craig thought at first that he was Negro.(282) He was wearing a thin-looking white jacket like a wind-breaker. (283) Craig said he did not get a good look at the driver. (284)

(95) Craig said also that the car looked white and appeared to have a Texas license.(285)

(96) Roger Craig reportedly committed suicide on May 15, 1975. (286)

(97) Another person also reported seeing a Rambler station wagon in Dealey Plaza immediately after the shots. In an FBI interview on November 23, 1963, Marvin Robinson said that he was traveling west on Elm Street toward Houston Street after the assassination.(287) Just as he crossed the intersection of Elm and Houston and was in front of the depository, a light-colored Nash station wagon appeared before him.(288) He said the station wagon stopped, and he saw a white male come down the grassy hill between the building and the street and enter the station wagon.(289) The car then headed toward the Oak Cliff section of Dallas.(290) Robinson said he would not be able to furnish a description or identify the man who entered the station wagon.(291)

(98) Robinson did not testify before the Warren Commission, and he has not been located by the committee.

(99) The committee also attempted to pin down information about cars which were parked in the area of the depository at the time of the Presidential motorcade for any further identification of cars reported fleeing from Dealey Plaza.

(100) Earle V. Brown was a Dallas Police Department patrolman at the time of the assassination who was assigned to stay on the railroad overpass over the Stemmons Freeway and to prevent any unauthorized

persons from standing on the overpass at the time of the motorcade.(292) In his testimony before the Warren Commission, Brown stated that he and Officer James Lomax had been ordered after the assassination to return to the area of the depository and list the license number of all cars parked in the vicinity. (293) Brown was not asked during his testimony whether any further investigation resulted from the list of the license number or what had happened to the list.

(101) Brown was interviewed by the committee in Dallas on October 26, 1978. At that time, he recalled the assignment to get the license plate numbers about an hour after the assassination.(294) He said that about four to five officers were involved. (295) He believed he turned the list in to Sergeant Howard, who was his supervisor.(296) He gave no further details concerning the list or the cars parked near the Texas School Book Depository.

(102) During the interview with the committee, Brown also added that soon after the Presidential motorcade passed, after the last shot was heard, Brown saw a man run down the stairs on the west side of the depository and then turn north away from the front of the building. (297) Brown estimated that this occurred approximately 15 minutes after the shots.(298) He said he was not able to follow the path taken by the man because of an obstructed view.(299)

(103) Brown described the man to the committee as young, of medium size, fair complexion, and not having dark hair.(300) He said the man was dressed in light blue work pants and a shirt which was similar.(301) He did not see anything in the man's hands.(302)

(104) Brown was shown a picture of Dealey Plaza and the depository during the committee's interview.(303) At that time, he noted that his view of the west door would have been obscured by an add-on shed section of the building.(304) Investigation by the committee indicated that the section was added to the building prior to 1956.(305) There is a door there at the west side of the building, but the door is hidden by uncut bushes and trees; no determination was made of the age of the bushes and trees.(306) The doorway does face the trestle on which Brown was standing at the time of the assassination; the estimated distance to the trestle is approximately 500 yards.(307)

(105) Brown told the investigators that he had not mentioned seeing the man leaving the building when he testified before the Warren Commission because he had not been asked by the Commission counsel, and also because he was not able to identify the man as Lee Harvey Oswald, although the man was about Oswald's size.(308) Brown said he thought he had mentioned the incident to his wife and to his partner at the time, Officer Lomax.(309)

(106) Brown also mentioned that he had experienced an extrasensory perception premonition before the assassination about the President being shot by a rifle barrel protruding from a window in a brick wall.(310)

(107) The committee interviewed James Lomax in Dallas on October 27, 1978. Lomax had never been interviewed by any law enforcement officers or the Warren Commission about events in Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination. During his interview, Lomax gave no information about the assignment to list the license numbers of cars

parked in the area of the depository after the assassination. Lomax had no other information to report about persons fleeing from the depository or Dealey Plaza. When asked by committee investigators about Earle Brown's report of a man leaving the depository, Lomax stated that Brown never mentioned it to him and that he did not observe the reported incident.(311)

(108) The committee was unable to locate a list by the Dallas Police Department of cars parked near the depository or any other reports relating to cars leaving the area.

V. ACCOUNTS OF BULLETS HITTING IN THE PLAZA AREA

(109) In view of the acoustics analysis that points to more than three shots being fired at the Presidential motorcade, the committee undertook to examine evidence that other bullets did in fact strike in the plaza at the time of the fatal shots. The most useful analysis of this evidence would have, of course, included a trajectory analysis to determine the path of those "bullets" and, most significantly, the point from which they were fired, in order to determine the presence of other assassins. Nevertheless, based on the reports of those witnesses made soon after the assassination, insufficient data remained to conduct such a trajectory analysis. The experts engaged by the committee to determine the path of missiles in Dealey Plaza have explained that the minimal data required would include the path of the missile, as well as its point of impact.(312) In none of the information collected on the presence of other missiles in Dealey Plaza was that information complete. The committee, therefore, attempted to set the information out as completely as possible, even though it was not possible to conclude on the basis of the scant information remaining what those reports meant in reference to the presence of other gunmen in Dealey Plaza.

(110) In an FBI interview on November 24, 1963, Mrs. Virgie Baker (nee Rackley) reported that at the time she heard the first shot, she looked in the direction of the triple underpass and saw what she presumed to be a bullet bouncing off the pavement.(313) Mrs. Baker was located immediately across the street from the depository when she heard the shots.(314) She thought they came from the direction of the triple underpass.(315) In the FBI report, no further details or information were given by Mrs. Baker about the location or direction of the object she believed to be a bullet.

(111) Mrs. Baker testified before the Warren Commission on July 12, 1964. At that time, she stated that the object she believed to be a bullet hit the pavement in the street at the point of the Stemmons Freeway sign on Elm Street. (316) She said it hit in the middle of the lane on the other side of the street, which would have been the left-hand lane going in the direction of the triple underpass.(317) At first Mrs. Baker said the bullet hit behind the President's car. Then she said she could not remember whether it hit to either side or behind the President's car.(318) Mrs. Baker said she was sure she saw the object hit before she heard the second shot.(319)

(112) Committee investigators were unable to locate Mrs. Baker.

(113) In a sheriff's department notarized statement dated November 22, 1963, Royce Skelton stated that he also saw a bullet hit the

pavement in the left or middle lane, to the rear of the President's car. (320) Skelton gave this account of the sequence of events:

—We saw the motorcade come around the corner and I heard something which I thought was fireworks. I saw something hit the pavement at the left rear of the car, then the car got in the right hand lane and I heard two more shots. I heard a woman said "Oh no" or something and grab a man inside the car. I then heard another shot and saw the bullet hit the pavement. The pavement was knocked to the south away from the car. (321)

(114) In his Warren Commission testimony on April 8, 1964, Skelton said that he saw smoke rise from the pavement when the bullet hit.

(322) Skelton said also that the sound of the gunfire came from the area of the President's car. (323) Skelton said he was located on the overpass directly over Elm Street at the time of the motorcade. (324) He said the sound of the shots definitely did not come from where he was. (325) Skelton also offered that the smoke he saw rising from the cement when the bullet hit "spread" in a direction away from the depository; he said the "spray" of flying cement went toward the west. (326) On the photograph designated Skelton exhibit No. 1, Skelton marked where on the street he saw the bullet and in which direction he saw the "spray." (327)

(115) Committee investigators were unable to locate Royce Skelton.

(116) In testimony before the Warren Commission on July 22, 1964, James Thomas Tague of Dallas stated that at the time of the Presidential motorcade, he was located near his car at the bridge abutment of the triple underpass; Tague said the nose of his car was sticking out from underneath the underpass. (328) Tague said that during the shots he felt something sting him on the cheek; after the shots, a policeman noticed that Tague had blood on his cheek. (329)

(117) On Commission exhibit No. 354, Commission Counsel Liebelier placed a "6" on the photograph to indicate the place Tague was standing; it is described in Tague's testimony as approximately 3 to 4 feet from the concrete embankment of the bridge going over Main Street. (330) Tague said he and a police officer discovered a "fresh" bullet mark on the curb about 12 to 15 feet from the embankment. (331) Tague said the police officer attempted to go in the direction the mark on the curb seemed to indicate the shot had come from; he told Tague he had seen "something" there. (332) The letter "C" was placed on Commission exhibit No. 354 to indicate the spot the policeman had indicated as the "source" of the shot which hit the curb. (333) On the photograph, "C" is located in the area of the railroad tracks. Tague said he was not sure but that he thought he was hit on the cheek by the second or third bullet. (334)

(118) The piece of curb was examined by committee experts to determine if neutron activation analysis could determine the type of metal present at the scar, which might indicate what kind of bullet or missile hit the curb. Nevertheless the neutron activation analysis expert was unable to make any comparisons with the curb sample because it had previously been scraped by the FBI and the remaining metal was too small for testing purposes. (335) Also, it was felt that

the metal still left on the curb portion would have been too contaminated by cement material to yield any meaningful results. (336)

(119) During its acoustical reenactment of the assassination that took place in Dealey Plaza on August 20, 1978, the committee used the location of the mark on the curb described by James Tague as one of the "targets" at which ammunition was fired from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository and the grassy knoll to determine if acoustical impulses would result during the simulation which matched the acoustical impulses on the Dallas Police Department radio tape, made contemporaneously with the shots. The curb target spot used during the reenactment was described as follows:

* * * measurements used at the position were devised by measuring to the fifth curb stone slab on the south curb of Main Street. This is the slab known to have been removed by the FBI on August 5, 1964. (337)

That spot was designated target 4 during the reenactment. (338) Gunmen then fired at target 4 from the Texas School Book Depository and from the grassy knoll. (339) None of the acoustical impulses that resulted from the shots fired at target 4 during the reenactment matched the acoustical impulses on the original Dallas Police Department radio tape that contains the sound of actual gunfire at the time of the assassination. (340) That indicates that in all probability the mark on the curb was not made by a direct shot from either supposed assassin locations.

(120) When Richard Randolph Carr testified in the Kennedy assassination conspiracy trial of Clay Shaw in New Orleans on February 19, 1969, he stated that he heard a shot and then three more shots in succession at the time of the assassination. (341) When asked if he could tell where the shots came from, Carr replied that "the last three" came from behind the picket fence located at the top of the grassy knoll, and that one of the shots "knocked a bunch of grass up"; he could tell by the way the grass was "knocked up" that the bullet came from that area. (342) Trying further to pin down the supposed location of the shots he heard, Carr stated that the sound came from the end of the cement arcade at the top of the knoll which was closest to the underpass. (343) When asked if he could determine from the direction in which the bullet hit the ground which direction it was traveling in, Carr said that if the bullet had continued, it would have gone from the area of the picket fence in the direction of the Criminal Courts building. (344)

(121) On August 13, 1978, the committee received information that a person in Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, had noticed a bullet fall to the ground near the motorcade at the time of the shots. Charles Rodgers of Lake Dallas, Tex. called the committee to report that he was present in Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination with a friend, Mike Nally. (345) According to Rodgers, Nally's uncle was a motorcycle policeman riding in the motorcade. (346) The uncle had apparently related to his nephew that when the shots were fired, he heard a clanging noise on the fender of his motorcycle. (347) The policeman looked down and saw a .45 caliber slug roll off into the

street.(348) The policeman then had to leave the area quickly as the motorcade was speeding from the plaza.(349)

(122) Rodgers said the next day Mike Nally came to him and said Nally's uncle had instructed him not to report the story and Nally passed that instruction on to Rodgers.(350)

(123) Based on the data provided by Rodgers, the committee was unable to locate Nally or to identify Nally's uncle.

(124) On August 5, 1978, the committee received information from former Dallas policeman Starvis Ellis that Ellis had also seen a missile hit the ground in the area of the motorcade at the time of the assassination. Ellis said he rode on a motorcycle alongside the first car in the motorcade, approximately 100 to 125 feet in front of the car carrying President Kennedy.(351) Ellis said that just as he started down the hill of Elm Street, he looked back toward President Kennedy's car and saw debris come up from the ground at a nearby curb.(352) Ellis thought it was a fragment grenade.(353)

(125) Ellis said also that President Kennedy turned around and looked over his shoulder.(354) The second shot then hit him, and the third shot "blew his head up."(355)

VI. ACCOUNTS OF SMOKE IN DEALEY PLAZA AT THE TIME OF THE SHOTS

(126) Several witnesses have given statements that they saw "smoke" in the plaza that coincided with the gunfire. The committee considered these statements relevant to the question of whether a gunman or gunmen were located somewhere other than the depository.

(127) In a Dallas County Sheriff's Department notarized statement dated November 22, 1963, Austin Lawrence Miller stated that at the time he heard three shots and saw people in the Presidential limousine react, he saw "something which I thought was smoke or steam coming from a group of trees north of Elm off the railroad tracks."(356) At that time, Miller was standing on the bridge of the triple underpass.(357) Miller said he did not see anyone in the area of the railroad tracks.(358)

(128) Miller testified before the Warren Commission on April 8, 1964.(359) At that time, Miller was not asked about his prior statement to the sheriff's department and did not give information about the smoke he had earlier reported.

(129) The committee was unable to locate Austin Miller.

(130) In an FBI interview on March 17, 1964, Clemon Earl Johnson, of Dallas, stated that he saw smoke near the pavilion at the time of the shots.(360) According to the FBI interview report, Johnson told the FBI that he believed the smoke came from a motorcycle, which was abandoned near the spot by a Dallas policeman.(361) At the time of the shots, Johnson was located on the Elm Street viaduct overlooking the Presidential motorcade.(362)

(131) Johnson was not called to testify before the Warren Commission, and he was not located by the committee.

(132) In testimony before the Warren Commission on April 8, 1964, S. M. Holland stated that he was employed by the Union Terminal Railroad at the time of the assassination and was located in the middle of the overpass at the time of the Presidential motorcade.(363) Hol-

land stated that between the third and fourth shots, he saw smoke rising from the trees located at the top of the knoll:

There was a shot, a report, I don't know whether it was a shot. I can't say that. And a puff of smoke came out about 6 or 8 feet above the ground right out from under those trees. And at just about this location from where I was standing you could see that puff of smoke, like someone had thrown a firecracker, or something out, and that is just the way it sounded. It wasn't loud as the previous reports or shots. (364)

(133) In a report to the sheriff's department on November 22, 1963, Holland had also reported seeing the puff of smoke at the time of the shots. Nevertheless, in that statement, Holland placed the time of the puff of smoke as coinciding the first "noise":

* * * when they got just about to the Arcade I heard what I thought for the moment was a firecracker and he slumped over and I looked over toward the arcade and trees and saw a puff of smoke come from the trees and I heard three more shots after the first shot but that was the only puff of smoke I saw. I immediately ran around to where I could see behind the arcade and did not see anyone running from there. But the puff of smoke I saw definitely came from behind the arcade through the trees. (365)

(134) James L. Simmons, of Dallas, reported to the FBI that from his location on the Commerce Street viaduct he saw "exhaust fumes or smoke" near the embankment in front of the depository building. (366) In the FBI interview on March 17, 1964, Simmons said that after the shots he saw a policeman jump off his motorcycle and run up the hill of the knoll toward the Memorial Arches. (367) It is not clear from the report if Simmons was describing the smoke as coming from the motorcycle or someplace else.

(135) Nolan H. Potter was also employed by the Union Terminal Co. at the time of the assassination and was with Simmons at the time of the shots. (368) In an FBI interview on March 17, 1964, Potter said that he heard three shots, saw the President slump over in his car, and that he also saw smoke in front of the depository, which was rising from the trees. (369) Potter gave no other details about the location of the smoke. In the interview, Potter also mentioned seeing the policeman leave his motorcycle and run up the knoll. (370) but he did not describe the smoke as being in the area of the motorcycle.

(136) Neither Simmons nor Potter testified before the Warren Commission.

(137) Based on the statements of these witnesses, if the smoke they reported was in fact the result of gunfire, it would have originated in the area of the top of the grassy knoll. There is no way of determining what type of ammunition was used in that "gunfire" so that it can be stated conclusively whether the smoke seen by the witnesses is consistent with smoke produced by the type of ammunition used in any gunfire from the knoll. Nevertheless, a firearms expert engaged by the committee explained that irrespective of the exact type of ammunition used, it would be possible for witnesses to have seen smoke if a gun

had been fired from that area. According to the expert, both "smokeless" and smoke-producing ammunition may leave a trace of smoke that would be visible to the eye in sunlight. (371) That is because even with smokeless ammunition, when the weapon is fired, nitrocellulose bases in the powder which are impregnated with nitroglycerin may give off smoke, albeit less smoke than black or smoke-producing ammunition. (372) In addition, residue remaining in the weapon from previous firings, as well as cleaning solution which might have been used on the weapon, could cause even more smoke to be discharged in subsequent firings of the weapon. (373)

Submitted by:

Ms. SURELL BRADY,
Staff Counsel.

REFERENCES

(1) FBI report, Dec. 6, 1963, contained in Warren Commission Exhibit 2089, pp. 35-36, in Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), volume 24, p. 524 (hereinafter Warren Report Hearings).

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid.

(8) Ibid.

(9) Ibid.

(10) FBI report, Dec. 5, 1963, contained in Warren Commission Doc. No. 7 (JFK Doc. No. 013074).

(11) Ibid.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Ibid.

(14) Ibid.

(15) Ibid.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Ibid.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Testimony of Arnold Louis Rowland, Mar. 10, 1964, 2 Warren Report Hearings, 168.

(21) Id. at p. 169.

(22) Ibid.

(23) Ibid.

(24) Id. at p. 170.

(25) Ibid.

(26) Ibid.

(27) Id. at p. 171.

(28) Id. at p. 172.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Ibid.

(31) Ibid.

(32) Ibid.

(33) Id. at p. 173.

(34) Id. at p. 175.

(35) Ibid.

(36) Ibid.

(37) Ibid.

(38) Id. at p. 176.

(39) Ibid.

(40) Ibid.

(41) Ibid.

- (42) Interview of Arnold Rowland by Wallace Heitman, FBI report, Nov. 23, 1963.
- (43) Ibid.
- (44) Ibid.
- (45) Ibid.
- (46) Ibid.
- (47) Interview of Arnold Rowland by J. Calvin Rice and John V. Almon, FBI report, Nov. 23, 1963.
- (48) Ibid.
- (49) Ibid.
- (50) FBI affidavit of Arnold Rowland, witnessed by Paul E. Wolff and James W. Swinford, Nov. 24, 1963.
- (51) Ibid.
- (52) Ibid.
- (53) Ibid.
- (54) Ibid.
- (55) Ibid.
- (56) Ibid.
- (57) Ibid.
- (58) Testimony of Roger D. Craig, Apr. 1, 1964. 6 Warren Report Hearings, p. 263.
- (59) Ibid.
- (60) Ibid.
- (61) Id. at p. 264.
- (62) Ibid.
- (63) Ibid.
- (64) Ibid.
- (65) Ibid.
- (66) Id. at p. 265.
- (67) Ibid.
- (68) Voluntary statement of Arnold Louis Rowland, Sheriff's Department, Dallas County, Nov. 22, 1963.
- (69) Ibid.
- (70) Ibid.
- (71) Ibid.
- (72) Scientific report of Photographic Evidence Panel, par. 293-302.
- (73) Ibid., par. 292.
- (74) Ibid., par. 301.
- (75) Ibid., par. 295.
- (76) Ibid., par. 301.
- (77) Ibid.
- (78) Ibid., par. 302.
- (79) Ibid.
- (80) Staff interview of Rose Mary Willis, Nov. 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 013056).
- (81) Ibid.
- (82) Ibid.
- (83) Ibid.
- (84) Ibid.
- (85) Ibid.
- (86) Ibid.
- (87) Ibid.
- (88) Id. at p. 2.
- (89) Staff interview of Mrs. Linda Pites, Nov. 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 002559).
- (90) Ibid.
- (91) Ibid.
- (92) Testimony of Linda Kay Willis, July 22, 1964, 7 Warren Report Hearings, p. 498.
- (93) Ibid.
- (94) Testimony of Phillip L. Willis, July 22, 1964, 7 Warren Report Hearings, p. 493.
- (95) Ibid.
- (96) Id. at p. 496.
- (97) Id. at p. 497.
- (98) Ibid.

(99) FBI interview of Richard Randolph Carr by SA John T. Kesler and Vernon Mitchem, FBI report, Jan. 14, 1964, file no. DL 100-10461.

(100) Ibid.

(101) Ibid.

(102) Id. at p. 2.

(103) Id. at p. 1.

(104) Ibid.

(105) Transcript of proceedings, *State of Louisiana v. Clay L. Shaw*, district court, Orleans Parish, New Orleans, Feb. 19, 1969 (JFK Doc. No. 002028), p. 4.

(106) Ibid.

(107) Id. at p. 11.

(108) Ibid.

(109) Id. at p. 18.

(110) Id. at p. 17.

(111) Ibid.

(112) Ibid.

(113) Id. at pp. 17-18.

(114) Id. at pp. 18-19.

(115) Id. at p. 20.

(116) FBI interview of James Richard Worrell, FBI report by SA Louis M. Kelley, Oct. 26, 1964, file No. DL 89-43.

(117) Ibid.

(118) Ibid.

(119) Affidavit of James Richard Worrell, Jr., Nov. 23, 1963 (JFK Doc. No. 003641).

(120) Testimony of James Richard Worrell, Jr., 2 Warren Report Hearings, p. 194.

(121) Id. at p. 196.

(122) Ibid.

(123) Id. at p. 200.

(124) Certificate of death of James Richard Worrell, Jr., Dallas, Tex., Nov. 7, 1966 (JFK Doc. No. 009219).

(125) Voluntary statement of Jean Hill, Dallas County Sheriff's Department, Nov. 22, 1963, Decker exhibit No. 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p. 479.

(126) Ibid.

(127) Ibid.

(128) Interview of Jean Hill, FBI report by SA Robert C. Lish, Nov. 23, 1963, file no. DL 89-43.

(129) Interview of Jean Hill, Mar. 17, 1964, FBI report by SA E. J. Robertson and Thomas T. Trettis, file no. DL 89-43, p. 2.

(130) Ibid.

(131) Ibid.

(132) Ibid.

(133) Ibid.

(134) Ibid.

(135) Ibid.

(136) Testimony of Jean Lollis Hill, Mar. 24, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, p. 210.

(137) Id. at p. 211.

(138) Ibid.

(139) Ibid.

(140) Ibid.

(141) Id. at p. 213.

(142) Ibid.

(143) Ibid.

(144) Id. at p. 212.

(145) Id. at p. 214.

(146) Ibid.

(147) Id. at p. 215.

(148) Ibid.

(149) Ibid.

(150) Id. at p. 221.

(151) Ibid.

(152) Ibid.

- (153) Id. at p. 217.
- (154) Id. at p. 221.
- (155) Id. at p. 222.
- (156) Id. at p. 217.
- (157) Ibid.
- (158) Testimony of Mark Lane, Mar. 7, 1964, 2 Warren Report Hearings, p. 42.
- (159) Voluntary statement of J. C. Price, Dallas County Sheriff's Department, Nov. 22, 1963, contained in Decker exhibit, No. 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p. 492.
- (160) Ibid.
- (161) Ibid.
- (162) Ibid.
- (163) Ibid.
- (164) FBI interview of Jesse C. Price, FBI report by SA J. Calvin Rice and Alfred D. Neeley, Nov. 25, 1963, file No. DL 89-43.
- (165) FBI interview of Lee E. Bowers, Jr., FBI report by SA Robert M. Barrett and John V. Almon, Nov. 22, 1963, file No. DL 89-43.
- (166) Ibid.
- (167) Ibid.
- (168) Ibid.
- (169) Ibid.
- (170) Ibid.
- (171) Ibid.
- (172) Ibid.
- (173) Ibid.
- (174) Ibid.
- (175) Ibid.
- (176) Ibid.
- (177) Testimony of Lee E. Bowers, Jr., Apr. 2, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, pp. 285-286.
- (178) Id. at p. 285.
- (179) Ibid.
- (180) Id. at p. 286.
- (181) Ibid.
- (182) Id. at p. 284.
- (183) Id. at p. 287.
- (184) Ibid.
- (185) Ibid.
- (186) Ibid.
- (187) Id. at p. 288.
- (188) Ibid.
- (189) Staff interview of Mr. and Mrs. Lee E. Bowers, Sr., Nov. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 014354).
- (190) Ibid.
- (191) Voluntary statement of Malcolm Summers, Dallas County Sheriff's Department, Nov. 23, 1963, Decker exhibit 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p. 500.
- (192) Ibid.
- (193) Ibid.
- (194) Ibid.
- (195) Ibid.
- (196) Ibid.
- (197) Ibid.
- (198) Ibid.
- (199) Ibid.
- (200) Ibid.
- (201) Ibid.
- (202) Statement of Malcolm Summers, Oct. 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 014277).
- (203) Supplementary investigation report, Dallas County Sheriff's Department, Decker exhibit No. 5232, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p. 523.
- (204) Ibid.
- (205) Ibid.
- (206) Ibid.

- (207) FBI report, serial No. 105-82555-4354x, p. 185.
- (208) Id. at p. 186.
- (209) Ibid.
- (210) Id. at p. 187.
- (211) Ibid.
- (212) Ibid.
- (213) Ibid.
- (214) Id. at p. 188.
- (215) Ibid.
- (216) Id. at p. 189.
- (217) Ibid.
- (218) Staff interview of Tom G. Tilson, Jr., Aug. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JKF Doc. No. 011374).
- (219) Ibid.
- (220) Id. at p. 2.
- (221) Id. at p. 1.
- (222) Ibid.
- (223) Ibid.
- (224) Ibid.
- (225) Id. at p. 2.
- (226) Ibid.
- (227) Ibid.
- (228) Id. at pp. 2-3.
- (229) Id. at p. 3.
- (230) Ibid.
- (231) Ibid.
- (232) Id. at p. 2.
- (233) Ibid.
- (234) Id. at p. 3.
- (235) Ibid.
- (236) Ibid.
- (237) Voluntary statement of Julia Ann Mercer, Dallas County Sheriff's Department, Nov. 22, 1963, Decker exhibit 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p. 483.
- (238) Ibid.
- (239) Ibid.
- (240) Ibid.
- (241) Ibid.
- (242) Ibid.
- (243) Ibid.
- (244) Ibid.
- (245) Ibid.
- (246) Ibid.
- (247) Id. at pp. 283-284.
- (248) Id. at p. 284.
- (249) Id. at p. 283.
- (250) Letter from Jim Garrison to Jonathan Blackmer and enclosures, July 15, 1977 (JFK Doc. No. 002967).
- (251) Id. at p. 10.
- (252) Ibid.
- (253) Ibid.
- (254) Ibid.
- (255) Ibid.
- (256) Ibid.
- (257) FBI interview of Julia Ann Mercer, Nov. 23, 1963, Warren Commission Doc. No. CD 205, p. 8 (JFK Doc. No. 002967).
- (258) Ibid.
- (259) Ibid.
- (260) Ibid.
- (261) Ibid.
- (262) Ibid.
- (263) Ibid.

- (264) FBI interview of Julia Ann Mercer, Nov. 28, 1963, p. 9, (JFK Doc. No. 002967).
- (265) Ibid.
- (266) Ibid.
- (267) Ibid.
- (268) Ibid.
- (269) Ibid.
- (270) Ibid.
- (271) Supplementary investigation report by Roger Craig, Dallas County Sheriff's Department, Nov. 23, 1963, Decker exhibit No. 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p. 524.
- (272) Ibid.
- (273) Ibid.
- (274) Ibid.
- (275) Ibid.
- (276) Ibid.
- (277) Ibid.
- (278) Testimony of Roger D. Craig, Apr. 1, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, p. 266.
- (279) Ibid.
- (280) Ibid.
- (281) Ibid.
- (282) Ibid.
- (283) Ibid.
- (284) Id. at p. 267.
- (285) Ibid.
- (286) Dallas Police Department homicide report, May 15, 1975, as quoted in "Assassination of JFK by Coincidence or Conspiracy?" Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., New York, Zebra Books, 1977, p. 449, fn. 98.
- (287) FBI Interview of Marvin Robinson, FBI report by SA John V. Almon and J. Calvin Rice, Nov. 23, 1963, file No. DL 89-43 (JFK Doc. No. 013840).
- (288) Ibid.
- (289) Ibid.
- (290) Ibid.
- (291) Ibid.
- (292) Testimony of Earle V. Brown, Apr. 7, 1964, 5 Warren Report Hearings, p. 231.
- (293) Id. at p. 234.
- (294) Staff interview of Earle V. Brown, Oct. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 00634).
- (295) Ibid.
- (296) Ibid.
- (297) Id. at p. 2.
- (298) Ibid.
- (299) Ibid.
- (300) Ibid.
- (301) Ibid.
- (302) Ibid.
- (303) Id. at p. 3.
- (304) Ibid.
- (305) Ibid.
- (306) Ibid.
- (307) Ibid.
- (308) Id. at p. 2.
- (309) Ibid.
- (310) Id. at p. 3.
- (311) Staff interview of James A. Lomax, Nov. 17, 1979, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 014352).
- (312) See scientific report of the photographic evidence panel, trajectory analysis, par. 110.
- (313) FBI interview of Virgie Rackley, FBI report by SA Bardwell Odum and Joseph G. Peggs, Nov. 25, 1963, file No. DL 89-43, Warren Commission Doc. No. 5.
- (314) Ibid.
- (315) Ibid.

(316) Testimony of Mrs. Donald Baker, July 22, 1964, 7 Warren Report Hearings, p. 509.

(317) Id. at p. 510.

(318) Ibid.

(319) Id. at p. 513.

(320) Voluntary statement of Royce Glenn Skelton, Dallas County Sheriff's Department, Nov. 22, 1963, Decker exhibit No. 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p. 496.

(321) Ibid.

(322) Testimony of Royce G. Skelton, Apr. 8, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, p. 237.

(323) Ibid.

(324) Id. at p. 236.

(325) Id. at p. 237.

(326) Id. at p. 238.

(327) Id. at p. 239.

(328) Testimony of James Thomas Tague, July 23, 1964, 7 Warren Report Hearings, p. 553.

(329) Ibid.

(330) Id. at p. 554.

(331) Ibid.

(332) Ibid.

(333) Ibid.

(334) Id. at p. 555.

(335) A report to the House Select Committee on Assassinations on the subject of 1977 neutron activation analysis measurements on bullet-lead specimens involved in the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy, by Dr. Vincent P. Guinn, Ph. D., Sept. 1978, pp. 7-9.

(336) Id. at p. 9.

(337) Staff memorandum re Dealey Plaza test shooting on Aug. 20, 1978, Aug. 22, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Doc. No. 013285).

(338) Ibid.

(339) Id. at p. 6.

(340) Report of Bolt Beranek & Newman, Inc., analysis of recorded sounds relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (No. 3947), section 5.3. The acoustics experts compared the results of the test firings in Dealey Plaza on Aug. 20, 1978, with the acoustical impulses on the original Dallas Police Department radio tape to determine what correlation coefficients exist between the two sets of impulses. From that correlation, the acoustics study determined that none of the impulses from target 4 were consistent with the known location of the Presidential limousine at the time of the shots, which would mean that the alleged assassins would not have been aiming at the limousine at all, but in the opposite direction, to have produced the acoustical impulse which would have matched that which was produced during the acoustical reenactment.

(341) See ref. 105, p. 12.

(342) Id. at pp. 12-13.

(343) Id. at p. 16.

(344) Id. at p. 32.

(345) Telephone interview of Charles Rodgers, House Select Committee on Assassinations staff outside contact report, Aug. 13, 1978 (JFK Doc. No. 010697).

(346) Ibid.

(347) Ibid.

(348) Ibid.

(349) Ibid.

(350) Ibid.

(351) Staff investigator rough notes, of staff interview of Starvis Ellis, Aug. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 013841).

(352) Ibid.

(353) Ibid.

(354) Ibid.

(355) Ibid.

(356) Voluntary statement of Austin Lawrence Miller, Dallas County Sheriff's Department, Nov. 22, 1963, Warren Commission exhibit 2003 (p. 41), 24 Warren Report Hearings, p. 217.

(357) Ibid.

(358) Ibid.

(359) Testimony of Austin L. Miller, Apr. 8, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, p. 223.

(360) FBI interview of Clemon Earl Johnson, FBI report by SA Thomas T. Trettis and E. J. Robertson, Mar. 18, 1964, Warren Commission exhibit no. 1422, 22 Warren Report Hearings, p. 836.

(361) Ibid.

(362) Ibid.

(363) Testimony of S. M. Holland, Apr. 8, 1964, 6 Warren Report Hearings, pp. 239, 242.

(364) Id. at pp. 243-244.

(365) Voluntary statement of S. M. Holland, Dallas County Sheriff's Department, Nov. 22, 1963, Decker exhibit No. 5323, 19 Warren Report Hearings, p. 480.

(366) FBI interview of James L. Simmons, FBI Report by SA Thomas T. Trettis and E. J. Robertson, Mar. 19, 1964, file No. DL 100-10461 (contained in JFK Doc. No. 013291).

(367) Ibid.

(368) Ibid.

(369) FBI interview of Nolan H. Potter, FBI report by SA Thomas T. Trettis and E. J. Robertson, Mar. 19, 1964, file No. DL 100-10461, Warren Commission exhibit 1418 (contained in JFK Doc. No. 013291).

(370) Ibid.

(371) Telephone interview of Monty Lutz, Wisconsin Crime Laboratories, Dec. 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations staff outside contact report (JFK Doc. No. 013637).

(372) Ibid.

(373) Ibid.

OSWALD-TIPPIT ASSOCIATES

—

Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session

—

March 1979

CONTENTS

	Paragraph
Foreword -----	(1)
I. Approach -----	(2)
II. Marie Tippit Thomas -----	(7)
III. Murray James Jackson -----	(8)
IV. William Anglin -----	(9)
V. Morris Brumley -----	(10)
VI. Basil Robinson -----	(11)
VII. Calvin Owens -----	(12)
VIII. Mrs. Johnnie Maxie Witherspoon -----	(13)
IX. Mary Ada Dowling -----	(14)
X. The Wise allegation -----	(15)
XI. Austin's barbeque -----	(39)

FOREWORD

(1) Even though the Warren Commission indicated that no credible evidence was found proving that Lee Harvey Oswald and Dallas Police Officer J. D. Tippit knew one another prior to the assassination, speculation has continued over the years about the circumstances of Tippit's murder on the afternoon of November 22, 1963. This speculation has grown because of the circumstances surrounding Tippit's death: Questions have persisted about why Oswald would have been in that neighborhood, including, had Tippit received enough information on the suspected assassin of President Kennedy to have been able to identify Oswald as the possible suspect, and was there anything suspicious about Tippit's location in that part of Dallas after the assassination, when other police officers had been ordered to the Dealey Plaza area or Parkland Hospital immediately after the assassination?

I. APPROACH

(2) Because there was little direct evidence to answer any of these questions, the committee concluded that the most effective way to learn if Oswald and Tippit knew one another would be to investigate the associates of the two men. Over the years, rumors have persisted that Oswald and Tippit were seen together at various public places. No effective way to investigate or verify those claims exists because of the passage of time and the general unreliability of such identifications.

(3) On the other hand, the committee concluded that if the two men had any associates in common, the fact of that association could be more easily discerned and might shed light on the nature of the relationship, if any, between the two.

(4) The committee undertook to compile the names of the associates and relatives of Lee Harvey Oswald and J. D. Tippit. Each associate interviewed was asked for the names of other persons each man was known to have associated with closely. Special attention was paid to the possibility of "overlaps" on the two lists, that is, persons who appeared to be associates of both men. After the lists were compiled, the committee requested data on each associate from the following Government agencies: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Secret Service and, where appropriate, Departments of Defense and State.

(5) On the basis of the initial investigation of the associates of each man and the review of the Agency files, further investigation was conducted where warranted either to clarify a relationship or probe a possible association.

(6) No relative or associate of J. D. Tippit had been called to testify before the Warren Commission about Tippit's associations or activities. Despite the fact that confusion existed even at the time of the Warren Commission about the transcriptions of the Dallas Police

Department radio dispatches that contained information about Tippit's location and activities on the afternoon of November 22, 1963, none of the police officers with whom Tippit worked were called to testify about the details of his assignment in Oak Cliff. (1) The committee interviewed nine persons who were reported to have had close personal and working relationships with Tippit.

II. MARIE TIPPIT THOMAS

(7) Tippit's widow, Marie Tippit Thomas, reported in an interview to the FBI in May 1964 that her husband's only associates were fellow police officers. (2) She stated that her social life with him involved the families and wives of many of those same officers. (3) Mrs. Thomas was interviewed by the committee on October 12, 1977. (4) At that time, she could provide no new information about Tippit's associates. She did mention that Tippit's closest friend had been Bill Anglin, another Dallas police officer who lived a few houses away on Glencairn Street in Dallas. (5) She further stated that his other close friends were Charlie Harrison, Bud Owens, and Richard Stovall. Mrs. Thomas also repeated her earlier information that Tippit had been employed at the time of the assassination part-time at Austin's Barbeque in Dallas. (6) Tippit worked as a security guard at the restaurant on Friday and Saturday nights from 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. (7)

III. MURRAY JAMES JACKSON

(8) The committee interviewed members of the Dallas Police Force who were purported to have been personal associates of J. D. Tippit. The first of these was Murray James Jackson. Jackson was working the dispatch system on the Dallas police radio when Tippit was killed. (8) Jackson reported to the committee that he had worked with and come to know J. D. Tippit very well over a 20-year period. (9) He stated that they "socialized when off duty". (10) Officer Jackson is the officer who was responsible for having sent Tippit into the Oak Cliff area according to the transmissions from the dispatches. (11)

IV. WILLIAM ANGLIN

(9) The committee also contacted William Anglin. Anglin indicated that he socialized with J. D. Tippit. (12) He said in the interview that "he and J. D. had coffee or tea at 'The Old Drive-In' " about 11:30-11:45 on the morning of November 22. (13)

V. MORRIS BRUMLEY

(10) Another of Tippit's associates who was spoken to was Morris Brumley. Brumley had known Tippit since 1934 when they attended school in Fulbright, Tex. (14) Brumley indicated that he had no information concerning the outside interests, associates, or attitudes of J. D. Tippit. (15) Brumley described Tippit as a good family man and conscientious in his work but not very sharp. (16) Brumley stated that Basil Robinson, another Dallas police officer assigned to the Oak Cliff section was also a good friend of Tippit's. (17)

VI. BASIL ROBINSON

(11) Basil Robinson was another member of the Dallas Police Department who had a rather long association with J. D. Tippit. Tippit's acquaintance with Robinson dated back to the Tippit stay at Bogata, Tex.(18) When interviewed by the FBI, Robinson indicated that he had been a "close personal friend" of Tippit and his family.(19) He said that Tippit had few outside interests because he was working all the time.(20)

VII. CALVIN OWENS

(12) Sergeant Calvin Owens was Tippit's immediate supervisor at the Dallas Police Department. (21) When questioned by the FBI, Owens indicated that Tippit was strictly a family man. He also said that he knew of no associates of Tippit's except members of the police force.(22)

VIII. MRS. JOHNNIE MAXIE WITHERSPOON

(13) Committee investigators also interviewed Mrs. Johnnie Maxie Witherspoon.(23) Mrs. Witherspoon stated that she became acquainted with Officer Tippit during his employment at Austin's Bar-beque.(24) Mrs. Witherspoon informed the committee that she and Tippit engaged in a relationship and started dating for a couple of years.(25) She said that the relationship ended in the summer of 1963 when her husband returned home.(26) She also indicated that Bill Anglin was an associate of J. D. Tippit's.(27)

IX. MARY ADA DOWLING

(14) One other person who was interviewed about Tippit was Mary Ada Dowling, a waitress for the Dobbs House Restaurant on North Beckley Street. She indicated to the FBI that Tippit had a habit of coming into the Dobbs House each morning.(28) She also indicated that on one occasion when Tippit was in the restaurant, Lee Harvey Oswald came in to be served.(29) She did not know if they knew each other.(30)

X. THE WISE ALLEGATION

(15) The committee also learned of an allegation about the assassination involving an associate and friend of J. D. Tippit's which was not reported in the Warren Commission Report. Interviews were conducted by the FBI in December 1963 about that allegation, and were furnished to the Warren Commission, but the substance of those interviews was not included in the report made public by the Commission. (16) In February 1977, the committee received information from Wes Wise, a reporter with KRLD-TV in Dallas at the time of the assassination and later mayor of Dallas, that he had received information about a car near the scene of the Tippit shooting that was traced to Carl Mather, a close friend of Tippit's. According to Wise, on December 4, 1963, he was giving a speech at the El Chico Restaurant in the Oak Cliff section of Dallas.(31) After the subject of the speech had turned to events surrounding the assassination, a man in the audience named Pate approached Wise and said a mechanic who worked

for Pate had observed a car in the parking lot of the El Chico Restaurant on the afternoon of November 22 after radio reports were being broadcast about the shooting in Dealey Plaza.(32)

(17) Wise went to Pate to discuss the story with the mechanic.(33) The mechanic told Wise that after the assassination there were sirens blaring and police cars "all over the area" near the garage.(34) He noticed a man sitting in an irregularly parked car in the restaurant parking lot; the car was slightly hidden by a billboard.(35) The man in the car appeared to be hiding, according to the mechanic.(36) All of the circumstances seemed so suspicious that the mechanic went across the street to get a better look.(37) When he was about 10 or 15 yards from the car, the man turned around.(38) The mechanic was able then to get a good look at his face; he saw also that the man was wearing a white T-shirt.(39) He made a note of the license number of the car.(40)

(18) When the mechanic saw news accounts of the assassination that night on television, he saw Lee Harvey Oswald and recognized him as being the man he had seen in the car that afternoon.(41) The mechanic had been afraid of reporting the incident.(42) Nevertheless, after Pate brought Wise to meet him, Wise was able to convince the mechanic that he should report the incident to the FBI.(43) The mechanic took with him the notepaper on which he had jotted the license number.(44)

(19) Wise stated also that he later took employees of CBS to meet the owner of the license number.(45) Wise said that during that meeting, which was arranged as a dinner between the owner and his wife and the person from CBS, the man appeared "so upset" and "agitated" that he was unable to eat.(46) At that time, the man explained his nervousness was due to the odd "coincidence" that a car with his license plate number was noticed under the suspicious circumstances and that he was a friend of Tippit, who had been killed at almost the same time very nearby.(47)

(20) Wise told the committee that he jotted down the information he received from Pate and the mechanic on a piece of paper he was carrying in his pocket at the time of his speech at the El Chico Restaurant.(48) He turned that paper over to the committee. Wise also told the committee that he thought he was still in possession of the slip of paper containing the license number that had been written by the mechanic. Wise told the committee that after several attempts he has been unable to locate that slip of paper among his records at his home.(49)

(21) The license number appearing on the paper provided by Wise from his conversation with Pate and the mechanic was Texas license PP 4537. The car was only described on the paper as a 1957 Plymouth 4-door, with no further description.(50)

(22) The FBI interviewed Wes Wise about this allegation on December 4, 1963. At that time, Wise said the mechanic, whom he refused to identify for the FBI, claiming he did not want to reveal the identity of his source, told him the car he saw in the restaurant parking lot was a red 1957 Plymouth with the license PP 4537.(51)

(23) In an FBI report dated December 14, 1963, Milton Love of the Dallas County Tax Office advised that the 1963 Texas license PP 4537

was issued for a 1957 Plymouth automobile in the possession of Carl Amos Mather, 4309 Colgate Street, Garland, Tex.(52) In a report dated December 14, 1963, FBI Special Agent Charles T. Brown reported that he observed a 1957 Plymouth with 1963 Texas license PP 4537 parked in the driveway of the house at 4309 Colgate Street, Garland, Tex.(53) Brown reported that that car was light blue over medium blue in color.(54)

(24) Mrs. Carl A. Mather was interviewed by FBI Agent Charles T. Brown on December 5, 1963, at the Mather home at 4303 Colgate Street in Garland, Tex. She identified the 1957 Plymouth with Texas license PP 4537 as belonging to her and her husband.(55) Mrs. Mather told the FBI that her husband was at work on November 22, 1963, at Collins Radio Co. in Richardson, Tex., until approximately 2 p.m., when he came by their home to take the family to the Tippit home to offer their condolences.(56) Mrs. Mather said the two families were friends.(57) According to Mrs. Mather, Carl Mather was with them at the Tippit home from about 3:30 p.m. until about 5 p.m., when he took the two Mather children home.(58) Mrs. Mather did not state in the interview which car her husband was driving that day at the time of the assassination or the Tippit shooting. No FBI report of an interview or contact with Carl Mather was located.

(25) On December 9, 1963, Wes Wise told FBI Special Agent Brown that he could at that time reveal the identity of the person who had provided him with the information about the car and license number.(59) He identified the mechanic as T. F. White, who worked at the Mack Pate Garage at 114 West Seventh Street in Dallas.(60) Wise advised it would be permissible for the FBI to interview White to get further details of the allegation.(61)

(26) T. F. White was interviewed by Special Agent Brown on December 13, 1963. In the interview, White said he saw a red car in the parking lot of the El Chico Restaurant at approximately 2 p.m. on November 22, 1963.(62) At the time of the interview, White said he believed the car to be a red 1961 Falcon with 1963 Texas license PP 4537.(63) White said he saw the man in the car from the side, and that when he saw pictures of Lee Harvey Oswald that night on television, he was identical with the man he had seen in the car that afternoon.(64) White said that after he saw the man sit in the car for a short time, the man left in the car at a high rate of speed, going west on Davis Street.(65)

(27) During the interview, Special Agent Brown advised White that the car to which the license number was traced was a 1957 Plymouth that was light and medium blue in color.(66) Brown also told White that Oswald had been apprehended at approximately 2 p.m. on November 22, 1963, in the Texas Theatre.(67)

(28) According to the interview report, when confronted with those facts, White reiterated that he had correctly copied the number of the car and that after seeing the news reports of Oswald, he thought Oswald was possibly identical with the man White had seen in the car.(68)

(29) Carl Mather and his wife were interviewed by the committee on March 28, 1978. Mather stated that his family had been close friends with the Tippits since 1958 when the two families lived on

Glenfield Street in Dallas.(69) The Mather family moved away to Garland, Texas, in 1961.(70) The relationship between the two families consisted of visits together to "family-type" clubs and baby-sitting.(71)

(30) Mather said that on November 22, 1963, he worked all day at the Collins Radio Co. in Richardson.(72) Mather said his boss at the time at Collins was J. A. Pickford.(73) The Mathers said that they were familiar with the allegation about the car with their license tag parked in the restaurant parking area.(74) Barbara Mather said she talked to FBI agents about their car twice, but that Carl Mather was never interviewed.(75) The Mathers said they attached no further particular significance to the incident since the FBI apparently dropped the issue.(76)

(31) During the committee interview, Barbara Mather stated that she and her husband never owned any kind of red car.(77) She stated that at the time of the assassination they owned a Ford station wagon, which was white over blue, in addition to the blue 1957 Plymouth which carried the license number reported by T. F. White.(78)

(32) Mather described his background as including a security clearance for electronics work.(79) He has been employed with Collins Radio Co. for 21 years.(80) One assignment involved work in Brandywine, Md., at Andrews Air Force Base, where he did electronics work on then Vice President Johnson's airplane Air Force Two.(81)

(33) Soon after the assassination, the Mathers met with Wes Wise and Jane Bartell from CBS to discuss the allegation about the mysterious car.(82) They noticed Mrs. Mather's name listed in the credits of a television documentary later done by CBS, but heard nothing more regarding the incident.(83) Eventually, new tags were issued for their car, and the 1963 tags were discarded.(84)

(34) The committee interviewed Wes Wise again on November 2, 1978, in Dallas. At that time, Wise repeated the details of his contacts with the Mathers and the mechanic who originally reported the story to Wise.(85) Wise recalled having dinner with the Mathers and described Carl Mather as "too nervous to eat," but his wife was "cool, very cool."(86)

(35) There was an additional allegation of a red car near the scene of the Tippit shooting. A witness to the Tippit murder, Domingo Benavides, testified before the Warren Commission that he saw a red Ford at the scene of the Tippit murder. He testified that at "about 1 o'clock" on November 22, 1963, he was driving west on Tenth Street between Denver and Patton Streets.(87) He saw a police car stopped four or five feet from the curb on Tenth Street, facing in an easterly direction.(88) A man Benavides described as Oswald was standing on the curb side of the police car.(89) Benavides said he saw the officer step around to the front of the car, and he was then shot.(90) Benavides said that at that point he "looked around to miss a car" and pulled his truck into the curb and ducked down.(91) He then heard two more shots.(92)

(36) After giving further details of the shooting of the officer and the flight of the man, Benavides said in his testimony that a car which he believed to be a red Ford was parked in front of him on Tenth Street.(93) He described the driver of the red car as about 25 or 30

years old.(94) Benavides said the man pulled over in his car "when he heard the scare" but did not get out of the car.(95) He was located about six cars from the police car.(96)

(37) The committee did not locate any public documents or Warren Commission reports which identified the driver of the red car. However, through investigation in Dallas, the committee did locate and interview a man who said he was at the scene of the Tippit shooting but never came forward with information.

(38) Committee investigators interviewed Jack Ray Tatum at his office at the Baylor University Medical Center in Dallas on February 1, 1978. Tatum stated that on the afternoon of November 22, 1963, he was driving north on Denver Street and stopped at Tenth Street.(97) At that point he saw a police squad car, and a young white male walking on the sidewalk near the squad car.(98) Both the police car and the young man were heading east on Tenth Street.(99) As Tatum approached the squad car, he saw the young male leaning over the passenger side of the police car with both hands in his zippered jacket.(100) Tatum said that as he drove through the intersection of Tenth and Patton Streets he heard three shots in rapid succession; Tatum said he went through the intersection, stopped his car and turned to look back.(101) At that point he saw the police officer lying on the ground near the front of the police car, with the young male standing near him.(102) Tatum said the man ran toward the back of the police car with a gun in his hand.(103) The man then stepped back into the street and shot the police officer as he was lying on the ground.(104) The man then started to run in Tatum's direction.(105) Tatum said he then sped off in his car and last saw the man running south on Patton toward Jefferson.(106)

XI. AUSTIN'S BARBEQUE

(39) The FBI interviewed Austin Cook on May 15, 1964. Cook said that he had employed J. D. Tippit at his drive-in, Austin's Barbeque, at 2321 West Illinois in Dallas, for about 3 years at the time of the assassination.(107) Tippit worked on Friday and Saturday nights from 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. at the barbeque as a "deterrent" to any teenage trouble from youths who frequented the establishment.(108) Cook told the FBI that he was a member of the John Birch Society, but that he had never discussed politics with Tippit and did not believe Tippit was interested in politics.(109)

(40) Cook told the FBI that he never heard Tippit mention Lee Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby or any of Jack Ruby's clubs.(110) The FBI report of the interview with Cook did not mention whether Cook had any knowledge of or acquaintance with Ruby or Oswald.

(41) The committee interviewed Cook on March 9, 1978. Cook was asked if he had known Jack Ruby. Cook replied that he may have met Ruby, but he could not recall.(111) He stated further that if he had met Ruby, that would have been the extent of their association.(112) In discussing his business, Cook told the committee that he originally went into business in 1946 in a grocery store at Ninth and Jefferson Streets in Dallas.(113) Cook bought the store from a woman

named Bowman.(114) Her son, Bert, stayed on at the store for about 6 months after Cook bought it, and Cook and Bert Bowman remained friends for many years.(115)

(43) Cook said that he and Bowman became partners in 1950 at a place they named the Bull Pen at 2321 West Illinois. (116) That business ended about 1958 when Bowman bought out his share of the establishment and took the name Bull Pen with him.(117) Cook then renamed the business Austin's Barbeque.(118)

(44) Cook stated that about 8 or 10 years ago, Ralph Paul bought the Bull Pen from Bowman, and Bowman in turn opened Pudnuh's in Arlington, Tex.(119)

(45) Bert Bowman's wife was interviewed by FBI Special Agents Robert Lish and David Barry on November 24, 1963. She stated that she had known Ralph Paul since he first moved to Dallas from New York about 1951.(120) Mrs. Bowman said that at the time of the assassination, Ralph Paul was living in the lower level of the Bowman home on Copeland Road in Dallas.(121) Mrs. Bowman said Ralph Paul was a close friend of Jack Ruby and had been of financial assistance to both Jack Ruby and Bert Bowman over the years.(122)

(46) According to Mrs. Bowman, Ralph Paul expressed great concern for his friend Jack Ruby after the shooting of Oswald.(123) On November 24, 1963, Paul told Mrs. Bowman that he had spent the whole day at a lawyer's office.(124)

(47) Mrs. Bowman said she was not acquainted with any friends of Paul.(125) However, on one occasion he brought a woman to the house whom he introduced as Tammy.(126) About 4½ years before, Paul had brought Jack Ruby by the house.(127) Mrs. Bowman said that Ruby remained for only a short time.(128)

(48) On March 9, 1978, committee investigators interviewed Mae-bert Leolla Cook, the former wife of Austin Cook. Mrs. Cook related that she knew J. D. Tippit when she still worked with her husband at Austin's Barbeque, where Tippit worked as a security guard.(129) Mrs. Cook stated further that she did not know either Lee Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby, but that Ralph Paul was a mutual friend of the Cooks and Jack Ruby.(130)

Submitted by:

Ms. SURELL BRADY,
Staff Counsel.

REFERENCES

(1) The Warren Commission did, however, request that the FBI conduct a "limited" background investigation on Tippit. That check included interviews of the Tippit family, associates and business acquaintances. The FBI included the results of that check in a report in May 1964. It appeared in the Warren Commission documents as Warren Commission exhibit 2985 (CE 2985).

(2) See ref. 1, CE 2985, p. 6.

(3) Id. at p. 7.

(4) Staff interview of Marie Tippit Thomas, Dec. 8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No. 003988).

(5) Id. at p. 2.

(6) Id. at p. 1.

(7) Ibid.

(8) See ref. 1, CE 1974.

(9) Staff interview of Murray J. Jackson, Nov. 3, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No. 003090).

(10) Id. at p. 2.

(11) C.E. 1974. See ref. 8.

(12) Staff interview of Bill Anglin, Dec. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No. 003532).

(13) Ibid.

(14) See ref. 1, CE 2985, p. 12.

(15) Ibid.

(16) Ibid.

(17) Id. at p. 13.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Testimony of Calvin Bud Owens, Warren Commission Hearings. April 9, 1964, vol. VII, p. 78.

(22) See ref. 1, CE 2985, p. 9.

(23) Staff interview of Mrs. Johnnie Maxie Witherspoon, Sept. 24, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No. 002372).

(24) Id. at pp. 1-2.

(25) Id. at p. 2.

(26) Ibid.

(27) Id. at p. 4.

(28) See ref. 1, CE 3001, p. 2.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Ibid.

(31) Staff memorandum to Bob Tanenbaum from Andy Purdy, Feb. 19, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Doc. No. 00837).

(32) Ibid.

(33) Ibid.

(34) Ibid.

(35) Ibid.

(36) Ibid.

(37) Ibid.

(38) Id. at pp. 2-3.

(39) Id. at p. 3.

(40) Ibid.

(41) Ibid.

(42) Ibid.

(43) Ibid.

(44) Ibid.

(45) Id. at p. 4.

(46) Ibid.

(47) Ibid.

(48) Staff interview of Wes Wise, May 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 008721).

(49) Ibid.

(50) Investigative notes received from Wes Wise (JFK Doc. No. 013919).

(51) FBI Interview of Wes Wise, Dec. 4, 1963, FBI Report by SA Charles T. Brown, file No. DL 89-43 (JFK Doc. No. 013912).

(52) FBI Interview of Milton Love, Dec. 5, 1963, FBI Report by SA Charles T. Brown, Dec. 14, 1963, file No. DL 100-10461 (JFK Doc. No. 013918).

(53) FBI Report by SA Charles T. Brown, Dec. 14, 1963, file No. DL 100-10461 (JFK Doc. No. 013916).

(54) Ibid.

(55) FBI Interview of Mrs. Carl A. Mather, Dec. 5, 1963, FBI Report by SA Charles T. Brown, Dec. 14, 1963, file No. DL 100-10461 (JFK Doc. No. 013914).

(56) Ibid.

(57) Ibid.

(58) Ibid.

(59) FBI Interview of Wes Wise, Dec. 9, 1963, FBI Report by SA Charles T. Brown, Dec. 14, 1963, file No. DL 100-10461 (JFK Doc. No. 013915).

(60) Ibid.

(61) Ibid.

- (62) Interview of T. F. White, Dec. 13, 1963, FBI Report by SA Charles T. Brown, Dec. 14, 1963, file No. 100-10461 (JFK Doc. No. 013913).
- (63) Ibid.
- (64) Ibid.
- (65) Ibid.
- (66) Ibid.
- (67) Ibid.
- (68) Ibid.
- (69) Staff Interview of Carl Amos Mather, Mar. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 006910).
- (70) Ibid.
- (71) Ibid.
- (72) Id. at p. 4.
- (73) Ibid.
- (74) Id. at p. 2.
- (75) Id. at 4.
- (76) Ibid.
- (77) Id. at p. 3.
- (78) Ibid.
- (79) Id. at p. 4.
- (80) Ibid.
- (81) Ibid.
- (82) Id. at p. 2.
- (83) Ibid.
- (84) Id. at p. 3.
- (85) Staff Interview of Wes Wise, Nov. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 013219).
- (86) Ibid.
- (87) Testimony of Domingo Benavides, Apr. 2, 1964, G Warren Report Hearings, p. 447.
- (88) Ibid.
- (89) Ibid.
- (90) Ibid.
- (91) Ibid.
- (92) Ibid.
- (93) Id. at p. 453.
- (94) Ibid.
- (95) Ibid.
- (96) Ibid.
- (97) Staff Interview of Jack R. Tatum, Feb. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 6905).
- (98) Ibid.
- (99) Ibid.
- (100) Ibid.
- (101) Ibid.
- (102) Ibid.
- (103) Ibid.
- (104) Ibid.
- (105) Ibid.
- (106) Ibid.
- (107) FBI Interview of Austin Cook, May 15, 1964, Warren Commission Exhibit 2985, p. 10, 26 Warren Report Hearings, p. 488.
- (108) Ibid.
- (109) Ibid.
- (110) Ibid.
- (111) Staff Interview of Austin Cook, Mar. 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Doc. No. 14231).
- (112) Ibid.
- (113) Ibid.
- (114) Ibid.
- (115) Ibid.
- (116) Ibid.
- (117) Ibid.
- (118) Ibid.
- (119) Ibid.

(120) FBI Interview of Mrs. Bert Bowman, Nov. 24, 1963, FBI Report by SA Robert C. Lish and David H. Barry, Nov. 15, 1963, file No. DL 44-1639 (JFK Doc. No. 004766).

(121) Ibid.

(122) Ibid.

(123) Ibid.

(124) Ibid.

(125) Id. at p. 2.

(126) Ibid.

(127) Ibid.

(128) Ibid.

(129) Staff Interview of Maeber Leolla Cook, Mar. 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No. 006909).

(130) Id. at p. 2.



GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILDT

Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session

March 1979

CONTENTS

	Paragraph
Foreword	(1)
I. De Mohrenschildt's background	(1)
II. Allegations of de Mohrenschildt Nazi activity	(10)
III. Knowledge of Oswald's possession of the rifle	(19)
IV. Allegations of de Mohrenschildt intelligence connections	(29)
V. De Mohrenschildt activities in Haiti	(37)
VI. De Mohrenschildt military connections	(80)
	Page
Appendix : Manuscript by George de Mohrenschildt, "I am a Patsy ! I am a Patsy !" ..	69

FOREWORD

(1) The Warren Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, that he was not tied to any intelligence agency, and that none of his associates were tied to the assassination. Nevertheless, speculation continued to center about one of Oswald's associations: George de Mohrenschildt and de Mohrenschildt's background. The Warren Commission concluded about de Mohrenschildt:

The Commission's investigation has developed no signs of subversive or disloyal conduct on the part of either of the de Mohrenschildts. Neither the FBI, CIA, nor any other witness contacted by the Commission has provided any information linking the de Mohrenschildts to subversive or extremist organizations. Nor has there been any evidence linking them in any way with the assassination of President Kennedy. (1)

(2) Despite this disclaimer of any subversive or disloyal activity on the part of de Mohrenschildt by the Warren Commission, de Mohrenschildt was rumored to have had ties with the intelligence communities of several countries. Indeed de Mohrenschildt himself admitted some involvement with French intelligence, but his actual role with them was never fully disclosed, and he emphatically denied any other intelligence associations. He explained his travels to Haiti with the cooperation of the Haitian Government as innocuous business deals with no political overtones.

(3) Speculation also continued about Oswald's relationship to de Mohrenschildt because of the contrast between the backgrounds of the two men. De Mohrenschildt was described as sophisticated and well educated, moving easily in the social and professional circles of oilmen and the so-called "White Russian" community, many of whom were avowed rightwingers. Oswald's "lowly" background did not include much education or influence, and he was in fact shunned by the same Dallas Russian community that embraced de Mohrenschildt.

(4) The committee undertook to probe more into the background and associations of de Mohrenschildt to determine if more light could be shed to either explain the relationship between Oswald and de Mohrenschildt or to determine if any new information contradicts that which was available to the Warren Commission. This probe seemed justified in view of the controversy that continues to surround the relationship, and the additional speculation that was caused by the apparent suicide of de Mohrenschildt in 1977 on the day he was contacted by both an investigator from the committee and a writer about Oswald.

I. DE MOHRENSCHILDT'S BACKGROUND

(5) De Mohrenschildt testified extensively before the Warren Commission about his childhood in Russia and Poland and his family. He

was born on April 17, 1911, in Mozyr in Czarist Russia.(2). His father, Sergius Alexander von Mohrenschildt, was a "marshal of nobility" in Minsk Province, and he served as director of the Nobel interests in Russia.(3) His mother, Alexandra Zopalsky, was of Russian, Polish, and Hungarian descent.(4).

(6) De Mohrenschildt's family had long had ties to the United States. A descendant of the de Mohrenschildt family, Baron Hilienfelt, who was a Baltic Swede, fought in the American Army of Independence, according to de Mohrenschildt.(5) An uncle, Ferdinand de Mohrenschildt, was First Secretary of the last Russian Embassy in Washington under the Czarist government.(6) De Mohrenschildt's brother, Dimitri von Mohrenschildt, emigrated to the United States and became a professor at Dartmouth University.(7)

(7) De Mohrenschildt's father was jailed by the Communist regime in 1920 for criticizing the Communist Government.(8) Friends of the government intervened to secure his release.(9) He was jailed again in 1921 and was banished to Siberia(10) for life. De Mohrenschildt explained that sentence was imposed when his father maintained that the kind of government he favored for the Russian people was a constitutional monarchy.(11)

(8) Sergius von Mohrenschildt escaped with his family to Poland; de Mohrenschildt's mother died soon after from typhoid fever which she had contracted during the escape.(12) While living in Poland the elder de Mohrenschildt successfully fought to regain an estate he had held in Russia near the Polish border.(13) It was money from that estate that George de Mohrenschildt brought to the United States in 1938 when he started his first business interest.(14) The size of the estate at that time was estimated at approximately \$10,000.(15)

(9) De Mohrenschildt testified that his brother Dimitri remained a "ferocious anti-Communist."(16) He served in the Czarist Russian Imperial Navy.(17) After the Russian revolution, Dimitri von Mohrenschildt joined anti-Communist groups and was jailed by the Communists and sentenced to death.(18) He was released from jail in a prisoner exchange with the help of a Polish Catholic bishop.(19) Dimitri von Mohrenschildt emigrated to the United States in August 1920.(20)

II. ALLEGATIONS OF DE MOHRENSCHILDT NAZI ACTIVITY

(10) On October 8, 1942 the U.S. Department of State placed a "refusal" or "lookout" in de Mohrenschildt's passport office file.(21) The committee was informed by the State Department that the effect of such a "lookout" would be that when the person applied for any type of passport action the file would be reviewed to determine if the person posed a security threat or had made false statements upon entering the United States.(22)

(11) The reason given for the lookout in de Mohrenschildt's file was: "Alleged to be Nazi agent. Refer any application to Fraud Section."(23) The file was cross-referenced to the file of Lilia P. Larin.(24)

(12) De Mohrenschildt entered the United States in 1938.(25) According to his Warren Commission testimony in 1942 de Mohren-

schildt met and fell in love with Lilia Larin, a Mexican citizen, and they traveled to Mexico together.(26) They stopped at a beach in Corpus Christi, Tex., enroute to Mexico and were then confronted by American Government agents, whom de Mohrenschildt thought might have been FBI agents.(27) The agents accused de Mohrenschildt of being a German Nazi spy.(28) Their car was searched but they were then allowed to continue on their way into Mexico.(29)

(13) After de Mohrenschildt lived in Mexico for several months, the Mexican Government informed him that he was a persona non grata in Mexico and ordered him to leave the country.(30) De Mohrenschildt speculated that the expulsion was prompted by General Maximo Camacho of the Mexican Army, who was jealous of de Mohrenschildt's relationship with Lilia Larin.(31)

(14) De Mohrenschildt's passport file also contained a document dated January 23, 1943, that referred to the censorship of mail of Lilia Larin. According to that document, a letter by Larin to the Mexican Government was intercepted: in that letter, Larin was seeking to intercede on de Mohrenschildt's behalf in getting permission for him to enter Mexico.(32)

(15) When de Mohrenschildt applied for a U.S. passport in January 1957, his application contained a pencilled notation referring to the earlier lookout in his file.(33) Nevertheless, the application was approved and de Mohrenschildt's passport was issued on January 23, 1957.(34) A similar notation was made on de Mohrenschildt's application in March 1960 when he applied for a passport renewal.(35) The refusal was similarly disregarded at that time, and he continued to receive passport renewals.(36) There was no further reference in de Mohrenschildt's State Department file about the original allegation or the determinations to later disregard the refusal.

(16) The Warren Commission also questioned de Mohrenschildt about the background of his cousin, Baron Maydell, and the allegations that Maydell may have had connections with the Nazis. De Mohrenschildt described Maydell as a White Russian who was opposed to communism and thought he could get the return of his Russian estate through intervention of the Germans.(37) In de Mohrenschildt's opinion, it was Maydell's German sympathies that created controversy and speculation that he was a German spy.(38)

(17) In 1941 de Mohrenschildt began work with Maydell's company, Film Facts, Inc., in New York.(39) De Mohrenschildt said he saw the work as an opportunity to learn something about making documentary movies.(40) With Maydell he made a documentary about the resistance movement in Poland and solicited the sponsorship of the Polish Consulate.(41) De Mohrenschildt said the movie was also used to benefit Polish refugees.(42)

(18) De Mohrenschildt's Central Intelligence Agency file contains a memo dated July 30, 1942, that referred to some type of film enterprise. The memo is written by Ensign Horrigan and directed to Commander Vanderbilt of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In the memo Horrigan states that de Mohrenschildt said he was representing an Irish film company that had taken pictures during the Spanish Civil War.(43) Horrigan wrote de Mohrenschildt's uncle's apartment was raided and that many films of a pro-Nazi nature were discovered which

were intended to show the force and effectiveness of the German Army. (44)

III. KNOWLEDGE OF OSWALD'S POSSESSION OF THE RIFLE

(19) George de Mohrenschildt testified before the Warren Commission that one evening when he and his wife visited the Oswalds at their Neely Street address in Dallas, Marina Oswald exclaimed that Oswald had bought a gun and showed the gun to Jeanne de Mohrenschildt. (45) De Mohrenschildt testified that this took place around Easter in the spring of 1963 and that the occasion of the visit was to take an Easter present or toy to the Oswald's daughter. (46)

(20) In his testimony de Mohrenschildt related that during that visit he and Oswald stood talking in the front room. (47) Marina Oswald opened a closet door to show the gun to Jeanne, and Jeanne in turn called out to George who was in the next room that Lee had a gun. (48) De Mohrenschildt said he did not look at the gun, but that Marina said Oswald used it for target shooting and that it had a telescopic sight. (49)

(21) De Mohrenschildt said he then asked Oswald "jokingly" if Oswald had taken the shot at General Walker, which had occurred in Dallas on April 10, 1963. (50) De Mohrenschildt said Oswald became tense, "sort of shriveled" and made some kind of face in answer to the question without specifically answering the question. (51)

(22) Nevertheless, in an interview at the American Embassy in Haiti in December 1963 with State Department officials, the de Mohrenschildts claimed that the gun incident had occurred in the fall of 1962. (52) Mrs. de Mohrenschildt stated that Marina Oswald had said "Look how crazy he is, he has bought a gun." (53) Mrs. de Mohrenschildt said she thought Oswald had only recently purchased the gun, that it was about 4 feet long, and that she did not know if it was a rifle or a shotgun. (54) She said Marina Oswald told her there was something special about the gun, that it was either automatic or had a telescopic sight. (55) In that interview, de Mohrenschildt claimed that the last time he and his wife saw the Oswalds was in January 1963 and that the de Mohrenschildts were too busy preparing for their upcoming trip to Haiti to see the Oswalds after that. (56)

(23) De Mohrenschildt had contacted the American Embassy in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, immediately after the assassination and said he had been acquainted with Lee Harvey Oswald, volunteering to be of assistance during the assassination investigation. (57)

(24) An April 1, 1977, the committee received from Jeanne de Mohrenschildt, the widow of George de Mohrenschildt, a photograph of Oswald standing in a yard and holding a rifle in one hand and two newspapers in the other hand. (58) a gun was strapped in a holster on his hip. This photograph, which was similar to other photographs recovered in a search of Oswald's property on November 23, 1963, had never been seen by the Warren Commission or law enforcement officials.

(25) On the rear of the photograph was the notation "To my friend George from Lee Oswald," with the date "5/IV/63" and another notation "Copyright Geo de M", and an inscription in Russian reading "Hunter of facists, ha-ha-ha!" (59) A handwriting panel engaged

by the committee determined that the writing "To my friend George" and the Oswald signature were the writing of Lee Harvey Oswald. (60) The panel was not able to conclude whether the other writing was written by Lee Harvey Oswald, Marina Oswald, or George de Mohrenschildt. (61)

(26) On April 1, 1977, the committee also received from Jeanne de Mohrenschildt a copy of the manuscript of the book, "I Am A Patsy, I Am A Patsy," which George de Mohrenschildt was writing about his relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald at the time of de Mohrenschildt's suicide on March 29, 1977. (62) In that manuscript, de Mohrenschildt wrote that he and his wife had stumbled upon the gun photo in February 1967 in boxes of their belongings that they had placed in storage in early 1963 before their departure for Haiti in May 1963. (63) De Mohrenschildt speculated in the manuscript that Oswald had in a sense left them a "gift from the grave," placing the photograph where it could later be discovered by de Mohrenschildt. (64) He explained that the photo was among English practice records that he and his wife had loaned to Marina Oswald, and that somehow the Oswalds had managed to return those records, including the photograph, to the de Mohrenschildts' possessions. (65) (27) In the manuscript de Mohrenschildt identified the handwritten date of the photograph, "5/IV/63" as April 5, 1963—and stated that at that time he and his wife "were thousands of miles away in Haiti." (66) That statement contradicts the statements de Mohrenschildt gave to Warren Commission and State Department officials about the dates of his travel to Haiti.

(28) The circumstances of the de Mohrenschildts' learning that Oswald owned a rifle, de Mohrenschildt's comment to Oswald about the Walker shooting, and the circumstances of the "discovery" of the gun photograph in the de Mohrenschildts' possessions may indicate knowledge the de Mohrenschildts had about the violent turn Oswald's political inclinations had taken that have not been fully explored.

IV. ALLEGATIONS OF DE MOHRENSCHILDT INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS

(29) During his Warren Commission testimony, de Mohrenschildt was asked by Counsel Jenner if he had "ever been in any respect an agent." (67) De Mohrenschildt responded that he never had. (68) He testified that none of his foreign ventures had ever involved any political activity. (69) Nevertheless, de Mohrenschildt explained that in 1941 he was involved with Pierre Fraiss who was connected with French intelligence work in the United States. (70)

(30) De Mohrenschildt said he went to work for the Shumaker Co. in New York as a salesman when he first arrived in the United States in 1938. (71) He identified Fraiss as the chief of export of the Shumaker Co. and one of his best friends. (72) De Mohrenschildt said he knew Fraiss was connected with French intelligence and that he worked for Fraiss "collect[ing] facts on people involved in pro-German activity." (73) De Mohrenschildt said the work with Fraiss took him around the United States. (74) It also involved contacting oil companies in the United States about selling oil to the French in competition against German oil supplies during the war. (75) De Mohrenschildt was compensated for expenses incurred in the "data collection"

for Fraiss, but was not paid a salary, according to his sworn testimony.(76)

(31) In his Warren Commission testimony de Mohrenschildt stated that he believed he had discussed Lee Harvey Oswald with J. Walton Moore, whom de Mohrenschildt described as "a Government man—either FBI or Central Intelligence." (77) De Mohrenschildt said Moore had interviewed him when he returned from Yugoslavia and that he was known as the head of the FBI in Dallas.(78) De Mohrenschildt asserted that he asked Moore and Ft. Worth attorney Max Clark about Oswald to reassure himself that it was "safe" for the de Mohrenschildts to assist Oswald.(79) According to his testimony, de Mohrenschildt was told by one of the persons he talked to about Oswald, although he said he could not remember who it was, that "the guy seems to be OK." (80)

(32) This admitted association with J. Walton Moore fed the rumors of some involvement by de Mohrenschildt in intelligence activities.

(33) In 1963 J. Walton Moore was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency in Dallas, Tex., in the Domestic Contacts Division.(81) According to Moore's CIA personnel file, he was assigned to the Domestic Contacts Division in 1948.(82) Moore's duties in the Dallas office were contacting individuals in the area who had information on foreign topics.(83)

(34) In an Agency memorandum dated April 13, 1977, contained in George de Mohrenschildt's CIA file, Moore set forth facts to counter a claim which had been recently made by WFAA-TV in Dallas that Lee Harvey Oswald was employed by the CIA and that Moore knew Oswald. In that memo, Moore is quoted as saying that according to his records the last time he talked to George de Mohrenschildt was in the fall of 1961.(84) Moore said that he had no recollection of any conversation with de Mohrenschildt concerning Lee Harvey Oswald.

(85) The memo also noted that Moore recalled only two occasions when he met de Mohrenschildt: First, in the spring of 1958 to discuss the mutual interest the two couples had in mainland China; and then in the fall of 1961 when the de Mohrenschildts showed films of their Latin American walking trip.(86)

(35) Other documents in de Mohrenschildt's CIA file indicated more contact between Moore and de Mohrenschildt than was stated in the 1977 memo by Moore. In a memorandum dated May 1, 1964, from Moore to the Acting Chief of the Contacts Division of the CIA, Moore stated that he had known George de Mohrenschildt and his wife since 1957, at which time Moore got biographical data on de Mohrenschildt after de Mohrenschildt's trip to Yugoslavia for the International Cooperation Administration.(87) Moore said also in that 1964 memo that he saw de Mohrenschildt several times in 1958 and 1959.(88)

(36) De Mohrenschildt's CIA file contained several reports submitted by de Mohrenschildt to the CIA on topics concerning Yugoslavia.(89)

(37) In an interview with the committee on March 14, 1978, Moore stated that he did interview de Mohrenschildt in 1957 after the Yugoslavia trip.(90) At that time Moore also indicated he had "periodic"

contact with de Mohrenschildt for "debriefing" purposes over the years after that.(91) Moore said that none of that contact or conversation with de Mohrenschildt was related to Oswald; Moore said that the allegations that de Mohrenschildt asked Moore's "permission" to contact Oswald were false.(92)

V. DE MOHRENSCHILDT'S ACTIVITIES IN HAITI

(38) According to State Department documents, George de Mohrenschildt and his wife were living in Haiti at the time of the assassination.(93) They arrived in the country on June 2, 1963.(94) De Mohrenschildt had earlier been in Haiti in March 1963 and returned to Dallas a week later.(95) He told State Department officials that he left Dallas April 19, 1963, traveled to New York and Philadelphia, and then returned to Dallas for "2 days" to make preparations for the final trip to Haiti.(96)

(39) De Mohrenschildt testified before the Warren Commission that he first visited Haiti in 1956 when he was working for the Sinclair Oil Co. At that time he did a geological prospect for oil drilling in the northern part of Haiti.(97) The project was abandoned because of the expropriations of companies which were going on in the Caribbean area.(98) When de Mohrenschildt returned to Haiti in 1961 after his South American walking trip, he continued working on plans for a possible geological project in Haiti.(99) During 1962 de Mohrenschildt continued to negotiate and promote the business venture and in that year he formed the Haitian Holding Co. and listed as the principals of the company himself, B. Juindine Tardieu, a financier living in Haiti with real estate holdings who served as an adviser to the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti in Port-au-Prince, and Clemard Joseph Charles, president of the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti.(100) The objectives of the company, as outlined by de Mohrenschildt, were the development of industries and enterprises in Haiti, using Haitian and American capital, and some economic assistance from the governments of the two countries.(101)

(40) De Mohrenschildt testified that his work in the Haitian enterprise was to include conducting a geological survey of Haiti to plot out oil and geological resources on the island.(102) He said that on March 13, 1963, he concluded a contract with the Haitian Government, which guaranteed that he would be paid \$285,000 for the survey; \$20,000 was paid in cash and the remainder was to be paid out in a 10-year concession on a sisal plantation.(103) He explained that Clemard Joseph Charles continued the administrative work on the sisal plantation while de Mohrenschildt pursued his geological work.(104)

(41) De Mohrenschildt identified before the Warren Commission newspaper articles about Charles, which he used in his promotional efforts to secure capital for the holding company. In one of the articles, Charles is identified as entering into a multimillion-dollar housing project with the financial assistance of large American banking inter-

ests.(105) In another article, it was reported that Charles had been presented with the keys of the city of New York.(106)

(42) De Mohrenschildt stated to the Warren Commission that the undertaking in Haiti was a purely commercial and geological interest, with no other "purpose or intent."(107) De Mohrenschildt explained that the office he used in Port-au-Prince was in fact the office of the Inter-American Geodetic Survey, but that the maps he developed were not to be used by any nation or group for any type of work other than his own geological interests.(108)

(43) De Mohrenschildt testified to the Warren Commission that he left Dallas in May 1963 and traveled to New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., before arriving in Haiti in June.(109) He stated that in Washington, D.C., he was "preparing for the eventuality of this project, checking with the people, Bureau of Mines, and so forth.(110) He gave no further details, and was not asked for any by the Warren Commission, about his activities in those cities or his contacts.

(44) In a CIA Office of Security memo dated December 30, 1974, contained in de Mohrenschildt's file, the agency noted that the de Mohrenschildts left Dallas after April 19, 1963, for a trip to New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., but they had not given any information in their testimony "on whom they had contact with or what they were doing 19 April to late May 1963."(111) The memo also noted that another individual had requested an "expedite check" on de Mohrenschildt for "exact reasons unknown."(112) It was stated further in the memo:

It is interesting that [name deleted] interest in de Mohrenschildt coincided with the earlier portion of this trip and the info would suggest that possibly [name deleted] and de Mohrenschildt were possibly in the same environment in Washington, D.C., circa April 26, 1963.(113)

(45) It was not brought out in his Warren Commission testimony, but de Mohrenschildt did meet in Washington, D.C., in the spring of 1963 with the Department of Defense personnel and Clemard Joseph Charles, the Haitian banker through whom de Mohrenschildt was negotiating his Haitian contracts.

(46) George de Mohrenschildt's Agency file contained a memorandum of a phone call on May 7, 1963, to Dorothe Matlack of the office of the Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence about de Mohrenschildt and Charles. According to the memo, the purpose of the call was to arrange a meeting between Charles and an Agency representative for noon of that day.(114) Mrs. Matlack had apparently made hotel reservations for the de Mohrenschildts and Charles.(115)

(47) In an interview with the committee on September 4, 1978, Dorothe Matlack stated that she served as Assistant Director of the Office of Intelligence of the Army until her retirement in 1974.(116) Her work included "human source collection of intelligence" and involved serving in a liaison capacity with the Central Intelligence Agency.(117)

(48) Mrs. Matlack said she was first informed about the visit of Clemard Joseph Charles to the United States in 1963 by Col. Sam

Kail,* an Army Intelligence officer who was working in Miami at that time.(118) Kail suggested that Mrs. Matlack talk to Charles when he visited Washington, D.C., because of Charles' relationship to President Duvalier of Haiti and Haiti's strategic position relative to Castro's Cuba.(119)

(49) During the committee interview, Mrs. Matlack said that she arranged a meeting for Charles in May 1963 in downtown Washington with Tony Czaikowski of the CIA, whom she introduced as a professor from Georgetown University.(120) She described Charles as "frantic and frightened" during the meeting.(121) He urged Mrs. Matlack to get the U.S. Marines to invade Haiti and overthrow Duvalier.(122)

(50) Mrs. Matlack said George and Jeanne de Mohrenschildt accompanied Charles to this meeting and that their presence was a "surprise" to her.(123) She did not know what role de Mohrenschildt was serving, but felt he "dominated" Charles in some way.(124) Mrs. Matlack said that despite the explanation of Charles and de Mohrenschildt that they were in the jute business together, she did not believe that was the reason for their presence together at the meeting.(125) Referring to de Mohrenschildt, Mrs. Matlack said, "I knew the Texan wasn't there to sell hemp."(126)

(51) Mrs. Matlack said she was so disturbed by de Mohrenschildt at the meeting that she discussed it with the FBI liaison, Pat Putnam.(127) Mrs. Matlack said she never heard what action, if any, was taken by the FBI about de Mohrenschildt.(128)

(52) According to Mrs. Matlack, Charles had no military information of value to offer.(129) She did not recall Charles ever discussing the question of arms sales to Haiti.(130) Because of the potential political information Charles could give about the current situation in Haiti, the CIA became the primary contact with Charles.(131) Mrs. Matlack said that except for a few phone calls after that meeting she never had any further contact with Charles.

(53) A Washington Post article by Norman Gale, dated September 29, 1964, reported that Haitian President Francois Duvalier had received two T-28 fighter planes from Dallas, Tex.(132) The article stated the planes were flown to Haiti illegally.(133)

(54) According to the article, Duvalier made down payment on the planes with a letter of credit for \$210,000 drawn on the Banque Commerciale of Port-au-Prince, Haiti(134) The article identified Clemard Joseph Charles as president and principal stockholder of the bank and a close ally of Duvalier.(135)

(55) The article stated that Charles visited the United States earlier in 1964 to buy boats and other weapons, and that he visited Dallas during that trip.(136)

(56) The article reported that I. Irving Davidson, Washington lobbyist, visited Haiti in May 1963 with two Dallas arms suppliers.(137)

(57) I. Irving Davidson was interviewed by the committee on November 2, 1978, in Washington, D.C. At that time Davidson was asked

*For further information on Sam Kail, see "Staff Report on Anti-Castro Organizations, Anti-Castro Activists, and Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in New Orleans," Hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, pars. 147-151.

about his business involvement with Haiti and the Haitian Government and possible ties with George de Mohrenschildt.

(58) Davidson said he first became involved in business in Haiti in 1962 or 1963 through Sam Ferber, whom Davidson described as an import-export dealer from New York.(138) Davidson said that he registered at that time with the State Department as a lobbyist on behalf of the Haitian Government.(139) His relationship with the Haitian Government prospered to the extent that he became friends with the President of Haiti, Francois Duvalier, and remained in contact with him for several years.(140) His business deals also involved working with the American Embassy in Port-au-Prince. Davidson said he was able to create warmer feeling toward Haiti by the American Government.(141)

(59) Davidson denied that he had ever participated in any arms deals for the Haitian Government;(142) he said Duvalier never had the money to buy arms.(143) Davidson said in the interview that he met Clemard Joseph Charles once when visiting Duvalier, but that he never met with him again nor transacted any business with Charles.(144) He said he was unaware of newspaper accounts that he had arranged arms sale deals for Charles.(145)

(60) Davidson said he was not acquainted with George de Mohrenschildt in Haiti.(146) In fact, Davidson claimed that he was not aware of de Mohrenschildt until 1978, when a newspaper article by Jeremiah O'Leary of The Washington Star suggested that Davidson had approached the FBI to find out what information the Bureau had on de Mohrenschildt in connection with the Kennedy assassination.(147) The article mentioned an FBI memo about a meeting at the Bureau between Davidson and two FBI agents in October 1967.(148)

(61) According to the FBI memo, which is dated November 1, 1967 and directed to Cartha De Loach of the Bureau from T. E. Bishop, Bishop and Special Agent Hobson Adcock met with Davidson at FBI headquarters on October 31, 1967.(149) According to Bishop, Davidson telephoned the Bureau on October 28, 1967 and requested a meeting with Clyde Tolson.(150) Davidson said he had been approached by Leonard Davidov and Hugh McDonald because they wanted Davidson to make inquiries about de Mohrenschildt's background.(151) Davidov and McDonald were allegedly working to uncover evidence that de Mohrenschildt was involved in the assassination and that former President Lyndon Johnson had prior knowledge of the conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.(152) According to the memo, Davidson also said that McDonald was engaged in some type of business arrangement with Howard Hughes' business empire in Las Vegas.(153)

(62) Bishop added in the memo that Davidson volunteered that after he made some inquiries about de Mohrenschildt for Davidov and McDonald, he would turn the information over to the Bureau.(154) Despite Davidson's offer of assistance to the Bureau, Bishop characterized Davidson's interest in the de Mohrenschildt aspect of the case in this way:

During yesterday's interview, he [Davidson] alleged his only concern was that of protecting President Johnson from being "smeared," however, it is strongly believed that his

real motive was that of seeking information on de Mohrenschildt and McDonald. In support of this, it is noted that prior to coming to Bureau headquarters he had already contacted Edward Cohen for background information on de Mohrenschildt and spent the previous weekend in Dallas, Tex., allegedly for the purpose of attending a football game. However, Dallas is also the residence of de Mohrenschildt.(155)

(63) In the memo Bishop identified Edward Cohen as having previously been the subject of an FBI investigation.(156) Bishop noted also that Cohen had conducted an investigation into Lyndon Johnson's alleged association with Overseas National Airways.(157)

(64) During the interview with the committee, Davidson stated that he never met with Bishop and Adcock as stated in the memo.(158) Davidson said Davidov and McDonald did contact him about the possibility of de Mohrenschildt being involved in the Kennedy assassination and he did then relate the substance of that meeting to the Bureau.(159) Nevertheless, he said the memorandum takes the import of the meeting at the Bureau out of context and suggests an interest in de Mohrenschildt when he in fact had none.(160)

(65) A CIA Office of Security memorandum dated January 7, 1964, reported that a confidential informant advised that the President of Haiti sent a confidential message to Davidson during the last week of December, 1963; the contents of the message were not known.(161)

(66) The U.S. State Department further documented some involvement by Charles in the sale of American military planes. In an airgram dated May 2, 1967 from the Department of State to the American Embassy at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, it was reported that Edward Browder had leased a plane for 1 year starting on November 24, 1964, in the name of a phony company and had flown the plane to Port-au-Prince and left it there.(162) The airgram reported also that Browder later cashed a check for \$24,000 signed by Clemard Joseph Charles.(163)

(67) Another airgram from the State Department to the Embassy dated May 25, 1967, verified that the check to Browder was drawn from the personal account of Clemard Joseph Charles at Manufacturers Hanover Trust Bank.(164)

(68) Edward Browder was interviewed by the committee on January 12, 1978, at the Federal penitentiary at MacNeill Island, Wash., where he was serving a 25-year sentence for securities violations.(165) During the interview, Browder discussed a series of gun-running and smuggling operations he was involved in during the 1960's that were intended to result in the eventual overthrow or assassination of Fidel Castro.(166) Browder stated that this work included assistance by the CIA in the form of money and operations.(167)

(69) Browder said that during that period he did purchase at least two B-25 planes to be used in "smuggling operations" which would be used to assist the gun-running and raids against Cuba.(168) Browder said he could not recall where he bought the planes.(169) However, he said a man named Pedro Diaz Lanz flew one of the planes to him.(170) Browder said he was a former test pilot for Lockheed Aircraft and has also flown for Pan American Airlines.(171)

(70) In May 1978 the committee received information that a stockbroker in Palm Beach, Fla., had known George de Mohrenschildt in Haiti. The information came from Jack Cogswell of Palm Beach. According to Cogswell, he ran into Joseph Dryer, who is a stockbroker with Loeb & Rhodes & Co. in Palm Beach and Dryer offered information about George de Mohrenschildt. (172) Dryer told Cogswell that when he knew de Mohrenschildt in Haiti, de Mohrenschildt's behavior was "strange" and included following people in his car. (173) Dryer related that de Mohrenschildt was associated with a man named Charles who was the president of a bank in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. (174) Dryer stated that he was told by Charles that a large amount of money had been placed in de Mohrenschildt's account in Charles' bank just before de Mohrenschildt left Haiti in 1967. (175)

(71) Joseph Dryer was interviewed by the committee in Palm Beach on July 6, 1978. At that time, Dryer said that in the early 1950's he became involved in a program sponsored by the U.S. Government to develop a substitute for jute. (176) Dryer explained that the Government's interest was in helping Caribbean and Latin American countries develop their own jute producing capacity and thereby save millions in the import of the product from other areas of the world. (177) In connection with that program, Dryer set up a jute subsidiary operation in Cuba, the North Atlantic Fiber Corp. (178) Dryer said that in 1958, Francoise Duvalier, the President of Haiti, sent an emissary to Cuba to discuss the prospects for a jute enterprise in Haiti; Dryer said the emissary was Clemard Joseph Charles. (179) Dryer said additionally that Charles was involved in the mid-1960's in a deal with President Johnson to buy jets in Texas. According to Dryer, the deal did not go through, but he said Charles may have had a successful deal for the sale of gunboats. (180) Dryer said Charles had "many connections" with the Central Intelligence Agency, and Dryer believed the Agency may once have "planted" a secretary on Charles. (181)

(72) Dryer said he met George de Mohrenschildt through Charles. (182) Dryer said that de Mohrenschildt claimed he came to Haiti to scout for oil, but Dryer stated that "I could never figure out what he did." (183) Dryer expressed the belief that de Mohrenschildt had "some intelligence connection," but Dryer did not know with which country. (184)

(73) According to Dryer, he, Charles and de Mohrenschildt were associated with a woman named Jacqueline Lancelot who owned a well-known restaurant in Petionville, Haiti. (185) Dryer said the restaurant was frequented by many American intelligence personnel from the American Embassy and other foreigners. (186) Lancelot had contact with the American intelligence operatives and passed them information about the Duvalier government. (187) Dryer's relationship with Lancelot included passing messages for her to people in the United States whom Dryer assumed were connected in some way to the CIA. (188) Dryer said one of those contacts was a person who worked for French intelligence and cooperated with the CIA. (189) In 1978, the person lived in the South. (190)

(74) Dryer said in the interview that Lancelot told him shortly after the Kennedy assassination that a "substantial" sum of money, \$200,000 or \$250,000, had been deposited in de Mohrenschildt's account

in a bank in Port-au-Prince.(191) According to Lancelot, it was not Charles' bank.(192) Lancelot said her source of information was the person who handed out the funds at the bank.(193) The money in the account was subsequently paid out, although she did not know to whom, and de Mohrenschildt left Haiti soon after.(194)

(75) According to Dryer, Jacqueline Lancelot related to him that President Duvalier had once implied that the American President might not remain in office.(195) Lancelot reportedly said that during a speech to Haitian troops in a port city, Duvalier allegedly said that "the big man in the White House wasn't going to be there much longer."(196) Lancelot told Dryer that she was not sure if that statement was made by Duvalier before or after President Kennedy's assassination.(197)

(76) During the interview with the committee investigator, Dryer was asked if he were familiar with the names of a number of people who may have had some connection or association with George de Mohrenschildt. Of the names, Dryer recognized Dorothe Matlack and William Avery Hyde.(198) He remembered Matlack as one of the people Charles asked Dryer to contact for him in the United States.(199) Dryer could not remember in what connection or context Hyde's name had been used by de Mohrenschildt.(200)

(77) The possible association between George de Mohrenschildt and William Avery Hyde may have some significance because Hyde is the father of Ruth Paine, the woman with whom Marina Oswald was living at the time of the assassination. The connection was intriguing because there was never any intimation by the Warren Commission that de Mohrenschildt had more than a brief acquaintance with Ruth Paine.

(78) De Mohrenschildt stated in his Warren Commission testimony that he met Ruth Paine on only one occasion, at a party at the home of Everett Glover in Dallas.(201) De Mohrenschildt said the party took place in either January or February of 1963.(202) De Mohrenschildt stated that it was his "recollection" that that was the only time he saw Ruth Paine.(203)

(79) In her Warren Commission testimony, Ruth Paine stated that she first met George de Mohrenschildt and his wife at the party at Everett Glover's, and that she never saw them again after that.(204) Ruth Paine gave the date of that party as February 22, 1963.(205) She stated that she had "no conversations, no letters, no contact whatsoever" with the de Mohrenschildts either before or after that party.(206)

VI. DE MOHRENSCHILDT MILITARY CONNECTIONS

(80) In addition to being present with Clemard Joseph Charles at a meeting in Washington, D.C., in May 1963 with a member of the Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence Office, George de Mohrenschildt had other personal associations with military personnel.

(81) An FBI memorandum dated September 15, 1942, stated that at that time de Mohrenschildt lived at 3022 Benton Street NW., in Washington, D.C., with Quinten Keynes, whom the memorandum described as a member of British intelligence, and two American

naval officers.(207) The memorandum also stated that de Mohrenschildt was allegedly "very pro-Nazi." (208)

(82) In October 1942 the FBI interviewed the man who rented the Benton Street house, Paul Joachim. Joachim told the FBI that he was employed at the time in the Navy building.(209) The other occupants of the house were Lt. Cdr. Harry Hull of the U.S. Navy, and Quinton Quines, who Joachim said worked at the British Embassy.(210) Joachim said de Mohrenschildt lived at the house during the end of May and all of June 1942.(211) He said de Mohrenschildt never made any statements about feelings toward any country, and no statements which were pro-Nazi. (212)

(83) De Mohrenschildt testified before the Warren Commission that at the time he first met Oswald in Fort Worth in the summer of 1962 he was accompanied by Col. Lawrence Orlov.(213) De Mohrenschildt described Orlov as his "very close friend" and stated that the two men were on business together in Fort Worth when de Mohrenschildt suggested that they visit the Oswald family.(214) No further information about Orlov was elicited; he was presumably retired from the military at that time.

(84) De Mohrenschildt testified further that during the first period of his acquaintance with the Oswalds in the fall of 1962, he and his wife took the Oswalds to a party in Dallas at the home of retired Navy Adm. Chester Bruton.(215) De Mohrenschildt said he and his wife were close to the Brutons.(216) During the party Bruton asked Oswald about his service in the Marine Corps, and according to de Mohrenschildt, received such a negative response from Oswald that the conversation was quickly terminated.(217)

GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILDT CHRONOLOGY FROM WARREN COMMISSION TESTIMONY

April 17, 1911—Born in Mozyr, Russia, to Sergis Alexander Von Mohrenschildt and Alexandra Zopalsky.

1918—Returned to live in Minsk after the Russia revolution.

1920—Father seized and put in jail by the Communists.

1921—Father banished to Siberia after second arrest; sentenced to life imprisonment.

1922—Father released from prison due to illness and escaped with family to Poland; mother died soon after from typhoid fever.

1929—Graduated from gymnasium in Wilno, Poland. Volunteered for Polish Army and attended Polish Military Academy in Grudziadz.

1931—Graduated from military academy with rank of sergeant candidate officer. Went to Belgium and enrolled in Institut Supérieur de Commerce at Antwerp. Returned to Poland to take part in military summer maneuvers.

Approximately 1936—Received masters degree equivalent at Institut. Entered University of Liege.

1938—Received equivalent of doctor of science of international commerce from Liege. During university studies ran sport shop business with girlfriend.

May 1938—Emigrated to the United States with approximately \$10,000 from his mother's estate and sports business. Worked for Chevalier Garde in New York selling perfumes. Worked as salesman for Shumaker & Co. Met Jackie Kennedy and her mother at Belpoint, Long Island, during the summer vacation.

1939-41—Dabbled in insurance business but failed to pass broker's examination.

1939—Worked for Humble Oil in Houston, Tex. Visited Louisiana home of Margaret Clark Williams who had large oil property in Louisiana. Returned to Louisiana and worked on rig in Terrebonne Parish. Tried to get job as polo instructor at Arizona Desert School for Boys. Contracted amoebic dysentery in Louisiana and returned to New York to recover. Mobilized by the Polish Army; contacted Polish Embassy in Washington, D.C., but, "It was too late to join the Polish Army."

- 1941—Cousin Baron Maydell offered de Mohrenschildt job making documentary movies. Assisted making of movie on Polish resistance.
- 1941—Worked with Pierre Fraiss at Shumaker Co.; assisted Fraiss in "collecting facts on people involved in pro-German activity" on behalf of French intelligence in the United States. Traveled to Texas to attempt to contact oil companies about French purchases.
- Approximately 1941—Received 4-F deferment from American Army. Met Lilia Pardo Larin through "King of Bananas" of Brazil, Dr. Paulo Machado, and went to live with her in Mexico. Car stopped by FBI agents at Corpus Christi and de Mohrenschildt accused of taking photographs of Coast Guard station at Arkansas Pass; carried Polish passport, accused of being German spy. Remained in Mexico approximately 9 months; invested in sugar company. Expelled from Mexico for allegedly illicit relationship with Lilia and returned to the United States.
- 1942—Met Dorothy Pierson in Palm Beach.
- 1943—Married Dorothy Pierson. Exhibited paintings at Newton Gallery in New York.
- 1944—Traveled to Texas. Got a loan from the Russian Student Fund. Applied at Colorado School of Mines, Rice Institute and University of Texas. Entered University of Texas School of Geology with minor in petroleum engineering.
- 1945—Received masters degree in petroleum geology. Worked as field engineer for Pantepec Oil Co. in Venezuela.
- 1946—Returned to the United States. Went to work for Rangely Field Committee in Colorado and worked in drilling statistics and technology. Met Phyllis Washington during vacation in New York.
- 1947—First went to Haiti and began establishing mining and development business.
- July 1949—Became American citizen.
- 1949—Received divorce from Phyllis Washington.
- 1950—Moved to Denver.
- Formed Hooker and de Mohrenschildt partnership in drilling and leases.
- April 1951—Married Wynne Sharples.
- 1952—Terminated partnership with Ed Hooker, returned to New York.
- 1953—Son Sergei born.
- 1954—Daughter Nayda born.
- Formed Walden Oil Co. with wife's uncle, Col. Edward J. Walz.
- 1956—took job in Haiti with Sinclair Oil Co. Traveled to Nigeria, France, Mexico on oil exploration, also Ghana, Togoland, France. Traveled to Cuba for Pantetec Oil Co. Traveled for Charmex, Cuban Venezuelan Trust, Warren Smith Co., Three States Oil & Gas and Lehman Trading Corp.
- 1957—Contacted by Core Lab of Dallas about work in Yugoslavia for International Cooperation Administration and Yugoslav Government.
- 1957—Divorced from Didi Sharples.
- Feb.-Oct. 1957—Worked in Yugoslavia under ICA. Accused by Communists of making sketches of military fortifications in Yugoslavia. Met Jeanne Le Gon in Dallas.
- 1958—Returned to Yugoslavia to develop drilling venture using Yugoslav labor for John Mecom of Cardwell Tool Corp. Visited Poland for 10 days. Visited Dominican Embassy in Washington, D.C., to discuss oil project with Ambassador.
- 1959—Married Jeanne Le Gon.
- 1959 or 1960—Went to Mexico City for Texas Eastern Corp. and encountered Mikoyan.
- 1960—Son Sergei died of cystic fibrosis. Became chairman of Cystic Fibrosis Fund of Dallas. Started National Foundation for Cystic Fibrosis with Jacqueline Kennedy as honorary chairman.
- 1960—Went on walking trip from Mexico through Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama.
- Fall 1961—Returned from walking trip.
- Early 1962—Went to Haiti to set up project to review mining resources of Haiti. Returned to Louisiana on Lykes Line ship. Began geology consulting work in Dallas.
- Summer 1962—Told by George Bouhe of young American defector who returned to United States with Russian wife living in Fort Worth. A few days later, went with Colonel Orlov to visit Oswalds; Marina was home alone; Oswald

arrived home later. A few days after that saw Marina alone again when his wife took her to a dental clinic at Baylor. Offered to help Oswald find a job; introduced him to Samuel Ballen—later said that may have occurred in December 1962 or January 1963.

Sept. 1962—Visited Oswald home in Oak Cliff: Marina had a black eye and claimed Oswald was beating her. Helped Marina move in with the Mellers. A few days later Oswald came by and asked for the address of the Mellers. Talked to Max Clark about Oswald and J. Walton Moore.

Oct. 1962—Visited Elena Hall while Marina was living with her.

Christmas 1962—Invited Oswalds to party at home of Declan Ford. Did not see Oswalds in October, November, and December 1962 until the Christmas party.

January 1963—took Oswalds to party at home of Everett Glover. Met Ruth Paine for the first time at Glover's party; never saw Ruth Paine again. During same period took Oswalds to party at home of Adm. Chester Bruton.

March 1963—Went to Haiti to arrange geology contract with Haitian Government. Stopped over in Dominican Republic.

March 13, 1963—Congress of Haiti approved de Mohrenschildt's geological survey for \$285,000; part of payment to de Mohrenschildt is to be interest in sisal plantation with 10 year concession.

Easter 1963—Visited Oswalds at Neely Street address; Marina showed Jeanne Oswald's gun. Asked Oswald about the Walker shooting.

May 1963—Left Dallas for Haiti; stopped over in New York, Washington, and Philadelphia.

June 1963—Went to Haiti. Stopped over in Dominican Republic.

April 1964—Went to Dominican Republic from Haiti to get Bureau of Mines information. Went to San Juan, P.R.

Submitted by:

Ms. SURELL BRADY,
Staff Counsel.

REFERENCES

(1) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 283-84 (hereinafter Warren report).

(2) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Hearings of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), Apr. 22, 1964, vol. 9, p. 168 (hereinafter "Warren Commission").

(3) Id. at p. 169.

(4) Id. at p. 168.

(5) Id. at p. 183.

(6) Id. at p. 173. (de Mohrenschildt testified that Ferdinand de Mohrenschildt, who died in 1924 or 1925, was married to the daughter of William Gibbs McAdoo.)

(7) Id. at p. 271. (Counsel Jenner of the Warren Commission asked de Mohrenschildt if Sergius de Mohrenschildt, who was reportedly born in Pennsylvania and went into the oil business, was his grandfather, but de Mohrenschildt could not confirm that information.)

(8) Id. at p. 171.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Id. at p. 172.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Id. at pp. 172-73.

(13) Id. at p. 174.

(14) Id. at p. 178.

(15) Id. at p. 179.

(16) Id. at p. 176.

(17) Ibid.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Id. at p. 177.

(20) Ibid (George de Mohrenschildt explained in his testimony that he ceased using the prefix "Von" in his name when he became an American citizen and adopted the French "de." His brother Dimitri, however, retained the original name.)

(21) Department of State, Passport Office document, October 8, 1942, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Tab B, p. 2. (JFK Classified Document No. 172).

(22) Staff outside contact report, Oct. 24, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 013224).

(23) Department of State, Passport Office document, Oct. 8, 1942, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Tab B, p. 2. (JFK Classified Document No. 172).

(24) Ibid.

(25) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 22, 1964, vol. 9, p. 179.

(26) Id. at p. 185.

(27) Id. at p. 186.

(28) Ibid.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Id. at p. 187.

(31) Ibid.

(32) Department of State, Office of Censorship Document, Jan. 23, 1943, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Tab B, p. 3. (JFK Classified Document No. 172).

(33) Department of State, Passport Office document, passport application, 1/ /57 (date illegible), George de Mohrenschildt Passport Office file.

(34) Ibid.

(35) Department of State, Passport Office document, passport renewal application, Mar. 10, 1960, George de Mohrenschildt Passport Office file.

(36) Ibid.

(37) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 22, 1964, vol. 9, p. 182.

(38) Ibid.

(39) Ibid.

(40) Ibid.

(41) Id. at pp. 182-83.

(42) Id. at p. 182.

(43) CIA classified document, OSS Memo, July 30, 1942, George de Mohrenschildt 201 file.

(44) Ibid.

(45) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 23, 1964, vol. 9, p. 249.

(46) Id. at p. 248.

(47) Id. at p. 249.

(48) Ibid.

(49) Ibid.

(50) Ibid.

(51) Ibid.

(52) Department of State airgram, Dec. 8, 1963, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3. (JFK Document No. 011353).

(53) Ibid.

(54) Ibid.

(55) Ibid.

(56) Ibid.

(57) Ibid.

(58) Affidavit of Receipt of de Mohrenschildt items, Apr. 1, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations. (JFK Document No. 001145. JFK exhibit F-382. F-383).

(59) Ibid.

(60) Testimony of Joseph McNally, Sept. 14, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, vol. II, p. 376 (hereinafter referred to as McNally testimony (Sept. 14, 1978, II HSCA-JFK hearings, 376)).

(61) Ibid.

(62) Affidavit of receipt of de Mohrenschildt items, Apr. 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 001145).

(63) De Mohrenschildt manuscript, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 001198).

(64) Id. at p. 184.

(65) Id. at p. 182.

(66) Id. at p. 183.

- (67) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 22, 1964, vol. 9, p. 212.
- (68) Ibid.
- (69) Ibid.
- (70) Id. at p. 184.
- (71) Id. at p. 183.
- (72) Ibid.
- (73) Id. at p. 184.
- (74) Ibid.
- (75) Ibid.
- (76) Ibid.
- (77) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission hearings, Apr. 23, 1964, vol. 9, p. 235.
- (78) Ibid.
- (79) Ibid.
- (80) Ibid.
- (81) CIA classified document, J. Walton Moore personnel file, biographic profile, reviewed Feb. 20, 1975.
- (82) CIA classified document, J. Walton Moore personnel file, memorandum, Dec. 8, 1949.
- (83) CIA classified document, J. Walton Moore personnel file, fitness report, Apr. 1, 1963-Mar. 31, 1964.
- (84) CIA classified document, George de Mohrenschildt 201 file, memorandum, Apr. 13, 1977, to Chief DCD.
- (85) Ibid.
- (86) Ibid.
- (87) CIA classified document, George de Mohrenschildt 201 file, memorandum, May 1, 1964, to Acting Chief, Contacts Division, from Dallas resident agent.
- (88) Ibid.
- (89) CIA classified document, George de Mohrenschildt 201 file, process sheet for OO/C collections.
- (90) Staff interview of James Walton Moore, Mar. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document No. 014893).
- (91) Id. at p. 3.
- (92) Ibid.
- (93) Department of State Airgram No. A-131, Dec. 8, 1963, House Select Committee on Assassinations (contained in JFK Document No. 009963).
- (94) Department of State Incoming Telegram No. 013865, Dec. 19, 1963, House Select Committee on Assassinations (contained in JFK Document No. 009963).
- (95) Ibid.
- (96) Ibid.
- (97) Id. at p. 276.
- (98) Ibid.
- (99) Ibid.
- (100) George de Mohrenschildt exhibit 6, Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 19, p. 551.
- (101) Ibid.
- (102) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 23, 1964, vol. 9, p. 280.
- (103) Id. at p. 282.
- (104) Id. at p. 281.
- (105) George de Mohrenschildt exhibit No. 1, Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 19, p. 544.
- (106) Ibid.
- (107) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 23, 1964, vol. 9, p. 280.
- (108) Id. at p. 281.
- (109) Id. at p. 277.
- (110) Ibid.
- (111) CIA classified document, Office of Security memo, Dec. 30, 1974, George de Mohrenschildt Office of Security file.
- (112) Ibid.
- (113) Ibid.
- (114) CIA classified document, memo, May 7, 1963, De Mohrenschildt 201 file.
- (115) Ibid.

(116) Staff interview of Dorothe Matlack, Sept. 4, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 015042).

(117) Ibid.

(118) Id. at p. 2.

(119) Ibid.

(120) Ibid.

(121) Ibid.

(122) Ibid.

(123) Ibid.

(124) Ibid.

(125) Ibid.

(126) Ibid.

(127) Ibid.

(128) Ibid.

(129) Id. at p. 3.

(130) Ibid.

(131) Ibid.

(132) The Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1964.

(133) Ibid.

(134) Ibid.

(135) Ibid.

(136) Ibid.

(137) Ibid.

(138) Staff interview of I. Irving Davidson, Nov. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document No. 013230).

(139) Ibid.

(140) Ibid.

(141) Ibid.

(142) Ibid.

(143) Ibid.

(144) Ibid.

(145) Ibid.

(146) Ibid.

(147) Ibid.

(148) The Washington Star, Jan. 24, 1978.

(149) FBI memorandum, Nov. 1, 1967, serial 62-109060-5837.

(150) Ibid.

(151) Ibid.

(152) Ibid.

(153) Ibid.

(154) Ibid.

(155) Id. at p. 3.

(156) Id. at p. 2.

(157) Ibid.

(158) Staff interview of I. Irving Davidson, Nov. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 013230).

(159) Ibid.

(160) Ibid.

(161) CIA classified document, memo, Jan. 7, 1964, I. Irving Davidson Office of Security file.

(162) Department of State airgram, from State Department to American Embassy, Port-au-Prince, May 2, 1967.

(163) Ibid.

(164) Department of State airgram, from State Department to American Embassy, Port-au-Prince, May 25, 1967.

(165) Staff interview of Edward Browder, Jan. 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document No. 005081).

(166) Id. at pp. 2-3.

(167) Id. at p. 4.

(168) Ibid.

(169) Ibid.

(170) Ibid.

(171) Ibid.

(172) Staff outside contact report, May 17, 1978. House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 009434).

(173) Ibid.

(174) Ibid.

(175) Ibid.

(176) Staff Interview of Joseph Dryer, July 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document No. 009765).

(177) Ibid.

(178) Ibid.

(179) Ibid.

(180) Ibid.

(181) Ibid.

(182) Ibid.

(183) Ibid.

(184) Ibid.

(185) Id. at p. 2.

(186) Ibid.

(187) Ibid.

(188) Ibid.

(189) Ibid.

(190) Ibid.

(191) Ibid.

(192) Ibid.

(193) Ibid.

(194) Ibid.

(195) Id. at p. 3.

(196) Ibid.

(197) Ibid.

(198) Ibid.

(199) Ibid.

(200) Ibid.

(201) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 23, 1964, vol. 9, p. 257.

(202) Ibid.

(203) Id. at p. 258.

(204) Testimony of Ruth Paine, Warren Commission Hearings, Mar. 18, 1964, vol. 2, p. 436.

(205) Id. at p. 435.

(206) Id. at p. 436.

(207) FBI memorandum, Sept. 15, 1942, Serial No. 100-32965-34.

(208) Ibid.

(209) FBI memorandum, Oct. 1942, Serial No. 100-32965-36.

(210) Ibid.

(211) Ibid.

(212) Ibid.

(213) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 22, 1964, vol. 9, p. 225.

(214) Ibid.

(215) Testimony of George de Mohrenschildt, Warren Commission Hearings, Apr. 23, 1964, vol. 9, p. 253.

(216) Ibid.

(217) Ibid.

APPENDIX

MANUSCRIPT BY GEORGE DE MOHRENSCHILDT

The manuscript of the book George de Mohrenschildt was writing at the time of his death in March 1977 is included in this staff report as an appendix. In it de Mohrenschildt gave many details about his activities and associations, and perhaps most significantly, an insight into how he perceived his relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald.

The facts and information in the manuscript in many respects differ from, and occasionally boldly contradict, statements that were made by de Mohrenschildt to several Government agencies at the time of the assassination and other information that has been made public. While there is no longer any way to resolve those factual conflicts or to confront de Mohrenschildt with the discrepancies, the manuscript is, nevertheless, included here to shed light on at least how George de Mohrenschildt himself viewed those facts and how he wanted the public record to read about himself and Oswald.

I AM A PATSY! I AM A PATSY!Preface in Haiti.

001198

I am a patsy! I am a patsy! These last words of my friend, Lee Harvey Oswald still ring in my ears and make me think of the terrible injustice inflicted on the memory of this "supposed assassin".

November 1963 was fairly uneventful in Haiti - no shootings and no invasions. My young geologist Alston Boyd and I had worked in our office located on Avenue Truman in the center of Port-au-Prince. Since we started very early in the morning to avoid the infernal daily heat, our daily chores were over at 2 P.M. This office occupied a large room of a quanset building belonging to the Haitian Government and we were kept there virtually incommunicado since it contained government maps and other "strategic information".

Alston and I drove to my house overlooking Port-au-Prince in the area called Tonton Lyle and a block away from the presidential retreat, then we ate and took a siesta, like any self-respecting Haitian. Then, later the afternoon we dressed and went to the reception at the Lebanese Embassy.

The usually animated streets of the capital seemed deserted. "I feel trouble in the air," said my wife Jeanne. The air was balmy, the soldiers and the tontons macoutes were absent and we could not hear any shots.

We greeted the Lebanese Ambassador and joined the crowd. George Morel,

head of the Pan-American Airways in Haiti came up to us immediately.

"Didn't you know your president was killed?" He asked in a strained voice.

At first we thought he was talking about the President of Haiti, Docteur François Duvalier who was my nominal boss in Haiti. Seeing our blank expressions, Morel explained. "President Kennedy was assassinated to-day."

I hoped that it would't happen in Texas and especially in Dallas. But Morel summarily explained the situation - and it was in Dallas.

Gloomily we filed out of the Lebanese Embassy, where people did not seem to be too badly concerned about President Kennedy's fate, got in the car and drove away. "If I had his tonton-macoutes around, this would not have happened." I said angrily and this was my first serious criticism of our services supposed to protect the President of the United States.

We drove gloomily to the American Embassy, located near the sea-shore and not too far from my office. The doors were wide opened and two marines stood there on both sides of a book where the American residents would sign their names as a gesture of reverence to the dead head of state. Having signed our names, we were the first to have done it, we drove to the house of an old friend of mine, Valentin (Teddy) Blaque, an attache at the Embassy.

Teddy's house was similar to ours, but more alebaroate, with a large terrace overlooking the sparkling bay of Port-au-Prince. Several mutual friends stood around, looking at each other with stunned expressions, and seemes to ask the same question: "Why him?"

"For the first time we had a president who was yound and energetic. And he was trying to solve the problems of the world," said Jeanne sadly, holding back her tears. "And he had to go..."

The beautiful view seemed funereal to us, as we stood there silently.

"And in DaLLas," I mused aloud, why there? A conservative and somewhat provincial city, but successful and proud of its success. We knew the Mayoo - a charming man - and many city fathers.

"But who did it?" I asked Teddy.

"I just listened to the radio and a suspect was arrested already," he said.

Before he mentioned the name, I thought of Lee and his rifle with the telescopic lense. "Could it be Lee? No it was impossible."

And driving back home, in stunned silence, we thought of Lee and the predicament he was in.

But since the official version had it that Lee Harvey Oswald was the main suspect, we made our depasition at the Embassy. We did know him and

we were aware of the fact he owned a rifle. We would be happy to testify what we knew about him and about our relationship with him and his wife. But we did not believe he was the assassin.

Then we learned that a letter was sent by someone influential in Washington to the officials of the Haitian government to drop me from the payroll and to exile me as fast as possible. Fortunately I had good friends and the latter did not happen. And later, little by little, we were ostracized by the United States Ambassador Timmons, then by the American businessmen and government employees, with whom we had been on very good terms and, finally, came the news of the investigation of all our friends and even acquaintances in the United States.

Then came the man with the white teeth and a flannel suit, an FBI agent trying to scare us off. At last, after a long time, we were officially invited to come to Washington and help the Warren Committee in their investigation. Although we could contribute very little, we still accepted to go to Washington and testify. Although our depositions were supposed to remain confidential, all the three hundred pages of irrelevant conversation were printed and promiscuously distributed. Actually our depositions were longer than Marina's and Mrs. Marguerite Oswald's put together! Why?

We assume two reasons - to waste taxpayer's money and to distract attention of the American people from the people involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. All the gossip, futile stuff, related to our private lives, half of it not relevant to Oswald, boring and useless. And all this because my wife and I liked Lee Harvey Oswald, tried to defend him and because Lee said, before he died: " I liked and admired George de Mohrenschildt."

Getting to know Lee Harvey Oswald and hi wife.

Early in the summer of 1962 the rumours spread out among the Russian speaking people of Dallas and Fort Worth of an unusual couple - the Osvalds. He was supposedly an ex-marine, an unfriendly and eccentric character, who had gone to Russia and brought back with him a Russian wife. He had lives in Minsk where I had spent my early childhood. And so I was curious to meet the couple and to find out what had happened to Minsk.

Someone gave me Lee's address and one afternoon a friend of mine, Colonel Lawrence Orloff and myself drove to Fort Worth, about 30 miles from Dallas. We drove over the dreary, sewage smelling miles separating thh two cities. Texas does have lovely open spaces, but here they were degraded and polluted. After some searching, we found a shack on Merced street in a semi-industrial, slummy area, near Montgomery Ward.

I knocked and a tawdry but clean young woman opened the door. I introduced myself and the colonel, giving a reference the name of George Bouhe from whom I obtained the address. George was an elderly refugee, very friendly, the father superior of all the Russians in the Dallas Fort Worth Area. So this was Marina Oswald.

To Orlov she was beautiful notwithstanding bad teeth and mousy blond hair.

I did not find her very attractive although she had a certain charm and she spoke beautiful, melodious Russian, so different from the language used by us who anglicized our language and bastardized it by foreign intonations and words.

Marina offered us some sherry and said that Lee would be over soon. We spoke a little, fooling around; she had a pretty good sense of humour but the opinions she expressed seemed trite to me. And then entered Lee Harvey Oswald who was to become so famous or so infamous. He wore overalls and clean workingman's shoes on. Only someone who had never met Lee could have called him insignificant. "There is something outstanding about this man," I told myself. One could detect immediately a very sincere and forward man. Although he was average-looking, with no outstanding features and of medium size, he showed in his conversation all the elements of concentration, thought and toughness. This man had the courage of his convictions and did not hesitate to discuss them. I was glad to meet such a person and was carried away back to the days of my youth in Europe, where as students, we discussed world affairs and our own ideas over many beers and without caring about time.

Lee was looking tenderly from time to time at Baby June. He loved her.

We shook hands and left. Driving back the colonel mused: "she is so charming and young!"

"But I found th ex-marine so much more interesting," I said.

My friend, the retired air-force colonel resented Lee, his offhandedness, his ironic smiles and especially his ferocious spirit of independence.

All his sympathy went to Marina, the poor Russian refugee.

We spoke English first and then, somehow, we switched to Russian.

Lee spoke it very well, only with a slight accent. Marina did not say very much. "Doesn't your wife speak any English at all?" I asked Lee.

"No, and I don't want her to know English. I want her to continue speaking her own language. Russian is beautiful and I don't want to forget it." And he added with deep conviction. "Russian literature is marvelous and the people I met in the Soviet Union were so warm and nice to me. Yes, I made many friends there," he added thoughtfully.

"And how about the Soviet Government?" I asked anxiously.

"Well, that's another story. The trouble with me I always look for an ideal which probably does not exist."

"Maybe your friend does not understand Russian," said Lee looking at Colonel Orloff. "Let's speak English then. You know I was a marine and have respect for the brass," he smiled and added a few kind words to my friend.

And then it was time for us to go. "My wife speaks Russian also and she would like to spend some time with you Marina, and the baby of course," I said.

"I would like to but it will depend on Lee," she answered humbly.

"I am sure Lee will let you go and will come himself!" A bond of friendship was already formed between the two of us.

First meetings with Lee.

Lee called me a few days after our trip to Fort Worth. "Marina and I will come over to-night, if you don't mind," he said.

"Maybe I could drive to Fort Worth and drive you?" I asked.

"No, thank you, we will come by bus," he answered laconically.

And here they were, Marina, Lee and the baby June. We lived at the time in a pleasant area called University Park, a few blocks from the Southern Methodist University, a conservative stronghold. Both my wife and I were fairly free at the time and welcomed our guests, so different from the local society. Jeanne liked Marina immediately and offered to help her with her English. "Yes, I have to know the language," she agreed and then added unexpectedly. "People already asked me why I liked Lee," and her eyes darted about the furniture and decoration of our rather modest home, "and I answer them, why did Lee like me?" Jeanne liked this humble remark and her sympathy for Marina increased.

In the meantime Lee and I sat on a comfortable sofa and talked all evening. Naturally I do not remember the sequence, although I recorded what I remembered a few years later, but mostly I asked questions and he answered them. Naturally I wanted to know what made him go to the Soviet Union and he answered me by telling me of his youth in New Orleans. Since his childhood he

was keenly aware of social and racial injustices. Instead of playing basketball or baseball, like any other red-blooded American youth, he read voraciously. Among the books he read was Marx's "The Capital" which made a deep impression on him. Ironically, he said, he borrowed this book from the Loyola University library.

"What did you like in it?" I remember asking him.

"It made clear to me the intolerable fact of the exploitation of the poor by the rich."

"But," I said, "Lee, you must have seen it all over the world, the weak or the poor are exploited everywhere by the powerful and the rich. Listen to this: two dogs meet on the crosspoint between East and West Berlin. One dog is running away from the capitalism, the other from communism. The capitalist dog asks - 'why do you run away?' - 'Because I can eat but I cannot bark. Why are you running away? 'If I bark I cannot eat' answered the capitalist dog." Lee laughed and answered by a joke he heard somewhere in Minsk. "As you know," he said, "Russians grab all the can from the satellite countries. So one day at the meeting of the communist party in Rumania, one of the workers stood up and said. 'Comrade Secretary, may I ask you 3 questions?' - 'Go ahead' I want to know what happened to our wheat, our petroleum and our wine?" 'Well' said the Secretary, 'it's a very complex economic question. I cannot

answer it immediately.'

"Well a few months later the workers are holding the same type of a meeting and another comrade realises his had and says: 'Comrade Secretary may I ask you four questions?' - 'Shoot' says the secretary. 'I want to ask you what happened to our petroleum, wine and wheat and also what happened to the comrade who had asked the three questions some time ago?' - Silence."

We both laughed. "At least here we are not being sent to a concentration camp," I said.

"you are wrong," answered Lee seriously, "most of the prisoners, convicts in American jail are political prisoners, they are victims of the system."

I read similar opinions recently in several liberal books and Lee was way ahead in thought of all of them. This was over fourteen years ago.

I remember concluding this conversation by telling Lee. "If you want to be a revolutionary, you have to be a fool or to have an inspiration. And your actions will be judged by the success or failure of your life."

Lee agreed. What I liked about him ~~in~~ was that he was a seeker for justice - that he had highly developed social instincts. And I was disappointed in my own children for the lack of such instincts.

Incidentally I remember some details pretty well because I made notes of them later and also made tapes of my recollections fairly soon after the assassination.

That night Jeanne served a Russian dinner which Marina found delicious but Lee hardly touched. He was ascetic in his habits, was indifferent to food he didn't like deserts. In the meantime baby June slept quietly in bed all wrapped up. Lee looked tenderly at her. That night we learned a lot about him - he neither drank or smoked and objected if others, especially his wife did. Since neither my wife or I smoked and drank very little, he like it and considered that we were on his side.

Jeanne was appalled finding out that baby June hadn't had any injections usually given to a child. Also Marina would pick up a pacifier from the floor - then tried it herself before putting it in June's mouth. Unfortunately she had infected teeth at the time, so the baby was exposed also.

My wife had high ideas on Russian hygiene and generally on the high standards of the Soviet youth, so she was outspokenly critical. "Your infected teeth have to be removed as soon as possible," she told Marina. When Marina objected that she didn't have any money and couldn't speak English, Jeanne promised to help her.

After dinner Lee and I went back on the sofa and ~~was~~ renewed our conversation.

"I served in the Marine Corps not because I was a patriot but I wanted to get away from the drudgery and to see the world," admitted Lee.

"Did you like the service?"

"Not particularly. But I had time to study, to read and indeed we traveled a LOT."

"You told me you lived in Japan. How did you land there?"

"Just an accident of the Marine Corps duty. The military duty was boring and stupid. But fortunately I moved around, began visiting places where youngsters meet and established contacts with some more progressive and thinking Japanese." and this," said Lee thoughtfully, "is what led me to Russia eventually. I also learned there of other, Japanese, ways of exploitation of the poor by the rich. Semi-feudal, industrial giants which act paternalistically yet exploiting the workers - proletarians. The wages in Japan were ridiculously low," Lee added.

"Well, it's changing now," said I. "Say, Lee, it's in Japan that you got your discharge from the marine corps?"

Lee did not like to elaborate on this touchy subject. "I had to work to support my mother."

But it developed later, as we all know, that he did not go back to USA to support his mother but changed his mind and instead went to Russia. He obviously used the money obtained at his discharge for this trip. He first went to Western Europe then drifted to USSR via Finland if I remember well.

Later on Lee's honorable discharge was changed to undesirable discharge and he hated to talk about it and considered it unfair to him. This explains his hatred of Connelly who was Secretary of the Navy at the time of this change of Lee's discharge.

But that day he did not discuss this subject and went on talking about Russia. "I got to Moscow and stayed there until the Russians had confidence in me and gave me a permit to work." He did not mention that he tried to commit suicide in desperation and cut his wrists.

Marine took part in the conversation. "Lee, you threw your passport in the face of the American consul and you said that you denounced your citizenship," she said.

Later Lee talked to me about his ordeal in Moscow but not this time. He went talking about his impressions of Minsk because he knew I was interested in this subject. He gave me a general description of the city I knew from my early childhood. "I was assigned to work there without any particular reason, in a TV factory, possibly because I had a little electronic training in the Marines," he said candidly.

"Tell me more about the countryside," I asked him.

"Swisloch river is pretty clean, we used to go by row-boats to the forest nearby to pick-nick on weekends. The forests are beautiful there, huge pine trees, clean grass, full of berries of all kind."

I remembered the cathedral, several other picturesque churches and the main building - GPU, NKVD, EGB - police headquarters, where my father spent several months and where he almost died of starvation and was finally sentenced to life exile in Siberia. But these were childhood memories and resentment on my part had disappeared. Lee gave me a perfect description of all these landmarks, they were still there, unchanged. But there were many new factories built, one of them where he worked.

"Did you like your job?"

"Not particularly, but the pay was sufficient, about a hundred rubles a month, an average for the Soviet Union. I could live on it. My apartment and all utilities were furnished by the factory for a nominal fee, as well as medical insurance etc."

He gave me the prices of bread, produce, milk etc, which were reasonable and of clothing, which were outrageously high. "Sometimes I used to run short of meat, but you know I am not a big eater, it was of no importance to me."

Marina listened in and gave more precise information, especially complaining about clothing and shoes. She was a practical one.

"You must have been somewhat privileged," I said, "being a foreigner, but how did the other workers live in Minsk, the Russians?"

"Not too well. Usually one roof for a couple, community kitchens and la-

vatories," he admitted. "This led to quarrels, gossip, jealousy a rather dismal situation. But what does it matter if everyone is in the same boat, if everyone suffers. No rich exploiters like here, no great contrasts between the rich and the poor."

"Butter and meat were out of my reach," said Marina bitterly, "but you foreigners could afford these luxuries."

She was ready to continue talking more but since she was from Smolensk, then town I was not familiar with, I asked Lee to talk more about Minsk and he did. To me his descriptions were most touching.

That night Marina announced that Lee was going to be laid off from his job in Fort Worth at Leslie Welding Company, if I remember correctly. It was a poor job anyway, minimal wages, long hours, unhealthy conditions but Lee did not complain, he never complained, it was Marina who was constantly dissatisfied. The air of American prosperity bothered her, she was envious of other people's wealth or wellbeing. Lee's mind was of a stoical, philosophical type, that's why, I guessed, he had gotten ~~xx~~ along so well with the other Russians he met in the Soviet Union. Russians do not mind to suffer and even go hungry if they can spend entire nights talking and speculating on some ezoteric matters.

Next time the Osvalds came to visit us, we began speaking of Minsk again. I reminisced that when I was five years old, my father used to talk

me to the forest and I helped him as well as I could in his awkward efforts to cut down a big pine tree. It was a tough job for my father who had never been a physically able man and he constantly hurt himself. Once he jammed his finger so badly that the bone broke and the finger remained useless for the rest of his life. Surprisingly I grew adept at that sort of thing and was quite able with an ax.

"Is that lovely forest north of town still in existence?" I asked Lee and explained exactly where it was.

"Yes, we used to go there frequently by bus with my fellow workers. We took food along and spent the whole day talking freely. I explained the United States to them and they informed me on life in Russia."

Lee generally did not complain about his life in Russia but Marina did very frequently, sincerely or not, I do not know. She considered me a capitalist and tried to please me.

I promised Lee that night to give him introductions to a few influential people, since I wanted him and his family to move away from the gruesome of Fort Worth slum. I hoped that the other members of the Russian community would help him also and told him so.

"Thanks a lot, I can take care of myself, I don't need those creeps, I shall find something," he answered gruffly. This was an example of Lee's in-

dependence, he refused help, objected even to my help. Rather than to be indebted to someone, he would rather starve on his own.

While Marina was usually a lot of fun, laughed easily but did not say anything that would make you think - Lee was serious and did not take life as a joke. But if he happened to be in a good mood, he became an excellent companion, remembered political jokes, told them well and laughed at yours.

"Do you know this one about an American tourist carrying a small transistor radio in Moscow?" Lee asked me.

"No, I don't know the story.

"Well, the Moscovite stopped the American and said: 'we make them much better than you do. What is it?'"

We both laughed. Then I countered and asked Lee.

"What is the difference between the capitalism and the socialism?"

Lee did not know.

"Capitalism makes social mistakes and socialism makes CAPITAL mistakes."

"A Russian Commissar is asked at the holy gates where he would like to go - to a capitalist hell or to a communist hell," said Lee.

"The Commissar answers: 'I would like to go to a capitalist hell, I am so tired of a communist hell.'"

Then I told Lee a few foolish jokes about Kennedy, they were very po-

"President Kennedy tells a group of businessmen: 'the economic situation is so good that if I weren't your president I would invest in the stock market right now! And the businessmen answer in unison: 'so would we if you were not our president.'"

We both laughed.

"Kennedy had a terrible nightmare. He wakes up Jackie: 'honey what a terrible thing, I dreamed I was spending my own money, not government's.'"

Again we laughed, but without resentment, we both liked President Kennedy. So I finished my foolish jokes by this one:

"John Kennedy runs to his mother at night. 'Mama! Mama! Help! Bobby tries to run MY country.'"

I think it was at that time that I told Lee that I had known Jacqueline Kennedy as a young girl, as well as her mother, father and all her relatives and how charming the whole family was, I especially liked "Black Jack" Bouvier, Jackie's father, a delightful Casanova of the Wall Street.

Lee was not jealous of Kennedy's and Bouviers' wealth and did not envy their social positions, of that I was sure. To him wealth and society were big jokes, but he did not resent them.

Now I want to tell something which may seem foolish to people who are not dog lovers. At the time we had two lovely black Manchester Terriers,

Nero and his faithful wife Poppea. Nero had followed us on a long trip over the mountains of Mexico and Central America and saved our lives on several occasions; Poppea was bought for him upon our return to USA and was a wonderful wife for him. I cannot tell how much intuition Nero developed during our trip and how easily he recognized friends from enemies. Well, on the first evening our dogs did not express any interest in Marina or in Baby June but they were fascinated by Lee. Nero especially showed his complete confidence and affection for him. He seldom did it to anyone even to our close friends. He snuggled up to Lee and looked at him with affection. He sensed that he was an utterly sincere person and was deprived of hatred. Poppea also licked his hand in a rare display of affection.

Incidentally, many of our friends and even our own children complained that our dogs were either unfriendly or totally indifferent to them.

And so Lee finally found a job at Taggart's Reproduction Company through the Texas Employment Agency without help from anyone. It was a good job for him as he had been interested in photography for a long time. I guessed that he took a course at the Marine Corps. Anyway he brought a good camera from the Soviet Union and took excellent pictures. Later he showed me excellent enlargements he made himself. These were in black and white he was not advanced enough to develop and enlarge colored photographs..

But Lee's job did not pay well and as began to trust me more, he accepted an introduction to a successful businessman-banker, Sam Ballen, who owned, among other companies, a large reproduction outfit, for maps, electric logs, and records. It was not a successful meeting, Lee and my friend did not like each other. To the businessman Lee was a radical and a maverick, and Lee considered Sam an ordinary bourgeois with no redeeming features to this credit. Actually, both were interesting people, they just did not appeal to each other.

Another conversation comes to my mind. One evening Lee was in a blue mood and confided that he was not particularly pleased with his reception in Minsk. Somewhat naively, he ^{had} expected to be treated as a special person, a prominent refugee, and nothing happened, there was little difference between his condition in Minsk and that of an ordinary Soviet worker. And so he had become depressed. That evening Lee expressed an opinion that he did not appreciate the Soviet type of government.

"Why?" I asked.

"It is somewhat too regimented for me," he said. "We were obliged to go to the meeting at the factory after work, dead tired and listened to inflammatory speeches. It was lucky if I was able to go to sleep.

Indoctrination of any kind are not to my taste."

I saw his point.

Our first evenings with the Osvalds were spent in conversations and discussions and we got to know each other very well. Now something else happened in our relationship. Before Lee got his job at Taggart's , I asked my daughter Alex and my son-in-law Gary Taylor to help the Osvalds moving to Dallas. The Taylors went to visit the Osvalds in Fort Worth and right there they offered Marina to stay with them and to keep the baby. Whatever furniture they had would be stored in their garage. This generous proposition was accepted, Marina moved to Dallas. Lee stayed for a short time in the apartment in Fort Worth and then moved to a small room at YMCA in Dallas, close to his work at Taggart's. During Marina's stay at my daughter's place, my wife helped her, drove her to the Baylor Hospital where they pulled out her rotten teeth. Thuse baby June was kept healthy and well fed. But this short separation did not prevent Lee from coming to see us, even alone.

Further conversation with Lee in 1962.

At the time we knew Lee, nothing could be further from our minds that he might become such a historical figure. His visits were very frequent - sometimes he would come for a short time, sometimes he would spend the whole evening with us. Some bribes of our semi-bantering, semi-serious repartees remain in my memory.

"You are an extremely sincere person, Lee," I told him. "You do not lie even to yourself. Most of the people I know are the opposite of you. They put up a front, they confuse, they deceive, they lie even when thinking."

"I guess it's dangerous to be that way. I know I make a lot of enemies. But what the hell," he acknowledged. "My position is that I am afraid of a very few things in life. I am not cautious. I am not," he smiled, "a turkey which lives only to become fat." And he showed me his non-existing belly. He was becoming very thin.

"Lee, your way of life is so un-American, it scares me to think what may become of you."

"It is true," Lee said, "I am probably committing a sin in not being interested in possessions or money. When a rich man dies, he is loaded with his possessions like a prosiner with chains. I will die free, death will be easy for me."

"Stop talking about death, you are only 22. If you want to talk about gruesome subjects, let me tell you this joke: a usurer is on his death-bed. A priest gives him a crucifix to kiss and to confess his sins. And the usurer blathers: 'I cannot loan you much money for it'".

"Regarding your attitude on money and possessions," I said, "I couldn't agree more with you. You would rather do something unusual than drive a Cadillac. I am the same way."

"Life for me," continued Lee, "is like a hungry crocodile. I'd better defend myself. I have to defend myself against the stupidity of this world. It is enormous! Life must be the work of a perfect idiot. Or maybe the stupidity, like breaking of the atom, is self-perpetuating?"

"Not too bad for a 22 years old American proletarian and a high-school dropout," I thought. "Lee, you have a very original mind."

"Thank you," he said. "I do not often hear the compliments. But let me tell you more why I despise money-loving middle-class. Such people are simply stupid, not serious, they are curiously attracted by crooks and adventurers. And so you hear how often they are sheared off their wool, like sheep, by various financial schemers."

"Diderot," I said, "thinks very much like you. "You have nothing, ~~you~~
~~nothing~~
~~nothing~~

have very little now, so a real friendship is possible between us. We are sincere with each other."

Lee agreed.

"Another thing Diderot said," I continued, "he was very happy being poor and living in a shack. When he achieved opulence and found a nice apartment in Paris, he knew he was going to die..."

"The philosophers talk but you did it," said Lee enviously. "This trip of your, what a freedom! 3,600 miles on foot on tough trails of Latin America. This demanded a complete change in life - willingly, suddenly, for this you needed an extraordinary moral audacity."

"This time I want to thank you, Lee. But do not exaggerate; this was an act of desperation rather than audacity, after the death of my only son. Finally this trip was very satisfying to Jeanne and to me."

And so we chatted in an open and friendly manner and I must of Lee. "My opinion of this guy changes completely and frequently, which happens only with people who are close and important to me. I usually judge the others superficially and label them once for all."

But now I should explain the reasons why I had introduced the Osvalds to my daughter Alex and to her husband. They were about the same age. Gary was a scatter-brained, simple-minded but pleasant young man and as most of his financial schemes failed, he had plenty of time on his hands. His

fondest ambition consisted of becoming rapidly another Clint Murchison or H.L. Hunt and that was hard to achieve. Frankly I hoped that my daughter and her husband Gary would acquire some of the world-wide interests that Lee certainly possessed. His serious approach to life contrasted sharply with the foolish flippancy of Gary's; I also hoped that Marina would teach my daughter some interesting facts about Russia. When these two were together they were somehow able to communicate, as my daughter was and is an excellent linguist.

But, introducing people of such different backgrounds led to unpleasant results. First of all we caused a separation between Marina and Lee. We did understand that it was not the first separation between them, but we actually caused this one. It amazed my daughter that Lee called Marina on the phone unfrequently and did not express much desire to be with her. But he missed baby June. It was peculiar for a young husband but I already suspected that he was pleased being alone at YMCA and was already bored with Marina's company. Next the personalities of Lee and of Gary clashed. Lee considered Gary a spoiled, rich American, foolish youngster and Gary looked down at him as a supercilious, unpractical lunatic with revolutionary ideas. My daughter's opinion of Marina was low also, she was slovenly and didn't know anything about baby-care. although she had obtained a degree of "registered pharmacist" in USSR.

My daughter's opinion of Lee was low also, he was not good-looking, did not care about his appearance, neither was he inclined to make money. As for me, I regretted that Alex did not see any qualities I liked in Lee - the fact that he was socially motivated, was a dreamer and a seeker of truth. But such people was a very hard time in life and that's why so many people considered him a failure and a loser (in quotation marks).

Maybe, had he lived longer, he would have fitted better into the scheme of American life, he would have joined the group of love-children, would have grown a beard and certainly would have been among the protesters against the war in Viet-Nam.

It was probably Marina, dissatisfied with my daughter's attitude, ~~that~~ who made Lee hustle and find an apartment. Very soon the Osvalds settled in their own ground-floor apartment on Elsbeth street, in Oak Cliff, suburb of Dallas. It was far away from us, while we wanted them to live nearby. Probably Lee wanted to be as far away as possible from the other Russian refugees, whom he disliked. Anyway, the apartment was ten miles or more away from our place at University Park.

With Lee's job secured at Taggart's and away from the gruesome slum in Fort Worth, Jeanne and I thought that the Osvald family would be happy..

Jeanne registered the baby in children's clinic for regular check-ups and Marina was treated almost gratis in the dental clinic of the Baylor hospital. This involved long trips for Jeanne to drive back and forth but she did not mind. Staying so far away from anyone put Marina in a condition of total dependancy on Lee, since she could not communicate with anyone around, we were the only source she could understand. To invite the couple for dinner, we drove back and forth, almost forty miles for a four-way trip.

Jeanne became quite close to Marina at the time, while Lee and I saw each other frequently. Soon, however, these trips became difficult for us as we both became busy in our professions, yet we wanted to continue seeing the Osvalds. One solution would be for them to buy some second-hand car but Lee did not know how to drive, nor did Marina of course. I did not doubt Lee's word. I mention this here because later Lee's lack of driving ability became a controversial issue. I believed him because I knew about the abject poverty of his childhood in New Orleans. In these prosperous United States, Lee's family occupied a position at the poverty line, similar to poor Blacks and Mexican-Americans.

Due to my wife's help, Marina's four spoiled teeth were removed and her system was not poisoned by them any more. Baby June became healthy also.

The Russian colony collected a small amount of money for Marina and the care of the baby June. Lee did not know about it, he would not have accepted any charity, so it was done secretly. I think Jeanne handled the operation and Marina spent spent nights in the house while the next morning Jeanne would drive her to Baylor dental clinic or to the child care center..

An amusing incident happened on the way to Baylor, recalls my wife. She had to drive by the predominantly section of town, gaudy but cheerful Hall and Washington streets, almost every decrepit house lodging either a night-club, strip-tease joint or a dance hall. Hookers and flashy pimps strolling along the broken pavements. Suddenly Marina excitedly attracted my wife's attention shouting in Russian to slow down. She looked at the tall, muscled, black youngster standing proudly at the corner and surveying the situation.

"Look at him! Look!" She pulled at my wife's sleeve in a frenzy. "What a handsome man!"

Oh yes," agreed Jeanne, "he is very handsome.

"No, he is fantastic, fantastic!" Exulted Marina.

Such an enthusiasm surprised my wife.

"He is so big and strong! What muscles he must have..."

As my wife related this incident, she observed that it was not a question of an attraction of a nordic woman to an exotic man of a dark race, but a distressing fact that a young married woman with a child would show such an uninhibited admiration for a sexy male.

I drove her myself on the same street and teased her myself about her attraction to black men. "Marina," I guessed, "you didnot see in Russia such, uninhibited, natural men."

She laughed: "neither Russians nor American Whites can compare to such beautiful men," she said candidly. "Maybe the Cubans I met in Minsk were just as attractive."

The Osvalds in Minsk.

The stories related by Lee and Marina about Minsk were especially interesting to me. It seems that Lee was very unhappy at the beginning of his stay there and he even tried to slash his wrists out of despair. Since he was supposed to have done it already in Moscow, in order to obtain a permit to remain in the Soviet Union, the wrist-slashing became somewhat of a habit if not a subterfuge with him. Marina held a job of a pharmacist in the hospital where Lee was treated, she took care of him, flirted with him very nicely and began conquering his heart. Later he polyps problem and so he kept on going to the same hospital. And that's how the romance began and flourished.

Marina came from a fairly good family from our point of view, since her father belonged to a former tsarist officer group. After his death her mother married a man called Prussakov. Later her mother died and Marina got tired of living with her stepfather and her half-brothers and sisters. And so she decided to move from Smolensk to Minsk where she received soon a degree of a registered pharmacist. I remember Marina's amusing repartee when I asked her if she liked her half-brothers and sisters.

"They were good, normal children, not like me. I was a bad one." And she laughed, showing a good sense of humour and a great deal of charm.

After the hospital meetings, Lee and Marina began going out together to dances and movies and eventually the relationship of affection and love developen between them.

"I remember looking at the new apartment building near the river Svishlokh," reminsced Marina, "but only high technical and political personnel lived there, as well as some foreigners, Lee among them."

I was a wonderful setting for a Soviet romance - love, an American refugee, a river and a new apartment building... Actually the building belonged to the factory where Lee worked at the time, his staying there was no particular favor. But for a girl who had lived in crowded rooms with a stepfather and several children, this new house seemed a real paradise.

And so they married and moved to that apartment building. Why did she marry him? She could have cohabitated with him, this happened frequently with young couples in Russia. The reasons are unknown to me and known only to Marina: love, pity or desire to come to the United States. Probably the latter, as soon after their wedding Lee decided that he wanted to go back to the United States. He traveled to Moscow without a permit, went to the United States embassy, got back his passport and borrowed there \$ 500 for the return.

While in Texas, he paid religiously back each month installements due on that loan. Marina frequently complained that he was too punctual in his payments - but he was. I ask you where do you find another man in Lee's position, on the verge of starvation, who would be in such a hurry to repay a government loan, which would be very difficult to collect from a poor man like Lee. But somehow Lee felt this obligation very sincerely.

Another question puzzled and still puzzles us: how come the Soviets permitted Marina to leave her homeland so easily, while it was hard for Lee to obtain a permit to leave USSR. He had to make another trip to Moscow to arrange it and he never explained to me clearly how he got the permit to take Marina along. "Well, I did it," Lee smirked, "because all bureaucrats, all over the world, are stupid..."

Marina had an uncle, a colonel of special forces NKVD - KGB to-day - Department of Interior, called Medvedev; I think he was her mother's brother. For some time she had lived with him, in Smolensk I think, and Lee told me that this important man was dead set against his niece marrying him. Later something made him change his mind. We were not interested at the time in the why's and the wherefore's of this colonel activities, now it is too late to find out. Maybe this colonel for his own reasons helped his niece to get out of Russia. Possible it was a good riddance of a Prussakova

niece, possibly something else...

The loyal, decrepit Russian refugees liked Marina only because her real father had been a prerevolutionary officer or some tzarist official. This matter was indifferent to us and we did not inquire further. But the permission to leave USSR was puzzling to us, uncle or no uncle, because we knew of many cases of Americans who never obtained a permit to leave Russia for their Soviet wives. Personally I know of one case, one of the reporters of the Christian Monitor successfully extracted his wife from Russia at the time of Stalin.

One day Jeanne asked Lee a straightforward question: "why did you decide to ^{go to} ~~leave~~ USSR, answer frankly!" "You risked never to return to your country."

"I was looking for an ideal," Lee answered sadly

"And why did you decide to return here?" Jeanne insisted.

"Because I did not find my ideal. Obviously utopia does not exist. I could travel and change countries the rest of my life and never find it."

We liked this statement and agreed with Lee.

We are becoming close friends.

From time to time my wife would prepare a special Russian or French dinner for the Osvalds, always keeping in mind that both of them were undernourished. And I would talk with Lee in the meantime, often late into the night. Although he unquestionably had had some unpleasant experiences, as the slashing of his wrists proved, Lee was never hostile or emotionally upset about his life in the Soviet Union. He spoke of his co-workers humbly and engagingly. "They were hospitable, friendly and sincere, they invited me to their homes, fed me from their meagre supplies and we discussed all the subjects frankly as we do it here."

"Did they tell you any jokes about their regime? I asked.

"Here is one I remember," Lee said. "An American worker comes to the Soviet Union and sees big apartment complexes. He asks: 'to whom do they belong?' - 'To the state' - comes the answer. "How about these factories and the big black cars?" - 'They belong to the State also.'" Then Lee smiled. "The Russian worker comes to visit United States. He asks: 'these huge factories, to whom do they belong?' - 'To the capitalists' comes the fast answer. 'Aha! says the Russian this is terrible!' Then he notices nice suburban homes, new cars. He asks: 'to whom these belong?' - 'To the workers', comes an immediate answer."

Then I asked Lee: "did you ever hear that one about a Soviet worker who was wandering from one factory to another asking 'is there a place that would pay as little as the little work I intend to do?'"

Lee did not laugh. "That is a rather vicious joke. Soviet workers work almost as hard as here and certainly they get paid much less."

Then he reminisced: "nobody in the Soviet Union tried to intimidate me or influence me. But I encounter these tendencies here. Nobody ever tried to make a communist out of me. I was a sympathizer but I never joined the party."

He is probably on the level, I thought.

"And what were your living conditions there?" I asked.

"Not bad at all, ample meals, clean surroundings, good companionship."

"And the pay?"

"Sufficient; the apartment cost me five per cent of my pay, and I don't each much, as you know. With Marina's additional salary we could manage quite well."

"Expensive but adequate and I am not interested, as you know, in stylish clothes. Of course, the Cubans dressed to kill," he smiled.

Marina must have missed good clothes there, I thought.

"And how about transportation?" I asked.

"Of course I could not afford a motorcycle, but I like to walk and the public transportation was cheap and good."

"What was most annoying to you in the Soviet Union?" Asked Jeanne who was listening in.

"Those endless, endless meetings we had to attend after work, listening to those deadly, monotonous speeches. You were lucky if you were in the back and could take a nap...We listened to those bureaucratic outpourings half-dazed, like children during a very boring lesson. Then we voted, rather indifferently, on various trivial issues. Later we would file out, exhausted and would return home. And," Lee smiled, "we never received any extra pay for the hours lost, and we certainly deserved it."

I approved his attitude, nodding agreement. I would also hate to waste my time on such meetings.

Lee spoke of other foreigners living there, some Cubans whose names I forgot, one family of refugees from Argentina; the father was an experienced engineer and Lee had a great respect for him. It wasn't once that he mentioned this family to me, talking mainly of the daughters who "were so pretty" and so friendly to him. All in all Lee spoke frequently to me of his interest in women and he even bragged amusingly and somewhat naively of his conquests in Russia.

Here in the United States Lee wasn't certainly a ladies' man, he felt depressed and confined. I think he frequently regretted having left Minsk.

But there I can visualize him cutting a path of Casanova among the Russian women. And why not? He was a foreigner, he acted freely, he looked pleasantly and his interest in Russian people was warm and genuine.

Marina admitted herself one day. "He was something out of the ordinary. He looked like an American, he was easygoing, loose and alert -not like the other guys." That Lee was a perfectly normal and well adjusted individual in Minsk - Marina insisted frequently. "The only trouble with him was, his interest in books - serious books, politics, discussions, rather than sex."

Maybe it is not nice to talk about confidential sex matters, between the Osvalds, but might as well do it, they show light on the personalities of this interesting couple. Marina was close enough to my wife to be completely open with her. "Lee does not have sex with me but rarely," she admitted, "very rarely, about once a month and he is in such a hurry, poor fellow, that I do not get any satisfaction. It's most frustrating." When Jeanne repeated this matter to me, I laughed and told Marina a well-known Texas joke, translating it, probably for the first time, into Russian.

"Mandy was a good-looking black prostitute. A handsome, tall Black, by the name of Rastus came to see her. 'How much do you charge Mandy?' - For fifteen dollars I does it all, for ten, we does it, for five you do it all! Rastus had only five dollars, so they agreed and went to bed. But while Rastus began making love to Mandy he turned out to be such a formidable male that in extasy Mandy wailed: 'Rastus I shall do it all on credit, you have such an honest face!'"

Naturally in Russian it did not sound very hot, but we all laughed and possibly it was the beginning of Marina's ardent interest in our racial minority - the Blacks.

But aside from such foolishness, we talked with Osvalds of their lives in the Soviet Union. And soon we acquired a certainty that Marina wanted a richer and materialistically more rewarding life than the one she had at home and it was she who convinced Lee to go to the American Embassy, to ask for the return of his passport and for money all this in view to go with him to the United States. Another interesting fact: the first time he went from Minsk to Leningrad or Moscow he did it illegally, but the second time he obtained a legal Soviet permit to go there by train. As a foreigner Lee was not supposed to leave town without notifying the police and obtaining a permit. Not an easy matter for some of the people who had tried to leave Russia.

I remember Marina telling me without any emotion that she had been discharged at the time from the Komsomol, an organization of communist youth, and that it happened because she had married an American. In the Soviet Union it was a disgrace, but she did not attach any importance to it while in Minsk, because obviously she knew she would leave her country anyway. Both Lee and I laughed about her naive belief that the streets of the United States were paved with gold and that the poor people were the ones who had to wash themselves their Cadillacs. I remember Lee telling us a joke, which circulated at the time among the young Russians. Capitalism to them meant champagne, luxurious cars, jazz, caviar for dinner and Gina Lollobrigida for a girl-friend. Marvelous! Communism to them meant vodka, dirty tramway, balalaika, black bread and their own mother!

Marina laughed goodnaturedly.

Very often people ask me with suspicion why I, a person with several university degrees and of fairly good financial and social standing - with friends among the rich of the world - became such a friend of that "misadjusted radical" - Lee Harvey Oswald? Well, I hope that this book clarifies Lee's personality and endows him with a lot of most attractive features. I already spoke of his straightforward and relaxing personality

of his honesty or his desire to be liked and appreciated. And I believe it is a privilege of an older age not to give a damn what others think of you. I choose my friends just because they appeal to me. And Lee did.

It never occurred to me that he might be an agent of any country, including United States - although he might have been trained in Russian for some ulterior motive - Lee was too outspoken, naively so. In this way I was similar to him. In 1946 when I was working in Venezuela for William Buckley's family company - Pantepec Oil Company - I met the Soviet Ambassador there who had been before world war one a rosbout for Nobel Oil interests, and my uncle was a director of that outfit. So the Ambassador knew my name and was extremely friendly to me. We spent many an evening talking and drinking vodka. As a result he suggested that he would offer me a contract to work in the Soviet Union. But after listening to me and my outspoken opinions, he advised me: "my friend, you talk too much, you criticize too much, you would be a babe in the woods in my country and would end up in Siberia."

Also Lee was very interested in other people, in their work, he tried to improve his own education by reading, observing and studying. Sometimes he was amusing when he used long, difficult words in English - words like

charisma, politicomania, extravaganzas, elitism - the knowledge of which he liked to display. We even laughed together about his use of such words, the exact meaning of which eluded him. Occasionally Lee's constant search for truth, for the answers to the mysteries of life, seemed tragic and disturbing to me. But this proves also that it seems highly improbable that any government would try to make an agent of such a man. His own element of self-inquiry, self-denial and self-doubt, mixed with instability worried Lee. But I told him not to worry, in my opinion instability, doubt, constant search were elements of youth and were indicative of exuberant life.

I told Lee that I pitied people who did not possess such characteristics, were living dead, they form the mass of obedient slaves in all countries.

A strong desire for adventure was also one of Lee's motivations. That's why he became a marine, that's why he switched jobs just because he did not like what he had to do so far. And routine was deadly to him. However his last job at the printing company fitted him well and he seemed fairly happy.

"Why didn't you stay in the Marine Corps?" I asked him one day.

"Oh, I did not care for the military, not much fun being an underling, not much adventure either."

"You could become an officer, you are intelligent enough," I countered.

"Oh, no, to hell with being an officer, I don't like to command other guys."

Often I was asked with suspicion, long before the assassination, "how did you get along so well with Lee Oswald?"

"In my life I have done many things, I was often a promoter, an originator of new ideas, so I liked new ideas, even if they seemed strange and outlandish, I enjoyed meeting people of various types, evaluated their thoughts, did not criticize them," I retorted.

Later on, when I was in the hot water because of my friendship with Lee, a friend of mine testified: "George always liked stray dogs and stray people."

Many people considered Lee a miserable misfit, an insult to the American way of life, and completely disregarded him. A Russian refugee living in Dallas told me once: "I am scared of this man Oswald, he is a paranoid."

"Paranoid or not, he is as intelligent as you are. Listen to him, there is a lot of sense in what he says," I would reply.

Probably to annoy Lee, the Russian refugees and some ultra-conservative Americans showered Marina with gifts and gave her too much attention. Since Americans could not communicate with her, their efforts were wasted. But the gifts given his wife by the refugees annoyed Lee. Unquestionably Marina

added oil to the fire bragging about the gifts and talking how successful some of the donors were - owning their own homes and two automobiles. He might have been wounded in his pride, although he never complained to me.

At the time Lee did not want Marina to learn English. She could only say yes and no and if she went to the store, she had to point out the articles she wanted. "It's very egotistical on your part Lee," Jeanne told him, "you have to let her ~~learn~~ study English so she can communicate with other people than the Russian refugees. You cannot keep her a recluse."

Sensing that Lee resented them, the members of the Russian colony gave Marina some hundred dresses. Baby June received a new crib, a carriage and a lot of toys. Unquestionably it annoyed Lee. The more people gave Marina, the more it disturbed Lee. Disturbed is not the right word - maddened. And so he declined invitations to these "benefactor's" homes, he was often rude to them. That situation had very sad consequences for this family.

As far as we are concerned, we continued our good relationship with the Osvalds, even after the situation in Soviet Russia and in Minsk especially have been thoroughly discussed. Instead of questioning them, we became concerned in the welfare of this couple. Be nice to the poor was always Jeanne's motto.

Seeing that Lee's situation was also gradually deteriorating, I became even nicer to him. Never kick a man who is down, help him, was my belief. Sometimes Lee's action and his sensitivities annoyed me, but I did not try to show any resentment and attempted to find a solution for him and his wife.

Contrasts between the Osvalds.

One day Lee brought to me typescripts of his experiences in Russia. He was interested in publishing them in a form of an article in a magazine or possibly to develop them into a book. A few typed pages, and poorly at that, in substance could not add much to what he had already told me. And what he had told me was of interest only to me, because I was familiar with the locale, but not to other readers. But it was important for him to get my recognition since he knew that I published many articles in Europe and in this country did some theatre reviews for the Variety Magazine. And so Lee sat on the sofa and looked hopefully at me.

"What do you think of this?" he asked.

"Remember I am not a professional writer, I was lucky enough to have had some articles published, your story is simple and honest but it is very poorly written. It is deprived of any sensational revelations and it's really pointless. Personally I like it because I know Minsk but how many people know where Minsk is. And why should they have interest in your experiences? Tell me!"

"Not many," Lee agreed mildly.

I did not say, not to offend him, that his grammar was poor and the syntax was abominable. And those long, pompous words...

But that was the result of his poor, formal education. And the only things in his favor stood out - his sincerity and his obvious good will to inform correctly.

"If you add some sensational, detective story type details, a beautiful female spy, depraved, desachistic policemen, if you depict all Russians degenerate, as ~~monsters~~ monsters, then your script will be published.

"No, than you," said Lee proudly. "I do not want to tell lies. My purpose is to improve Soviet-American relations." And he added quickly. "People here should know how decent and generous Russians are. Now, well, they treated me, a simple American ex-marine, with kindness and generosity - I did not find anything monstrous in Soviet Russia."

"I agree with you personally. Also you talk about some individuals you met there. It's good and factual, they are decent people. But who is interested in accurate this or that, in refugees from Argentina or in some cheerful Cuban students? Correct?"

Lee agreed and I handed him back his pages.

The same typescripts were shown me later for identification by the Warren Committee lawyer and they were printed in the Warren Committee report. So Lee's wished ~~wish~~ came true after his death.

This was a period of relative tranquillity for Lee, as he was working for Taggart's developing and enlarging photos, posters and maps and he seemed to enjoy his work. But Marina was dissatisfied and complained to Jeanne again. "He comes home tired, hardly talks to me, only to the baby, then reads Russian books and is seldom tender and loving to me."

Incidentally I never saw him interested in anything else except Russian books and magazines. He said he didn't want to forget the language - but it amazed me that he read such difficult writers like Gorki, Dostoevski, Gogol, Tolstoi and Turgeneff - in Russian. As everyone knows Russian is a complex language and he was supposed to have stayed in the Soviet Union only a little over two years. He must have had some previous training and that point had never been brought up by the Warren Committee - and it is still puzzling to me. In my opinion Lee was a very bright person but not a genius. He never mastered the English language yet he learned such a difficult language - I taught Russian at all levels in a large University and I never saw such a proficiency in the best senior students who constantly listened to Russian tapes and spoke to Russian friends. As a matter of fact American-born instructors never mastered Russian spoken language as well as Lee did.

The fact that Lee reserved Marina as a perfect Russian conversationalist

for himself was foolish and selfish. Being in close relationship with the Osvalds we noticed the signs of the coming disintegration of their already fragile relationship. Lee seemed to be fond of Marina but he mostly cherished baby June. Maybe he was too secretive a person to show his affection and Marina's slavish nature demanded more attention and tenderness. But Lee never spoke badly to us about his wife, he never criticized her but neither did he ever express any deep feeling for her. Even in his typewritten memoirs he spoke very little of her.

Marina, on the other hand, annoyed and criticized Lee, due possibly to a perversity of her Russian character. "He is so puny, so dull, he never drinks, only works, tires easily, is only interested in books" She complained to me and my wife. And she said that behind his back and obviously to him directly when we were not there. Never did we hear from her that she loved her husband. But there was nevertheless an element of strong attachment which tied together these two so different people, but we did not notice it at the time.

Lee was indeed all wrapped up in his work, books, his ideas on equality of all people, especially of all races; it was strange indeed for a boy New Orleans and ^{poor white} Texas family, purely Anglo, to be so profoundly anti-racist. "Segregation in any form, racial, social or economic, is one of the most

repulsive facts of American life", he often told me. "I would be willing any time to fight these fascistic segregationists - and to die for my black brothers."

He obviously intended to do just that, as we shall see from the later chapters and from Marina's inscription on Lee's picture. Warren Committee completely disregarded this unusual aspect of Lee's character and eliminated my statement from the report.

Otherwise, we seldom heard from Lee much talk about women, Marina, on the other hand, spoke freely to Jeanne and to myself about her pre-marital experiences, her admiration for strong, sexy men. She spoke enthusiastically about the Cubans she met in Russia. "They were outgoing and gay. Often they carried their guitars with them, and their catchy Caribbean tunes, danced so well. They were such fun!"

This was an indirect criticism of her husband who did not like music, except Russian folkloric sad tunes, who did not play any musical instruments and could not dance. And let's face it he wasn't particularly entertaining with her.

Here I want to dispel once more the impression I may have given that Lee did not have a keen sense of humour. For instance I remember this one he told me. "A Russian doctor had a parrot who was able to say 'how do you do', 'good night' etc."

One hot evening the doctor left the parrot on the windowsill to cool off. A Russian mujik passes by and hears parrot's greetings. He takes his hat off and says: 'excuse me, comrade, I thought you were a bird!'"

On American politics he expressed the following opinion. "Under dictatorship people are enslaved but they know it. Here the politicians constantly lie to people and they become immune to these lies because they have the privilege of voting. But voting is rigged and democracy here is a gigantic profusion of lies and clever braain-washing."

Also he said something about FBI which did not strike me at the time as very clever, but history proved his judgement correct. "knowledge is a great power, especially if you know it about very important people." Obviously J. Edgar Hoover's files must come to your mind.

Also he told me the joke which must have been circulating at the time in the Soviet Union. "A strip-tease joint was opened in Moscow for the tourists. It was decorated and run just like in Paris and lots of money was spent on this establishmen. Yet it did not attracact much trade. A State Economic Commission questioned the worried director. He explained: 'I did by best, hired the best decorators, imitated a place in Paris.'- 'How about the girls?' asked a member of the commission. 'No trouble with them, they are all at least for thirty years good, party members.'"

Lee also liked jokes about southern hillbillies and rednecks but I cannot recall any of them now. He subscribed to "Krokodil" a Soviet satirical publication, somewhat similar to the New Yorker or to the British Punch. Krokodil, which we often read together, featured mainly Russian self-criticism in the form of short stories or cartoons. Animals frequently featured local politicians, and in the manner of Krilov's fables, emphasized the foibles of the Soviet bureaucracy. It also took swipes at the bourgeois world quite sharply.

Lee read Russian classics and discussed some at length with me, especially I remember "The Idiot" by Dostolevski, a psychoanalytical study. He understood the pre-revolutionary life in Russia, which I did not know but heard about from my parents. Russian classics belong exclusively to the pre-revolutionary or early revolutionary days and modern Russians are fascinated by those days of extravagant aristocracy, tzarist power and abuses of it, great wealth and great waste, ownership of slaves, temporal strength of the Greek-Orthodox church - these aspects of the old days Lee observed with distaste but the elegance and the gayety of the certain occasions gave him a feeling of nostalgia, as he were Russian himself.

Marina did not care about any of this, she was a super-materialist, really destinaed by nature for the mediocre, middle class American life: new clothes

new buildings, plastic, neutral surroundings, tall, well-dressed men.

"Lee, when shall we get a car/" She kept on nagging. "Everyone here has one, even the poorest people!" And poor Lee even did not know how to drive a car. And when Marina was talking to Jeanne he said: "I never wanted a middle-class wife, mediocre, obscure, money-loving who would have the taste of vanity, of luxury, of comfort, of all that bourgeois nonsense."

Well, you have one, I thought.

Marina liked wine, he objected to it. She smoked, he detested the smell of tobacco. So whenever she was without him she would become a chain-smoker, inhaling deep, asking for drinks, enjoying these forbidden pleasures. He called Lee, a slender, ascetic man, but by no means a weakling, a bookworm. He respected education and knowledge, especially in others, she was just the opposite; she didn't value her degree as a pharmacist.

"It must have been difficult to get it?" I asked her once.

"Not for me, I got by easily, used ponies and passed my examinations," she answered breezily.

But she would remember some handsome fellows and had had and shared bed with, of real soviet type orgies. She confided in Jeanne. Those parties were organized in Minsk by richer sons of the bureaucrats who disposed of comfortable apartments while their parents were gone. The kids drank and

slept indiscriminately . "This was terrific," she reminisced. "And I also remember a handsome boy who instead of joining us on holidays would take a book and would go all day to the forest to study. Some people are crazy," she concluded.

In my conversations with Lee, I found out that he was an open and straightforward agnostic. Religion did not interest him. He was that way probably since his early childhood. His agnosticism was of the type of Jefferson's or Franklin's - and it was fine. He was not an aggressive atheist who wanted to impose his point of view with violence. He must have read Toynbee and Bertrand Russell because his argumentation against organized religion was solid. One day he said, "The doctor sees a man at his weakest, the lawyer sees the man at his wickedest and the priest sees a man at his stupidest," he chuckled. "I read it somewhere, it's pretty good?"

Lee was always very humble with me and he really blossomed when I showed some interest in what he had to say. But aren't we all the same way?

Only once, while discussing organized religion, he expressed his views with cold disdain. "What I dislike," he said, "are the materialistic aspects of the American type religion, not all, but the large denominations with their ridiculously garish churches, their tax-deductible tricks and finageling." Lee seemed quite versed in the matter. Here he was rather

instructing me. And I had to agree with him on the greedy aspects of our modern Christianity, so far removed from the original teachings of poverty and humility.

I remember talking to my wife about Lee and she mentioned that we both treated him on a perfectly equal basis, and never scorned him, while other people who helped the Osvalds did it for Marina only or for the child. And Lee did not like any help, especially that type. He was occasionally rude to the people who interfered in their lives being intrinsically a very independent, selfsufficient person. And so he began refusing invitations which infuriated Marina.

Many local people, especially Russian refugees, resented Lee because he had deserted these United States, the "country of the brave and the free" and many considered him an outright traitor. And he, a hundred percent, native-born American smiled and would say: "who are the real Americans? Only the Indians, Blacks and the Mexicans from the South~~xxx~~-Western states, to whom this country originally belonged."

We have a different attitude. We like young people who search to solve some problems which bother them. He disliked many aspects of American life and thought that maybe somewhere else it was better. Being with him took me back to my young days at the University of Liege, when we spent entire

discussing various problems of life without any respect for the rules or for the establishment.

It was not the first time that he mentioned that he was disappointed in the Soviet Union because he did not find there his ideal of justice. "Maybe it does not exist..." he said sadly one day. "And so I came back."

The narrow-minded people condemned him without understanding his motivations, without giving him a chance to explain himself. And later on our Dallas police let him die without explaining himself and telling the truth.

But we are talking of the year 1962 and of people he met then. Many resented him - and he answered in kind. And we were the only ones who took interest in him and gave him a chance to express himself.

Since I had mentioned Lee's agnosticism, let's go back to Marina's attitude towards religion. We were positive that at the time Marina was also an agnostic, even an atheist, after all she was brought up in Soviet Russia in purely communist surroundings. She did not have the slightest idea of God, not any interest in anything divine - or so it seemed to us. But soon she realized that being religious in the United States would help her, as it usually does. And so she had her child June christened later in the Greek-Orthodox church in Dallas during one of her separations from Lee. This exacerbated their conflict. He told her in our presence: "you

doublecrossed me, you should have consulted me before doing this to my child. This is unforgivable!"

And so there was another element added to their disputes.

Personally I do not criticize faith or religion, but these should be true and profound feelings, not the outward manifestations. Lee's faith, his strongest belief was - racial integration. He told me at many occasions - "it hurts me that the Blacks do not have the same privileges and rights as white Americans." And I agreed with him. This was the time when Blacks had to sit at the back of the bus, couldn't eat in restaurants or stay in the hotels and motels reserved for the whites. It angered and annoyed me. At the time I didn't have many contacts with the Blacks, except with some artists, teachers and preachers. But in my profession I couldn't afford to have Black friends often in the house, I would have been black-balled and eliminated from the competitive field. Fortunately now the situation changed for me and I am very happy.

Lee also resented the poor care of his child. This led to frequent quarrels and recriminations. Gradually fights between the Osvalds became frequent and vicious. Marina would arrive by bus with the baby and would complain to Jeanne: "He beat me up again," and showed bruises on her body to Jeanne and a black eye to me.

One day we visited them in their apartment on Elsbeth Street in Oak Cliff. It was on the ground-floor of a dreary red-brick building, the atmosphere of the house and the neighbourhood conducive to suicide. The living-room was dark and smelly, the bedroom and the kitchen facing bleak walls. But Lee was proud of his own place and showed me his books and magazines as well as some letters from Russia which we read together. The place was spruced up by the lovely photographs of the Russian countryside taken by Lee there and later enlarged by him. Trees and fields, charming peasant huts and cloudy skies contrasted strangely with the dreary walls and the lugubrious atmosphere. Some pictures were framed by Lee, others unframed were assembled carefully in an album. I also remember artistically taken pictures of Moscow and Leningrad, especially of the river Neva which I also slightly remembered from my childhood. He was happy to have access to elaborate photographic equipment. "Look at these churches, look at these statues," he exclaimed proudly. Indeed almost all his pictures had a professional touch, he was justly proud of them.

While Lee and I were chatting on that moth-eaten sofa of his in the living-room, Marina invited Jeanne to come to the kitchen. There she cried and showed an infected spot on her shoulder. "The son of the bitch waught me smoking and he grabbed the cigarette and put it out on my bare flesh," she cried.

"This is terrible, this is terrible," shouted Jeanne, coming out of the kitchen. "Lee what have you done to your wife?"

"Well, she smoked against my orders," He said sullenly.

"You lived abroad only two years and picked up those customs," Jeanne attacked him. "You could not have picked up this brutality in Russia where women are independent. And here you have no right to brutalize a woman just because she smokes occasionally."

Right there we discussed with them very frankly their growing antagonism and tried to find a solution to it. We came up with an idea of a temporary separation but let it up to them. "Take it easy," I told Lee, "and stop abusing your wife."

"But she enjoys brutality," he answered calmly. "Look at me I am all scratched up." . Indeed, even in the darkish room we could see long red marks on his face - traces of Marina's fingernails. "She is provoking me," he added sadly.

"Still it's no excuse," I said. "Your temperaments obviously clash - it's another reason for separation."

The Osvalds remained silent, wrapped up in their misery.

"Do it," said Jeanne, "before you really hurt each other. And you Lee are responsible because you are stronger."

"Man, that woman loves to fight," countered Lee seriously.

Marina and Jeanne went back to the kitchen where Marina cried on my wife's shoulder. On the way home Jeanne related the complaints. "He is cold and hostile," said Marina. "He goes to bed with me so rarely now. Once in a couple of weeks. He makes me so god-damn frustrated."

Jeanne was amused by such frank revelation but could not find a better solution for Marina than advising her to be more feminine, use some perfume in the evening and occasionally put on a sexy, transparent negligee.

But before leaving I remember taking a close look at baby June, laying in her crib, rather fat and not being able yet to say a word. "She reminds me of someone, of some celebrity," I said.

And then the answer came to me. "Look at June," I shouted. "Look she is a baby edition of Nikita Krushchev!"

I did not mean it as an insult, just the opposite. I rather liked that outgoing, earthy old man, and so did the Osvalds. So we all laughed and assembled around the crib, examining the baby. "Same pinkish color of the skin," observed Jeanne. "Same rare, fluffy hair," said Marina. "Same round Russian face," agreed Lee smilingly.

And so we left that evening advising our young friends to talk over their problems and to stop torturing each other. Whatever their decision

would be, we would be glad to help them in any way we could.

Driving back from the Osvalds we spoke of their problems and laughed June-Krushcheff comparison. "Yes, the baby has the same slanting eyes and the same belligerent expression," said Jeanne, "how come I did not notice it before?"

Yes, June was not a pretty baby at the time but perfectly normal and healthy. We have not seen her lately, for reasons I shall explain, but I am sure she grew up to be a lovely young girl. She has a step-father and knows probably little or nothing about her real father. And we remember with sadness how much Lee was devoted to her. "He is an unusually loving and tender father," I mused aloud while driving.

"And he has a very good hearth," said Jeanne, "look how much our dogs love him."

"t's so touching when Lee kisses June and calls her "moia malenkai devochka". And never gets mad at her, I concluded while we approached our house.

Increased animosity between Lee and Marina.

Conflicts in married couples develop slowly like a cancer, and then from the slow development the sickness attacks the couple with alarming rapidity. In previous chapter we showed how slowly but insidiously the animosity developed in the case of Osvalds. Looking back at Lee and remembering his reactions, he became suddenly standoffish, sometimes supercilious and spoke only to people whom he liked and trusted. And there were not many of them. Lee was not close to his mother and seldom spoke of her. But neither did he criticize her. He hardly spoke of his brother Robert and not at all of his wife. Yet, the Osvalds stayed with them for a short time upon their arrival in the United States.

As a matter of fact we never met any member of the Oswald family and we are sorry not to have met Lee's mother. Even Marina spoke nicely of her.

Later we admired when Marguerite Oswald tried desperately to clear up her son's name and reputation. We wish her the best of luck.

One of the reasons we agree with Mrs. Marguerite Oswald that her son was probably innocent of Kennedy's assassination - and we insisted on this during the Warren Committee interviews (although it was never brought up publicly) - was the following: Lee actually admired President Kennedy in his own reserved way. One day we discussed with Lee Kennedy's efforts to

bring peace to the world and to end the cold war. "Great, great!" Exclaimed Lee. "If he succeeds, he will be the greatest president in the history of this country."

Kennedy's efforts to alleviate and to end segregation were also admired by Lee, who was sincerely and profoundly committed to a complete integration of Blacks and saw in it the future of the United States. "I am willing to fight for racial equality and would die fighting if necessary," He told me once. Because of his poor, miserable childhood, he probably compared himself to the Blacks and the Indians And commiserated with them. In this he was so different and so noble compared with the Southern trash and red-necks, whose segregationism stems from their fear of the Blacks, of their strength and of the possibility of their prominence in every field of human endeavour. Education for the Blacks was an anathema for them, while Lee was fullheartedly for it. He loved black children and admired their cute and outgoing ways. He also was fond of the black music and folklore with which he was familiar from his childhood days in New Orleans.

Lee despised the reactionary groups, the white supremacists, the so called "hate groups" and did not hide his feelings. I naturally agreed with him. Marina, on the other hand was not interested in anything except acquiring possessions. Her crass materialism, envy of other refugees' success,

compared to Lee's idealism, lead inevitably to confrontations.

Lee was rather neat and orderly, Marina was lazy and devil may care about her household and herself. This unusual ~~Anglo~~Russian-American couple was too much for the average Anglo. Hence their cohabitation with ~~the~~ Robert Osvald and his family was short. It all became clear to my wife as she had the opportunity of observing Marina more than I did. This ex-Russian activist and member of the Communist youth stayed in bed 'till noon or later and avoided domestic chores. This was what happened when she stayed in our house. The same opinion was shared by my daughter with whom Marina stayed also for a while.

Marina was simply deprived of energy while Lee, capable of an effort, was not however an average go-getting type of a person who succeed in America. I often regretted that Lee did not get a better education, he would have done well in the scholastic world and would have been a useful citizen

In the meantime Lee's relationship with Marina worsened as she became more enticed by the American "luxuries". It was a sensuous joy for her to wear my wife's silk nighties when she stayed with us and my daughter said that she did the same when she stayed in her apartment.

As Marina was luxuriating, Lee was reading whenever he could his Russian books (he had brought a lot from The Soviet Union) and his friends kept providing him with new supplies of books and magazines.

Although I did not notice any special signs of jealousy regarding Marina - for obvious reasons, she could not communicate with Americans and the Russian refugees were too old for her - but it annoyed him that his wife kept corresponding with her boy-friend, or an ex-lover, in Russia. Lee intercepted a letter from this man and became very bitter. I do not remember whether he beat her up on that occasion, Marina did not complain. But he told me that the letter contained reference of Marina's plan to return to the Soviet Union without him. It could be that Lee imagined it. Anyway, the situation became tenser. Lee obviously loved Marina in his own way and did not want to lose her.

Marina's smoking and occasional drinking gave fits to Lee, he hated the smell of tobacco on Marina's breath. Laughingly I told him to avoid this problem and to approach Marina, when he was in an amorous mood, from the back. He did not laugh this time.

Junie's upbringing also caused bitter disputes, Lee accused his wife of not paying enough attention to his daughter, not to change her diapers fast enough and to be tender enough with her. Actually Marina was not a bad mother, but Lee was too much of a perfectionist and June was his idol. In our opinion he spoiled the child too much and we told him so.

The Osvalds quarrelled in front of us bitterly but without physical

violence. But gradually the tempo of their fights increased and we saw Marina more often with bruises and Lee with scratches on his face.

Jeanne tried to convince Lee to change his ways to be more tolerant otherwise this confrontation would end in a tragedy. I did not believe that Lee would seriously hurt Marina and laughed - "even prominent people occasionally beat their wives, the most important is not to maim them."

My wife liked Marina and found her amusing and stimulating but we were both annoyed to hear her complaints about "that idiot Lee who does not make enough money."

"Why don't you try to make something out of yourself?" asked Jeanne. "I came penniless to America, worked hard and became a successful designer. Go to school, learn English, revalidate your degree."

Marina was not interested.

To encourage Marina and prevent her from bitching at Lee, Jeanne gave her a series of records to teach Russian-speaking people English. They were her own records, as she came to the United States from China, without knowing the language well. But she learned fast and made a superhuman effort to become independent and to give an excellent education to her daughter.

We also gave the Osvalds a phonograph. But instead of learning English

she played melancholy Russian tunes and did not obviously cherish the idea of finding a job.

One day both of them were reading to us a letter from Marina's girlfriend in Russia. "Marina," it read, "I knew you would make it, you were destined to be great and your success in America is a proof of it."

Lee smiled sadly: "Marina what were you saying to your friend?"

Ironically Marina did become famous after the assassination, was on the cover of Time Magazine, received a lot of money from charitable but foolish Americans, and is now well off financially.

At the time it was pathetic to read such a nonsense. But it is possible that Marina in her own strange way considered her arrival in America a great success, maybe the hundred or odd dresses donated to her turned her head?... Who knows?

One day she told Jeanne that she always wanted to come to the United States - at any price. all the foolish gadgets and all the junk which clutter our lives in this country.

Idea of separation

We were appalled at the Osvalds' marital troubles which from being bad became desperate. One day Marina came to our house without announcement, crying, badly bruised all over and carrying baby June along. It would be dangerous for her to Lee. And so we discussed the situation with a charming couple - the Mellers - very kindly people without children of their own. He had been a professor in Eastern Poland and she a Soviet displaced person. They met in a camp in Germany, fell in love, married and eventually came to the United States. They met Marina and liked her and at the same time they were not prejudiced against Lee. Not being rich, they were generous, and they accepted to host Marina and the child 'till the situation would clear up.

The same day I invited Lee to come to the house to discuss the situation with him. We spoke very calmly and as a matter of fact of the need for separation. Our dogs, Nero and Poppea, sitting snugly next to Lee were a living proof that he was not either frantic nor nervous. When it came to the last beating, result of Osvalds' desperate quarrels, Jeanne said: "separate as fast as you can. Stay away from each other. I will let you know Lee later where Marina will be. But not before some time lapses."

At that Lee became indignant, our dogs went into hiding, "you are not

going to impose this indignity on me!" He shouted. "I shall tear up all of June and Marina's clothes and break the furniture." He was incoherent and violent. We never saw him in this condition before.

"If you do this, you will never see June and Marina again. You are ridiculous," she said quietly. "There is a law here against abuse."

"By the time you calm down, I shall promise you will be in contact with baby June again," I interceded, knowing that Lee was afraid that someone would take the child away from him. And so he calmed down, promised to think the situation over, assured us that there would be no more violence and after a while we drove the couple back to the dreary Elsbeth Street apartment.

The next evening Lee was back with us, all alone. Again he wanted to talk the situation over. He sat gloomily on our famous sofa and both of us tried to talk some sense.

"I heard of love accompanied with beating and torture," I said half seriously, read Marquis de Sade or observe the life of the underworld - l'amour crapule, as they say in France. But your fights seem to be deprived of sex, which is terrible..."

"If you think you are fond of each other, cannot you do it without scratching, biting and hitting?" Jeanne tried another reasoning.

Lee sat gloomily without saying a word.

"Separation will be a test for both of you," continued Jeanne, "you will see if you can live without each other. If you can, Lee, you will find another woman and will be happier with her."

"If not," I laughed, "you will separate or divorce again. Look at me I did it four times until I found somebody who can stand me."

Jeanne kept on talking about a nice temporary home for Marina and the baby and the good care both of them will have. Naturally we did not mention the name of Mellers.

"I promise you, Lee, that after a cooling off period, I shall give you the address and the telephobe, so you can communicate with your child. Nobody should separate a child from her father."

Lee believed my promise because he knew that myself I had been a victim of a vindictive wife who prevented me from seeing my children.

Jeanne had called one of two families who knew the Osvalds and they wholeheartedly approved of the proposed arrangement because they thought that Marine would be better off alone than with Lee. And I personally was sure that Lee would be happier without Marina.

Since Marina had been for this arrangement from the start, it was only Lee we were worried about.

That night we separated rather sadly. "You may hate us, Lee, or maybe you will be grateful to us one day for enforcing this separation," I said "But I don't see any other way out under the circumstances. This is Saturday, we are free tomorrow and will come in the morning to help Marina and the baby move out."

Lee agreed but he was on the verge of tears. "Remember your promise. You will give me soon their address and the telephone."

We shook hand and Lee left.

The next day, a Sunday, we drove to Osvalds' apartment on Elsbeth Street. Lee hardly said hello to Jeanne to who he has always been most cordial.

"This is not the end of the world, Lee," she told him. "Cheer up!" And she went to help Marina. I sat on the sofa with him and tried to talk to him. He was gloomy and hardly said a word. He did not try to help us move the crib, baby's belongings, but when it came to Marina's clothes, he became infuriated. In the meantime our big convertible Galaxie - which we kept for years in memory of Osvalds - was filling up high. Seeing all those innumerable clothes, Lee grabbed a bundle of them and shouted: "I will not permit it! I will not permit it! I shall burn all this garbage."

And so back we went into the apartment following Lee and the bundle of Marina's clothes. "You cannot go back on your promise to be calm, Lee!" Shouted Jeanne. Disgusted, I wanted to call the police for help. But Lee looked so desperate that I sat on the sofa again, grabbed him by the arm and tried to reason with him. "Brutality won't help you, Lee," I said. "If you keep on with these tantrums, Marina and the baby will be gone anyway and you won't see them again. So better submit and keep your word."

He sat gloomily not sure of what he was going to do.

"We are wasting our valuable time helping your kids," I shouted losing my patience. "To hell with you and your quarrels!"

And Lee calmed down and agreed to everything. He even helped carrying Marina's clothes acquired from the hateful Russian-American benefactors, and put them on top of our overloaded car. With all this junk, our convertible sank almost to the ground and groaned.

And so we departed Jeanne holding up to all that stuff to prevent it from falling out, Marina holding on to baby Hune. As I was driving I laughed because we looked so obviously ridiculous. But fortunately this was a Sunday, there were few people on the streets and I drove slowly, avoiding main arteries from Oak Cliff, in the far Western part of Dallas, to the Lakeview area, in the Eastern part of Dallas, a distance of some fifteen miles.

And so we reached the apartment of that gentle couple, the Mellers, who came out, greeting Marina and the baby and helped to unload all that junk.

Little did they suspect that this kindly action would cause them so much trouble after November 23rd 1963 and that their gentle life would be disturbed by the insane suspicions and crazy publicity following Kennedy's assassination.

Marina complained for the last time about that stupid Lee and all the trouble he had caused all of us. I was worried about him. "Let's get over with it," I said gloomily, finishing the unloading. "And let's get out of here. We have done enough for these crazy kids."

Separation and more trouble.

Obviously the separation which we caused and worked so hard at was not the right solution for the couple's problems. It was a heavy burden on this charitable Polish-Russian couple - the Mellers - who were used to their own ways and who had to share Marina's temperamental problems. She would not help Mrs. Meller in her household ~~pr~~ chores and behaved like a prima donna. And for Lee the separation was much worse. He missed Marina and the child and came to our house daily, asking how they were, did June miss him, were they well take care off. In other words he practically forgot that this separation was not a joke and that he had caused it to a great extent.

Again we had a chance to talk together, in a less cheerful mood than before. "One can arrive at truth by trial and error," he said. "In my case I commit so many errors and I still do not know whether I arrive at truth."

"It is possible, Lee," I countered, "that you take things too seriously. Don't do things which are unpleasant or uncomfortable because of some great ideology you may have. You see all the mess you are in. You must have read Arthur Koestler's book where he repents for his years as an ideological communist revolutionary."

Lee remembered the book.

"Stop living miserably, do like a normal person does, live pleasantly and keep your own ideology to yourself. Don't disclose yourself."

"You are right," of course, said Lee. "But this society we live in, it's so disgusting and degrading. How can you stand it?"

"Well, my friend, that's why we have built in distractions, stupid TV, moronic movies, rock and roll music for most of the people."

"And good books for us," concluded Lee, rather aptly.

"Lee, you are too straight, your back does not bend enough. One of these days someone will break your back. You have to learn to bend, be resilient?"

"But look at the politicians here, most of them. They want to be praised publicly of their honesty and good will. Connelly, the governor of Texas, for example. In reality they will do all the degrading actions and yet try to appear in good light."

This was the first time he mentioned his loathing for Governor Connelly. What caused it, we shall show later.

"What you need, Lee, is a good walj in the jungle, like we did. That would bring you back to the essentials of life - survival."

"Marina is not Jeanne, she will not do anything of the sort. And we have the baby..."

Later we were asked many times with great suspicion - "why were you wasting your time on this crazy Marxist and his unappealing wife?"

The answer is - first to help a young couple in despair and secondly - more complex answer - I found Lee a most interesting and invigorating individual, he never bored me. Maybe the reader will agree....

Talking to Lee was a balsam for his raw nerves, a sincere conversation calmed him down and it wasn't bad for me either. Fortunately I remember well so much of what he said. I remember distinctly that one of those evenings together we talked of John F. Kennedy. Lee liked him and certainly did not include him among those despicable politicians he mentioned before. I showed him President's picture on the cover of Time Magazine and Lee said - "how handsome he looks, what open and sincere features he has and how different he looks from the other ratty politicians."

I don't remember exactly the words but Lee spoke most kindly of the gradual improvement of the racial relations in the United States, attributing this improvement to the President. Like most young people he was attracted by the Kennedy's personality but he also knew that JFK's father was a rascal who made money off whisky and being bullish on the stock-market which is betting against this country's economy.

Lee often mentioned that the two party system did not work well, that other points of view were not represented. He did not see the difference between a conservative democrat and a fairly liberal republican - and in that I agreed with him.

"Both republicans and democrats really did not oppose each other," he mentioned one day, "they do not represent different points of view, but they are both solidly against poor and oppressed."

But regarding JFK, Lee did not have such a gloomy attitude and he hoped that after the Bay of Pigs fiasco Kennedy would accept coexistence with the communist world.

As I mentioned before, he did not like Marine Corps and considered it racist and segregationist. "Do you know that President Truman wanted to abolish this Marine Corps and I would agree with him on that," Lee did not like any militarists, Russian or Americans, he thought that some day there would be a "coup d'etat" in this country organized by the Pentagon and that the country would become a militaristic, nazi-type, dictatorship.

Maybe this negativist attitude was the result of the separation, these days he was gloomy and did not smile at my jokes. Yet I tried my best. I remember telling him about the meeting of four girls, French, English, American and Russian. "The French girl said, 'my lover will buy me a dress.' The English girl said: 'my husband promised to buy me a new coat.' The American girl bragged: 'my boss will buy me a mink stole'. And the Russian girl concluded: 'Girls, I am prostitute also'."

One of those evenings Lee spoke for the first time of his discharge from the Marine Corps. "I received an honorable discharge and then those bastards, in the Navy, changed it into an undesirable discharge, just because I went to Russia and threw my passport in the face of the American consul."

"Didn't they do it because you lied? You were supposed to go back to the States to help making a living for your mother..."

"Oh, hell, that was just a crooked excuse," He said sullenly. "And Connally sighed this undesirable discharge. .."

Those days Lee was bitter about religion, which he generally seldom mentioned. He explained his avowed agnosticism: "money waster of these innumerable churches, garish and costly, should be spent much more usefully on hospitals, asylums, homes for the poor and elderly, on eliminating slums."

But Lee did not like the communist party either. "In Russia party members are mostly opportunists, carrying their cards proudly in order to get better jobs, or they forced into the party by the circumstances or families."

Again I tried to cheer up Lee by telling him a joke I heard in Yugoslavia.

An uneducated Montenegrin communist arrives in Belgrade where he sees for the first time changing lights in a main intersection. 'Comrade,' he asked a passer by. 'What are these lights for?' He asked timidly. The slyde answer was: 'the red lights are for the communists to cross over, the yellow for the communist sympatizers, the green for all the others.' And so the peasant tried to cross on the red light, almost got killed and strongly admonished by the policeman: 'what kind of fool are you?'- 'But I am a member of the communist party, but I didn't really wanted to join it, I was forced into it.'-

He did not laugh but conceded that the joke proved his point. "People without any party affiliation were the nicest among those I met in Russia, he concluded.

I remember that Lee did not like any political parties, anywhere. He was just a native-born nonconformist. But he told me that when he used to teach his coworkers English in Minsk, he tried to present United States in the most favorable light and wasn't too popular with the authorities because of that. In USSR he defended Usa, in USA he defended USSR.

This type of attitude I like very much and I tried to do the same when I worked in Yugoslavia in 1967. I remember deeply offending the secretary of the communist party of Slovenia comparing him to my ex-father-in-law,

ex-chariman of the Republican party of Pennsylvania and an extremely rich man. Both of them, communist and a super-capitalist were made in the same mold. When he hear this, Lee finally smiled.

And so Lee tried to create good feeling in two opposing countries, in two opposing systems of government. This is not an attribute of a violent man, just the opposite. I must say that I never considered Lee capable of a truly violent act. Marina annoyed him, he beat her up, but she scrtached him back and hurt him worse. Lee regretted his acts but Marina did not. Lee threatened to destroy toys and clothes but he did not do it. Look how he accepted our intervention... I am not a very violent person, but I would not stand for somebody else to take away my wife and my only child, whatever the reasons were.

Unquestionably Lee was a very sincere person, he meant what he said, even if it meant trouble for him. Marina, I remember, had the same feelings regarding religion as Lee, she found all religions absolutely ridiculous, a childish farce. But at the same time she had her baby baptized - just in case. She knew it would create a favorable impression among Americans and Russian refugees. She did it at the time of this separation, we did not know about it, and she did it without Lee's consent.

And so baby June was baptized in the Russian-Orthodox church, where

the priest, father Dimitri, was a good friend of mine. Being a neophyte himself - he had been a strong Baptist - he was somewhat fanatical about his new faith and considered this baptism a great achievement. And he did well in the church and at present time he is bishop of California.

When Lee heard of this baptism, he became infuriated and it led him into more religious or rather anti-religious discussions, which I remember well.

"You know all those theories of immortality cleave me cold," said Lee.

"And who would be this mysterious judge who would punish or reward me? It's out of sight."

"Yes, I agree with you but becoming just gas after death seems too simple to me."

"Eternity, immortality, what highfaluting ideas," continued Lee.

"Anyway I have had enough time in this short existence of mine," he smiled bitterly. "What shall I do with immortality?"

"Somebody ~~is~~ said," pursued Lee, "this man is not intelligent to doubt - he is a BELIEVER."

"My friend," I said, "hope and religion are a peculiar mixture. They make lots of people happy but they also made Jewish people go to gas chambers singing Hebrew songs, instead of fighting the Nazis."

"That won't happen to me," said Lee. "I don't need hymns to pep me up when I die. And I don't know where I shall go after death and I don't care. But I shall not be like a rich American - who eats, sleeps, drinks, amuses himself and then dies painfully leaving all his belonging and a large bank account. I shall die poor and free."

I was frequently asked - was Lee a good husband? Now we have seen his unpleasant characteristics. But he often helped Marina in the household work. He gave her all the money he earned. Sometimes he complained that she was too lazy - and so he did the job himself, cleaning dishes even washing clothes. He was tender to the baby. As far as sex is concerned, we have heard Marina's complaints but we know that the greatest mystery in the world is what happens between the married couple at night, behind the closed doors. And we never looked in the keyhole.

I don't remember Lee ever saying that he would go back to the Soviet Union, even when his marriage was going on the rocks.

If Marina had any brains, she should ~~know~~ have known that a man like Lee, who was not a money-maker but barely a wage earner, would never provide her with all the luxuries, all those desirable items, that America seemed to possess in such limitless quantities. She picked at him, annoyed him, as if she desired a separation, which she finally achieved through us.

This letter from Marina's ex-lover that Lee intercepted, why did she let it drag around. Maybe she wanted to end this unsuccessful marriage?

What annoyed us also was that Marina liked to ridicule Lee. She called him a fool, a moron. "you are always thinking of politics instead of making money - you act like a big shot!"

Marina had a bad habit of constantly correcting Lee when he was speaking Russian and that annoyed him and me. Lee, for a man of his background, had a remarkable talent for Russian and Marina foolishly tried to blow up his occasional mistakes or ridicule his slight accent. It's difficult to know two languages to perfection and Lee's English was perfect, refined, rather literary, deprived of any Southern accent. He sounded like a very educated American of undeterminate background. But to know Russian as he did was remarkable - to appreciate serious literature -- was something out of the ordinary. He had affinity to the Russian ways of life, customs, music and food.

Therefore to criticize this remarkable fellow was an act of nastiness or idiocy, especially for Marina who knew only two English words - "yes" and "no". That 's how she went around and did her shopping pointing at the articles with her finger.

Lee asked me once - "what is your philosophy of life? You make me talk a lot but tell me jokes instead of being serious."

"Well, jokes sometimes express more than thick, serious doctoral theses," I answered. "Frankly I am not interested in politics, I lost most of my relatives - and so did Jeanne - through various wars and revolutions. What I believe in - live and let live. But let the minorities and the poor live decently, then I for that type of a government. I had voted Republican so far but I am considering switching to the Democratic party. There is a guy there there by the name of Eugene McCarthy whom I like. I also consider that each country deserves the government it has, let the communists live the way they want, same goes for the socialists or even dictators. For instance the Germans definitely deserved Hitler."

Lee nodded agreement.

"This country has too many damn problems to bust into other countries and impose our ways. We must solve our problems first."

FBI later annoyed me to no end and intervened in my life. Immediately after the assassination and Lee's declaration that I was his best friend and the only one he respected, I became marked as a suspect number one by the FBI and CIA. Various agents, in disguise and officially representing their agencies invaded my friends and business acquaintances asking: "is

he a communist, is he an anarchist, is he an agent provocateur, what country is he working for;"some even intimated that I was a hypnotist and that I held Lee under my spell.

Just imagine the effect of such massive inquiries? And both my wife and I had left Dallas for Haiti eight or nine months before the assassination, working on the geological survey of that country.

Some morinic agent comes to your friend and asks:"In George a potential killer?" Then your best friend begins to worry. The same thing happened to my wife, a famous designer:"is she a marxist/ Why was she born in China? Is she an agent of the Mao Tse Tung?" Stupid questions, but your business contacts begin to worry and you lose them.

You have to investigate like the Scotland Yard does, or do it through the private detectives, cautiously, not by innuendo,gossip or plain brutal imposition. Finally, assembling of a bunch of such depositions into volumes of gossip at a large expense to the taxpayer - and that's what the Warren Report is -is a hight of foolishness and a bureaucratic nightmare. But we shall talk about these matters later.

What did Lee dislike about the United States.

Lee was frequently critical of the United States and this was understandable considering his poor and sad childhood in New Orleans, Texas and New York. But also there was some logic in his arguments.

"America is a racist society from its very origin. The arrival of the pilgrims and elimination of the Indians. United States is dishonest country because it's based on the spoliation of its rightful owners. This country is based of hate and intolerance. And finally," concluded Lee, "I think American Arglos hate this country because they ruined it to such an extent. Just look aràund - ugliness and polution.

"Ypu exaggerate, Lee," I argued. "There are lovely places in each town."

"The plastic ghettos of the rich, you call them lovely," he answered angrily.

"In this country of great economic wealth, the jobs are hard to find even in times of prosperity. In depression, it's awful."

"One thing you are right about," I said, "there are few happy people here. I remember an old joke: 'in America the poor get poorer, and the rich get...Porfirio Rubirosa,'"

He did no laugh, Lee probably did not know who Porfirio Rubirosa was.

"What kind of a country this is, if an Alabama ignorant redneck calls a Black professor from Dillard University - 'a nigger!'" And Lee continued angrily. "You like jokes, so listen to this one: 'two white policemen sit in their office somewhere in Mississippi. A voice from outside calls: 'a sheriff, come over a man is drowning.' A fat-bellied sheriff rises, goes out and comes back shortly. 'Goddamit', he says, 'another nigger tries to drown himself, the bastard wrapped himself in chains, cannot swim.'"

Yes, Lee could be justifiably angry. But he hated FBI most of all.

"Those SOB's annoy me and Marina constantly. They keep on inquiring about me and her. They intimate that I am a suspicious character and that she is a communist. And so I cannot hold a decent job..."

"I agree with you, Lee, why don't you write FBI a letter and complain?"

"I did that and promised to blow their god-damn office," he said angrily.

As we know now, the existence of this letter was carefully concealed by FBI from the Warren Committee.

A banker, friend of mine, to whom I introduced Lee, knew the situation and shied away from him. He did not want investigators in his warroom.

Lee could have moved away from Dallas, and he did already move from Fort Worth here, but those lousy investigators followed him everywhere. That's

why the Osvalds moved to New Orleans, but this happened after our departure to Haiti. I would have advised him to stay on his job.

The banker, I mentioned above, gave Lee an interview, on my insistence, liked him, found him an independent, clear-thinking man, yet he did not hire him. "I am afraid getting involved with this guy," he told me later. "He is a hot-head, FBI will keep pestering him. And his undesirable discharge...I am sorry."

This same friend of mine testified at Warren Committee that had I stayed in Dallas, there would have been no assassination (if Lee was involved) as I would have known what he was up to. And I am thankful for this one intelligent remark, although at the same time the same banker said some disagreeable things about me. But I am a Christian, so I forgive him.

Some other good friends understood what we were trying to do for the Osvalds - trying to improve their position materially, socially and emotionally. And had we been successful, Lee's animosity might have disappeared or would become constructive criticism. And, God, we need it!

Marina testified at the Warren Committee hearings that Lee had been a different person in the Soviet Union, a friendly and compatible man, but in the States he resentful and a recluse. He disliked the life of Russian refugees, comparing their bourgeois ways, soft and comfortable,

with the tough and ascetic life of their compatriots in Russia. He considered them fools, who did not understand the problems of the United States and even as traitors to their own mother-country. Why Lee did not resent our soft ways of life, I shall never know...

Lee disliked people who were lavish with Marina, spoiled her; and she foolishly bragged: "Look at this, look at that. They gave it to me. They can afford it." Naturally it infuriated him.

And so, testified Marina, Lee became somewhat of a recluse, and all that giving backfired making Osvalds' life miserable and empty. It could be that this was intentional; some elderly ^{lonely} people are jealous of an unusual couple, seemingly in love, so they get mixed up in their affairs.

Lee disliked and even despized bureaucracy in every form here or in the Soviet Union. "Here they are nasty", he said to me once, "in the Soviet union they are naive and stupid!" This outburst came out after I asked him: "how in the hell did you get out so easily out of Russia?"

"I outsmarted those Russian bureaucrats. Man! They are just an amorphous bunch of people. They make a mistake and go to a concentration camp like a bunch of sheep."

Comparing Soviet Union and this country, Lee told me one day: "both sides have made a lot of mistakes, enormous mistakes, but which side is right and which side is wrong, I shall be damned, I don't know."

And he added seriously. "I hope at least China will be right and will do well."

Effects of the separation.

Several interviewers and even good friends asked me constantly the same question: "you belong to a different sphere of society - why did you get mixed up with these 'low class' people, the Oswalds?"

Most of the reasons were explained in previous chapters but there was another important explanation. In 1960 I lost my only son of a congenital disease - Cystic Fibrosis - CF in short. Although the fatal issue was expected, when it happened it affected me so strongly that I knew that I had to get "away from it all". I asked my wife Jeanne to give her successful designing profession and join me on an expedition on foot by the trails of Mexico and all of Central America. This effort helped me immensely and then we met the Oswalds very shortly after our return.

Lee understood the nature of my ordeal - and so did Marina - which was a Russian way of going back to nature, to be alone in the wilderness with the image of the lost person in our minds. And so we experienced a communion with a departed child. But walking among the poor and despossessed opened our eyes to the realities of life. Before that, like most people in this country, we were hustling after our business, quite successfully most of the time, and dismissed poverty and inequality from our minds.

I became receptive to some of Lee's ideas, listened to them, discussed

then freely and came to look at him as a friend, Almost a son.

Our experience of living with the poor people of Mexico and of Central America interested Lee immensely and he kept asking intelligent questions. Because of his childhood in New Orleans and his early contacts with Latin Americans, he understood complex, semi-feudal problems and was searching for solutions. Marina was not involved in these discussions. Thus, possibly I identified Lee with my lost son, unconsciously, of course, and as far as age is concerned he could be my son. Maybe this is the reason why Lee accepted our paternalistic in his private life.

Lee trusted Jeanne and I implicitly and felt that whatever we tried to do would be beneficial to him.

I can think of another element of our closeness. At one period in my life, I was an officer in the Polish cavalry where I always prided myself on excellent relations with the soldiers. Maybe I treated Lee also like a soldier firmly but fairly. And on Jeanne's part there was the same element vis-à-vis Marina, who was about her daughter's age. And so the Osvalds might have considered us our foster parents.

After the forced separation, Lee came to our house every day. Once he brought some visiting cards he printed for me at Taggart's. A touching

gesture and I still keep these cards. Lee obviously liked my impossibly long name and spelled it correctly, but he printed the cards on shiny Bristol paper with fancy letters and black borders, as if they were made for a funeral.

The evening he brought my cards he appeared completely despondent from loneliness. "Give me Marina's telephone," he begged me, "I want to talk to her and the child."

We consulted each other. By consensus we gave Lee Marina's telephone and address, against Marina's will. We just did not believe that she would be afraid of Lee. Whether our decision was a right one, we don't know but starting that evening Lee began calling his wife at all times of day and night, disturbing everybody until this charming couple, the Mellers, asked Marina to move out.

This time we had nothing to do with the move and it seems that Marina refused to be with Lee and moved first to Mrs. Katia Ford's place - a Russian refugee married to an American geologist - and later she moved to another family named Rays (she was also a Russian refugee and he an American advertising executive). Eventually she returned back to Lee. But before that she gave Lee each time her telephone and address. Marina returned to her domicile after a tearful scene - which we did not see-

Supposedly Lee swore her his love, stood on his knees and promised to make some money.

Later on we were told that Marina had moved away from Lee for a few days in Fort Worth, and then went back to him...

The separation we were involved in so painfully was too short to have a positive effect, I told Lee. He should have been more patient and we were angry with ourselves for this intervention in their lives.

And life was catching up with us - time became very valuable for both of us. Jeanne had to finish some urgent designing jobs and my long awaited project of a geological survey of Haiti was coming to fruition. At the same time I was chosen chairman of the local Cystic Fibrosis campaign, which meant writing letters, seeing lots of people, participating in various meetings and above all - raising money. Jeanne was most useful spending her energy most usefully, raising large amounts of money from our rich neighbours and from the executives of the clothing industry. The campaign was a great success.

And here is another coincidence: my ex-wife and I had started this Cystic Fibrosis foundation on a small scale in Dallas and eventually it became a national organization with headquarters in Atlanta. At the time of our friendship with the Osvalds, Jacqueline Kennedy became an honorary

chairman of our Foundation for which, we all, afflicted parents were profoundly grateful to her. Lee Oswald was aware of this fact and out of friendship to me, he expressed several times how much he admired our President's wife.

Our meetings at the end of 1962

Somebody familiar with things Haitian know how difficult is to organize anything worth-while in that country. But I have always been very fond of Haiti and especially of people there. Fortunately my many friends were helpful and we were assured now that my survey was developing a firm base. Also I was trying to organize a company to help developing the sagging economy of this impoverished but beautiful country. So the time was short for us and we were seeing the Oswalds rather seldom.

One night he came alone and seemed very depressed.

"Lee, my friend," I told him. "You like Tolstoy, don't you. He said many clever things but this one applies to you. 'Man must be happy. If not he has to work on himself to correct this misunderstanding which makes him unhappy.' I think I know what your 'misunderstanding is'"

Lee nodded sadly. "My tragedy is," he said, that my suffering is inflicted on me by a person close to whom I want to be and from whom I would want to find protection and consolation."

These words, which I remember distinctly, touched me greatly.

"You try to change Marie into your image. It's difficult, if not impossible. You should like her for what she is, not for what you would want her to be. Do you my point?"

"But she is becoming like an American middle-class wife," Lee fought feebly. "She thinks only of foolish comforts. She is becoming like the rest of them, talking of washers, driers and other gadgets as if they were the most important things in life."

"Lee, you are too demanding. She is new in this country and is affected by it. Take it easy. Try to be friends with her. Somebody said: 'friendship is a quiet and exquisite servant, while love is a ferocious and demanding master'."

"I am a fool and I am very unhappy," said Lee quietly. "But thanks for advice anyway. You are a very good friend."

When he left I thought. Here is a good fellow whose tragedy is a complete misunderstanding of himself. He wants love from a woman who does not understand him. And he himself does not face squarely the issues. What is the most important to him? In the meantime the despair is like an organism which destroys him. He begins to lose hope.

And so Lee went back home and to his miserable life. But he seemed to be resigned to unhappiness and we have not had any complaints from Marina - no black eyes and no burned cigarettes on her delicate white flesh.

In the meantime a big party was to be given for Christmas of 1962 by Declan Ford - the geologist - and his wife Katia - the Russian refugee-

who knew the Osvalds well but tried to steer away from them. They were probably annoyed by Marina's stay with them, as far as Lee was concerned they were rather indifferent to him. Being younger than most ex-Russians, Katia was a relatively liberal person.

After we received the invitation, Jeanne called Katia and asked her permission to bring the Osvalds who were extremely lonesome at the time. KATIA WAS NOT TOO enthusiastic at Jeanne's suggestion but with a little of arm-twisting she accepted, but asked specifically not to bring the baby June. Or maybe the baby was just a pretext and Osvalds had no money to hire a baby-sitter. So I got on the phone and said: "Osvalds are lonesome, isolated, nobody sees them except us and we are not giving a party this year. We will not come without the Osvalds."

"Marina will not have anyone to speak to if we invite her to another, purely American party. At your party she will find some Russian-speaking people. I have a solution, I shall find a baby-sitter for June."

Fortunately Jeanne's friend, an American-Italian lady, a good Christian, volunteered for the job and stayed with June that whole night.

That Christmas eve both Marina and Lee were well dressed and looked very elegant. Lee didn't always had to be a non-descript individual, he had sometimes a very pleasant appearance and could dress well.

The self-appointed baby-sitter, Anita, liked June and took care of her in a typical warm, Italian manner and the Osvalds and two of us, chatting pleasantly, to Ford's attractive house in North Dallas. It was a clear, cold night and a slight layer of snow, unusual for Texas, cheered all of us and gave the city a Christmas-like appearance.

Most of the guests had already consumed lots of drinks and they were chattering excitedly in a dozen languages. The loveliest girl of the crowd was a Japanese musician, Yaikô, staying in Dallas for a short time with her friends from Tokyo. She was a delicate, elegant, sophisticated girl, restrained and dignified, a little lost in our Dallas society of noisy, self-assertive, aggressive females.

Marina did not look too well, she seemed to be afraid of the crowds, she liked to operate with men one-to-one, and appeared bashful, like a country-girl. Lee, on the other hand, blossomed and was the hit of the party. Naturally a good conversationalist - if he wanted to - both in English and Russian, he was outgoing and friendly possibly because the people were more liberal than usual, his behavior was exemplary. Serious, attentive and polite, he answered questions intelligently, if the person who asked the question was serious. He reacted well to the surroundings.

Somebody played Russian tunes on the piano and some good voices could be heard. Marina unfortunately was not musical and Lee was engrossed in conversations. I stayed around him and noticed that several women flirted with him and displayed their charms. Some were quite attractive. But Lee's greatest conquest was this Japanese girl Yaiki, I had mentioned before, and whom I also found the most interesting woman of all. He noticed her also and angled towards her - or possibly it was vice-versa - anyway soon they were engrossed in a conversation. Of course Lee had served in Japan and there he had learned a lot about the country and the people. He had told me that he met there some interesting leftist youngsters.

Maybe Yaiki had met G.I.'s like Lee before - although he certainly was not an average G.I.; whatever it was, but they were engrossed in each other and I left them alone. Marina stayed around, but not being able to understand she fretted and did not know what to do with herself. As far as I was concerned, I was delighted. How many times I'd heard her call Lee a bore, a fool, a bookworm, how many times she degraded his masculinity and here the loveliest girl of all was in a trance. Now Marina became just a jealous woman, she even forgot to smoke cigarettes and to drink wine - both were free and plentiful - she just watched Lee with narrow, jealous eyes. "We should go home," she muttered to me. "It's getting late. I am

worried about June."

"Don't worry, she is well taken care of. And we are having a good time," I answered, enjoying the situation sadistically.

And Lee this time was not to be budged. It was the first time that I saw him truly shine in the crowd. He enjoyed the evening and insisted staying there to the end of the party.

The other Russians at the party, unknown so far to the Osvalds, like cultured Russian Jews, were amazed by Lee's almost perfect command of the language. He spoke very fast to an elderly lady and she said: "I have lived here in America thirty years and I cannot speak English as well as you, young man, speak Russian."

The party finally became boisterous and noisy. Lee and Yaiko lost track of each other. But she found me and asked timidly: "what an interesting friend you have. What's his name?"

"Lee Harvey Oswald."

"Oh, what a lovely name."

"I agree with you that Lee is an unusual and intelligent young man, but many others, the majority, disagree with me. They don't seem to understand him."

"I do," said Yaiko. "He had so many true things to say about Japan. He is

a very sensitive person and he understood my country. The New Japan is very complex."

"Yes, Lee is not one of those GI's who believe that for a bar of chocolate and a pair of stockings you can conquer a woman - and for a larger stake - the whole country."

"Where does he work?" She asked bashfully.

I gave her Taggart's address and the telephone number and thought to myself: "he! he! A real romance is in the making..."

At last something good was happening to my friend Lee, new horizons are opening for him.

Unfortunately I cannot say whether this romance has materialized, as I my life became hectic and I did not have much time for the Osvalds, their conflicts and even Lee's love life. They did communicate however and I wouldn't have known about it had it not been for Marina who came over one day furious and told me: "I found in Lee's pocket this Japanese girl's address. What a bastard, he is having an affair with her."

I did not say anything just smiled and thought: "good for him."

"That Japanese bitch," she cried bitterly, "we had a fight over her - and look at the result."

She sported a new black eye.

"She provoked me to a fight," Lee told me later, showing his scratched face. "This time she fought like a mad cat."

The situation was normal again, they were at each other's throat.

Rare meetings in 1963

This last incident, due this time to Lee's romantic interlude, showed us that it was only up to them to iron out their difficulties. We even began to agree ~~wik~~ that the Russian refugees were perhaps right in eliminating this unhappy couple from their lives.

We did not show to Lee or Marina this change of our attitude but our meetings became rarer. When we saw each other we spoke mostly about Lee's job, our coming departure and about June's health. Only one evening led to some serious discussion. I remember Jeanne complimented Lee for his serious attitude towards life; she was tired of people teasing her and did not enjoy this American passtime. My teasing annoyed her also.

"Excessive vanity is related to jokes and constant teasing," she told Lee. "People who tease are trying to be brilliant at others' expense. That you don't do, Lee, neither to us to Marina." The teasers and constant jokers," she continued, "want to show themselves superior."

Lee was grateful for the compliment. He sat on that sofa of ours and told us something very touching. "I think that I shall be moving away from here after your departure. When my heart is heavy - and it will be when you will be gone - It will be hard for me to remain in one place."

"Dont impose new changes on Marina and the child, think of them," said

Jeanne. "If everything works out well, we shall invite you to stay with us in Haiti."

Then she gave the Osvalds this advice: "you seem to be still in love with each other. Cultivate this love as you would cultivate a fire, adding affectionate actions like little pieces of wood. Otherwise the fire will be extinguished."

"Study, Lee," I had to add my piece of advice. "Study is the best consolation against worst adversities. Some philosopher said that, it's not my own idea."

"Kids," said Jeanne. "We shall miss you, although you have been giving us a lot of headaches. We shall be basking in the sun of Haiti, drinking the beauty of our favorite island and eating sunshine and mangoes."

"Maybe it won't be so pleasant," said I, "not wanting the Osvalds to think of their dismal lives on Elspeth Street in Oak Cliff. "Remember life in America is fun...fun...fun... and then worry...worry...worry..." I quipped. "Try to have more fun than worry."

As a result of our admonishments Marina promised not to smoke and Lee said: "I won't put out cigarettes on your arm, since you won't be smoking." Peace for a while in the Osvald family.

Practical issues of life took over, I had to spend all the time on my geological work and on preparations for departure and Jeanne was designing furiously for several companies at the time trying to make some money. Our finances were almost exhausted.

But one evening with Osvalds, fraught with incidents, stands out in our memory. That evening we decided to show the 8mm. movie of our walking trip which Lee did not see and insisted on seeing. This was sometime in January of 1953. A scientist working for the research department of an oil company, Edward Glover, arranged for the projection in his house. Ad he invited all his friends, acquaintances and colleagues. Most scientists and skillful technicians dream of wilderness and free life in the open. And so the large room was full. Our only guests were Lee and Marins. They had found someone to babysit for ~~them~~ baby June.

I did not show this film often as this original was precious to us and we didn't have a copy of it. Taken all outdoors, this film came out amazingly well starting with our departure from the "civilized" world and ending a year later south of Panama canal. What we did was a little walk from the Texas border, all on foot - and we did not cheat even once.-

This trip began in October of 1960 and we returned from Panama in a civilized way by plane, to Jamaica first and then to Haiti where we took a good rest.

During this hegira we made a complete breakaway from all comforts, slept exclusively outside, on the ground, ate whatever the Indians had to sell and I exchanged occasionally my knowledge of minerals against food supplies. We walked freely as much as we wanted, slowly at first, much faster later, guiding ourselves by old mining maps and by compass. We lost a lot of disgusting fat in a hurry and after three months became lean and bronzed like savages, able to run up a high mountain without breathing hard.

The film, taken periodically, showed this amazing change in us, from slobs to healthy individuals, the rest consisted of beautiful scenery, of Indians we met, of our wonderful Manchester Nero and of our unpredictable mule- Condessa.

We stopped in a ranch south of Panama canal and left our mule there, to be retired from hard work. I hope she ended her life peacefully.

Quite a few of Glover's friends from Dallas and New York, mostly your career people, although conservatively inclined, were interested in meeting Lee Harvey Oswald. Some were more interested in him than in our movie. And they got their money's worth. After the showing they asked Lee some pointed questions and he answered them aggressively and sharply without hiding, and even exaggerating, his feelings. Lee wanted to show

these well dressed, prosperous youngsters that he was different radically from them. I wanted to stop him but he went on nevertheless talking of his sympathies for revolutionary movements all over the world, of his respect for Fidel Castro and for Che Guevara. This made him hardly popular with this group, composed mainly of big oil companies' employees, dreaming not of revolutions but of advancement of their respective careers.

And there is ~~hardly~~ nobody more conservative and even race conscious than an oil company employee or executive. Lee knew that. "I bet you" he said sharply, "that your companies do not employ any Blacks or Mexicans in any positions, not executive but average position..."

Nobody answered Lee's challenge.

"Naturally abroad you act differently, you use natives of all colours that American oil companies are soooo liberal."

Incidentally, now the situation changed somewhat, possibly because of President Kennedy's assassination which put in sharp prospective racial discrimination in this country.

But there was an exception in this conservative group - a tall, dark-haired, attractive woman in her late twenties. She took a vivid interest in Marina and did not take offence to Lee's utterances. She asked me if Marina spoke any English. I said - "no!"

"Would you introduce me to her? My name is Ruth Payne."

I did. And to my great surprise Ruth began to speak in fluent Russian to equally flabbergasted Marina.

Mrs. Ruth Payne, an eccentric American, came from a wealthy Philadelphia quaker family and went to some Eastern college where she took Russian studies very seriously. She was one of those gifted people who learn a difficult language well and are infatuated by the Russian culture. Mrs. Payne was probably bored in the suburban Irving atmosphere and wanted to practice Russian; her husband being a research engineer for Bell Helicopter, she had energy and time on her hands. She saw a native-Russian who did not speak any English - Marina was a real find for her. Some people accused her later of an infatuation of a different type, but I did not notice it. Anyway she was more interested in Marina than in Lee who in the meantime continued his furious and extravagant discussions with our conservative friends.

Thus began a friendship between these two women, a friendship which lasted till the days of assassination. Ruth Payne has done more for Marina and June than any other person, yet, for some reason Marina refused to see her after Lee's death.

All in all the showing of our picture was a success, beautiful scenery, waterfalls, volcanoes in eruption, outcrops of brilliantly hued deposits showed up well - and scientists, being adventurers at heart, loved wild-

derness. Marina could not care less, she was not an outdoor woman, but being polite, she did not express her dislike and kept on chatting amiably with Ruth Payne.

Lee, on the other hand, commented later excitedly how much he liked the film and that he envied us for having lived for a year close to nature, an ascetic life of complete freedom. "You have walked almost 4,000 miles to get away from people, comforts, stupid gadgets and conventions. It would be my dream also. I envy you. I have never been completely free."

"Yes it was a great privilege," I told Lee, "but it was tough, believe me. We wore out twenty two pairs of shoes and guaraches each."

The subject of our film filled most of our last conversations with Lee. I advised him to try the same, we spent quite a lot of money on our trip but some American lunatic who pretended that he was a saint had done part of our itinerary by himself, without spending a cent, people fed and clothed him out of charity.

"I would never do anything without paying for food and lodging," said Lee. "And Marina is not an outdoor woman like your wife."

Some newspapermen and writers attribute to me the part of Svengali, of sinister, evil adviser to Lee. Nothing could be farther from the truth. He was a strong and stubborn man, a hundred-per-cent American, who had made

a decision early in life, in his childhood as a matter of fact, that the American way of life means unabridged capitalism, crooked politics, violence, racism, pursuit of luxuries rather than ideals, living up to Joneses etc.. And that conviction motivated his escape to Russia. Nothing could have persuaded him to the contrary.

Lee's views on Latin America were determined long before we met. On the basis of our trip I began to look at things somewhat like Lee always did. Previously I lived in several Latin American countries, where the social injustices were obvious, but then I was looking at life as an eager petroleum geologist, not as a sociologist.

This time our primitive trip put us close to simplest people, we lived with them and understood the problems of the poor. And it was exactly what had happened to Lee in Japan - hence his immediate close relationship with Yaiko who was a sensitive and perceptive woman.

Lee told me that the same phenomena of awakening to the fate of the poor occurred to Che Guevara when he carried his assignment as a doctor in Central America, in places we visited ourselves. The desperate plight of the poor could not be denied by anyone with open eyes and a little bit of feelings for a fellow-man.

Che Guevara understood the situation well," said Lee, "although his stay

in Central America took place years before your trip. But still you saw dismal poverty in parts of Mexico, in Guatemala, San Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama, didn't you?"

"Yes we did. But in Costa Rica we found a somewhat different situation. Why?"

We knew the answer but asked Lee anyway.

"Simply because," he said, "that this country has never been occupied and corrupted by us, Americans."

Right he was. The ignorant "high-school dropout" knew the history of different United States interventions in Latin America.

And so Costa Rica is Switzerland of Latin America, with a true democratic government, limited police force, no army or air force. You can talk there freely and meet the president in the barbershop in San Jose. you can also find refuge there if you steal millions in USA.

All these problems are clear and open now but then were not in 1963.

We discussed with Lee the dismal poverty of overcrowded El Salvador, where the wealth of the whole country belongs to 23 families, latifundistas since the Spanish conquest. It's still true to-day.

And then the tragic-comical history of Nicaragua. Somoza family owns most of Nicaragua and this regime was imposed by the wife of an American am-

bassador during the occupation by the Marines. An elderly Nicaraguan geologist told us the story of a handsome and husky telephone lineman, who seduced the lonesome wife of the Yankee Ambassador -the name was mentioned but I forgot it - and his subsequent appointment as chief of police, which was equivalent to a dictator for life. His and children's.

These discussions with Lee took place 13 years ago. To-day the frequent support of the United States of oligarchs, crooked generals and ruthless dictators is discussed openly in the Congress, Senate and in the United Nations. But in 1963 such conversations might have been considered subversive. Now, after Vietnam and Watergate we all see a little clearer and talk more freely.

"Lee, how do you understand the Latin American situation so well?"

"I am from New Orleans, as a kid I met a lot of refugees from all these banana republics, no better source of information."

In this way both Lee and I were non-conformist, even revolutionaries. But my long years of experience in Latin America, followed by my son's death and the ensuing sadness, made me commiserate with the fate of the poor and of the starving. A younger man, I was career and money mad, a hustler... But Lee was the same since his childhood, which made him such a beautiful and worthwhile person to me.

I had been in the Social Register, played with the jet-set, knew innumerable rich people, including the Bouvier family, father and mother, and Jacqueline and Lee when they were young girls - all this foolish activity makes me to-day disgusted with myself. Now all this opportunistic waste of time is meaningless but Jeanne, my wife, and Lee had always been on the side of the underprivileged and she had lived in China and saw new-born babies thrown in the garbage because parents were too poor to feed them. To Lee, commiseration for the dejected came naturally. Poor as his family was in New Orleans, he never really experienced hunger. By his inner nature he belonged to the socially motivated people.

In our last meetings Lee often expressed his concern about this country -past and present. Its origins - according to him - by the hypocritical pilgrims, through Indian genocide, invasion of the continent by the greedy and hungry European masses, who, meeting racist attitudes of the Anglos, became even more racist themselves. Before busing confusion arose in this country, Lee was keenly aware of the racist cancer eating America's healthy tissues. "All people are SOB's" he often said, "but the strongest and more ferocious always win, physically but not morally."

Jeanne often participated in our discussions. Let me explain her background a little and to clarify why she got along so well with Lee.

Social attitudes are unpredictable and do not depend on your parents or on your environment. Jeanne's family in China was well to do, her father built a railroad, she lived a luxurious childhood, but she preferred from early days to give than to receive. She remembered the Chinese as humble and kind people, dismally poor, who hated to fight and rather insulted each other and stamped their feet. Even in huge families, violence was seldom seen. These subjects were interesting to Lee who discussed them with my wife. She told him of the formation of the puppet state of Manchukuo, of the Japanese invasion and of the ensuing cruelties, of her flight from the Japanese to the United States.

Lee compared her experiences ~~with~~ of the old militaristic Japan with the present Japanese movement, which he knew so well. And so both of them got along fabulously well, instructing each other on the Far-Eastern situation thirty years ago and now.

Since Marina never participated in these discussions, we would talk with Jeanne of this curious couple after their departures from our home.

"The opposites attract," was Jeanne's opinion.

"I think it's sex," was my opinion, "but what type of sex I don't know."

But there must have been a strong emotional bond between those two.

They always came to each other, except just before the assassination Lee

begged Marina to come and live with him, he had a job with the Book Depository, everything seemed fine. And Marina refused because Lee could not buy a washing machine to which she had had access in Mrs. Payne's house. From this incident came the theory attributed to me by some publication (Esquire, I think) - "A washing machine theory of Kennedy's assassination". Supposedly I compared Marina to a typical Texas woman who would not go back to her husband because he could not afford a new Cadillac. But in poor Marina's case it was a washing machine...

The comparison is not bad but I did not enunciate it since for me Lee is innocent of Kennedy's assassination. I cannot prove it but the later events, which will be discussed, tend to prove Lee's innocence.

I did not know Lee to be a dangerous man, a man who would kill like a maniac without any reason - with reason any man is a potential killer - and we proved that he was rather an admirer of Kennedy's. Lee's convictions, when we knew him, were fairly liberal, equalitarian, not even communist but rather socialist. He seemed to have abandoned his early, rather vague, Marxist beliefs. He did not try to influence me in any way nor did I try to exert any influence on him. "That's why it's so easy to be with you," said Lee one day, "everyone tries to influence me one way or another, in the Soviet Union, in Japan, here, and you leave me strictly alone."

Our film recurred frequently in our conversations and even Marina participated in these discussions. "How could you have done such a thing at your age?" she asked Jeanne. "And to look so trim, strong and beautiful?"

"Effort and constant exercise. Control over your body," would lecture Jeanne. But to no avail. Neither was I successful to convince Lee to be sportier. "Get your troubles, your sadnesses, your anger out of your systems through hard physical exercise," I advised them both. "It worked so well in our case. Unfortunately neither of them would follow our advice.

Lee and Admiral Chester Bruton.

There was a hiatus in our meeting with the Osvalds as I had to fly to Haiti to sign a contract there and then spent some time in New York preparing for the survey. Jeanne during that time did not see the Osvalds, she was finishing her designing assignments and was packing. We would take a minimum of things to Haiti, leaving our furniture and heavy items in a warehouse in Dallas.

Then I came back from New York and asked Jeanne to invite the Osvalds. They arrived immediately and brought baby June along. I remember this was a beautiful, spring day, warm enough to swim. And so Jeanne called Frannie, the wife of Admiral Chester Bruton, both good friends of ours and incidentally long-time enemies of Richard Nixon, whom they knew from his California days when he made his career ruining good citizens' reputations.

Admiral Bruton was a submarine hero of World War II and I do not recall whether he had four or five naval crosses. He never talked about them and a most humble and charming person.

Frannie Bruton, an ex-schoolteacher, a painter, an admirable woman in many respects had invited us that same day to a swimming party. Jeanne asked her if we could bring a couple of friends along ~~XXXXXX~~ and we mentioned the name of Osvalds.

Although we had spoken to her about this unusual couple, Frannie was not sure who they were but asked us to bring them along anyway.

And so we arrived to Bruton's lovely place with a huge swimming pool and Frannie was delighted to see us. When I reminded her that Lee was an ex-marine, she went to get the admiral who was a congenial man and liked to meet the enlisted men.

In the meantime Marina sat by the swimming pool with the baby. She either did not know how to swim or disliked showing her figure which was not too hot. Jeanne gave her a conservative bathing suit but she refused to use it. Lee sat quietly, immersed in his thoughts. That was frequent with him when he was in new surroundings. Before diving in, I told him jokingly: "Lee, isn't that funny that you get punished for your actions - which are only an appearance - but you don't get punished for your thoughts, which are the real thing."

While he was pondering over that, I continued: "this is a nice place, makes you think of oppressed workers etc... but you should see the places of the real moguls of finance. This is a poor admiral's retirement home."

Frannie and Jeanne were talking in the meantime with great animation about China. Frannie, a world-traveled woman, of most varied interests,

knew China where she spent several years with her husband. She loved the country and the people - so she and Jeanne hit it off fabulously well.

I went back to Lee and told them quietly, so that the ladies could not hear. "Does the wife of the Admiral strike you as an aristocratic, rich woman?"

He just nodded agreement.

"Do you know that she is the daughter of a tenant-framer widow's from Oklahoma. In her childhood the mother was so poor that she took washing in. Frannie walked to school four or five miles. She couldn't afford to buy paper and used the ^{margins,} ~~edges~~ of old newspapers to write on or to do her arithmetic. And the Admiral was also a poor farm-boy from Arkansas. He got his education in the Navy and is both a lawyer and an electronics engineer."

I do not know why I wanted to talk so much, but this time I ^{wished} ~~wanted~~ to convince Lee that all is not bad in this world and that comforts obtained honestly are not to be despised. But Lee did not say anything.

At that time came the Admiral Chester Bruton, not tall, broad of shoulders, a typical submariner. "When I was in a submarine in the Pacific he used to joke goodnaturedly. 'I couldn't turn around in the tower be-

cause I was constantly excited thinking of all those women on the mainland. So I had to forge ahead, and that's how I got my Navy crosses."

We used to call him Henri, in the French manner, because he loved to speak French to us and so did Frannie. Both spoke French very well and were well read. Later they went to live in France.

But this day he greeted everybody and began talking disgustedly of his new job with Collins Radio, actually an important position he took after his early retirement from the Navy. He did not like the commercial aspects of his work. "I should have stayed in the Navy a bit longer," he said irritably, "I am not made to be a salesman."

Then he began talking warmy to Lee, asking him about his duties in the Marine Corps - but my friend remained cool and aloof - although Henri was kind and continued chatting amicably.

"That Marine Corps was the most miserable period in my life," he said disgustedly. "Stupid work, ignorant companions, abusive officers. Boy, was I happy to have gotten out of it. To hell with the Navy."

Here I saw for the first time his profound dislike for the military and especially for the brass. The term "admiral" irritated him.

"He is somewhat of a rebel and a little bit a Marxist," I told the

admiral, trying to smooth over the disagreeable incident.

I never saw Henri mad, but he was this time and I knew that he could hardly restrain himself from telling Lee to stand at attention first and then to order him out of the house. Instead he just walked away. Lee did not continue being insulting and spoke politely with Frannie about his stay in Japan. "You lived in the compounds there, being officers wives, and did not have the chance to meet the real people in Japan, like I did."

"I wish I could have," answered Frannie diplomatically.

Marina was the personification of charm that afternoon. We had to translate what she said, of course. But she loved the arrangement of the house, as we took her around, the luxury (really quite relative) of the furnishings, Frank's paintings (she was an excellent amateur painter) - the whole thing. And the surroundings were an incredible contrast to the gloomy apartment of Elisabeth Street. And so she smiled politely and even flirted with the Admiral.

Excellent snacks were served later by our hosts, not a real dinner, and nothing out of ordinary happened any more. Henri was a good host and restrained himself while Lee, finally relaxed, told some funny, if slightly derogatory, about his Marine Corps life.

"We had a sargeant in the Marines who was as racist as any German SS trooper," he began telling us. "But then his sex habits..."

"Please, Lee," I stopped him.

"I could sing you the Marine anthem but, fortunately, I never learned it," Lee tried to be funny again.

I cannot say that this evening was a great success. But we left quite late, still amicably, because most of the conversation at the end of the evening was carried on in French between four of us.

Four years later we saw the Brutons again in Washington D.C. They moved to Arlington permanently and we spent a couple of days in their house. Naturally the subject of the assassination came up and the Brutons were absolutely flabbergasted. They did not associate the rude young ex-marine with the "presumable" assassin of President Kennedy. They probably did not catch the Oswalds' names when they had met them and then they had traveled extensively in the meantime.

Frannie became quite excited that she had entertained "that horrible individual." Henri, being an adventurous man, was rather amused than appalled by this fortuitous acquaintanceship. "Well," he said jokingly, "we met Nixon and we also met Lee Harvey Oswald..."

Neither of the Brutons were ever approached by the FBI agents and had never been asked to testify at the Warren Committee, nobody seems to have known of this strange meeting. It seems to me that I had mentioned it to Albert Jenner, of the Warren Committee, but possibly he did not take me seriously and then it may be that the Committee would not bother an American admiral. The "so called foreigners" were to bear the brunt of the suspicions and innuendoes.

Easter of 1963

In April 1963 we were at last ready to leave to New York first and then to Haiti. I could begin to work on my long-awaited contract, which was officially finalized, signed by the President Francois Duvalier and published in the Haitian Congressional Record. All our light belongings were packed, furniture ready to be sent to the warehouse.

During the commotion before departure we saw little of Osvalds and we knew that they were living practically like hermits, nobody visited or invited them, except maybe the Paynes. On April thirteenth, if I remember correctly, we sat exhausted in the evening. "This is a big holiday," said Jeanne. And the Osvalds are alone. Even Marina is abandoned by the conservative refugees as she had gone back to her "Marxist" husband."

I agreed with Jeanne and commiserated with Marina. Being left alone was a penalty for her because she preferred Lee notwithstanding all the fights and the beatings.

Jeanne had previously bought a huge toy rabbit, practically June's size - a fluffy thing for the poor child. Osvald's new apartment was on Neely Street, a few blocks away from the old place on Elsbeth Street. This was our first visit to their new abode which was infinitely better than the previous one. They had the second floor here, all to themselves.

Huge trees shaded the structure and in the back yard the climbing roses hung up on the trellises. The house itself was of white frame of the usual type of southern structure.

We rang the bell. The lights were off as it was obviously late for our sedentary friends. Although it was about 10 P.M. we had to keep ringing a long time. Finally the front window opened. "Who is there?" Asked Lee's familiar voice.

"Jeanne and George, open up, we have something for June," I answered cheerfully. Lee came down, opened the front door and then led us up a dark staircase.

Now Marina was up also and the apartment was lit up. It was clean and spacious but almost void of furniture. "Isn't this a nice place?" Confided Marina in Russian. "So much better than the old hole-in-the-wall."

We agreed and congratulated them on finding such a good place.

She was cheerful and Lee was smiling also, which hadn't often happened of late. He was happy that they were left alone by the emigrés and even by the rare Americans they knew. Lee's feelings for the emigrés could be compared to those of pro-Castro Cubans towards all the refugees crowding the streets of Miami.

Lee appeared satisfied with his job and proud of being able to provide a better place for his family. This was the first time we did not see any conflict between him and his wife. Of course, what follows will prove that all was not honey in the Oswald family.

Marina served soft drinks and began discussing some domestic affairs with Jeanne. Lee and I walked to the balcony and began to chat. He was very curious about my project in Haiti but so far neither one of us were sure it would materialize. Now it was "a fait accompli". Lee envied my profession and a chance I would have to help an undeveloped country and the poor people there. Incidentally he knew Haiti from his readings - he was aware the oldest, independent, Black Republic in the world. He had learned that Haiti had helped United States during the War of Independence, a fact not known to many Americans of his age and background. He also had heard about United States' intervention in Haiti after World War I - actually at the end of the war - and of the long American occupation of that country. He even learned which part of the Española Island the Republic of Haiti occupied and her size.

"You are very lucky going there, it will be an exciting experience," he said. And this opinion was valuable and encouraging to me because most

~~had been very~~ of my friends and acquaintances had a very dim view of my whole project and thought it would be dangerous and a waste of time. It turned out to be one of the most useful and pleasant experiences of our lives. But most of these advisers knew little about Haiti - and I mean well educated, prominent people. To them it was an insane, tropical, Black Republic - rather a ferocious dictatorship. Some had predicted the worst disasters if we lived there.

Then we talked pleasantly of his job, of June who was growing nicely and we also spoke of the unfortunate rise of ultra-conservatism in this country, of racist movement in the South. Lee considered this the most dangerous phenomenon for all peace-loving people. "Economic discrimination is bad, but you can remedy it," he said, "but racial discrimination cannot be remedied because you cannot change the color of your skin." Of course, he greatly admired Dr. Martin Luther King and agreed with his program. I just mention it here, but he frequently talked of Dr. King with a real reverence.

In the meantime Marina was showing Jeanne her bedroom, kitchen and the living-room. There she opened a large closed, next to the balcony, and began showing Jeanne her wardrobe, which was considerable. On

the bottom of the closet was rifle standing completely openly.

"Look! Look!" Called Jeanne excitedly. "There is a rifle there."

We came in and I looked curiously. Indeed there was a military rifle there of a type unknown to me, something dangling in front.

"What is that thing dangling?" Asked Jeanne.

"A telescopic ^{sight} ~~XXXX~~," I answered.

Jeanne never saw a telescopic sight before and probably did not understand what it was. But I did, I had graduated from a military school.

"Why do you have this rifle here?" Jeanne asked Lee.

"Lee bought it," answered Marina instead, "devil knows why. We need all the money we have for food and lodging and he buys this damn rifle."

"But what does he do with a military rifle?" Asked Jeanne again.

"He likes shooting at the leaves."

"But when does he have time to shoot at the leaves and the place?"

Asked Jeanne curiously.

"He shoots at the leaves in the park, whenever we go there."

This did not make much sense to us, but liking target shooting ourselves we did not consider this a crazy occupation.

All this time Lee stood next to me curiously silent.

"Did you take a pot shot at General Walker, Lee?" I popped a question spontaneously. And then I guffawed. "Ha! Ha!" Thinking this a pretty good joke.

Lee's reaction was strange. I often tried to reconstruct it. He did not say anything. He just stood there motionless.

It was naturally a very foolish joke because there was an attempt a few days before at General Edwin Walker, a rather notorious character who was asked to resign his post in Germany by General Eisenhower, if I remember correctly. Anyway he was an ultra-rightist who had tried to run for governor of Texas. And he got surprising number of votes, some 200,000 on a political platform somewhat to the right of Hitler's.

This joke just popped out because General Walker lived fairly close to us, on Turtle Creek. Everyone knew his house with a huge American flag in front, sometimes replaced by a Confederate flag - and much later by South Vietnamese and Rhodesian flags.

As I said, Lee's facial expression remained calm. He became just a little paler. ~~Since~~ This was the last time I saw him and yet I cannot say with precision what his reaction was. I think he mumbled something unintelligibly and I did not ask. For sure he was embarrassed, possibly stunned. And Marina was definitely shocked.

Neither Jeanne nor I laughed much at my Walker joke. And certainly not Marina nor Lee. Only later we realized how stunning and unexpected this joke was to them. It hit the nail on the head.

Marina testified at Warren Committee that I KNEW that Lee shot at General Walker and she also testified under oath that Lee did shoot at General Walker and had missed him narrowly.

I do not blame General Walker, we called him jokingly Genral Foker, whom I never had the pleasure of Meeting for calling me a dangerous radical. I stupidly laughed at a bullet which ~~xxxxxxx~~ might have killed him...

This joke cost me a lot of money by hurting badly many of my business contacts.

Marina testified also that Lee indeed considered General Walker a fascist and tried to kill as the most dangerous man for this country. Marina's testimonies turned out to be contradictory and vague but there is another thing which makes me believe that Lee possibly tried to shoot General Walker. A man, whose name I do not recall, a Jewish man, whom Lee met at the Ford's Christmas party, described General Walker as the most dangerous man in the United States, a potential neo-fascist leader.

I noticed that Lee kept on asking why. And the other fellow explained clearly his reasons. Lee might have been influenced by this statement.

Another possible reason is the inscription on Lee's photograph, which we received posthumously and Marina's inscription on it. I shall talk about it later.

This innocuous remark of mine influenced our lives, but we heard later from Alfbert Jenner, counsel of the Warren Committee, that Marina's testimony was even more damaging to me. She supposedly remembered my saying: "Lee, why did you miss him?"

That I naturally did not say and Marina was so vague in her recollections that even the Warren Committee did not take her seriously.

Actually I think Marina believed that I knew somehow of Lee's shooting at General Walker and that's why she was so afraid that evening that I might tell the police or FBI about it. Lee, on the other hand, never considered me capable of treason and then he KNEW of course that I was completely unaware of his attempt.

Lee was a little scared of my extra-sensory perception - which I still have with my students - Had I known anything about it, I would have persuaded him not to try any such crazy foolishness.

Lee often commented with amazement that I could guess his thoughts. And I do believe in existence of ESP, especially among people attuned to each other. It happens to me constantly that I guess who is on the line when the phone rings. I know when somebody close to me writes me a letter or wants to get in touch with me. It even happened that I thought suddenly of a well-known person - but barely known to me - turn on the TV and there he would be.

This happened I remember with Captain Rickenbaker whom I knew slightly but admired a great deal. We were sitting in a living-room with friends in New Orleans and I said suddenly: "turn on the radio, Captain Rickenbaker is going to speak". And he did.

Anyway this evening of Easter of 1963 ended in an amicable manner. We walked in the small garden and Marina gathered a gorgeous bouquet of yellow roses and gave it to Jeanne in appreciation of the rabbit she had brought for the child. The Osvalds were also happy that I did not mention any more the rifle or the Walker joke, instead of making an issue out of it.

It was our last meeting and a friendly one. We said that June looked less now than Chruschcheff, she was growing up. She did not have such a bald head, her eyes got bigger and she was less chunky.

Lee himself mentioned it, caressing the child: "look, she is much better-looking now than our great Russian leader."

"I hope she keeps his amusing and friendly personality," said Jeanne.

He is gone now, God bless his Bible-quoting soul and his earthy personality. His sudden bursts of anger and beating of the table with his shoe, are all gone and belong to history. Millions of Russians miss him.

After this Easter visit things began to move so fast for us that we could not see the Osvalds and we did not even talk to them on the phone.

Our move to Haiti.

Our move to Haiti ended our personal contacts with the Osvalds. But other contacts were not interrupted, including the strangest one, the posthumous, which I will describe later. Soon after arrival in Port-au-Prince, capital of Haiti, we received a post-card from Lee, giving us his new address in New Orleans. At our last meeting for Easter neither of Osvalds mentioned that they intended to leave Dallas. So, this was surprise for us. Obviously they moved from Dallas at about the same time we did, but we, we do not know. Maybe they were just lonesome. Maybe Lee wanted to remove himself and his family from General Walker's neighbourhood?

And so Lee gave us this, now famous, address on Magazine Street in New Orleans, Louisiana, the town where he spent most of his youth. Incidentally it was written in English. The card got lost somehow and Jeanne failed to put the exact address in her book. So she still has under Lee Harvey Oswald's address - 214 Neely Street, tel. RI. 15501. and the business address of his reproduction company. We did mean to send them a Christmas gift but the tragic events of November 1963 occurred in the meantime.

Any time we look at this address-book we think off Lee and wish he were alive, not only because we liked him so much, but also because he could have proved his innocence, or, if he were involved, to tell the whole truth about the conspiracy. He always had enough integrity to tell us all the truth, even if he had done anything wrong. Remember, he did not deny - or accept - his guilt in shooting at General Walker.

What I had to say here, and it bothered me for a long time that I did not do it before, relates to the type of person Lee Harvey Oswald was, the reader will have to form his opinion of his guilt, or lack of it. Several new elements will be brought in here, which, in our opinion, are favorable to Lee. Both my wife and I still miss him and are deeply sorry that he met such an untimely death at the hand of such a repulsive individual.

And so we led a delightful existence in Haiti in our beautiful house overlooking the Bay of Port-au-Prince, doing useful work with my international group of geologists: one Italian, one Swiss and one American, as well as the Haitian helpers. Incidentally, I may have gotten this assignment because there were no Haitian geologists in the whole country at the time. There may have been some in exile.

But after November 22, 1963 the situation changed for us. Information trickled from the Embassy personnel, and through the Miami papers that I had been Lee Harvey Oswald's "best friend", that both Jeanne and I "befriended" the assassin of the President of the United States. Of course, we ourselves did tell the political officer at our Embassy that indeed we knew Lee and Marina and that we were ready to help in any investigation, we also wrote to our friends about it - all our letters were incidentally intercepted by FBI - and finally I wrote a letter of condolences to Jacqueline Kennedy's mother, whom I had known better than her illustrious daughter. Mrs. Hugh Auchincloss of Washington D.C., ex Mrs. Jack Bouvier of New York and Southampton, was a dear friends of my in-laws and mine.

In this letter I expressed me grief over the death of a great President and a wonderful man. Being influenced by the barrage of one sided propaganda in the Newspapers, on radio and TV, I added to this letter: "I am deeply sorry I have ever met Lee Harvey Oswald and had befriended him."

Living abroad and not having any inside information on the case we were "brainwashed" by the media which emphasized and explained constan-

tly that indeed Lee was unquestionably the lone and only assassin. Without any facts and Lee dead, everyone in Haiti considered him the assassin. Even cynical and well informed European diplomats in Haiti were of the same opinion. But they began to grumble asking themselves the same question: "where is the motif?"

Now something unusual happened. A gray-suited, bulky, Miami suntanned, with false teeth and an artificial smile, Mr. W. James Wood, an Agent of FBI arrived in Port-au-Prince for the sole purpose to make me deny a statement I had made to my friends and to the political officer at the Embassy. What was this disturbing statement? I had contacted a government man in Dallas, the only one I knew personally, probably a CIA agent, or possible an agent of FBI, a very nice fellow by the name of J. Walton Moore. Looks like it's a specialty of these government agents to have a capital letter instead of the first name. Purely Anglo-Saxon, you know... Anyway Mr. J. Walton Moore had interviewed me upon my return from a government mission to Yugoslavia and we got along well. He had lived in China, was born there as a matter of fact, in a missionary family. So I invited him and his wife to the house and he got along

fabulously well with Jeanne. I used to see Mr. Moore occasionally for lunch. A cosmopolitan character, most attractive. A short time after meeting Lee Harvey Oswald, before we became friends, I was a little worried about his opinions and his background. And so I went to see Mr. J. Walton Moore to his office, in the same building I used to have my own office, Reserve Loan Life Building on Ervay Street, and asked him point blank. "I met this young ex-Marine, Lee Harvey Oswald, is it safe to associate with him?". And Mr. Moore's answer was: "He is OK. He is just a harmless lunatic."

That he was harmless was good enough for me. I would decide for myself whether Lee was a lunatic...

And that was the statement which greatly disturbed W. James Wood and his superiors. And that same statement disturbed later Albert Jenner, a counsel of the Warren Committee, when I gave my testimony. As disturbed Jenner was and he knew that my testimony was truthful, W. James Wood who came to see us in Haiti was more than disturbed. He tried to make me deny this statement And so we were sitting in a luxurious Embassy room, staring with animosity at each other, ~~AND~~ this repulsive, replete bureaucrat dared to tell me: "you will have to change your statement."

"What do you mean?" I asked incredulously.

"That false statement of yours that a government man told you that

our President's assassin was a harmless lunatic."

"False statement! Man, you are out of your mind!" I answered sharply.

And so the gray-suited man in no uncertain terms threatened me:

"unless you change your statement, life will be tough for you in the States."

"Nuts!" Was the only answer I could make.

After meeting Mr. W. James Wood, I immediately began having doubts of Lee's guilt. And while I was talking to him, the conversation lasted quite some time, he constantly tried to intimidate me reminding me a lot of undesirable people I had met in my life and puritanically challenging me on the grounds of moral turpitude, i.e. too many women.

I told this obnoxious FBI agent that either FBI or CIA or any other agency was in any way implicated in President Kennedy's assassination. I just took a precaution which seemingly backfired. But I did imply that these government agencies were negligent. Still my statement was of utter importance to FBI and Mr. Wood and he kept on trying to force me to deny it.

I categorically ~~denied~~ refused to deny anything and we ended this stormy session without shaking hands.

Then my wife went through the same routine. Threats and allusions to

her belonging to some leftist organization of scouts (imagine - leftist scouts!) which marred her background. Since she did not have any moral turpitude behavior pattern, except her guilt to have been born in China, she ANSWERED Mr. Wood in a quiet and icy manner and absolutely refused to influence me to change my statement.

"You don't seem to like FBI," said the gray-suited man with an artificial smile, at the end of the interview.

"I do not like your methods. They are both brutal and naive. Learn from Scotlan Yard, they know how to conduct themselves. When they inquire they do it with discretion not by innuendo and gossip. You do harm to the people you investigate and don't discover anything useful about the case."

A friend of mine in Dallas, an investment banker, told later the Warren Committee investigators that our emotions were probably tensed up during our intervæw with Mr. Wood. And he was right.

The assurance that he was harmless naturally influenced me very positively in my relationship with Lee. Adn still I kept asking him many embarassing questions like:"how did you get to Russia? It's expensive to travel so far? how did you come back so easily? His answers were good enough to me. He did not work for any foreign government, nor for

our government - the latter is more doubtful - if I though he did, he would not have been a good friend of mine. On the other hand, after this interview, my opinion of FBI under J. Edgar Hoover (another letter instead of the first name) became very low and this was confirmed by recent events, destruction of Lee's letter to FBI in which he begged to leave him and his wife alone.

As I mentioned before the whole Bouvier family were very close friends of mine, I met them upon arrival in the United States. They were very warm, friendly people. The newspapers all over the country made a big issue out of it: "a mystery man who was close to Lee Harvey Oswald and to Jacqueline Kennedy." Some newspapers put forth some odious insinuations... My life seems to be full of such strange coincidences. It's probably in the grave that I shall stop meeting strange people and form peculiar friendships.

Even Dr. François Duvalier, president of Haiti, got alarmed by all these goings on. Incidentally, President Duvalier was no friend of John F. Kennedy who cut down to nothing United States help to Haiti. But there was another factor: my house was located in the same mountainous development as President's palace, on Tonton Lyle Estates, and the implication was obvious: living next to the man who befriended

a president's assassin presented a problem...

In a small country like Haiti, government people know more of what was going on in the American Embassy than the Ambassador himself. The visit of the FBI man was blown completely out of proportion. Americans were scared of me and even Haitians avoided visiting us.

The Warren Committee.

As the atmosphere of Port-au-Prince became oppressive for us and my work was suffering from it, we were considering abandoning my survey, disbanding my small personnel and return to the States. But President Duvalier found himself a solution to this situation. He asked Dr. Hervé Boyer, Minister of Finance - Secretary of Treasury - and a good friend of mine who had helped me to get the Survey contract, to invite me to his office and to have a chat with me. This was a friendly office which I visited often when some problems had to be solved, and the secretary who was also Boyer's mistress, a gorgeous Muletto girl, was no less amicable to me as usual.

But not so Dr. Boyer. He said decisively: "you are in the hot water. Everyone is talking about you and your wife. Do not abandon your survey but go back to the States and clear your name somehow. If you cannot, come back, wind up your work and leave the country."

It so happened that on the same day our Embassy received a letter, addressed to me and my wife, from Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the Warren Committee. Mr Rankin invited us to come to Washington D.C., and if we wished, and to testify. This letter also stated that if we accepted to testify, the Warren Committee would pay all our expenses to Washington

and back to Haiti. Of course we were most anxious to cooperate as much as we could to solve this crime. But Jeanne refused to travel without our two dogs - Manchester terriers - and, after the exchange of wires, Mr. Rankin accepted the additional "dog expense".

It was unfortunate that Nero and Poppaea, our terriers, ^{were blissfully unaware} that this trip was caused by Lee Harvey Oswald whom they liked so much. For them this expedition was a ball.

We stayed at the old Willard Hotel, not far from the Veterans' Administration Building, where the Committee was located.

I was the first to testify. The man who took my deposition was Albert Jenner, a lawyer from Chicago, who much later became well known in connection with the Watergate case. Jenner was a well known trial lawyer and I have to admit that either he was much cleverer than I or that I was impressed by the whole setting and the situation as it unfolded in Washington at the time. Anyway Jenner played with me as if I were a baby.

Also people I met there were rather impressive. Allen Dulles, head of CIA at the time, who did not interfere in the proceedings but was there as a distant threat. Judge Warren himself, a rather sympathetic, paternal figure who had a weakness for Marina, we found later. Representative Gerald Ford, friendly and youthful-looking. The last ten years changed him

considerably. And then innumerable, hustling lawyers, all of them trying to figure out how a single man, Lee Harvey Oswald, could have done so much damage with his old, orimitive, Italian army rifle. Having around such a galaxy of legal and political talent, you don't have to be tortured, you would be impressed and intimidated to say almost anything about an insignificant, dead ex-Marine.

And, during my lengthy deposition, I said some unkind things ~~thing~~ about Lee which I now regret. The reader must imagine my situation, sitting there and answering an endless flow of well prepared and insidious questions for more than two days. .. Was this an intimidation?

"We know more about your life than you yourself, so answer all my questions truthfully and sincerely," Jenner began.

I should have said, "if you know everything, why bring us all the way from Haiti?" But I did not and began to talk. And my answers were very nicely edited ~~except~~ in the subsequent Report. "Say the whole truth and nothing but the truth," he intoned.

Jenner was a good actor, very cold and aloof at first, he switched to flattery and smiles when he felt that I was getting tensed up and antagonistic. "How cosmopolitan you are! How many important people you know! Yes, you are great!" said Jenner ingratiatingly. And probably this

flattery worked well on me, proving to me that Albert Jenner was such a good friend of mine. So I answered all the questions to the best of my ability, with utter sincerity, without even asking to have my lawyer present and he, the sneaky bastard, did not say a word that the whole testimony would be printed and distributed all over the world. And so my private life was shamelessly violated. During this time Jeanne and the dogs were languishing in the old Willard Hotel.

At the end of this long testimony Jenner seemed convinced that I was not involved in any way in this "already solved" assassination. He began showering compliments on me and I felt like a star of a pornographic movie. Before leaving, I told Jenner of the harm this affair was causing me, mainly of the attitude of the American Ambassador. Of the reflexion on my work in Haiti. He inserted therefore some nice statements, putting me above all suspicion. Big deal! The harm was already done. And how could I have been suspected of anything, being so far away from Dallas, unless President Duvalier and I used voodoo practices and inserted needles or shot at a doll ressembling President Kennedy. Since everyting was known, Jenner concluded my useless testimony with the following words: "you did all right. Keep up the life you have been leading. You helped a poor family." And he added

as an aside "remember, sometimes it is dangerous to be too generous with your time and help."

Then followed one and a half days of testimony for my wife and our Manchesters. They were not "material witnesses" but Jeanne refused categorically to leave them in the hotel. If our dogs could have talked, their testimonies would have been more valuable than ours.

As Jeanne and I discussed our experiences as witnesses, many details came to our minds. For instance: "Lee Harvey Oswald must have asked you a question about your political philosophy. What did you say?" Asked Jenner slyly.

"Live and let live," I answered simply. Jenner made some comments on that but generally seemed satisfied.

I said to Jeanne later: "it was an unpleasant experience, but in Russia we would have been sent to Siberia for life." She agreed.

Jeanne's opinion regarding our experiences were somewhat different from mine. I was anxious to leave my home and return to Haiti.

"I considered it a favor of mine to come and help the Committee," she had said. "I was completely relaxed. The counsel was pleasant and reserved. However, instead of asking pertinent questions, for instance 'when did you meet the Oswalds?' and 'how many times you talked to him

and Marina and about what?' Instead they asked me: 'where were you born? Who were your parents?' I never suspected that my personal life would be broadcast, although I had nothing to be ashamed of. Still it's my property, my life, the whole report was a washup, a coverup."

Later we shall say whom The Warren Committee tried to cover up, maybe unconsciously.

"I can never forgive the cheek of asking me how many children I had," continued recollecting my fiery wife, "how many jobs I changed, and why, whom I had worked for, how many times I went to Europe on buying trips, how much I earned. I had expected to speak only of Lee and Marina. So I have a grudge and if I could, I would try to make them pay for the harm and insult that done to me. Where is the privacy we are supposed to have here?" Said Jeanne bitterly.

"And so I spoke of my wonderful parents, of my life in China, my arrival in USA. Poverty, hard work, success finally. But I hoped that this would be a country free of prejudice, of racial discrimination. Financial opportunities in USA were not the prime reasons for my coming here. My faith, or lack of faith, all was polluted by this porno-exhibitionist questioning. Finally we began discussing Lee in a desultory manner," concluded Jeanne.

Naturally our testimonies regarding Lee and Marina coincided. We said the same things in our own ways and we never even bothered to read our own testimonies. Obviously everything we said coincided perfectly. When you said truth, you don't have to remember it, so we did not discuss further details.

"Finally," remembered Jeanne, "they made me identify the gun. Nero, the Manchester was there, he sniffed at the gun, he could have made a better identification than I. For me the gun seemed familiar, but whether it was the same we saw in the closet, I couldn't say. It seemed to have a telescopic sight. So I told Jenner - 'ask Marina, she could identify the gun! "

We both felt that the minds of the members of the Warren Committee were already made up, they were obsessed with the idea that Lee was the sole assassin. The idea of Cuban refugees with mortal grudge against Kennedy did not interest them. We both were interrogated the same way. Any time we said anything favorable to Lee, they passed it up. And Jenner jesuitically kept asking questions which were incriminating to Lee.

An amusing detail of Jeanne's interrogation: Jenner shied away from Nero - ~~and~~ Jeanne promised that he would not bite, that he never bit Lee who was a good human being - to which Nero would be willing to swear.

We discussed also what we had heard from the committee members - most other witnesses were nervous and contradicted themselves, probably intimidated by the awesomeness of the proceedings and the fact that many were not even naturalized citizens. And so some good people spoke very unkindly and untruthfully of Lee just because they were frightened and they wanted to please the Committee. They really should be forgiven.

All the favorable facts we mentioned about Lee were subsequently misinterpreted in the printed edition of the report or not mentioned in it at all.

Both of us we furthermore felt that Jenner was displeased whenever he heard some favorable facts about Lee.

Then we asked ourselves: why did Warren Committee spent all the money bringing us back and forth, keeping us in an expensive hotel, doing all that hellishly expensive investigation around the world about us, even carrying our mutts to Washington and back to Haiti? Why such a waste of the taxpayers' money if they did not want to hear the truth?

We discovered that we both told Jenner independently: "why don't you send good detectives to New Orleans and to Mexico, find who were Lee's contacts at that time and what he was up to at the time of the tragedy. It seems that a Senate Committee is going to do just that now, in the summer of 1976.

We wondered why the Committee paid so much attention to the testimonies of people who had known Lee and Marina in Dallas, long before the assassination or others who had known him long before that? And the answer was - just to fill up the pages and tranquillized American populace.

Jeanne dispute with Mrs. Hugh Auchincloss, Jacqueline Kennedy's mother in the evening when we finished our deposition. Jeanne asked her: "why don't you, the relatives of our beloved President, you who so wealthy, why don't you conduct a real investigation as to who was the rat who killed him?"

"But the rat was your friend Lee Harvey Oswald," was the cold answer.

Thus the mind of not only the members of the Committee but of President's family were all made up.

Jenner kept asking me constantly - "why did Oswald like you and didn't like anybody else?" As if there was some homosexual link between us....

"I don't have the slightest idea, maybe because I liked him..."

"Maybe he liked you because you were a strong person?" Jenner asked again intimating that maybe I was a "wolf" or a devil influencing him to do evil. "Maybe he identified you as an internationalist?" Intimating again some dark connections I might have.

"Maybe," I answered. "I am no admirer of any particular flag."

"You and your wife were the only ones who remained his friends? Con-

tinued Jenner his line of inquiry.

This question was asked of both of us. And we answered both in about the same terms: "to us they were warm, open, young people, responsive to our hospitality."

Albert Jenner then brought to my attention part of a letter I wrote to Mrs. Auchincloss from Haiti. He used this as my admission of Lee's guilt, and I had explained already under what circumstances this letter was written. "since we lived in Dallas we had the misfortune to have met Lee Harvey Oswald and his wife Marina. I do hope that Marina and her children (now she has two by Lee) will not suffer too badly through life and that the stigma of the assassination will not affect her and the innocent children."

This was my foolish letter and my speculation, not Jeanne's.

And again, after the impact of this letter read to me, Jenner very cleverly bamboozled me into a possible motive of Lee's guilt. "The only reason for Lee's criminal act," I continued, "would be that he might have been jealous of a young, rich, attractive president who had a beautiful wife and was a world figure. Lee was just the opposite; his wife was bitchy and he was a failure."

Now, away from the pressures of the Committee, I consider this statement of mine most unfair. It would not have made him a hero to have shot a liberal and beloved president, especially beloved by the minorities, and Marina was not such a bitch, while Jacqueline was not so beautiful. Especially she was not beautiful inside when she married that gangster of international shipping Aristotle Onassis.

If you read the Warren Report, there is another leading question by Jenner: "as a humanitarian person you cannot imagine anyone murdering another person?" A childish, naive question, of course.

"I cannot imagine doing it myself," I answered equally stupidly, but at least I did not express opinion about Lee's guilt.

Lee, an ex-Marine, trained for organized murder, was capable of killing but for a very strong ideological motive or in self-defence.

But a few more words about my letter to Mrs. Auchincloss, Mrs. Kennedy's mother. The copies of these letters were given Warren Committee by Allen Dulles, her close friend, as well as the copies of her letters to me. On January 29, 1964 she wrote to me: "it seems extraordinary that you knew Lee Harvey Oswald and Jacqueline as a child. It certainly is a strange world. And I hope, like you do, that Lee Harvey Oswald's innocent children

will not suffer.

Very tired by our testimonies, we were invited after our ordeal to the luxurious house of Jacqueline Kennedy's mother and her step-father, Mr. Hugh Auchincloss. This luxurious home was located in Georgetown and Auchincloss' money originated of ~~some~~ association of Hugh's family with John D. Rockefeller, Sr. of the oil fame. We spoke about another coincidence in our lives. I flew one day from Dallas to Washington and Mrs. Hugh Auchincloss happened to be on the same plane. She was flying from some health-farm in Phenix, Arizona, where rich women stay on a diet, exercise and put themselves in an acceptable shape again. This was the year of presidential election and Mrs. Auchincloss, a staunch republican was for Nixon and was sure than her son-in-law, JFK, did not have the slightest chance to win the elections.

I, on the other side, was sure that Kennedy would win the elections and was going to vote democratic for the first time.

I told her that the mood of the country was for her charming son-in-law, and she answered that I did not understand American politics...

Eventually, we had to talk sadly about the assassination. Allan Dulles was there also and he asked me a few astute questions about Lee.

One of them was, I remember, did Lee have a reason of hating President Kennedy? However, when I answered that he was rather an admirer of the dead President, everyone took my answer with a grain of salt. Again the overwhelming opinion was that Lee was the sole assassin.

I was still thinking of poor Lee, comparing his life with the life of these multi-millionnaires, I tried to reason - to no avail. It seemed to me that I was facing a conspiracy, a conspiracy of stubbornness and silence. Finally both Jeanne and Janet (Mrs. Auchincloss) got very emotional embraced each other and cried together, one over the loss of her son-in-law, another over the loss of a great president she admired so much.

"Janet," I said before leaving, "you ^{were} ~~are~~ Jack Kennedy's mother-in-law, and I am a complete stranger. I would spend my own money and lots of my time to find out who were the real assassins or the conspirators. Don't you want any further investigation? You have infinite resources."

"Jack is dead and nothing will bring him back," replied she decisively.

"Since he was a very beloved president, I wouldn't let a stone unturned to make sure that the assassin if found and punished," implored Jeanne
 "We both have grave doubts in Lee's guilt."

Later we discussed for a long time why a woman so close to President

Kennedy, nor Robert Kennedy and the rest of Kennedy family, as we discovered later, would be so adamant on this subject. A later chapter, dealing with Willem Oltman's strange adventure, will raise further grave doubts in readers mind. Would it be possible, as much as it sounds like a sacrilege, that Lee was a "convenient" assassin to all the relatives and friends of the late President Kennedy? Convenient not in any derogatory sense but just because was a PATSY, a patsy not involved in any revenge arising out of JFK's biggest and costliest mistake - the Bay of Pigs.

Isn't better to think, maybe subconsciously, that the assassin was a crazy, semi-literate, ex-Marine, screwed-up, Marxist lunatic, with an undesirable discharge and a poverty-stricken childhood, unsuccessful in his pursuits both in USSR and in USA - and with a record of marriage verging on disastrous. It's better to hold to this belief for them and for the rest of the country rather than to find out that the assassination was a devilishly clever act of revenge caused by the Bay of Pigs disaster...

This would explain Lee's desperate scream: "I am a patsy!"

But we were still in the Auchincloss' luxurious mansion, about ready to leave. "Incidentally," said Mrs. Auchincloss coldly, "my daughter Jacqueline never wants to see you again because you were close to her husband's assassin."

"It's her privilege," I answered.

Hugh, who was a very silent man, asked me suddenly: "and how Marina is fixed financially?"

"I do not know, I just read that she received quite a lot of money from the charitable American people - maybe eighty thousand dollars."

"That won't last her long," he said thoughtfully and, almost without transition, pointed out to an extraordinary chest set: "this is early Persian valued at sixty thousand dollars."

We said goodbyes amicably to the Auchinclosses and drove off back to our hotel. "That son-of-the-gun Hugh has an income running into millions," I told Jeanne thoughtfully.

"Such figures are beyond my comprehension," she said sadly.

Our return to Haiti.

When we had received Rankin's letter inviting us to come to Washington and testify at the Warren Committee, we knew that we would be of poor help, as we had been out of contact with Lee for over eight months prior to the assassination. We could not say what happened to him and Marina after we had left Dallas. But, naturally, I was anxious to testify in order to clear my name and to be able to work on my Survey.

But the American colony in Port-au-Prince were in an uproar when they were told that we were going to Washington to testify. "How horrible!" said some. "Aren't you afraid?" said the others. Even my old friend at the Embassy, Teddy Blaque, said: "but he was an assassin and you were so deeply involved with him. . .

Many thought that we would be put in jail and would never come back to our lovely house in Port-au-Prince.

Fortunately the Haitian Ambassador in Washington was reassured by the Warren Committee that we were decent people, the Ambassador transmitted this message to the President Duvalier and we could return safely to Haiti. But my contract became hopelessly harmed by the intervening publicity and by the peculiar attitude taken by the American Embassy towards us.

And President Duvalier, the astute Papa Doc, knew through his informants that our Embassy would not protect my rights any more. And the old fox was absolutely right, the payments for my Survey began drying up and in later years I never received any cooperation from anyone in our Embassy or in the State Department in trying to recover the large balance of my contract still due to me.

I cannot even give a complete resume of incongruous theories and suppositions which evolved - and are still evolving to-day- in feverish minds of various writers and reports ^{ers} as a result my past friendship with Lee and the colorful excerpts from the Warren Committee depositions which were leaked out.

One theory had it that Lee was ~~xxxx~~ operated by me via long distance, from Haiti to Dallas. Impulses were transmitted very deviously because I, a geologist and a famous scientist, had previously inserted a transistor in Lee's skull (either under the skin or deeper I do not remember). A book was published in New York describing this whole operation in detail. Since Papa Doc disliked President Kennedy, we would sit in his office, surrounded by "Tonbèn-Macouts" - and would operate poor Lee, who would blindly obey us.

As a credit to the American reader, I may say that this book did not have much success and I seldom meet anyone who had bothered to read it.

However another book was published in Luxembourg - to avoid criminal prosecution - and it had an enormous success in Europe. "L'Amérique brûle" - America burns - contains over 400 pages of outrageous innuendoes against the American insituations . The writer, Jeames Hepburn, an invented name is actually a group of European newspapermen who had been assembling dirt about the United States. This collective James Hepburn calls both Lee Harvey Oswald and myself CIA agents. Let me translate this nonsense which appears on page 356. "Oswald was suspected, as any other agent returning from a mission un thh enemy territory of having been 'manipulated'. He was put therefore under surveillance by CIA and then interrogated and 'tested' by one of the specialists utilized at the same time by Washington (CIA) and by Houston (oil men) and whose 'nom de guerre' was George S. de Mohrenschildt, and whose nickname was 'chinaman'"

This 'well-informed' book which still has flashes of success in Europe, goes on describing yours truly: "the Chinaman was 'presumed' to have been born in the Ukrainé and was an expofficer in the Polish cavalry.

He was recruited during the war by O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services) and was registered in 1944 at the University of Texas where he obtained a degree of geological engineer, specializing in petroleum geology.

The CIA used him in Iran, in Egypt, in Indonesia, in Panama, in Guatemala, in Nicaragua, in San Salvador, in Honduras, in Nigeria, in Ghana, in Togo, in Haiti etc. where he worked - in principle - for the Sinclair Oil Company.

George de Mohrenschildt was closely connected with petroleum circles (and member of Dallas Petroleum Club, of the Abilene Country Club, of the Dallas Society of Petroleum Geologists) and had close personal connections with the managers of the following companies: Kerr-McGee Oil Company, Continental Oil Company, Cogwell Oil Equipment, Texas Eastern Corporation and also with John Mecom (of Houston). He was a distinguished and cultured man (Mr. Hepburn obviously buried me already) who was part of the Establishment and frequented the Social Register of New York. His wife, a White-Russian lady, born in China, worked frequently with him.

Another of his covers was the International Cooperation Administration (I.C.A. - sic) in Washington."

This "book" also accuses Lee of working for a photographic firm in

Dallas, a cover for CIA, which specialized in making and reproduction of maps and confidential documents for the United States Federal Government.

But enough of all this nonsense. However, let us remember, that all these idiocies and distorsions were based on the Warren Report.

If I were a CIA agent, I would not have been so miserably treated by the American Embassy in Port-au-Prince, and especially by the Ambassador.

It is discouraging to say that the Warren Report contained mostly the "words which were put in our mouths" so to say. However, there were a few good and truthful facts in this report. For instance, a friend of mine, an investment banker in Dallas, testified that he met Lee and that he found him intelligent and alert. Another young man, who had lived in Fort Worth, also had some kind words for my friend.

Effects on our lives.

The publication of the Warren Committee Report brought an immediate and drastic change in our lives in Haiti. Only the close and true friends understood the real reasons of our involvement with the "presumed assassin" of the generally beloved President Kennedy. In this manner the phony friends were weeded out of our lives but still too many people, in addition to the publicity caused by the Report, were contacted by the FBI agents at various times asking imbecillic and insulting questions, implying grimly the worst suspicions about us. The same thing happened to Jeanne. A good friend recalls that an FBI agent asked for the whole day of his precious time just to talk about us. Discussing Jeanne's background in China, the agent asked our friend: "is she loyal to the United States?"

Our friend answered without hesitation: "yes, she is, in my opinion."

"Whom are you kidding..." said sarcastically the FBI agent.

Insulting and stupid articles appeared in the newspapers and in the magazines all over the world, and still do, about Jeanne and I, calling us "mysterious associates of Lee Harvey Oswald."

Just a few months ago Chicago Tribune and San Francisco Chronicle

published articles implying that I had received a considerable amount of money in Bahamas just to keep quiet about the mystery of Kennedy's assassination. A shyster in Washington by the name of Fensterwald assured a European newspaperman of similar monetary operation.

I should have probably sued the authors of such vicious allegations, but this would have added additional publicity.

Even a nice and fair book by Gerald Ford, "the Portrait of the Assassin", in which he mentions us very favorably, had disastrous effects on our lives: "Oh! you were mentioned in that book about the assassin..."

Money was offered for interviews, which we refused to accept. Overseas telephone service in Haiti was inadequate - very few people had private telephones - I happened to be one of the few with the telephone in my office, but not at home. This office telephone kept buzzing for months: some unknown voices asking me insidious questions: "what was your relationship with Oswald? What did you think of him? Did you have the same convictions as he did? Did he kill Kennedy? Why are you hiding in Haiti?"

Some man called me from Hong-Kong just to ask me a single question: "who are you?"

And this was so false, because I had been working on my contract

in Haiti!
 a year before we met the Osvalds and we arrived in this island nine months before all hell broke loose in Dallas - and we were living there without interruption all during this time.

And so after a few particularly insisting reporters kept on calling me, and spending their evil money, I would hang-up.

But the worst was the attitude of the Ambassador Timmons, the charge d'affaires Curtis and all the other sycophants. But more on that subject later.

Then came an offer for us to appear on a televised interview for the NBC's The Warren Report. The reporter's name was George McMillan and he asked if he could come all the way to Haiti to visit us. He sounded like an intelligent man and was provided with a good recommendation by a mutual friend. I did not commit myself to a televised interview but told McMillan that he was welcome to visit us in Haiti.

A gruesome incident took place the day of his arrival at the old Port-au-Prince airport. After a season full of invasions - a group landed from Cuba and made havoc all over Eastern Haiti. They were well armed, familiar with the terrain and murdered indiscriminately. Eventually all of t

them were executed by the faithful "tonton-macoutes", TN's as we used to call them. One of the invaders was brought in to Port-au-Prince, publicly executed and to show the Haitian populace that it wouldn't pay to attack Papa Doc and his government: the dead body was then exhibited on the plaza near the airport with all the supplies and ammunition. The exhibit was attached to the chair and the swarm of flies around him was like a funeral smoke.

When McMillan, an experienced newsman arrived, he saw the commotion and the crowds surrounding the body. I did not want him to see the gruesome and drove around it at full speed without comment. Later in the evening, however, around the drinks, he began to talk about it

Incidentally when we invited McMillan we were not sure whether he wanted to talk to us about Oswald or about the situation in Haiti, which was the center of attention at the time. Since I was in charge of the geological Survey and the only American working independently in Haiti at that time, I thought that McMillan wanted an interview with me. And I certainly knew the situation well, and it was different from what the American press had described. In my opinion Dr. Duvalier was an advocate of the poor Blacks against the rich, French-educated Mulattoes.

This was a simplified version of the situation but better than the full condemnation of the Devalier regime in Graham Green's "The Comedians".

Anyway, I didn't want him to see that dead man attached to the chair without giving him some facts surrounding the execution. What an impact his report would have on the public in USA if he would start it with the statement about the dead body and the flies.

We brought McMillan to our house because he seemed as a very pleasant individual. He had told us that he defended Blacks' equal rights and that somewhere in the Carolinas, where he lived, KKK burned crosses on his lawn and forced him to leave. Anyway we wanted all our friends who came to visit us in Haiti to know the true facts about the regime - the good and the bad.

Later on when we sat on our terrace to the sounds of the delicate tinkling of "anolis" - small lizards - and looking at the fantastic view of the City and the dark Bay, McMillan mused aloud: "why didn't you want me to see the cadaver?". He stopped suddenly as a huge tarantula moved slowly on its long legs close to him, He shuddered. "Don't worry, I reassured him, "this big ones are not dangerous, only the small ones.

"Very simple, I didn't want you to see the dead guerilla, without telling you the facts surrounding his death first." I explained. "After all, Papa Doc is my employer."

But instead of listening to me, or even answering, McMillan launched into the diatribe about the great program NBC were preparing about Warren Report, that we would be the main personalities in it etc. He even offered to bring in the whole TV crew, if we accepted. But sick of all this unwanted publicity, we refused firmly.

Fortunately George McMillan turned out to be an interesting and pleasant a good tennis player. He did not waste his time altogether and we being boycotted by the Americans in Haiti were glad to have with us a liberal, independent person. He left Haiti two days later asking us to re-consider our decision and mentioned a substantial fee.

I asked several friends for advice regarding this TV matter and they all answered that remaining silent ^{and invisible} would ham us. "You are the only ones who could say a few kind words about Oswald," wrote one of my best friends who had met Lee and wasn't entirely convinced of his guilt. "This national TV appearance would dispel the dangerous aura of mystery in your relationship with Lee," wrote another.

And so, after battling it between us back and forth, we reconsidered our decision, I called McMillan and arrangements were made immediately by NBC to bring us and our faithful pooches to New York City.

The weather was stormy, we had circled for two hours over the city, but the ordeal was over and we landed safely. NBC ~~arranged~~ reserved for us an apartment at the Plaza Hotel and the next day we spent the whole afternoon in from the the camefas.

And again, as the interview progressed, it became obvious that the producer and McMillan tried to make me say something derogatory about Lee and to drag out of me insidiously some damaging comment to his memory. To them he was definitely the assassin and we, possibly, the conspirators or his secret advisers. As Jeanne and I were positive in our non-sensational statements, the whole interview did not make any sense. We were invited to New York on wrong premises that either we would produce some inside information or would prove to millions of Americans who would watch the show that Lee was the only assassin.

Since the Warren Committee, slanted as it was, could never find any reason in Lee's involvement in this crime "of the century", the promo -

ters of the NEC show hoped that I, as his best friend would finally explain his insane action. And that was the reason why we were brought in to New York.

And to Jeanne and I, who did not have any more information than anyone reading newspapers and magazines, Lee remained the same person we knew - eccentric, interesting, warm, close friend and we never considered him seriously as President Kennedy's assassin.

Of course, insanity is a possibility but all the previous incidents and conversations with Lee did not suggest impending insanity. Nor was he ever to us a poor loser, a stupid high-school dropout, a bloodthirsty revolutionary nor a person jealous of other people's success and money. Such people are met everyday on the streets of any American city in groves.

The enclosed picture of Lee with the rifle and Marina's inscription would indicate that he might have been considering hunting fascists - and in his mind General Walker was one - but certainly not our president Kennedy.

A few days later, while still in New York, we saw a complete 40 minutes preview of our appearance, and again we saw what a poor job we did trying to present Lee's side. And later, the worse parts of these

forty minutes interview were used for an hour show, called "The Warren Report" that so many millions saw.

It was alike a McCarty erg, the time of the government's witchhunt against the "leftists". This was a general hunt, government's and media's against a defenseless dead man.

Upon return to Haiti we knew immediately that something went awry with our relationship with the Haitian government. Usually, we used to go through customs first, cheerfully greeted by Mr. Jolicoeur, a clown-like but charming public relations man for Papa Doc. This time our luggage was searched subrepticiously while militia examined our papers in a different parts of the building. When out luggage and we were reunited - the bulk of maps and information I had carried with me were stolen.

Since they were my property, I lodged a strong protest with our Embassy and the Duvelier's cabinet. Both parties laughed at me.... What maps? What search? Where were you? How naive can you be...

Our return to the United States.

The incident with the stolen maps destroyed my desire to continue working for the Haitian Government and the American Ambassador declared in a hysterical way: "I hate you. You cause me nothing but trouble!"

"I am a Christian, Mr. Timmons, I don't hate anybody. But I wish you would help me to recover my maps."

Before this incident the Haitian Government insisted that I try to develop some of the resources I'd discovered in Haiti: Copper, titanium, bauxite, excellent oil possibilities. Therefore, whenever I left the country I took the bulk of information (not all, fortunately) with me and each time I acted as an agent for the Government. Here, with my maps gone, the trust was destroyed and I began preparing for departure. Since the Haitians owed me a large amount of money for the Survey, I was able to dispatch most of my valuable information through friends to a safe place to the States. Anyway, most of my work was completed and I began worrying that the Haitians would detain me as a hostage. Just recently an American citizen, an ex-air force officer, domiciliated in Haiti was accused by ~~the~~ Papa Doc of dealing with his enemies abroad. The poor fellow looked for asylum in our Embassy - but

it was refused to Him (all other embassies do give asylums to political refugees, ours doesn't. In addition to this the chief of police came and assured the Ambassador that nothing would happen to the poor ex-US officer. And so he was carried out screaming and shouting and nothing was heard of him again. My friends in the know told me that he was beaten to death in the dungeons of the presidential palace.

Such a fate was not to our taste. Since nobody expected our immediate departure, we made a very secret deal with a small German line - plying the trade in the Carribean islands - using the good offices of the German Ambassador, and the little ship accepted us on board late in the evening. How we avoided the customs etc? I still had a *laisse passé* from the President Duvalier and nobody bothered to stop our truck with our furniture and supplies and our personal car.

Late in the evening the only person who came to say good-bye to us was the delightful Ambassador and his charming Austrian wife, we drank a few glasses of champagne and departed into the dark Carribean.

Incidentally on the manifest of this ship we ~~appeared on~~ signed our names as follows: Jeanne - a cook; I- deckhand. And that's how we landed in Miami, having skirted very close the Cuban Coast.

The crew, most international, was composed of a German ex-submarine commander, an engineer - a young Norwegian genius who could repair anything on board, and a medley of Haitians, Jamaicans, Trinidadians and other picturesque Carribeans. Since Jeanne decided to cook some delicious European melas for the captain and the crew and I, in excess of energy, painted the whole deck, a pleasant surprise awaited us in Miami. When I asked the captain for the bill, not only for us but also for the car and the luggage, the answer was: "it was a pleasure having you on board. You earned more than the price of your transportation." The only way to reciprocate was to invite the officers to a supitious dinner.

From Miami we drove slowly to Texas. Incidentally as we were skirting late at night Lake Okochobee on a deserted road, a brilliant comet crossed the dark, tropical sky, lighting the weird scenery around and even scaring our dogs. A comet for some is considered a good omenxbut for us it foretold very bad times indeed.

In Dallas we hoped to meet some good, old friends, quite a few had come to Haiti and enjoyed our hospitality. Instead we encountered suspicion and an outright hostility. Surprised at first, we soon discovered the reason - the Warren Committee Report.

the transcripts of
 Immediately after our testimonies, which we signed without even bothering to read - it was supposed to be truth and nothing but the truth - who would want to quibble over the words. After our depositions we were soo sick and tired of the whole affair. We put the matter of the inquiries by these various agencies and even our our own testimonies completely out of our minds, and, while driving an open car back to Dallas along the coast, we breather in the fresh marine air and wanted to forget the whole tragic incident.

But in Dallas we had to face another situation.

"Have you read the Warren Report?" a lawyer, good friend of ours, asked us.

"No," I answered, "I heard there is a comprehensive resume of various depositions."

"Arn't you going to reat it. It contains some sixteen volumes and one of them is almost exclusively about the two of you."

The agra od suspicion, of innuendoes, of gossip, of semi-lies and concealement polluted the air around us. But the events forced us to read what we had said in Washington D.C. and especially what has been said about us in these voluminous sixteen tomes.

Still we postponed reading these dry, bureaucratic, insipid pages until one day we sat with some friends in Fort Worth (they had known Lee and Marina also but had avoided interrogation by some hook and crook) and they loaned to us the volume in which we figured so prominently. "Read it carefully and don't miss a word. Actually you should read all the volumes and you will understand the attitude of many people towards you."

And indeed, after reading several depositions, I was ready to vomit and I understood what Albert Jenner, our "inquisitor" at the Warren Committee had mentioned: "you will be the only people in the world to know exactly what others think about you.". He did not dwell further on these words and did not indicate that our depositions and those of other people we knew or had even remote relations with, would be printed, after careful editing, to probe the nebulous point that Lee was the sole assassin. It turned out that some decent people volunteered to testify on the condition that their testimonies would remain secret and available only to Warren Committee members. But FBI insisted that all depositions should be printed and distributed to the public.

The shades of J. Edgar Hoover must regret that decision after it was discovered how many falsehoods his organisation was involved in.

Adn never again these patriotic and decent people will expose themselves in the degrading positions of "informers".

It was saddening to read the opinion of an old business associate that "he never trusted me completely". My ex-sexcretary divulged that i had made many suspicious and intriguing trips to Houston, Texas - such an exotic and mysterious place to her underling's mind. A scurrilous remark was made by an old Russian emigrée, a biddy whom we never considered bright but harmless "that Chinese woman never even believed in God," she declared indignantly, as if religion was not a very personal matter. "He always wanted to be the commissar of Texas," was an opinion of a slight acquaintance. And finally the testimony of my ex-son-in-law, Gary Taylor: "if anyone had finagled this assassination or had influenced Lee Harvey Oswald in that direction, that person would be obviously George de Mohrenschildt.

Of course, in the meantime my daughter had abandoned him and he kept a grudge against me because I had not approved of their teen-age marriage.

Reading all this I even thought of writing a short book, assembling these opinions and give the book the title "I arranged Kennedy's assassination".

Or another title that would attract customers: "My affair with the teen-age Jacqueline Bouvier and how I got rid of her husband."

The same people, Russian refugees and Americans, who had detested or ignored Lee and Marina, made money out of them later, especially out of the resulting unbelievable promotion of the "poor Russian Marina," - "that defenceless, God-fearing, miserable wife of that brutal monster Lee Harvey Oswald."

The story reminds me somewhat of another specimen, Svetlana Stalina the daughter of the greatest assassin the world had seen (including Adolf Hitler and Atilla the Hun), communist and daughter of the ferocious communist, who came to the United States in search of God...

But back to Marina. She finally "made it in the United States", just like her girl-friend put it in her letter from Soviet Russia in 1962. She became a success, had her cover in Time, money poured from the naive Americans. Her arrival in this country was superbly fulfilled: Lee Harvey Oswald had finally become a real money-maker after his death. Poor fellow, even his tomb was stolen and desecrated from the public cemetery near Arlington, Texas.

Lee became subject of articles and books - and will be for a long time - by the scavengers from a poor man's death.

I would not dare to call our dear President Gerald Ford a scavenger, but his book was the first one, directly accusing Lee Harvey Oswald - on "his" Portrait of the Assassin.". Naturally the book was ghost-written, inept and uninteresting, yet he was the first one (he or his ghost-writer) to have the information assembled by the Warren Committee.

Again, I have to give credit to the American people, the book was a failure.

Newspapermen kept on calling us, they were geniuses at discovering our whereabouts, we did not have a listed number and stayed with some friends. They should have used their talents investigating Lee's activities in Atlanta, New Orleans and Mexico City just before the assassination. Garrison did it and his career as district attorney was ruined. People who had the slightest connection with Lee and whose testimonies were not exactly "cosher" as far as the official version was concerned, died mysteriously.

The owner of the apartment house on Gillespie, an eccentric lady who, like us, was extremely fond of Haiti - she almost had a fit when she saw Haitian car licences on our car - asked discreetly for police protection for us.

With the exception of the European press, the majority of the American books and articles accepted an almost preposterous thesis introduced by some lawyer of the Warren Committee that the same bullet killed Kennedy and gravely wounded Governor John Connally. Yet, Connally himself distinctly remembers two consecutive shots and he had never changed his testimony.

Only some more logical and cynical writers mentioned the fact that there was no reason whatsoever in Lee's action; but they approve the thesis that Lee was aiming at Governor Connally, whom he had reasons to dislike, but being a usual flop and f--- up, he killed Kennedy instead and only wounded Connally...

Notwithstanding these superficial conclusions, favored in USA, the general opinion in other countries ^{stopped} ~~never~~ accepted the th thesis ^{ing} Of Lee's guilt. Many people suspected LRJ, as a party which profited directly from the assassination and who always thoroughly disliked JFK and the whole Kennedy clan, who used to cold-shoulder him and his wife... It's not for us to judge but the latest discoveries of FBI's finageling add some credence to this theory. After all LBJ was a most devious man and jointly with it he ignorance was also out of the ordinary. They say that he was not sure of the location of Vietnam.

And so, here again, Lee Harvey Oswald was the most convenient patsy.

And so, little by little, even naive and credulous Americans, annoyed by this constant harping on Lee's guilt, by the serving of platitudes and repetitious statements, began to disbelieve in Lee's guilt, or at least the began to doubt the non existence of any conspiracy. After all, Americans are business-minded, if somebody performs an act as assassination, without any rime or reason and without any financial reward.... something stinks in Danmark.

We, personally, retained our doubts to ourselves, saw fewer people than before, restrained our social life and eliminated false friends and acquaintances.

A dear friend of ours, a ~~chief reporter~~ staff writer for the Dallas Herald, insisted on interviewing us and pointed out my deep-felt opinion how harmful it is for the United States to believe that a lone lunatic killed the President and then, another lunatic killed him. And then, shortly afterwards, the brother of the President was murdered in kold blood by another lunatic, without any apparent reason. What is it a country of himicidal maniacs? Had a reasonable theory of a plot or plots had been substantiated, I think it would be beneficial to this country.

A message from Lee

In February of 1967 we finally found a suitable place to settle down, before that we moved from one place to another and visited our children in California and Mexico. The place called conveniently "La Citadelle" was exactly fitting to us and was ample enough to accommodate all the furniture which had been stored in the warehouse since the beginning of 1963.. It was about time to settle as four years storage at the Southwestern Warehouses began to exhaust us financially.

I thought of abandoning the whole junk and leave it to the warehouse -it's good sometime to start anew, but there were books....

And so we went to the warehouse with an old, faithful friend, always ready to help and to pick up some old junk for himself, and, before our furniture was taken out, we began looking through the accumulation of various and sundry items that could be eliminated. . I was less interested in this task, so I chatted with my friend, a good guy who had followed us on many of our trips, while Jeanne was finishing the selection of things to take and to discard.

Suddenly, he rushed out of the warehouse with a crazy look on her face, shouting excitedly: "Look, look, what I found!"

She dragged me to the pile of open crates and I saw inside a slightly familiar-looking green box. "What the hell is this?"

"This is the box with the records I gave Marina before our departure," she shouted.

"How did they get there? We left them such a long time ago?"

"I havn't the slightest idea, I considered them lost." Jeanne was short of words, this was so weird. "I had used them myself to leardn English when I came to this country. They served me well. Then I loaned them to Marina long before our departure for Haiti."

"Remember how punctiliously honest Lee was," I said. "He would not keep any of our belongings. But how the hell did they into this warehouse? Possiblyhe remembered where we were storing our furniture. Or, maybe he gave the package to Glover to whom we had loaned some of our furniture and who finally added it to the rest of stored boxes at the Southwest Warehouse?"

This remains a mystery to this day, because we lost track of Glover, a good guy who got so frightened of his very slight acquaintanceship with the "President's assassin" that he moved out somewhere without leaving an address.

My wife began taking taking the albums out of the box and as she opened

to see if the records were not broken, she shrieked almost hysterically

"Look, there is a picture of Lee Oswald here!"

This was the same, so controversial picture of Lee, which appeared on the cover the the defunct "Life". Many newspapermen and "investigators" had assumed and had written hundreds of pages that this picture was a fabrication, a "fake", a superimposed photograph. Frankly we did not care but now, right there, was a proof that the picture was genuine

We stood literally frozen stiff, Lee staring at us in his martial pose, the famous rifle in his hands, like in a Marine parade. It was a gift for us from beyond his grave.

"What did he mean by leaving this picture to us?" I wondered aloud.

"He was not a vain kind of a person."

Then Jeanne shouted excitedly again: "look there is an inscription here. It read: "To my dear Friend George from Lee." and the date follow - April 1963, at the time when we were throusand of miles away in Haiti I kept looking at the picture and the inscription deeply moved, my thoughts going back when Lee was alive.

Then I slowly turned the ~~picture~~ photograph and there was another

epitaph, seemingly in Marina's handwriting, in Russian. In translation it reads;" this is the hunter of fascists! Ha! HA! Ha!"

Here Marina was ^{again} making fun of her husband, jeering Lee's very serious anti-fascists feelings, which we knew so well and described in several chapters of this book.

It's hard to describe the impact of this discovery on us, especially Lee's dedication and Marina's inscription. This message from beyond the grave was amazing and shocking. From the grave we did not even dare to visit, because FBI considered with suspicion all the visitors at Lee's burial place. The confirmation that Lee considered me his best friend flattered me but Marina's message expressed a chilling scorn for her husband. Anyway, if he were a hunter of fascists, and we agree with such a description, why was she making fun of him?

First of all it makes in doubt her assertion that Lee tried to shoot General Walker, secondly for a Soviet Russian refugee the word "fascist" is not a laughing matter - some fifteen million people lost their lives fighting them. And how many more died of cold and hunger?

We kept this photograph for ourselves and showed it only to a few close friends. Their reactions were interesting: to some the photograph indicated that Lee was a maniac, a killer, it constituted a proof of

his aggressiveness, of his guilt. To others, just the opposite - it gave him the aura of a militant idealist. The man of such anti-fascist inclinations COULD NOT be the assassin of the most liberal and race-conscious president in the history of the United States.

We did not show the photograph to any authorities, to them Lee Harvey Oswald's case was closed and we did not want any further involvements. Neither did we show it to any investigators or reporters in the United States.

But I did write a letter to a friend, one of the editors of Life Magazine, explaining that I had a message from Lee Harvey Oswald and I did ask him to keep the matter confidential. I added to my letter a short resume of the facts - how this picture got into our possession.

Immediately I received a call from my friend saying that Life had a team working on Oswald's case, a team of investigators, because the magazine had doubts of Warren Committee's conclusions.

The next day a reporter assigned to the assassination case called me and we talked for a long time. He was intimately familiar with all the details, psychological and technical, of this unbelievable complex case, having worked on it since November 1963. Like ourselves, he was at Marina's inscription and gave it the same meaning as ourselves.

"We shall use to as a main feature of our special edition if and when we know something definite about Oswald's involvement or of his innocence," he said.

Again I asked the man to keep this matter confidential temporarily and he promised to do so.

Obviously either Life's people were talkative or, more probable, our telephone was tapped. This we found at several occasions.

Now we know much more about "Watergate" type tactics of our government agencies, especially FBI, but at the time ~~being~~ we did not have anything to conceal - except the existence of this picture - and this only for our own sentimental reasons. Whenever we heard a suspicious noise on the telephone, we laughed, spoke in foreign languages or made offensive remarks at whoever was listening in. Some voluminous files must be hidden somewhere containing "transcripts", translations and obliterations of our conversations.

Again, being faithful taxpayers for years and years, we could but marvel at the unbelievable waste of our money. But what was it compared to 140 billion U.S. dollars spent in Vietnam. But one bad habit leads to another...

Now something should be said as to why we did not contact Marina

regarding picture. Naturally she knew of its existence from our mutual friends, the Fords. But, as this story clearly indicates, there is no ^{re} love lost between Marina and us. We had helped her with the baby care, with her own health and finally made a supreme effort trying to solve her unsolvable conflict with Lee. We never received a word of thanks from her. But this is not important, we helped her when she was poor and desperate.

Unfortunately, after Lee's death she showed herself a real "operator". She created an appearance of a helpless victim, of a woman searching for God, and naturally God-fearing Americans sent her substantial contributions or donations, all tax-free. We heard from some reporters that donations were sent frequently stuck between the pages of Bibles and she would grab the money and flung the Bible furiously on the floor.

We did not treat her very nicely in our testimonies, but we were utterly truthful. Marina should have recognized it, had she taken the trouble of reading our depositions. She might have come then to a true evaluation of herself and of her dead husband.

Well, she is settled now, when we see each other we say "hello" politely. As a matter of fact the last time I even did not recognize her.

She looked prosperous and well and spoke excellent English.

Another reason we did not contact Marina and haven't had a serious conversation with her, was her attitude towards Mrs. Ruth Payne. Ruth was a perfectly charming, charitable Quaker, a Christian in the true sense of this word, who, like us, helped the Osvalds out of pure humanitarian impulses. Actually she did more for them than anyone else. Marina lived with her for and off, took advantage of her hospitality. Ruth drove her to New Orleans and back. She showed utter kindness to her, occasionally Lee, and especially to baby June. She and her husband were simply admirable people. Yet Ruth had her own family to take care of ~~and~~ as well as her teaching profession. Her only reward consisted of lessons in conversational Russian.

Lee, on the other hand, seldom accepted hospitality and certainly did not ask for it. And yet, Ruth's and Marina's great friendship ended abruptly after the assassination.

As Ruth told us later, upon our return from Haiti, Marina said that she did not want to see her ever again. And Mrs. Payne was too proud a person to insist.

It is possible that Marina was advised by the authorities to shy away

from her former independent-minded friends and she must have been scared stiff of authorities. Time will tell. But still many years went by and she still does not see Mrs. Ruth Payne.

Short sketches of various incidents involving Marina will prove to the reader these peculiarities of her character, which may incidentally appear admirable to many readers. Her dreams of America bristling with high buildings, criss-crossed with high-speed roads, blessed with luxury for everyone and especially with fast automobiles for all teenagers and adults. Ah she was right, some economist calculated fifteen years ago that if the automobiles kept on proliferating at the same rate, each family in America would possess five hundred automobiles at the end of this century. A paradise on earth!

Yet we never disliked Marina, there was really nothing to dislike, there was no substance in her. She was amusing sometimes, witty, naive mostly, like some Russian peasants, yet with great deal of shrewdness underneath. My wife used to call her affectionately - "that rascal Marina" - and that description fitted her perfectly.

Unusual visitors.

The photograph we found in the record album is identical to the one Life Magazine published shortly after the assassination. I think Marina took it, at least she so testified. Only the dedication to me and the inscription by Marina constitute new elements. This picture, unquestionably did a lot of damage to Lee. It shows him in a militaristic pause, holding a rifle, a ^{pistol} ~~revolver~~ on his side.

But let's not forget that Lee was trained by the Marine Corps to hold, show and respect weapons. The Beretta we saw in his apartment was well oiled and immaculately clean. Another bow to the United States Marine Corps. But whatever later testimony tried to prove, I knew that he was not a particularly good shot. He did not have that cold stare in his eyes - incidentally he had rather attractive gray eyes - he did not have a very steady hand and a stiff stance which indicate to anyone familiar with things military a good marksman. To Jeanne and I he did not have an ugly expression of a killer, and we knew professional killers, Jeanne in China during the Japanese occupation, I in other parts of the world. He owned a pistol but we never discussed why, I assumed for self-defence, he lived in a very disreputable part of Dallas.

Maybe Lee liked to shoot at the leaves, but he did not have a decisive, self-assured, automatic attitude of a sharpshooter. On the contrary, he was nervous, jittery, poorly coordinated type, and, as I said before completely unathletic. Also devoid of any mechanical ability. I had observed boys and men of that type in my own regiment and they were totally unfit for military performance - and usually very poor shots.

We had tried to keep the existence of Lee's photograph as secret as possible, just a few friends saw it and Life's reporter knew of it. Something, however, leaked out and about two weeks after my conversations with Life's writers, I received a strange telephone call. A slightly accented voice said, and I quote: "we are from Life Magazine," and he mentioned the name of the reporter I had spoken to, "we are here in Dallas and would like to see you?"

"Certainly," I agreed immediately. "Come over."

They knew the address and an hour later two men appeared in our house. A strange pair; one slight, Latin-American type fellow, the other a big bruizer, beefy, powerful, Anglo type. They sat down, announced that they represented Life Magazine, the Latin mentioned

his repertorial qualifications, the beefy character said he was a photographer. Indeed he was loaded with cameras of all types. The names were respectively - Smith and Fernandez. Smith mentioned also that he was a staff photographer for Fortune Magazine, which put me completely at ease.

"We would like to ask you a few questions the other Life reporter failed to discuss with you," said Fernandez.

I obliged him. These questions were unimportant, mostly about Lee's habits and his character. Then they became more specific. "Was he sociable? Whom did he know well? What were his relations with fellow-workers in this country and in USSR? Did he have many friends? In addition to us? What did he do in Mexico? Whom did he meet there? Could he speak Spanish? Why did he go to New Orleans? Could he drive a car? And many other questions, which I do not recall now.

I answered these questions to the best of my ability, but naturally many had to remain unanswered, since I was out of the country and did not have any contacts with Lee during that time.

The question may arise; why was I so frank with Life Magazine people and let myself pumped out so naively. The answer is that one of my most admired friends used to be a staff writer for Life and he

had performed
 an extremely kind and difficult intervention on behalf of my father
 stranded in Europe during the war. Incidentally, I felt very much at
 ease with these two character because I had a visitor at the time, an
 economist from the East, a very athletic fellow and a good friend and he
 was there all the time.

Later in the afternoon Jeanne arrived, very surprised to see the
 unusual guests. I explained who they were. "But you have a very strong
 Spanish accent?" she asked Fernandez.

"Yes, of course, I am of Spanish origin and I had worked as a reporter
 for Life mostly in Latin America. So, excuse my poor English."

This sounded reasonable enough.

Then Smith, "the photographer", produced a series of excellent, very
 clear photos of some twenty men, mostly of Latin appearance and asked
 pointedly if we had ever met any of them.

We both looked carefully at these strange, sometimes brutal, faces.

"I am not sorry not to have met any of them," I quipped. "They
 look rather disreputable. Who are they?"

Somewhat this question remained unanswered.

"I have an excellent memory for faces and I am positive not to have ever seen any of them," I added.

Jeanne, in a more cheerful and confident mood pointed out three better-looking ones: "This one has a cute moustache! That one has an interesting look about him. And this one is so handsome! Oh, I would like to meet these three men," she concluded laughingly.

This cheerfulness was met by a stony silence, a kind of a hostile attitude. Fernandez did not say a word. He seemed disappointed. Smith broke the awkward silence and asked: "May I take a few pictures of you and the dogs?"

The mentioning of the dogs conquered Jeanne and we obliged again. Many photographs were taken.

The conversation lingered for a while longer. Fernandez became more amiable and called our dog Nero in the Spanish manner "Senor Neron" which pleased Jeanne no end. Finally the two strangers left, promising to contact us again from New York, to give our regards to my friend there and to send us copies of the pictures.

A few days went by. We both were busy and didn't have time or occasion to discuss this visit. One evening, lying in bed, I asked Jeanne:

"What did you think of those two characters who came to visit us the other day?"

"Rather suspicious," she said. "I was thinking of them at this very moment. This is ESP. How did you know they were from Life?" She asked.

"Did they have any identifications?"

"None," I mused. "And I did not ask for any. But they knew exactly what I was talking about with the Life reporter in New York. Fernandez remembered all the questions and all my answers."

"You were ver careless," said Jeanne convincingly. "Don't you know that the house has been bugged on and off. More on than off."

She was absolutely right. These men were impostors. Next day I checked with the Life office in New York. Smith and Fernandez did not exist as far as Life was concerned.

But it is very possible that my naivete and the very certainty that we did not know any of the men on the photographs, put these two men at ease, otherwise we might have joined the other twenty or thirty people who had died mysteriously just because of their accidental knowledge of soem details or people which might have affected the official version of Oswald's guilt.

We never communicated to anyone, except to a few very selected and faithful friends, what had occurred. The Government agencies would have made a usual mess out of this situation and we might have become victims of an eventual revenge.

But to our minds, this visit was very significant: people at whom ~~whom~~ we glanced so casually, were unquestionably involved in some way in President Kennedy's assassination. Now they have disappeared swallowed in the mass of our population or, possibly, they had left the country altogether. It's a mystery to solve but not for clods from our bureaucratic mass of officials, unsophisticated, under-educated, and like the Englishmen said during the war of our GI's: "over-paid, over-fed, over-sexed andover here.

And Lee's opinion comes clearly to my mind: "the bureaucrats all over the world are the same..." And I am adding my own definition: most of them would not be able to make an honest living in the world of business and free competition.

Who are the real criminals?

Over twelve years went by since the tragic events of 1963. Kennedy's widow remarried. Questions arose in some decent people's minds: did Jacqueline know what type of an individual ^{she espoused} ~~or what~~ was it a huge bank account, not a real person. The Dean of women at the University of Texas where I had been lecturing at the time, was pale with indignation when she heard the news. Then Mrs. Aristotle Onassis became a widow again. And then Robert Kennedy was assassinated carrying with him the reason for the strange warning he had given my friend Willem Oltmans... Worst of all, Dr. Martin Luther King was shot in a cowardly way by an ignorant redneck, possibly encouraged by another redneck - but clever and powerful that one - J. Edgar Hoover, who hated and despised the Blacks. The award of the Nobel price for Peace to Reverend King was an ultimate insult to him, Then the shrews and unscrupulous CIA agents and their associates assembled large fortunes by illicit profits in Corea, Vietnam, Thailand, Camboja and Laos...

And the discoveries will forthcoming - of deals, corruption, doublecrossings, discoveries annoying to me because they have to do with taxes I had been paying for years. And in this manner American money will be soon "Chinese" money.

In a way, the high-school dropout, that "inferior American, Lee Harvey Oswald, had foreseen all that by calling our bureaucracy - stupid but crooked. But, knowing him the way I did, he would have also understood "Gulag Archipelago" and would have approved Solzenitzin's indignation...

My wife and I spent many an agonizing moment thinking of Lee, ashamed that we did not stand up more decisively in his defence. But who would have listened to us at the time and would have published anything true and favorable to him?

If you, dear reader, are interested not in the assassinations but in organized murder for profit, follow the articles in the French publication "Le Canard Enchaîné". You will learn that Aristotile Onassis' fortune, made during the war, was based on a very simple formula: old tankers are overinsured, duly sank by the Nazis submarines, motley, ignorant crew members drown and their no less ignorant poor families receive peanuts in a way of compensation. Repeat the operation dozens, maybe hundreds of times. Later, when a huge fortune is made, acquire exclusive rights for transportation of Arab oil...

If you believe in just punishment, Aristotle's rotten soul will remain forever in the Greek-Orthodox hell.

Conscience is the most stretchable substance - Ari's friends found him cheerful, amicable, cosmopolitan, intelligent - although his education was not more advanced than Lee's, he danced well and sang Greek and Argentinian folklore songs. Only his end was somewhat gruesome...

Our performance at the Warren Committee was very lukewarm and not decisive enough in favor of Lee. I hope he will forgive us.... And I hope also that Mrs. Marguerite Oswald will also forgive us.

Lee's innocence or his being just a patsy is our conviction. And now we can speak more objectively of the reasons of our conviction. That the younger generation in America does not believe in Lee's guilt is a fact but why should old fogies, like ourselves, have such unorthodox opinions?

Let us talk of the clever "leading on" by the choice lawyers of the Warren Committee, which forced us, Lee's friends and acquaintances to appear somewhat antagonistic to him.

The general opinion setup in the United States at the time puts pressure on you, warps your judgement, changes your words.

In these short chapters we tried to correct the distorted image of this good friend of ours. Some will say that the introduction of the late Aristotle Onassis in these chapters may be in bad taste - others may find an interesting and significant relevance.

Somebody else will prove who fired the fatal shots, will prove or disprove Lee's involvement or lack of it in the conspiracy to commit the assassination. If there are good Catholics involved in this affair, maybe a confession will solve the problem.

We like to speak of Lee's occasional, clever repartees, of his frequent outbursts of justifiable anger at the existing situation in this rotten world of ours, of his deep concern for the starving and poorer than himself, of his worry and his pity for the racially segregated, for masses deprived of their just rights by the clever manipulators.

Had Lee lived most of his life in the totalitarian country, he would have landed in a concentration camp for his outspoken opinions - for his loose tongue.

More should be said of Lee's interests in the world affairs. I can hear his clear speaking voice, sincere, simple, without affectation - its attractive modulation.

Lee did not have a trace of a nasal, Skuthern drawl, his was a voice of a thinking, refined individual. Incidentally, I never heard Lee use any four-letter Anglo-Saxon words, no profane language in English or in Russian. This was most unusual for a man of his background, I mean New Orleans and Fort Worth slums and the United States Marine Corps.

But do not think he was a sissy, as there is a wide-spread belief that if you do not swear, you are not a red-blooded American. I am guilty of constantly cussing myself and the students with whom I associate happily these days, consider me OK and a good guy.

Segregationists are still here but they are losing ground. Still we have a long way to go. A ~~medic~~ professor of medicine from Kentucky but born in Alabama, believes that intermarriage and any sexual integration is the only way to combat racism. The ones who disagree "should be shot", says he. Lee agreed with this opinion, I remember.

We wish that our dogs, Nero and Poppzea (both gone now) could have barked on his behalf. Such a testimony would have been very flattering for Lee, and you cannot fool an animal says a truism. And yet, they were meflant little creatures and trusted very few.

We constantly shout - "communists at fault", "it's a Marxist conspiracy", instead that most of our mishaps come from own mistakes - committed or good actions - omitted. What fiendish names were given our friend Lee Harvey Oswald - communist, traitor, misfit, insane killer!

In the meantime our top capitalist, Harold Lamar Hunt called John F. Kennedy a "traitor" and a confrontation between the US Government and the Soviet Union, during the missile crisis, a "dispute between two communist states".

Everything is relative: we waste 140 billions and 45,000 lives (our own only) to prove that democracy is right and Lee Harvey Oswald wanted to improve our image around the world in his own way, humanizing United States. Remember his nice but naive defence of the American ways to his friends-workers, during his stay in Minsk...

Listening to Lee describe his experience in the Soviet Union, one saw clearly that the Soviet Union was not a UTOPIA but just another livable country, enormous, with endless problems, full of good, friendly people - and many others, stupid, cruel and limited.

Judge the man after reading this book: no easy solution is offered, no criminal presented on a dish, I am not even offering an analysis of

his complex personality. Make up your own mind.

Why, with passing time we became more and more convinced that the whole story of Lee Harvey Oswald HAS not been told, we are adding just another chapter to it. It should be useful, as I had known him well, better than anybody else, according to the Warren Report, better than his mother and wife, according to the lengths of our depositions.

How the oppressive weight influenced my testimony can be seen so clearly by me now, looking at it after several years, as if it were somebody else deposition, deprived of a warm feeling for Lee, full of my own stupid jokes, which make me sad now. I was not expressing myself really, I didn't defend Lee vigorously and passionately enough, which I am sure he would have done if he had to defend me in a similar situation. I was cleverly led by the Warren Committee counsel, Albert Jenner, into saying some things I had not really want to say, to admit certain defaults in Lee, which I wasn't sure were his', in other words I consider myself a coward and a slob who did not stand up to defend proudly a dead friend, whatever odds were against him.

That big, clever boy, the trial lawyer handled me like a baby: first he bullied me, then he led me to tell him carefully all about my life by saying: "don't conceal anything, we know more about yourself than

you do."

I should have answered: "if you do, why ask the questions? Why all the rigomarole?"

And then later, in a friendly manner this time, Jenner would put forward some suppositions regarding Lee, suppositions which seemed innocuous enough at the time but sufficiently cleverly termed that would make me admit that possibly, just POSSIBLY, he might have committed a crime... After all, he was so cruel, he put a cigarette on his wife's bare flesh... A torturer!

It makes me remember now that Lee was keenly aware of the fact that it was the white man he had brought in "scalping" during the American-Indian war. And later, somehow, the Indians, cruel and contemptuous were charged with this unpleasant procedure.

Almost everyone has a skeleton hidden in a closet, so did I, I shall talk later about it. But it was such an insignificant, small skeleton... I should have taken a stronger stand. Instead, I talked, talked, talked, drunk with words and descriptions.... Talking about oneself, as everyone knows, is the sweetest passtime. And Jenner got me into this talking mood by calling me "distinguished, handsome, vi-

rile," - intimated that I knew people all over the world, that I led a very colorful life, was a great Casanova, member of the jet-set, he lauded my university degrees. In reality the bastard despised me, my independence and especially my liberalism.

Jenner was an impressive trial-lawyer, somewhat like Bailey, it was hard to resist him, he knew how to cajole and how to threaten.

In reality Jenner spoke much more than I did, the Warren Report so well doctored, does not show it. At lunchtime and between the sessions he offered me suggestions, tried to find answers - a clever plan and a good preparation, makes me think of the Tukhachevski trial in the Soviet Union. There, of course, drugs were also used. The results on paper were proving General Tukhachevsky's treason, the results for the Soviet Union was the fall of the Red Army and Nazis' original, gigantic success. I am not comparing myself to ~~the~~ Tukhachevsky, but rather the whole Warren Report and its disastrous effect on the American credibility.

In my case, such a long deposition had a sopophoric effect on me, you get deadly tired of these official proceedings, you begin to agree with the questioner just to get out of this boring room, away from thi

annoying, dry individual. You only dream to get away from all this nonsense, to go back to your sunny house in Haiti, to my few real friends there, to my interesting work and to the week-ends of skindiving in the beautiful, transparent waters of the Carribean near the Arcades Islands.

My idiotic interrogation had lasted almost three full days and then the same torture was inflicted on my wife, somewhat shorter and enhanced by the presence of our Manchesters, Nero and Poppaea, who testified, silently, unfortunately, for their friend Lee.

The final conclusion, after observation of all this bunch of lawyers is a short pun.. "Have you ever met an honest lawyers?" someone asked. "Yes, I did, only recently. He paid for his own lunch..."

Jeanne's best suggestion, eliminated from the Warren Report, was a suggestion, similar to mine: "don't try to solve the crime of the century by deposition, i.e. gossip, ninety per-cent irrelevant to the issues. Have good detectives hired, we are supposed to be the heaven of private dicks. Don't use FBI's or CIA's or any other federal agents, they are recognizable a mile away."

During our walking trip through Guatemala, where we happened to be

there just before the Bay of Pigs. The town was full of crew-cut Americans, not speaking a word of Spanish, out of place. I told Jeanne ~~them~~ "but these are Marines, or rather Marine pilots. What the hell are they doing here?"

No question that the same idea occurred to all the pro-Castro Guatemalans, and the country is full of them... And messages were sent on time to Fidel Castro...

Looking over Marina's deposition recently, I was amazed how closely our opinions on Lee matched, they almost coincided, as if they had been dictated to us. "The weight of the evidence" must have influenced both of us. First we were both angry at Lee for putting us into such a horrible situation. Bad enough for me, but think of Marina's plight, especially the first days after the assassination... I cannot talk of her feelings, but I know how deadly scared she was, in a foreign country, not knowing the language and used to the Stalinist tactics.

We know, Jenner and Dulles told us, that Marina had made innumerable mistakes - perjuries if you wish - being under a tremendous pressure and frightened out of her wits. The pressure we were under was of a different type, yet very strong. We had lived here for a long time and were familiar with the "American" ways.

But we cannot forget the attitude of the American Embassy in Haiti, the Ambassador's animosity towards me, the hard and soft approach of the FBI agent, the possibility of losing my contract in Haiti. A mysterious letter at the Embassy ^{from Washington} (this I found through a few remaining friends there), warning the personnel there against us. There was a pressure from our friends, by the Radio, newspapers, TV - finally this powerful Warren Committee - all saying "disassociate yourself from this assassin Lee Harvey Oswald!"

Everybody was on a bandwagon wondering this insignificant ex-Marine.

Now let us ask ourselves a question: was there a conspiracy on the part of the Warren Committee members, this powerful and impressive group of people to promote a deliberate lie, to inculcate an innocent person? No, I don't think so, they acted naively and sheepishly for a purpose which seemed right to them and good for the country. The country was in an upheaval, it was necessary to pacify the public opinion. And the dead eccentric is the easiest subject of condemnation. Personally, I think that such a mentality is tragic and detrimental to this country. It's the same self-illusion as throwing Prince Sihanouk out of Cambodia, accusing him of being a "red prince". —————>

Then financing and supporting to the bitter end his enemies. Fortunately for the "Red Prince" he is well and back in his country, while his enemies are either dead or exiled.

And now I am sorry to cast an accusation at John F. Kennedy's family, especially on his brother Robert, who wanted to sanctify the President's memory and to make us all - all American citizens - forget our President's biggest mistake, the Bay of Pigs. Willem Oltmans strange incident, described here, is explainable by this attitude. Also our conversations with Jacqueline Kennedy's family.

The Bay of Pigs resulted in an unbelievable hatreds and desires of revenge among the Cuban refugee groups as well as among Castro's followers, but to a lesser degree because their losses were smaller and the result was Castro's triumph. But the desire of revenge among the refugee groups here were thus covered up and whenever somebody like Garrison in New Orleans would try to establish a connection between the assassination and the Bay of Pigs, he would be put down as a drunkard, incompetent and silenced. Garrison was completely completely discredited and lost his district attorney's position. His latest book is a fiction dealing with the assassination.

Willem Oltmans and his clairvoyant.

After our return from Haiti, we were literally assailed by a great number of journalists, who wanted to interview us. The most interesting among them was Willem Oltmans, United States representative of NOS Television (Dutch State Television) with headquarters in New York.

Oltmans, a Dutchman but educated in the United States - a Yale graduate - told me how he became interested in the President's murder in 1964, while we were still in Haiti. He flew to Dallas on March 9, 1964 on an American Airlines from Kennedy airport in New York to address the next day the Criterion Club in Wichita Falls, Texas. At the counter in New York he ran into Marguerite Oswald. The two sat together during the following dinner-flight and it was during this journey that Oltmans first began to doubt the truth as to Lee Oswald being the killer of President Kennedy all by himself and miserably alone. It was Marguerite Oswald who told him that the chief of police in Dallas interrogated Lee for forty-eight hours, without making a tape-recording of the hearing and even keeping his notes. When the Warren Commission asked the Dallas police officials whether they did not think Oswald an important enough subject to borrow a tape-recorder for the investigation of the murder o

the President of the United States, the answer had been negative.

Upon returning to the Netherlands, Oltmans discussed his conversation with Marguerite Oswald with the famous clairvoyant, Gerard Croiset in Utrecht, the Netherlands. It was Doubleday who had published in 1964 the biography of this amazing Dutchman, who has been solving crimes and murders all over the world, including in the United States.

It was Croiset who first described to Oltmans in a tape-recorded interview (which is being kept at the Institute of Parapsychology of the University of Utrecht, the Netherlands) that I existed. Croiset told Oltmans that Lee had a friend in Dallas, in his fifties. He described some of my physical features, including that my name held the letters sch and the word de.

Oltmans immediately consulted the chief of programs of National Dutch Television in Hilversum, Carel Enkelaar. He received the assignment to return to Dallas and try to locate this mysterious friend of Oswald's, who, according to the Dutch clairvoyant, was of noble descent and was a geologist. He, the mysterious X, was, according to Croiset, the architect of the ambush in which Kennedy had been killed. Oswald was only the fall-guy.

Oltmans returned to Fort Worth and visited Mrs. Marguerite Oswald.

It was Lee's mother who, following Croiset's description, pointed to a volume of a complete set of the Warren Report and indicated our name and existence to the Dutch journalist.

Oltmans reported back in Hilversum that Croiset's indication had been correct. There was a friend, in his fifties, and his name did match the words de and sch. He was George de Mohrenschildt.

NOS Television then instructed Willem Oltmans to phone me April 2, 1967, to ask for a TV interview. I replied that I had to attend the World Petroleum Congress in Mexico City and that he should contact me in two weeks. I did not hear from him again until later that year.

When Oltmans reported to Hilversum that he had contacted me, the Dutch television presidium felt Oltmans was in grave danger. They reasoned that so many people, directly or indirectly connected with trying to unravel the Kennedy assassination had been killed or mysteriously disappeared, that Oltmans was immediately instructed to contact the office of Robert F. Kennedy, at the time the Senator of the State of New York.

This office was located at the US Post Office building, near 43rd street. Oltmans saw Tim Hogan, Robert F. Kennedy's press assistant, and explained the situation, including Croiset's analysis, that Kennedy

had been killed in a plot and that I was the engineer of the ambush.

Tim Hogan said the Senator was making a speech in Albany that morning and was flying back at 1 P.M. in the "Caroline". He would inform the Senator immediately relaying Oltman's request whether he could have some protection from FBI. NOS Television had figured that Robert Kennedy, former Attorney-General of the United States was as safe a person to ask advice in this delicate matter.

Tim Hogan called back around 2 P.M. in Oltman's apartment in Kew-Gardens, New York. He relayed to Oltmans that RFK had personally picked up the phone and talked to J. Edgar Hoover in Washington, D.C. FBI agents were to contact him later that day.

Indeed, already at 4 P.M. two agents called at Oltman's apartment. They stayed two full hours, but Oltmans only relayed to them that he was instructed to interview us in Dallas and that, at the same time, NOS TV had told him to contact Robert Kennedy.

When the agents left the Oltmans apartment, they assured him that from that moment on he would be 24-hours a day under surveillance of the FBI and there would be nothing to worry about.

The next evening Oltmans wanted to visit an Indonesian friend in Greenwich Village, an architect, who was designing a cover for a book

Oltmans was writing about the late President Sukarno of Indonesia.

Driving southward on Westside drive at around 8 P.M. in a Sunbeam Tiger, with a V-8 motor, a convertible sports model, with aluminum racing wheels, at a speed of about sixty miles per hour, Oltmans was being overtaken by a cab with a passenger riding in the back-seat. The cab cruised for a while next to Oltmans' car until the 53rd Street exit was reached. Then the cab made a fast move, in which Oltmans was cut off in such a way that he crashed in the rails. His car was a total loss. His head was bleeding. He was brought to the Kew-Gardens hospital, where he was examined, bandaged and sent home. The insurance awarded him within ten days a new car, which Oltmans quickly shipped to the Netherlands. He himself left a few days afterwards.

Two months later, Oltmans received in his bungalow in the country near Utrecht a telephone call from a certain Glenn Bryan Smith, attorney from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Smith announced that he was conducting an investigation into the JFK murder for.....
....., the author of "Green Berets". He wanted to discuss with Oltmans the Dallas affair and compare notes. Oltmans agreed to a meeting in Hotel Terminus in Utrecht, but only in the presence of Carel

Enkelaar, NOS TV boss. It so happened.

During the conversation, however, Glenn Bryan Smith slipped in some threats. He cautioned Oltmans in the presence of Enkelaar to stop investigating President Kennedy's assassination because "you would not be the first person to die or disappear in this matter. What they do is, they will kidnap you in a New York street, drive you to a private airport, and dump you over the Atlantic Ocean. You would not be the first person to die this way either."

Oltmans says that he remained unperturbed. He waited a few months more publishing an extensive report on his automobile accident in the leading weekly magazine "Haagse Post", showing on the cover pictures of John F. Kennedy and myself. Oltmans then returned to the United States in October 1967 and came to film us with a Dallas CBS TV crew on October 15th. It was a very pleasant meeting for us.

From that moment on, this Dutch journalist, who initially approached us, because he had received indications that we might be involved indirectly through Oswald with the Kennedy assassination, became a very personal friend. He has visited us every year since 1967.

He will by now be convinced, that we had nothing to do whatsoever with the JFK assassination.

As a matter of fact, he told us, that despite of Gerard Croiset's great gifts for solving crimes, at the same time some forty per-cent of his indications and prognoses are always false.

Nevertheless, Oltmans relayed to us as recently as the summer of 1976, that this famous Dutch clairvoyant is still deadly convinced that I am the man who tricked Lee Harvey Oswald, and who set up, financed by the Dallas oil lobby, the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I am supposed to have done it from Haiti, probably through some voodoo trick....

I probably should have sued that Dutch clairvoyant but I presume that he is probably broke and an international law suit would be very costly.

Why Lee and I agreed on FBI.

Recently it was established that FBI had concealed and destroyed a letter from Lee Harvey Oswald written to the Dallas office before the assassination. I do not think we have an exact text of this letter but the newspapers report was extremely angry at the way FBI kept annoying him and his wife and therefore made his normal pursuit of life impossible. This explains, naturally, why in our conversations Lee had such a dim view of this "great" institution and its leader J. Edgar Hoover.

I had a personal grudge against FBI, which I will explain in this chapter and I had a personal distasteful impression when I saw J. Edgar Hoover one day, in La Jolla, California. I remember that Jeanne and I were there to visit a partner of mine who had a ranch nearby and made some investments in the oil ventures. In the evening, having dinner at one of the best motels, facing the sea, I recognized Mr. Hoover, sitting together with some of our oil magnets, and behaving in such an obsequious manner, as if he were a servant of these very wealthy people. And he looked like a pompous waiter, or possibly, head-waiter. I knew some of the people sitting with him and a meeting could

have been very simply arranged, and thus a lot of difficulties would have been avoided for both of us in the future. But something retained me from approaching the group and I did not do it. Jeanne did not have any special reason to like or dislike the man, but I had a previous experience with FBI which was ridiculous and could have ended badly for me.

Outside of my unimportant experience, similar to Lee's in a way, the final result is that a letter of paramount importance to the investigation of Kennedy's assassination was concealed, that President Kennedy was killed and the old idol, head of FBI, remained untouched and secure until his natural death. The President did not get the right type of protection - while mediocrity or failure, or both, remained unpunished.

Now back to my trago-comic trouble with FBI. This will answer possibly why so much money and effort was spent on the investigation of my wife and of me. I had already mentioned it. Why choose us? Why try to persecute us with such a persistence? The reason we knew Lee so well were not enough.

We both traveled a great deal, Jeanne as a famous fashion de-

signer, and she was famous before I met her and ruined her career with my own adventurous deals and this walking trip; I traveled even more as a petroleum consultant, had several wives and was part of the "so called" establishment, mainly for business reasons. People in the "jet-set" or the "cafe society" are really very boring, the same world over, while an eccentric like Lee, was of great interest to me.

In other words, we were successful in our own fields and neither one of us never, but never, paid any attention to politics in the United States, left or right.

My early scrap with FBI dates from 1941, soon after my arrival in the United States. At that time I was very young, had some money which I brought from Europe and made a little more in this country and about to be drafted to the US Army. Frankly I was not in a very militaristic mood at the time, as the Germans saved my father from the Russians. We are of, so called, Baltic descent, which means a mixture of people of Scandinavian, German, French and other lineages, descendants of the knights who had conquered Estonia, Latvia, Finland and even parts of Russia.

Now, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ many of the Balts were German oriented, but I

I had relatives of this type, personally I was French-oriented. I also had spent two painful years in the Polish Military Academy and later "manoeuvring" on horse-back around the Soviet border, a rather dangerous occupation. So I was about to be drafted in the United States Army and did not feel very enthusiastic at the prospect to start in the boot-camp all over again.

But, instead, the doctors found that I had a very high blood pressure and declared me unfit for service. I still suffer from this high blood-pressure, so really I owe my life to the good American doctors who had discovered it so early. Now I can keep it under control.

At that time I was not yet an American citizen, but a resident of New York, and madly in love with a Mexican young widow, whom we shall call, Señora L. After meeting her in New York, I asked a Brazilian friend who knew Señora L. well: "I am madly in love with her, shall I marry her?"

"If you marry her, you will be unhappy. If you do not marry her, you will be unhappy also," answered my friend smilingly.

Of course, he was absolutely right. But still we were madly in love with each other. And so, she invited me to drive with her across the

United States to her own country Mexico, which she would explore with me. She had been brought up in Europe and lived there most of her life, hence her lack of knowledge of her own country.

Incidentally, she spoke very little English, and I very little Spanish, so we communicated in French, which probably made us most suspicious to FBI. Maybe someone denounced us? We both had enemies. Anyway, our delightful trip in a new convertible Chrys  r, along the Eastern shore, then along the Gulf of Mexico was rudely interrupted. This happened near Corpus Christi, Texas, where we had rented an apartment in the Nueces Hotel as Mr. and Mrs. X (I forgot the fictitious name we used). We left the hotel early to go to the beach at Aransas Pass and spent a delightful day there. I like to paint water-color landscapes with beautiful female bodies in the foreground, and I made several sketches.

Driving back from the beach, we were stopped on a deserted road by a bunch of people, who, we thought were plain American gangsters. We had little money with us, the car was insured, so we stopped without too much fright. The characters identified themselves: they were FBI agents who had taken us for German spies observing United States fortifications...

When I was telling the story to Lee, he could not stop laughing.

"This is so typical of FBI. Taking you, at that time you were a reserve officer in an Allied Army, driving along the coast with a beautiful Mexican woman, talking French to her, and painting...." He guffawed. "You were a typical German spy."

But, my friends, don't laugh at FBI's ingenuity. Soon after having verified our papers and listened to angry Spanish shrieks of Senora L. - they had followed us to the hotel and inspected our luggage - the agents realized they had made a foolish mistake. I even understood that one or two of them followed us all the way from New York (another expense to the American taxpayer, but he is always the victim), so the mistake was a very costly one. And so I was accused of an infraction to the old Mann's Act. Mann Act prohibits, still does, crossing the ~~border~~ border from one state to another with a woman who is not your wife for the purpose of committing a licentious act....

Of that, we were certainly guilty, we had crossed dozens of borders on the way to Mexico and committed dozens, maybe hundred of licentious acts. However, we were not put in jail, just had to sign some papers that we were not married and proceeded all the way to the Mexican border. We felt as if someone dirty put his filthy hands in

our very personal affairs. Senora L. made a strong complaint to the Mexican Ambassador in Washington and received much later apologies from the FBI agents. As far as I am concerned, five years later, when I was applying for United States citizenship in Denver, an FBI agent came to the hearing and reaopened the case, accusing me of immorality and of a flagrant infraction of the Mann Act.

I still would like to find out some day what kind of a puritannical, hypocritical, SOB this Mann was...

I already passed my citizenship examinations without a single mistake and was holding an important position with a group of oil companies. So I did get a defence. My lawyer threatened the FBI agent of a personal damage suit in the amount of a million dollars, for damage done to my reputation. And so, the Mann Act was quickly forgotten, the judge laughed at the FBI story, and I was made American Citizen. Maybe not first class, because naturalized, but a citizen still.

And Lee concluded: "and so you lived forever afterwards happy as a naturalized American citizen."

"You don't realize, Lee, how important it was for me to be a citizen, as I became after the war a man without a country, a "heimatloss"."

"I guess it's better to be without a country than to live in a country like this, run by FBI," was Lee's bitter conclusion.

I guess that in these days of open immorality and of pornography staring at you from each bookstore, nobody would be accused of breaking such an antiquated law as Mann Act. It's probably buried for good.

During these unbearably long sessions with the counsel for the Warren Committee, Albert Jenner, I got the warning from him that FBI was after my neck. "Better go to see those FBI guys and straighten up your situation with him," was his advice.

Of course I did not waste my time on visits to FBI, both my wife and I were anxious to get back to Haiti. But now, looking at the report, I think that there must have been other reasons that millions of dollars were spent on my unimportant life, also my wife's and our children's, with the final result that our depositions became three times more voluminous than Marija's. And so much costlier to the American taxpayer. Look at all those innumerable places we lived in, in various countries and different continents, everywhere these FBI agents were sent to and received information through interrogation, bribery or subterfuge. And, naturally, the incident with the rifle

activated all this insane activity.

Again Jenner gave me a hint at the beginning of the interrogation. He asked me: "didn't you know that Oswald tried to shoot General Walker?"

You already know from the previous chapters what had actually happened, and what Marina had said later.

"Of course not," I answered, "my pot-shot joke was in a dubious taste but only a joke nevertheless."

"But Marina said," continued Jenner, "you knew about it, you said it to yourself."

Now, after all these years, reading for the first time the text of the Warren Committee Report, which had been too repulsive for me to touch, I can see her statement. She quotes me: "how is it possible, Lee, that you missed?" (page 23)

This is what I was supposed to have said that Easter night when my wife and I arrived to give a stuffed rabbit to little June. And I was supposed to have said that before entering the apartment and seeing the rifle. This statement made me Lee's conspirator, of course.

However, soon afterwards, in her deposition she affirmed in these words: "George de Mohrenschildt didn't know about it, he was smart enough to have guessed it."

And so, such a contradictory and inane testimony forced the US Government, via FBI to order the most complete, the most costly and the most useless investigation...

Could it be that Marina was told by someone in the Government, especially in FBI, to use this inane accusation, then to change it?

Maybe Marina some day will admit how all this nonsense came about. Generally, she speaks well of both of us in her further deposition, she calls Jeanne a good friend, and me "a strong man" and a "liberal".

Considering how foolish bureaucracy could be, maybe Marina's deposition was poorly translated, hence contradictory. Also there was a piece of gossip going on in the Committee Building that Chief Justice Warren liked Marina so much, that he advised her to incriminate us, to take pressure from herself. After all, we were mysterious Europo-Asiatics, living abroad and leading a strange life. This would take away the sting of her guilt, because she did know that Lee tried to shoot General Walker and missed. If it were true, he would have been taken out of the circulation.

Anything is possible in this gossip, bureaucratic atmosphere of
 , the Warren
 innuendo, the first Watergate of the American Government.

Committee. Because the second version of Marina's deposition was different again. I would like to quote it exactly: "de Mohrenschildt did not know anything about the shooting. Simply he thought that ~~he~~ ~~thought~~ this was something he thought Lee was likely to do. He simply made a joke and the sting of it hit the target."

And this finally, by all these devious way we came to the correct version of the incident.

And then Mr. Rankin asked her: "from your knowledge were they (Lee and I) close enough so that your husband would make George de Mohrenschildt a confident of anything like that?"

"No matter how close he might have been to anyone," answered Marina, "he would ~~have~~ not have confided such thing."

And thus, again, we came to a reasonably true answer.

It's hard to say whether Lee would have confided in me, this is pure speculation and I tend to agree with Marina. Had he done so, I would have certainly persuaded him not to follow such a foolish enterprise. As much as I dislike fascists, I would have been against such a violent action against such an insignificant man like General Walker. We used to call him for laughs "General Fokker".

Marina is the only one to know the truth whether Lee actually shot at General Walker. If he did, his mind had been made up firmly. He would have remained secretive about it.

But there is a contradiction there; Lee wasn't a fool, if he had shot at anyone, he would not have kept his rifle right in front of the closet for anyone to look at it. Now, when he had a large apartment with a lot of hiding places, he would have ~~placed~~ put his rifle in a well secreted corner.

In conclusion, poor Marina was so mixed up in her testimonies, that she did not even remember the incident described in this book, when we took her away from Lee's apartment on Beckely street and carried her ~~xx~~ the baby and the belongings to Mr. and Mrs. Meller's place. She had probably forgotten the burned flesh on her arm, anything, she must have been terribly frightened.

And so, with her, at first, extremely damaging testimony, we got investigated through and through, at a great expense to American taxpayer, and, fortunately for us, came out unscathed~~d~~ fatally, just damaged morally and financially.

A few more words about this lovely institution = FBI, which might have played a good part during the ganster days in the prohibition e

FBI should change and be more controlled by the Congress. This institution should adopt more modern and sophisticated ways of *Sûreté Général* or of Scotland Yard to become more sophisticated, more secretive and less naively viscious. Frankly I even preferred the straightforward methods of the Haitian police, the famous "tontons macoute", these boogie men with dark glasses, as they had effectively protected the lives of President Duvalier, ^{"Papa Doc",} and of his family and still do protect the life of his son "Baby Doc". And FBI could not protect the lives of the President John F. Kennedy, of his brother Robert nor, the most important, the life of Dr. Martin Luther King.

FBI did so much damage to us because, while still in Haiti, I often expressed an opinion that Lee was a patsy, that he was not interested in preparing an assassination of the man he liked and respected. And I was also an open critic of our Government agencies, because J. Walton Moore when I had contacted regarding Lee, told me that he was a "harmless lunatic." And, as a result of this frank criticism, FBI tried to crucify us in Haiti, to damage our contract there, with the connivence of the American Embassy. In the final result I lost a lot of business contacts because FBI had pried too much into my private life and exposed it in the wrong light.

I am a patsy....

We are alive and enjoying life in a very different way. We moved away from the business world to the academic world and it's more rewarding. For this I have to thank Lee Harvey Oswald and FBI.

Fortunately also, we did not lose our real friends. Now were we sent to a concentration camp like the Japanese in World War III or the Navajos in XIX century in Arizona. And we do not complain, life is interesting and exciting for us. Often we wish Lee were here with us to share some of the good changes we are having in this country and in the world. He was too young when he died.

But more often we think of shady aspects of this gruesome "investigation", of the harm done to this country and especially to the damage to the memory of Lee, my dead friend.

Jones, the editor of the Midlothian, Texas newspaper, and a simple honest man, told me upon my return to the United States: "I shall never forget Lee Harvey Oswald's face, beaten brutally to a pulp, of his terrified expression when he was being led by beefy policemen the day of President Kennedy's assassination. And this young man kept shouting 'I am a patsy'.... I am a patsy!....' And," continued this elderly

newspaperman, "I swear to God I knew that he was telling the truth."

I had a premonition the day of Kennedy's assassination, 3,000 miles away, in Haiti, that Lee was involved in some way, that he was in deep trouble. It's strange how those things work...

Think on the inscription on the picture we had discovered in our luggage. How could a hunter of the fascists be the assassin of a young and liberal President? Would Lee address this photograph so endearingly to me, knowing well how much I liked John F. Kennedy, had he intended to assassinate him?

Would his wife call him, even sneeringly, "the fascists' hunter", if her husband was preparing to assassinate the most liberal President America ever had?

Whether you were responsible, even partially, even as a patsy, in the conspiracy to assassinate, I do hope that this book will cast some true light on the type of person you were, and will help you to sleep in peace.

Knowing Lee and his truthfulness, my wife and I believe that had Lee had the chance to speak, he would have told the truth. If he even had some part in the assassination, he would have proudly thrown to the world his reasons for it.

Lee was above all an individualist, an idealist who hoped to change the world, not a blind slave led by his prejudices, by an excessive devotion to a defined doctrine, to preconceived notions.

He denied that he was the assassin to the last moment of his life. And while Dallas police questioned him for forty some hours, he never admitted anything. For some reason, the police chief never released to the Warren Committee any notes of this interrogation and he denied that the interrogation had been tape-recorded. Dallas police supposedly had not a single tape-recorder at the time. As primitive as the Dallas police had been, such negligence is hardly credible.

Chief Justice Warren, while interrogating the chief of police who had said "we never got around to buy a tape-recorder", asked acidly: "wasn't it worth while to borrow a tape recorder when the assassination of the President of the United States was being investigated?".

The City of Dallas was certainly rich enough at the time to have acquired a tape-recorder.

And so the tape of Lee's interrogation either did not exist or had mysteriously disappeared.

In my opinion Lee would have told the truth during this lengthy inter-

rogation, during which he must have been beaten and maybe tortured, he would have cracked down but his last words were: "I am a patsy!" And so he was.

What I have been trying to concentrate on was Lee's personality and on what I had remembered, taped and noted , of his opinions, his jokes and his remarks in our conversations.

Naturally, I could not avoid to relate what our relations with Lee and Marina, and especially my friendship with Lee, had had on our lives.

I hope that this book will correct the generally low opinion people in this country have had on Lee. Maybe this new focus on him will have some influence on the ultimate judgement on the assassination of President Kennedy.

Lee Harvey Oswald might have been sometimes violent, like almost anyone amongst us, he might kill a person he hated, he might have been violent to a racist or a pseudo-racist, to someone who might want to hurt him and his family. But to assassinate the President he rather admired, just for the glory of it, is entirely foreign to his personality.

Lee cared for freedom in this country and he cared for the improve-

ment of the world tension at the time. And this type of a person was being moved from one place to another by the Dallas police, the movements were announced, the crowds were there, and thus he was shot and killed.

Some other aspects of Lee's personality must emerge from this book. ~~First~~ It shows that Lee was not a harmful person, on the contrary a rather inspiring individual.: his deep desire to improve relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It took twelve years and a man like Kissinger to achieve partially this purpose. At last the latent anomosities between these superpowers are dissipating.

But Lee hoped for more: he hoped that these two powerful countries would become friends and he thrived to achieve it in a naive and maybe foolish, but sincere, way. It is clear now that the war between these two countries would end in a holocaust. And so, Lee Harvey Osval had dreamed and hoped for a detente and for friendship, not so bad for a high-school dropout from a New Orleans slum.

It is always better for all of us to be friends than to fight, only insane people would want to fight now with the available nuclear arsenal. These insane people are forcing other to believe in the superior!

ty of any weaponry. We can kill all the Russians hundred of times over and they can do the same to us. So where does a "superiority" lead?

It is my firm opinion that Lee was never sure he was right, but he was always groping for truth, for a light.

It must come out clearly from all the material I had gathered here that Lee was above all anti-segregationist, he was anti any people who discriminate against any minorities, against any underprivileged.

Both Lee and I firmly believed that subservience to any dominant political idea is wrong, people should try to discover an ideology which fits them, even though it might be unpopular, and follow it.

If not, we would become the same dummies Russians were during Stalin's time. Their servility backfired and they became victims of it. "They did not try to find out who was right and who was wrong," Lee told me during one of our conversations, which often dealt with the Stalinist times in Russia. He had learned a lot in Minsk. "Free people," he had said, "should not remain mere pawns in the world game of chess played by the rulers."

Some time ago I saw a program, sponsored by some safety razor firm,

which featured Lee talking in New Orleans on the radio. This was regarding his pro-Cuban activity. The program was taped and Lee's photos were inserted. Lee spoke rather intelligently but the inserted photos made his look ugly and threatening. It was a nasty way to portray a dead man. Technically the program was awful; had no much sense anyway, but its purpose was to brainwash the American people into believing more firmly that Lee was the sole and only assassin.

And we will never know the whole truth until someone will come forward, confess and will accept the guilt.

Let's recall some of my conversations with Lee regarding Fidel Castro. Lee was rather an admirer of Fidel and especially of Che Guevara, a romantic, swashbuckling personage. In his mind Fidel was a sincere man who aimed to the best for his country, to eradicate racial prejudice and to bring a social equality to his people. I do not think he knew very much about Cuba and his information came through his contacts with Cuban students and technicians he had met in Minsk.

Lee liked Fidel as a representative of a small country, an underdog, facing ferlessly a huge and powerful country like United States.

Che appealed to him as a handsome, brilliant doctor, who had tra-

veled around Latin America, discovering basic injustices and who eventually tried to correct them. He did know that in some of the poorest parishes of Mexico the peasants considered him a new Savior. Now Che is dead, the man who killed him was assassinated recently in Paris. So it's all immaterial.

Regarding the Bay of Pigs, Lee thought it was an utter disaster. He was sure that we should not have gotten involved in the internal affairs of Cuba. He was against the Cuban refugees, but this subject was not discussed too much between us. He thought that Cuba before Castro was a whorehouse for the American tourists, headquarters of American racketeers like Lansky and Co. These were his opinions.

As far as I was concerned, I was not sure whether he was right or not, I knew Cuba very slightly myself, I was there a year or so before Castro's victory over Battista. To me it was a cheerful, corrupt country; but austerity did not seem to fit the Cuban sunny natures.

Lee thought President Kennedy should not allowed any invasion of Cuba, but he was not vehement or violent in his views on this subject. I have the impression that the matter was of not much interest to him. Lee never expressed any hatred for Kennedy because of the Bay of Pigs, he just calmly assessed as a very foolish action.

Remember that many Cuban refugees and their relatives paid with their lives for this invasion, and the ones who remained alive and here consider the disaster Kennedy's fault. I cannot visualize Lee being in cahoots with these Cuban refugees in New Orleans, as some sources suggest but he might have played his own game, meeting some of them, checking just for the hell of it what their motivations were.

The amazing and attractive side of Lee's personality was that he liked to play with his own life, he was an actor in real life. A very curious individual.

On the other hand, I can very easily visualize Lee joining a pro-Castro group.

In my humble opinion, as indicated by some events and conversations in this book, the Kennedy family did not want to pursue the matter of finding the real, unquestionable, assassin, nor a conspiracy. And they could have done it with their own, immense, private resources. If somebody would kill my son or my brother, I certainly would want to be sure who did it. But possibly the personality of Lee Harvey Oswald suited perfectly the political purposes of the Kennedy family.

Lee was a "lunatic" and a "Marxist" who killed John F. Kennedy

without any reason and made a martyr out of him. And so, the matter was closed for ever. Why look for more responsible people?

Regarding Lee's real or imaginary attempt at General Walker's life will remain a mystery. There are stories going around that, according to Marina, Lee also wanted to shoot Nixon, whom he considered a reactionary of the same type as Walker. This was at the time when Nixon was vice-President. But Lee never even spoke to me about Nixon, so it remains pure speculation.

The picture appearing with this book, was taken by Marina, so she says in her deposition in January or February of 1962. Dedications were made probably at the same time.

Final conclusion for us, Lee's friends.

We are alive and fairly healthy. I returned to teaching and am happy to be with young people. But I often miss Lee and his stimulating presence. Real friends remained faithful and good to us, the superficial and false relationship disappeared.

Yet, this past friendship with Lee had strangely adverse effects on our lives. People read superficially this gossip Warren Report and wonder who these strange people are. They call us, ask foolish questions. Even to-day insidious articles appear claiming that we were "bribed" (by whom?) to hide the truth about Kennedy's assassination. Subsequent publicity make us controversial and even gruesomely threatening.

Up to this day I read strange idiocies about myself. An example is a book published in French "L'Amerique Brule" - America Burns. The publishers are in Luxembourg where they cannot be sued. In this book I am an alleged CIA agent assigned to Lee Harvey Oswald. Let me translate a chapter regarding my relationship with Lee.

-Oswald was put under supervision by the CIA and interrogated as well as tested by one of the specialists utilized by the CIA in Washington D.C. and by its Houston Branch. He was an oilman, whose "nom de

guerre" (operative name) was George de Mohrenschildt.-

I certainly should have chosen an easier nom de guerre!

His nickname was "the Chinaman" and he pretend to have been born in Ukraine and was an ex-officer in the Polish Cavalry. He was recruited during the war by OSS and was inscribed in 1944 at the University of Texas where he obtained a degree of a geological engineer, specializing in Petroleum Geology. The CIA had utilized him in Iran, in Indonesia, in Egypt, in Panama, in Nicaragua, in San Salvador, in Honduras, in Ghana, in Togoland and finally in Haiti, where he worked "in principle" with Sinclair Oil Company. de Mohrenschildt was closely connected with or mixed up with oil circles and was member of Dallas Petroleum Club, Abilene Country Club, Dallas Society of Petroleum Geologists. He had very close relations with managers of Kerr-McGee Oil Company, Continental Oil Company, Coswell Oil Equipment, Texas-Eastern Corporation and also with John Mecom of Houston. He was a distinguished and cultured man, who was part of the establishmen and member of the social register. His White-Russian wife, born in China, often operated with him.- Another of his covers was ICA, Washington D.C.-

And so I here standing for judgement. I have never been to some of the countries mentioned here (for example Egypt and Indonesia) and I lived and worked in many other countries ~~they~~ article did not mention. In each case I either worked for myself or for some oil companies, but I never, never worked for CIA. And I do not think CIA will hire me in the future.

As for hbe I.C.A. mentioned above, this was the name of the ~~Department~~ ~~ment~~ division of the State Department, a shortening of International Cooperation Administration which dealt with economic help abroad. I was hired as a petroleum technician in that capacity worked for a year in Yugoslavia.

I cannot say that I never was a CIA agent, I cannot prove it. I cannot prove either that I ever was. Nobody can.

Only recently disclosures have been made giving names of the CIA agents who were at the same time our State Department employees and worked in our embassies and consulates in various capacities. Before this the fact of belonging to CIA was a well kept secret.

And so, almost everything I had done in my life became distorted

and suspicious by unscrupulous reporters and gossip-mongers.

The latest infraction into my privacy come from the people who want to write about Lee Harvey Oswald. They rehash the Warren Committee information.

Just a few months ago in the San Francisco Chronicle and in the Chicago Tribune, suggesting snidely that I had gone to the Bahamas after the assassination to be paid off there by someone, to keep some secrets regarding Lee Harvey Oswald... And what can you do about it? Suing is not my style and I have no time for it. And so I write to these writers and receive letters of apologies.

Another painful annoyance to us to think that some of our good friends, in the foreign countries where I had worked, read this trash and may believe that I was some kind of an agent and that they had befriended a double-faced individual.

The same suspicion applies to my wife and her friends abroad.

Let us hope that this book, poorly written and disjointed, but sincere, will help to clear up our relationship with our dear, dead friend Lee.

DEPOSITIONS OF MARINA OSWALD PORTER

Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session

March 1979

CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction -----	319
Deposition of Marina Oswald Porter, Sept. 20, 1977 -----	319
Deposition of Marina Oswald Porter, Aug. 9, 1978 -----	349

INTRODUCTION

During Marina Oswald Porter's public testimony before the committee on September 13, 1978, Congressman Preyer stated the two depositions she had previously given the committee's staff would be made part of the committee's final report. Those depositions are reprinted in their entirety in this appendix.

DEPOSITION

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:44 a.m., in room 16G28, Federal Building, Dallas, Tex.

Present: Ken Klein, assistant deputy chief counsel, and Clifford Fenton, chief investigator.

Mr. MULLOY. For the record, I am Patrick H. Mulloy, U.S. Magistrate for the Northern District of Texas, here for the purpose of swearing in Marina Oswald Porter for a deposition this morning.

Will you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give on this deposition will be the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. PORTER. I do.

Mr. MULLOY. Further, pursuant to the laws of the United States, I am authorized—I wish I had a copy of the Code—I am authorized to take oaths.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Mr. KLEIN. Good morning. My name is Kenneth Klein and I am the assistant deputy chief counsel for the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

Today is September 20, 1977, it is approximately 10:55 in the morning.

Present is Clifford Fenton, who is the chief investigator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations. To your right is Mrs. Jewel McGrath, who is a stenographer and, as you can see, she is taking down everything we are saying here.

For the record, would you please identify yourself?

The WITNESS. Mrs. Marina Porter.

By Mr. KLEIN:

Q. Please give your address.

A. I live on Route 1, Box 228A, Rockwell, Tex.

Q. We are in the conference room in room 16G28 of the Federal Building here in Dallas, Tex.

Now, I have been designated to obtain statements from witnesses under oath by the Select Committee on Assassinations.

Up to this point I met you approximately 1 hour ago and I have not spoke to you about any of the facts pertaining to the death of President Kennedy, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Before we go any further, is this statement that you are giving us now a voluntary statement?

A. It is.

Q. You have not been subpoenaed to appear here, you are appearing voluntarily, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. I have advised you that you have a right to have a lawyer present during this statement, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Do you wish to have a lawyer present?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Now, do you at this time have any difficulties speaking or understanding English?

A. I don't think so. I will ask if I don't understand something.

Q. You have lived in the United States for how many years?

A. Just a minute—1962.

Q. From 1962 to 1977, that is 15 years?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you speak English in the course of your every day activities here?

A. I do.

Q. If you do have any problem understanding anything that I say, please ask me and I will put it into a form that you will understand.

Is it fair to say you have no problems communicating with people in English from day to day?

A. Usually I don't; if I do not understand a certain word, I will ask the meaning of it.

Q. Before me I have a copy of our committee rules. It is entitled Committee Rules of the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress. I also have a copy of House Resolution 433 and a copy of House Resolution 222 and I am making all three documents available to you and I also should note for the record that I made these available to you approximately 15 minutes ago when we entered this room.

A. Right.

Q. I am going to ask you questions, many of which will pertain to testimony that you gave before the Warren Commission when you testified before that body. In some cases I am asking the question because I want to know if you might remember any more, or I am asking it because I have more detail to ask than they asked.

A. I don't know what the word "pertain" means. Is that a source of information?

Q. About, in other words—which was the sentence? What I mean is, that many of the questions I ask you, you were asked similar questions by the Warren Commission about the same subjects.

A. OK.

Q. I would like to see if I can possibly get some more detail on some of the questions and in some cases I will ask you questions the Warren Commission did not ask you at all.

A. OK.

Q. I realize that it has been approximately 15 years since some of these events occurred and you might have difficulty remembering particular facts or information, so I would just request that you do your best and, if you don't remember something, you can say you don't remember.

A. Excuse me, you know how memory plays tricks on you. Do you think if I try to answer some questions to the best of my ability from the memory, it would be not entirely contradictory to what I said before but maybe details may be different from what I said then so can I just go by what I said?

Q. What you can do is—I have here your testimony and if at any point you would like to look at a particular part of the testimony, you can.

A. Can you read it for me, what I said, and can I agree with it?

Q. As I said, I am interested in most cases in things that were not asked of you by the Warren Commission or where they might have touched on a subject or not asked you about particular aspects of it which I am going to ask you about.

A. OK.

Q. But if there is a point where you don't remember a particular fact, then just tell us you don't remember that.

A. OK.

Q. Do you recall testifying before the Warren Commission?

A. Yes; I do.

Q. Did anyone ever tell you what you should testify to them?

A. No.

Q. Did anyone ever suggest to you in any way how you should testify, or what you should say to the Warren Commission?

A. No.

Q. To your knowledge, as you sit here today, is there anything which you testified to before the Warren Commission which you now believe to be incorrect?

A. No; I never read my own testimony but whatever I said was the truth.

Q. My next question was going to be now that you speak and understand English much better than you did at the time you testified before the Warren Commission, have you ever had the opportunity to look over the printed testimony, your testimony before the Warren Commission?

A. No; I never have. I had an interpreter, I believe.

Q. At that time you had an interpreter. What I am saying is, in the years since then, if you testified now you wouldn't need an interpreter, I take it, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What I am asking is, did anybody ever give you the transcripts of what you testified before the Warren Commission and let you read that transcript?

A. I had the privilege of reading my testimony, it was offered to me but I didn't read it.

Q. You never did?

A. No.

Q. Is there anything which you didn't tell the Warren Commission about relating to the assassination of President Kennedy which you can tell us now?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Is there any area where the Warren Commission did not ask you any questions and yet you know that you did possess some information that related to the assassination of President Kennedy, but they didn't ask you about it?

A. I did not study the Warren Commission report so I was not looking for faults.

Q. I am not saying a fault, I am saying is there any area where they didn't ask questions in a particular area so you did not volunteer the information which you can think of at this time?

A. I think I lost you. Would you please repeat that?

Q. What I am saying is this, is there any information which you might have possessed which related to the assassination of President Kennedy where the Warren Commission, for whatever reason, did not ask you a question in that area and therefore you wouldn't have told them about it. Is there anything like that that you can tell us about now?

A. What you really mean, if I had hidden something inside that will maybe open up something more?

Q. Not necessarily that you have hidden something.

A. Or forgot?

Q. An area where they simply did not ask you about it and at the time you didn't remember to tell them about it so it was never told.

A. I don't think so. You see, when you listen to the news and television you don't know where the sources come from, the Warren Commission or somebody else, you never question going back to the Warren Commission and reading it, was it there or not.

Q. I would like to ask you a few questions now concerning your background in Russia.

A. OK.

Q. When you met Lee Harvey Oswald, where were you living at that time?

A. With my aunt and uncle in Minsk.

Q. What was your uncle's name?

A. Ilya Proosakov.

Q. When you testified before the Warren Commission, you stated that he worked for the Ministry of Interior, is that correct?

A. Just a minute, let me translate from Russian to English. Yes; Minister of Internal Affairs.

Q. Ministry of Internal Affairs?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he do for the Ministry?

A. He was engineer by profession but that is all I know. He had some kind of ranking, military ranking as well. He had to wear a uniform.

Q. Do you recall testifying he was a colonel or lieutenant?

A. Lieutenant colonel.

Q. Do you have any idea what his job was?

A. No; he never discussed his job at home.

Q. Since you testified before the Warren Commission, since that time, have you ever heard from that uncle?

A. I did place a telephone call once to my uncle, it was about 4 years ago. At first I wasn't sure that it was him. You never know with the Russians. But then I asked him to speak to my aunt and he said that she is not available, so I asked him what time it was over there, he said just wait a minute and let me go and check. I knew where the telephone was and where he had to go and check. It took a little while, so then I knew it was him. He was very cold on the telephone, he was like an icicle. I do not expect a relative to be so cold. He didn't answer any questions except yes and no and that was it. Then I asked to speak to my aunt, but she was out of the apartment.

Q. Did you ever speak to him about the assassination at all?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever meet your uncle when you were in Russia?

A. He met him before we were married, sure.

Q. What kind of relationship did they have?

A. Just polite. They were courteous to each other, sometimes they discussed politics and each of them had a different opinion but they really didn't argue, you know, that loudly.

Q. Did they ever spend any time together when you were not present?

A. Probably.

Q. Did they ever, to your knowledge, go anywhere together?

A. I don't think so. Sometimes we would visit. Lee would sometimes visit my aunt and uncle when I would be home with the baby or sometimes me and my aunt would talk and they would talk together.

Q. Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever speak to you about your uncle?

A. Of course he did. We discussed our relatives.

Q. What generally was his feeling toward your uncle?

A. That he considered him kind of cool and really—just a minute, let me phrase it right—not very open person, that he was kind of secretive and he said that he had been under—I mean worked with the Government so long or whatever his schooling was, that he does not open up that quick.

Q. Was your uncle associated in any way with the secret police?

A. I don't think so. I would not know. That is my guess.

Q. What do you really mean by secret police, doing arrests or something like that?

A. Since I don't know what kind of job he really was doing, I cannot speculate so whatever I said could be true or not true.

Q. When you say you don't know what kind of job he was doing, was it unusual that you wouldn't know what kind of job your uncle, who you were living with, was doing?

A. No; it is an official building, lots of people would live in the same building live there. There were doctors and engineers, professions. Once they go behind the doors, you don't know what they were doing. I know what his profession was.

Q. Did he make an effort to not let you know what his job was?

A. It never entered my mind to ask him what particular things he was doing.

Q. Did you live with him?

A. Yes, and it was understood that the job that he is doing is not to be discussed at home. His telephone number there was unlisted, only his wife knew it. She gave me his telephone number once and I called him. He was upset and he told me never to call his telephone number again. I thought it was sick.

Q. You have no idea what his actual function was?

A. Sometimes he brought books home and they would be concerned with—just a minute, I don't know how to translate the name of the college he finished—can we go off the record?

Q. Ask the question on the record.

A. For example, a person working with the wood, the forest, it doesn't mean a ranger or lumberjack, but you have to study all about grains, mathematics, and things.

Q. Are you saying the books he brought home were concerned with wood?

A. The industry, everything having to do with the wood. That is what he mentioned. Sometimes like college kids would have exams and he would be present and check their papers, too, once a year.

Q. Did your uncle ever express any views to you about the United States?

A. Oh, yes, every time I mentioned something about America and other countries, he said, well, you think everything in foreign countries are better, he said they have just as much junk as we do. He was quite patriotic.

Q. Did he ever say he liked or disliked the United States?

A. My opinion was that he did like it because we had a subscription to American Magazine that was prohibited by law but until then we always had it.

Q. Did your uncle ever mention President Kennedy?

A. Not that I remember.

Q. To your knowledge, is he still alive?

A. I don't know if I would hear if he died, because he was pretty old then. He had one heart attack. My aunt was pampering him all the time. She was afraid he was going to die.

Q. Do you recall the name of the person who introduced you to Lee Harvey Oswald?

A. I forgot most of the Russian names. Do you have any names. Could you have any names with you? I can tell you if it is correct or not.

Q. Would it refresh your recollection if I told you you testified to the Warren Commission it was Yuri Mereginisky?

A. I don't remember anybody by that name, but it is probably correct.

Q. M-E-R-E-G-I-N-S-K-Y? Do you recall—

A. That is probably correct but I do not remember it.

Q. When I say that name, do you remember the person?

A. No.

Q. Nothing at all?

A. No, because it was a group of young men around and right now in my mind I can't remember exactly what the figure looked like who introduced me to this is so and so and this is so and so.

Q. Could you tell us what were the circumstances under which you were introduced to Lee Harvey Oswald?

A. I had a date. I was invited for the dance and I promised the boy for 6 months that I would go to the ball with him. We were there. It was another group of people and I was introduced to him by somebody.

Q. Was it just—was it a coincidence that you were introduced to him or did somebody intend you to meet him, did somebody want you to meet this particular person?

A. It was coincidence.

Q. You have no recollection of the person that actually introduced you to him?

A. No.

Q. You have no recollection of the person Yuri Mereginisky?

A. No. I wish I knew who it was.

Q. Do you recall what year you and Lee Harvey Oswald left the Soviet Union?

A. I believe it was June 1962.

Q. Was it unusual for a Soviet woman who had married an American to be granted permission to leave the country?

A. I was surprised they granted me permission, I really was.

Q. Do you have any idea why you were granted permission?

A. I considered it just being lucky.

Q. Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever indicate to you whether he knew how come you were allowed to leave the country?

A. He had his doubts as well.

Q. He had his doubts as to whether you would be——

A. As to whether I would be able to leave.

Q. Did you ever say to him, "Why do you suppose they let me leave?"

A. I don't remember if I ever asked him this question but I sure did ask myself.

Q. Did he ever say anything after you were granted permission?

A. We were just very happy that we would be going to go.

Q. Do you recall when you were informed that you would be allowed to leave?

A. It could be May.

Q. I am not asking so much for the date as for where you were, where he was and just in what manner you were informed?

A. I think we received some kind of letter, or information, it was through the mail. Nobody came and announced.

Q. Were you both, that means you and Lee Harvey Oswald, present when you opened that particular letter?

A. I don't remember whether I was alone or he read it—had the message.

Q. Do you remember what his reaction was when he first learned that they were going to allow you to leave?

A. Oh, whoopee, you know.

Q. Was it a surprise?

A. It was a joyful event.

Q. What I am asking is did he appear to be surprised that you were allowed to leave or did he seem maybe to expect that you would be able to leave?

A. He did not expect that. I felt like I was just worthless to the Russians so they just let me go. That is the only explanation I can give because I have a very bad characteristic from work.

Q. I should indicate for the record that the U.S. attorney, U.S. Attorney Mighell just entered the room and gave me a piece of paper and then left the room.

Did Lee Harvey Oswald ever speak to you at any time about—I mean after you were granted this permission, did he ever speak to you about how it came about that you were granted this permission to leave?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Would you tell me what physical markings you recall on the body of Lee Harvey Oswald, I mean any scars, anything that you could describe, any marks on his body?

A. He had a thin scar on his wrist.

Q. Which wrist?

A. The one he wore his watch on, I don't know whether it was right or left.

Q. The one he wore his watch on?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was the scar?

A. On the inside.

Q. You pointed to the inside of your left wrist.

A. Yes.

Q. Any other scars on his body?

A. I think one behind his ear.

Q. Do you recall which ear?

A. No.

Q. The one behind the ear, was it noticeable?

A. Maybe it wasn't noticeable; you had to look for it.

Q. Could it be seen without pushing his hair back or was it——

A. No; you could not see it.

Q. You had to look for it to see it, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge did he have any other marks on his body?

A. I don't remember. I don't think he had an appendix scar.

Q. The Warren Commission questioned you and you testified that at certain times FBI agents spoke with you, is that correct?

A. I recall that we had some visits from some men and since I didn't speak English, I have been told by Lee that it was FBI men. Then once that I remember, it was an agent who claimed to be from the FBI. It was Ruth Paine, the agent from the FBI came, and he spoke to me through her. She was the interpreter.

Q. What did she tell you the FBI man said?

A. He said—he asked questions if I had been approached by any foreign agent at any time since I arrived from Russia and would I tell him or call him right away if anybody would do such a thing.

Q. Do you recall the name of the FBI agent?

A. Since I have been listening to the news and testified a few times, I think the name is Hastings, but as far as remembering the man being introduced by this name at the time, I do not.

Q. Is the name James Hosty, familiar?

A. Yes; that is familiar, that is the name of an associate with the man who came to the house with Ruth Paine.

Q. Now, you testified before the Warren Commission that at some-time in August 1962 Lee Harvey Oswald went outside and spoke to some FBI men for a couple of hours?

A. If I testified to it, that is probably—I mean that is true.

Q. Do you remember right now as you sit here today, do you remember that incident where he went outside and spoke to FBI agents?

A. Very vaguely. Was it in Fort Worth?

Q. I believe that was what your testimony was.

A. That is the memory that I have, that it was in Fort Worth.

Q. Do you recall anything he said to you after he finished speaking to the FBI men?

A. I recall when he came inside he was quite upset over it and wished that they had left him alone.

Q. What did he tell you about his relationship with the FBI? What were his feelings toward the FBI?

A. The information that he gave me and his reasons for being upset was because he said he was annoyed by them checking on him; the only reason for that is that he just returned from Russia.

Q. Were the feelings that he expressed about the FBI—did they ever change or was he always annoyed at them?

A. I think he was annoyed all the time.

Q. Was there any time when he ever appeared to like them or to be friendly with them?

A. I don't think so. I think he was reserved and polite and that was it. I didn't hear the conversation. If I did, it was in a different language anyway, I mean from mine.

Q. I am talking more about what he would say to you at times when he was alone with you about his contacts with the FBI. Did he ever appear to be friendly toward them?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This agent Hosty—

A. Excuse me, what do you mean, invite for a cup of coffee and be very hospitable, is that what you mean?

Q. You testified before the Warren Commission and to us just now at times he was angry with them for bothering him. What I am asking you is, were there any other times when he might have said to you, "Gee, I like the FBI; I think they do a good job," or something like that?

A. No; he never said that.

Q. This agent James Hosty who spoke with you at one time, have you ever seen or spoken to him since the date of the assassination?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Since you spoke to the Warren Commission, have FBI agents come and interviewed you at any time or spoken to you at any time since you testified before the Warren Commission?

A. I testified for the Warren Commission I believe three times.

Q. Right.

A. You mean after the third time did they ever contact me?

Q. That is correct.

A. If I have been in contact with them, it does not have anything to do with the Warren Commission testimony.

Q. My question, I will make it more specific, did they ever contact you or you have contact with them on anything relating to the Warren Commission or the assassination of President Kennedy?

A. No.

Q. Are you aware that a short time before the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald delivered a note to the FBI office in Dallas addressed to agent Hosty?

A. When I heard this on the news, I was surprised.

Q. When you heard it on the news, was that the first time that you ever knew anything about this?

A. That was news to me that a note like that even existed. I had my doubts because knowing a little bit of Lee's personality and my knowledge he had been annoyed by the FBI and wanted to be left alone, I wondered if he would go—I don't know the right word for it—and threaten somebody with a note. The content of the note I found out through the news media. I seriously doubt—

Q. Forgetting what the news media said the content of the note was, you had no indication from him that he has ever written a note to them?

A. I do not remember that. He slightly mentioned something. I do not recall at all because I was surprised when I heard it on the news. It didn't bring any memories, like, well, I forgot. Lee said, "Well, I am going"—he mentioned he was going to talk to them and tell them to stop harassing him, that is true, but I don't recall that he mentioned anything about the note.

Q. Did you tell him that they were harassing you?

A. No; I just told him about the incident that the man came alone and what he asked me and it made him angry.

Q. It made Lee Harvey Oswald angry?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he say what he was going to do, that he was going to do anything about it?

A. He said he was going to ask them to leave me out of all these visits.

Q. Did Lee Harvey Oswald tell you that he spoke to the FBI when he was arrested in New Orleans?

A. I don't remember that.

Q. Are you surprised to learn that Lee Harvey Oswald, upon being arrested in New Orleans, asked to speak to the FBI?

A. I didn't know that he asked to speak to the FBI.

Q. I am saying if I were to tell you that, that he did do that, would that surprise you?

A. Really not, because I think the FBI is a Government branch and beside the police, to call somebody else when it is something international, you don't call the police; you would call the FBI, that is what I would call.

Q. When the Warren Commission took your testimony they asked you if to your knowledge did Lee Harvey Oswald ever work for the FBI. And you testified he didn't.

[Witness shook her head no.]

Q. Is there anything you have thought of or learned in the intervening years which might make you either change your answer or question whether he might have worked for the FBI?

A. You know, so many different speculative things have been raised through the news media——

Q. I am not saying things you read in the newspaper, I am saying from your own personal memories.

A. No; not from my personal life.

Q. Let me say this before going further. All the questions I am asking you I would like you to answer from your own personal knowledge and memory of events and, unless I specifically ask for it, I would hope you would not answer any questions based on what you read in the newspaper or saw on television.

A. Yes; it is very confusing.

Q. I want to make that clear.

A. Whatever you are asking right now, it will be from my personal memory. OK.

Q. Have any people ever contacted you either before or after the assassination and identified themselves as members of the Central Intelligence Agency?

A. No.

Q. Have any people ever contacted you either before or after the assassination and identified themselves as agents for any U.S. Government agency?

A. No. You are a Government representative, so——

Q. That is correct, so other than myself, has anybody ever contacted and asked you or told you anything relating to Lee Harvey Oswald or relating to the assassination of the President?

A. I give the answer no first but now, since I look back, I have been surrounded by FBI agents and Secret Service men all the time. I didn't ask for identification all the time.

Q. The FBI and Secret Service, any other Government agents?

A. No.

Q. Now, you testified before the Warren Commission that after Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested in Dallas you had one opportunity to speak with him; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. To the best of your recollection would you tell us everything that was said at that time by you and by him?

A. To tell you the truth, I don't remember the details of the conversation. The thing I recall was it was in jail and it was a glass window and we spoke by the telephone, or through the telephone.

Q. Did you speak in English or Russian?

A. In Russian. He pointed with his eyes on the telephone and the way I understood it was that he tried to say it was bugged so be careful what you say so we just spoke about the casual things at home. That is all I can recall.

I was thinking you probably have documents of the conversation.

Q. I just wanted your remarks.

A. I just asked him what the bruise was about, how he was feeling. He assured me not to worry, everything would be all right.

Q. When he told you everything would be all right, did he give you any indication of why he thought it would be all right?

A. He did speak to his mother as well, or brother. Since I didn't speak English, I thought maybe he gave them places that they might call for help, a lawyer. He mentioned to me something about Red Cross. If I need anything that is where I should call.

Q. On the date of the assassination he was working in the Texas School Book Depository; is that correct?

A. That is right.

Q. Did he discuss with you that job at any time?

A. If he did, I don't remember what he was telling about the job, anything specific.

Q. Did he ever have any conversation with you about whether he should take that particular job?

A. I don't remember.

Why not, a job was a job and it wasn't very easy for him to find a job. I would welcome any job he could get.

Q. You testified before the Warren Commission that you spoke to him on the Thursday right before the assassination. The assassination was on Friday; is that correct?

A. Yes. I don't remember the dates but, if you say it was a Thursday, I believe you.

Q. Do you remember seeing him——

A. The night before? Yes.

Q. The night before.

Did he discuss with you at that time the fact that the President would come to Dallas the next day?

A. Yes; he did.

Q. Did he discuss the fact that the President would be passing by the Texas School Book Depository?

A. No. I kept asking questions because I was very curious about President Kennedy being in Dallas. It was very exciting and his answers were very, very cold and he looked like he didn't want to talk about it.

Q. You also testified before the Warren Commission that he had mentioned on that day renting an apartment in Dallas; do you recall that?

A. We were separated not for the reasons of having a divorce or something like that, it was because of the financial difficulties and there was only one way we could manage to save some money, if we lived apart. He wanted to come back; we were planning to get together as soon as possible, so he did mention the apartment.

Q. Do you remember him saying, on that day before the assassination, if you wanted he would rent an apartment in Dallas for you and him to live together?

A. I think so.

Q. Did he indicate to you—I withdraw that.

A. I think we had an argument that week or the night before, I don't know, because when I tried to contact him at his apartment by the

number he gave me, they say there is no such person living there so he apparently didn't give the right name to them so I was very frustrated—I don't know why he shouldn't use his own name, why he should hide.

Q. Do you recall testifying before the Warren Commission that he was very secretive?

A. Yes; he was.

Q. How else was he secretive; what else did he do that was secretive?

A. I would like to learn English, I would like to meet neighbors because it was very lonely to live all by yourself. He didn't want me to speak to anybody or even try to. He didn't want them to find out I was from Russia. I didn't think it was that embarrassing.

Q. Did he ever tell you why he didn't want people to know you were from Russia?

A. The way I understand, it looks like in this country people would be very suspicious of people coming from Communist country and he doesn't want people to stare at us or give us any difficulty; that was his explanation. I found out differently ever since.

Q. Did he hide the fact that he had been to Russia? Did he try to hide that from people?

A. I think so.

Q. Did he hide the fact that he wanted to go to Cuba? Did he hide that from people?

A. Sure.

Q. Do you remember this particular discussion the day before the assassination about him renting an apartment in Dallas?

A. I think so.

Q. What was your answer to his suggestion that he do so?

A. I really don't remember. I don't remember if I was still angry with him; I really don't recall.

Q. Do you recall if he said when in particular he would rent this apartment?

A. The location, no.

Q. Not the location but when he would rent it?

A. In the very near future, maybe a week or two.

Q. Do you recall how he got a job in the Texas School Book Depository building?

A. Through a friend.

Q. Do you recall what particular friend?

A. I think it was Ruth Paine, but I am not sure. The way I remember right now I think she was the one who was very helpful and she spoke to somebody she knew who worked there. I was very happy she helped him find a job.

Q. Were you present when Lee Harvey Oswald first learned he could have a job in the Texas School Book Depository?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Was it you who told him about the job?

A. Maybe it was Ruth. I probably was present because it is all in the same house.

Maybe he went over there and they told him he can have a job. I really don't recall at all how it was all about.

Q. At the time that he took the job in the Texas School Book Depository, were you aware of any other offers that he had for jobs in other places?

A. You see, I read since so that is a very confusing——

Q. I am not interested in what you read.

A. I don't remember if I knew or not.

Q. If he would have had another job offer at the same time for more money, can you think of any reason why he might have taken the job in the Texas School Book Depository instead of another job?

A. I do believe he did like Ruth and, since she went to all the trouble to get the job for him, I think that would have been the courteous thing to do.

Q. Do you think he might have taken a job for less money just because he liked Ruth?

A. No; it doesn't sound logical.

Q. I am asking you, you knew the man.

A. I wish I did know the man. I thought I did but apparently I didn't.

Q. From what you knew, would he turn down a job for more money?

A. To tell the truth, we were very poor and I think a better offer of a job would probably be more likely he would take.

Q. Did he ever indicate to you he could have had a job——

A. Unless he didn't like the person maybe, he would not.

Q. Did he ever indicate to you he could have had another job which would have paid more than the job at the Texas School Book Depository?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did he like photography?

A. I don't think so. That is a very expensive hobby.

Q. To your knowledge, did he own——well, did he own a camera?

A. I really don't remember.

Q. Did he own any kind of——

A. I remember in Russia, he took pictures. It was our camera or somebody's camera but I know he was taking pictures. I do believe it was our camera because he was carrying it with him.

Q. When you lived in Texas did he own a camera?

A. I don't recall but, according to some pictures we had he might have because he had some pictures that were taken recently, I mean during our living there. I do believe he probably had. But I would not recognize the camera. If somebody said was that yours, I would not claim it.

Q. Did he ever to your knowledge have any photography equipment, like developing or other photography equipment?

A. I don't remember.

Q. You don't remember anything?

A. I don't remember. What would that include?

Q. I mean any kind of equipment that would relate to photography other than a camera, for example, equipment so he could develop film, anything like that?

A. I don't know anything about photography.

Q. Did he have any kind of equipment that you ever saw and——

A. Didn't he work once with some kinds of photography? He could use their equipment.

Q. I can't answer the question. I have to ask you the questions.

A. Oh, I am sorry about that.

Q. Did he ever have possession of any equipment for developing film that you know of?

A. I can honestly say I do not remember.

Q. I want to mark these two photographs. On the back of the first one, which I would ask be marked JFK committee exhibit No. 1, it says in the bottom right-hand corner copy from the National Archives, records group No. 272, under that it says CE-133B. I will ask that be marked JFK exhibit No. 1.

[The above referred to photograph was marked JFK committee exhibit No. 1 for identification.]

Q. Now, this second picture that I will ask to be marked says copy from the National Archives, record group No. 272, CE-133. I would ask that this be marked JFK committee exhibit No. 2.

[The above referred to photograph was marked JFK committee exhibit No. 2 for identification.]

By Mr. KLEIN :

Q. I will show you those two photographs which are marked JFK exhibit No. 1 and exhibit No. 2, do you recognize those two photographs?

A. I sure do. I have seen them many times.

Q. What are they?

A. That is the pictures that I took.

Q. What do you recall as far as the circumstances leading up to you taking these pictures and when you actually took them and what happened?

A. I do believe it was a weekend and he asked me to take a picture of him and I refused because I don't know how to take pictures. That is the only pictures I ever took in my whole life. So we argued over it and I thought the pose, or whatever he was wearing was just horrible, but he insisted that I just click, just push the button and I believe I did it twice and that was it. I do not know whether he developed them, at home or somewhere else, I have no idea.

Q. What is he wearing in those photographs and what is he holding?

A. What was a surprise for me was for him to hold his rifle and a pamphlet, some kind of newspaper. It puzzled me, it was a ridiculous way to pose for a picture.

Q. Does he also have a pistol in his arm?

A. I don't see that, it looks like it—yes, I see now.

Q. And you recall testifying about these same two photographs when you testified to the Warren Commission?

A. Yes; I remember them asking if I ever took the pictures and I had completely forgotten because it was only once in my life and I didn't know how to take pictures. Yes, when they showed me that, yes, I did take the pictures.

Q. The camera you took them on, was that Lee Harvey Oswald's camera?

A. I believe so.

Q. Was it the same one he had in Russia or a different one, do you know?

A. I don't know, but I do believe it could be the same.

Q. What did he tell you to do with the camera as far as taking the pictures?

A. He just told me which button to push and I did.

Q. Did you hold it up to your eye and look through the viewer to take the picture?

A. Yes.

Q. And after you took the picture what did you do after you took the first picture?

A. I went into the house and did things I had to attend to.

Q. How many pictures did you take?

A. I think I took two.

Q. When you took the first picture you held it up to your eye?

A. Yes; that is what I recall.

Q. What did you do next?

A. I believe he did something with it and told me to push it again.

Q. The first time you pushed it down to take the picture?

A. Yes.

Q. And the first time, what happened before you took the second picture?

A. He changed his pose.

Q. What I am getting at is, did you give the camera to him so he would move the film forward or did you do that?

A. He did that.

Q. So you took the picture and handed the camera to him?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he do?

A. He said, "Once again," and I did it again.

Q. So he gave you back the camera?

A. For the second time; yes.

Q. Did he put the rifle down?

A. You see, that is the way I remember it.

Q. Did he put the rifle down on the ground between—

A. I don't remember. I was so annoyed with all this procedure so the sooner I could get through, the better, so I don't recollect.

Q. But you do remember taking the picture?

A. Yes; I am the one who took the picture and the weather was right.

Q. What did you say?

A. Somebody speculated the picture couldn't be taken; the weather was wrong.

Q. I am not interested in what people speculated.

A. There is nobody to blame for it but me.

Q. When you took the first picture and you gave him the camera, did you walk over to him and give him the camera or did he walk over to you?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Are these the only two pictures you ever took in your life at least up to that time?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you taken any pictures since then?

A. I try at home, to photograph the kids at home with a Polaroid camera. They didn't come out right.

Q. When you took the picture did he tell you to hold your hands steady?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you try to do that?

A. Yes.

Q. After you took the two pictures—were there just two that you took?

A. Yes; as far as I remember.

Q. When you say as far as you remember, could there have been more that you took?

A. I don't think so. You mean the same day, if that is the only pictures?

Q. The same day at the same time are you sure you only took two?

A. I remember I clicked the thing twice. If it was four times or six times, I don't have any more pictures to prove it. I remember definitely two.

Q. Could it have been more than two?

A. If it could be more, I would tell you I remember, it was four times or a whole hour.

Q. I am asking are you sure it was two or are you not sure, or it was at least two?

A. At least two. I am not sure because I do not remember all the details. I remember definitely two and it wasn't clothes changing and another session.

Q. What I am getting at is are you sure you didn't take three, for example?

A. No; I am not sure.

Q. Do you know what he did with the film after these pictures were taken?

A. No; I don't.

Q. Did there come a time when he showed you photographs? In other words, when he had the film developed and showed you the photographs?

A. I really don't remember that. He probably did.

Q. You don't remember if he ever showed them to you?

A. There is a lot of things I don't remember by now.

Q. I am just asking, I am not saying you should or shouldn't remember, I am just trying to clarify what you are saying. Are you saying you don't know if you ever saw these pictures while he was alive and you were with him?

A. Right now it is not clear in my memory. I have seen the pictures so many times, I don't know if it was the Warren Commission report, the news media, or I saw them at the apartment.

Q. You are not sure when you first saw the pictures?

A. I am not sure.

Q. Do you know if you ever saw them in his presence, that is Lee Harvey Oswald?

A. I do not remember right now. But if I did, in the testimony before the Warren Commission, if I said I did, I did.

Q. But do you have any recollection now?

A. No; I don't.

Q. Do you have any recollection of him ever saying anything about these particular poses or the photographs?

A. Let me turn back, what strikes my memories, George de Mohrenschildt came—I am not trying to confuse you, you know, give you a false statement. I try to get my memory to go. What strikes me, I think I was surprised that he showed pictures to George de Mohrenschildt because I thought the rifle and the gun, first of all I was always against it so, if in my memory I remember being surprised at him showing pictures like that to George, so apparently I saw them at the apartment.

Q. You remember him showing the pictures to George?

A. Something strikes my memory that how dare he show pictures like that to a friend.

Q. Do you remember if George said anything?

A. I don't remember if George said anything.

Q. Would you think about it for a few moments and tell me if you can remember anything else about him showing either or both of these photographs to George de Mohrenschildt?

A. I don't want to cast shadows on somebody that is maybe innocent and comments they maybe did not make.

Q. I am not asking you to say anything good or bad about Mr. De Mohrenschildt, just simply tell me if you remember that particular incident, him showing these pictures to George de Mohrenschildt.

A. It is so hard to dig in your memory 13 years ago.

Q. Take your time.

A. I vaguely remember because it still strikes my memory it surprised me that he showed them to him, so apparently it was at the apartment.

Q. When he was arrested and you spoke to him at the jail, did he say anything about these photographs?

A. No.

Q. May I be excused for a second?

A. At this time it is approximately 5 minutes after 12, and at the request of Mrs. Porter we will take a break for a few minutes.

[A short recess was taken.]

By Mr. KLEIN:

Q. It is now approximately 10 minutes after 12.

I didn't speak to you at all during the break, did I?

A. No; I didn't see you during the break.

Q. You left the room?

A. Yes.

Q. The same people are present, Clifford Fenton, Mrs. McGrath, myself, and you, you being Marina Oswald Porter.

When you took that break I was asking you some questions about these two photographs which we marked JFK exhibit 1 and JFK exhibit 2. I just wanted to clarify one thing. You said that Lee Harvey Oswald was the one who moved the film forward after you took the first picture?

A. Yes; I did.

Q. Do you recall exactly what happened? You snapped the first picture; did you give him the camera at that point?

A. I don't remember. I think I did. I probably did because I don't know what to do with it and he insisted on a second take so he had to do whatever had to be done with the camera.

Q. So you didn't.

A. I didn't know the procedure to take one picture from the other.

Q. So to move it forward, you must have given him the camera; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall whether you were standing in the same place when you took both of these pictures?

A. I think I was.

Q. What is the address where these pictures were taken?

A. I don't know.

Q. Where was it?

A. It is in Dallas. I think it is the Oak Leaf area.

Q. You were also telling us that you remember that he showed one or both of these photographs to George de Mohrenschildt; is that right?

A. I vaguely remember or try to remember.

Q. Do you remember anything about that, what was said, who was present?

A. I do not remember what was said but I believe George and G-E-A-N-E-A, his wife, were there.

Q. What did you say?

A. I am trying to clear my memory. I do not remember the details of the conversation, but why I think I remember this incident was I was surprised at him showing these pictures to George.

Q. Do you recall anything he said to George when he showed them to him?

A. No; I don't.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of what happened to the originals of these photographs?

A. I assume the Warren Commission or FBI or police have them.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of what happened to them after Lee Oswald had them developed?

A. What happened to them?

Q. What he did with them?

A. He probably kept them in his closet where he kept all his junk.

Q. Do you know that or are you just guessing?

A. I am just guessing because I didn't have them among my things or anywhere around, lying around the living room or bedroom.

Q. To your knowledge, were any copies made of these photographs before the assassination?

A. No; I don't.

I can see the position of his hands are changed.

Q. Do you know whether Lee Harvey Oswald might have given a copy of this photograph to anybody?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did he ever speak to you about these photographs at any time after taking them?

A. No.

What was there to talk about?

Q. And you never had a copy of either of these photographs?

A. Apparently they were in the apartment.

Q. I am saying did you have the original or a copy of these photographs before the assassination?

A. Apparently they were at the apartment.

Q. I am saying personally——

A. Me as a memento, no.

Q. Did you ever possess a copy of these photographs, have it in your possession?

A. For me to keep?

Q. Yes.

A. Not that I remember. I wasn't that enthused about these pictures.

Q. Did you ever write anything on the back of either the original or a copy of one of these photographs?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever write a note or anything to George de Mohrenschildt on the back of the original or a copy?

A. No.

Q. Are you sure of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Who had the money in your family?

A. Lee.

Q. Who possessed it?

A. He did.

Q. He possessed it?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge did he ever come up with money that was unaccounted for, you know, all of a sudden he had more money than he should have?

A. He just gave me a grocery allowance; that is all I had.

Q. Were you aware of how much money he had at any time?

A. No; it is not my habit to go and check through somebody's pockets. I knew there was some money he tried to save but I never went and tried to count, unless he told me to.

Q. Did you ever see him with an amount of money or did he give you an amount of money and you wondered where did he get that much money?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall that when you left Moscow that he signed a promissory note to the U.S. Embassy there for \$435?

A. He told me about it, that he had to borrow money from the Government.

Q. He paid that back; is that correct?

A. To my knowledge he did.

Q. Are you aware that he paid \$10 a month for a number of months but then in December 1962 he paid \$190?

A. No; I don't know about that. I know he paid little by little. Anyway, we had to save for it to pay it.

Q. Are you aware of that, that he paid \$190 at one time?

A. No.

Q. Then January 9, 1963, about a month later from December 11, 1962, a month later he paid \$100?

A. I don't know that.

Q. Then January 29, 1963, 20 days later, he paid \$106?

A. I am not aware of that.

Q. Does it surprise you from a period of December 11, 1962, to January 29, 1963, which is approximately 1½ months, he was able to pay—

A. Does it surprise me right now?

Q. Almost \$400. Does it surprise you that he could pay almost \$400 in 1½ months?

A. Yes.

Q. Is this the first time that you ever learned about it, right now?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any idea how he could have come up with that much money?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever mention to you paying off this note?

A. I have just little peanuts he gave to me. How much was left I don't know.

Q. Does this seem like a lot of money for him to pay off in a month and a half?

A. Yes.

Q. From your knowledge of his finances?

A. Yes. How much did he make per week, do you know?

Q. Do you know how much he made per week?

A. He told me like \$55 a week, then another job was \$65 a week; that is what I remember.

Q. Now, if that was his salary, you don't have any knowledge of how he came up with the sums I just mentioned?

A. No; I don't remember anybody giving him the money or he had an extra job where he earned the money. I could guess maybe his brother lent it to him, the money to pay the debt.

Q. If he would have had an extra job, would it be fair to say you would have known about that?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think it would be possible to have an extra job without your knowing about it?

A. No, because then he would have to come later from work than he would come. If he had an extra job, he would let me know.

Q. So you would have known if he had an extra job?

A. Yes. His brother was very helpful, so that could be the source of his extra money.

Q. Did your husband ever mention the name Hunt; H-U-N-T?

A. No.

Q. Are you sure?

A. Yes. Right now I am sure, if I said before then maybe I just don't remember the name.

Q. Did you ever hear about a letter—withdraw that.

A. That he supposedly wrote?

Q. I don't want to hear what the media may have said, I want to know if you have any knowledge of him writing a letter to anybody named Hunt?

A. No.

Q. Did he write many letters to people?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever see him writing a letter to anybody?

A. To his mother while we were in Russia.

Q. Other than in Russia?

A. He wrote to our friends in Russia.

Q. Did he enjoy writing?

A. Yes; I think so.

Q. When you met him in Russia, what kind of work was he doing?

A. He was working at a radio factory. It is something equivalent to our Texas Instruments right here.

Q. What did he do in particular, do you know?

A. I know it was a very plain job. Some kind of mechanical job.

Q. Is it correct that when you testified to the Warren Commission you said that he was living in an apartment in Russia and that you had always dreamed about that particular apartment?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you suppose he had enough income to pay the rent for that apartment?

A. In Russia you don't pay as much for your apartment, you pay only a certain portion of your salary. If you make \$400, you pay \$40 for the same apartment, if you make \$600, you pay \$60.

Q. It was not unusual he could afford that apartment?

A. No. It was unusual for young men without family to live in an apartment like that, but they usually granted better positions for a foreigner in Russia.

Q. Was it unusual for a single foreigner to live in an apartment like that?

A. No; it was not unusual for a single foreigner but, if he was Russian, he would not live in an apartment like that.

Q. Did he have many Russian friends?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember his closest friends?

A. I remember one name—there was one young man who visited us quite often—maybe you can help me to remember the name, I don't remember.

Q. I don't have the name.

A. All the names I mentioned in the Warren Commission. He had one that I don't think I ever met, maybe once, or maybe never met, but he mentioned him, that he spoke to him at work, then one that visited us. Then he had—we had close friends that I met through him, Mr. Ziger.

Q. Could you spell that as best you could?

A. Z-I-G-E-R. Mr. Ziger.

Q. This is a friend—

A. They were immigrants from Argentina.

Q. He knew them in the United States?

A. He knew them before and through him I met them.

Q. In Russia?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he correspond with any people in Russia after coming with you to the United States?

A. I think so.

Q. Did he write them letters?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they write him letters?

A. I do believe we received some mail.

Q. Do you know what happened to those letters?

A. No; I wrote some of my friends and I got answers but, after all this happened, my letters never go through.

Q. I am not as much interested right now in your letters, I want to know did he write letters to his friends in Russia?

A. Yes.

Q. And they wrote him back?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall the names of any people who he wrote to or who wrote him?

A. I think it is the same friends that we had before, I have forgot the names.

Q. Did he ever say anything about these letters that he received from them or what he said to them?

A. It was just a friendly contact and, of course, we discussed it when we received the letters back.

Q. Were you allowed to read the letters he received?

A. They were written in Russian language.

Q. You speak Russian, so did he show the letters to you or just tell you about them?

A. Yes.

Q. He showed you the letters?

A. Yes; but I don't remember what they were about or who from, it wasn't anything so important.

Q. Are you now a citizen of the United States?

A. I am not. I would love to be.

Q. Is there a reason why you are not at this time?

A. The only reason is my own, because I do not take the time to study the Constitution and keep up with the politics, up to date, and with a busy household you don't have time really to sit down and study and I don't want to fail the exams, it is very embarrassing.

Q. Has anybody ever indicated to you that you couldn't become a citizen?

A. I don't believe—in the earlier testimonies to the FBI sometimes when I was very difficult and didn't want to answer the questions, sometimes it has come up, "Well, would you like to live in this country?" I felt it was a little threat. I didn't know if I had a constitutional right to anything then.

Q. You testified about that to the Warren Commission?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Since you testified before the Warren Commission has anybody else ever made that same suggestion to you?

A. No.

Q. You are familiar with Priscilla Johnson?

A. Sure.

Q. How do you know her?

A. Oh, I met her when she came here with the offer to write a book about my life and we worked for quite a few months together. I gave her all the information that she needed. That was 13 years ago.

Q. When did you first meet her?

A. Thirteen years ago, I don't remember the exact date.

Q. Where?

A. She—I believe she came to my house.

Q. In Russia?

A. No; right here.

Q. In Texas?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did she come, what was the purpose?

A. I had many offers from different writers to write the book and I didn't think it was right for me to do so. I was embarrassed. She kept sending telegrams and telephone calls, she would like to meet me and we talk things over. I still refused. Finally, later on she told me she decided to see me in person and, when we met, I liked her, so agreed. There was an agreement between us, I gave her information so she could write a book.

Q. Was it the first time you ever met her or saw her after the assassination?

A. Yes.

Q. Did she ever indicate to you she had met your husband?

A. Yes.

Q. What did she say?

A. She said when she worked in Russia for some magazine, she worked there for a year or two, and she would like to have an interview with Lee, but he granted it to another lady reporter instead of her. She spoke but full Russian, so that was another point that helped me to make up my mind she is the right person.

Q. This book that is coming out—I believe you have a book coming out next month?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there anything in that book which relates to Lee Harvey Oswald or to the assassination of the President which you have not told the Warren Commission and which you have not told me? What I mean is something about Lee Harvey Oswald which relates to the assassination of the President?

A. I don't know, I didn't read the book.

Q. You know what you told Priscilla Johnson.

A. I told her everything I know. I told everything I know to the Warren Commission.

Q. I am saying in sitting down for these many months and telling her everything you know, did you come across anything that might have popped into your mind you might have forgotten about when you were talking about the book?

A. I would have to read the book, the Warren Commission report and see if I forgot to put it there, things like that.

Q. Just give me 1 moment.

I asked you before whether you had any contacts since the assassination with any U.S. Government agency. Have you had any contacts since the assassination with any foreign, with any agencies of any foreign governments.

A. No.

Q. Had you had any contacts since coming to the United States with Lee Harvey Oswald, were you ever contacted by any agency of the Soviet Government?

A. No.

Q. Were you ever contacted by any agent of the Cuban Government?

A. No.

Q. You testified before the Warren Commission that the name Hidell was used because it rhymed with Fidel?

A. I assumed that.

Q. You assumed that?

A. I think we discussed that and I just jokingly made that, "Because it is Fidel" and he said yes.

Q. For the record, somebody just opened the door and asked if somebody else was here, and who was not here. That was a 1-moment interruption.

On these two pictures I have shown to you, committee exhibit 1 and committee exhibit 2, can you give us an estimate, the best you can, how much time elapsed between the time the first picture was taken and the second picture was taken?

A. No; I can't.

Q. Did you know how much a minute is?

A. OK, it could be 5 minutes. I don't know how long it takes to do whatever is supposed to be done.

Q. You don't have any idea how long it took?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever taken—you said you have tried to take pictures since this time of your children, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. When you took pictures, did you ever move the film forward?

A. No; I have a Polaroid camera, that is the only one I can use. I don't believe how many pictures I ruined.

Q. Do you recall when you took these photographs about how far away from him you were standing when you took it?

A. I know the little yard, the back yard wasn't very big. No; I don't know in feet.

Q. Let me say this, the distance I am standing away from you now, do you think this was more or less than when you took those photographs?

A. I wouldn't speculate. I don't know how many feet.

Q. You are just not sure?

A. No. The place still exists, you can measure it. I think it exists.

Q. The camera that you took the photographs with, do you know what happened to that camera?

A. No.

Q. Do you know where he bought the camera?

A. No. I think that that is the camera he brought with him from America and kept it in Russia and brought it back.

Q. Do you know what happened to it?

A. When they confiscated everything, they took it. I don't know.

Q. Were there any other photographs you possessed that were taken with that camera?

A. I don't possess anything anymore, everything was confiscated, so if I have pictures of my children, or whatever there were, they are from Archives, everything was there.

Q. Were there any other pictures taken from you that were taken with the same camera?

A. Yes.

Q. What kind?

A. I don't know if it was the same camera, I assume it was that one.

Q. Did you ever see him with any other camera?

A. No. I do believe the pictures were taken in Russia of our friends, or my baby, or me with that same camera, but it is for experts to figure it out if it is the same camera.

Q. And those pictures you believe the Archives have?

A. Yes. I do not remember him purchasing a new camera in the United States.

Q. This camera, do you recall whether to take pictures with this camera, you would look down into the viewfinder or whether you would hold the camera up to your eye and look straight ahead?

A. I just recall I think it is straight.

Q. You would put the camera up by your eye?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember what color the camera was?

A. I think it was black.

Q. Do you remember anything else about it?

A. Not the name; no. But again, since I am not expert with the camera, that is what I remember, I think?

Q. As I told you when we began, the entire statement has been taken down on that stenotype machine. Mrs. McGrath is going to transcribe the statement and it will be typed out so that you or anybody can read it.

A. Will that be a matter of public record?

Q. When it is typed out, it will be sent, an original copy will be sent to you and you will be asked to read everything and after you read everything, if it is correct, if it is correctly transcribed, what you said today, you will be asked to sign and verify—there will be a little form which you would be asked to sign saying that transcript is a fair and accurate account of your statement. You will be given a copy to keep of the statement.

A. OK.

Q. Then when you sign it you will send back the signed statement that it is accurate.

Now, if it is not an accurate account, that is, if when you read it there is something in there which is incorrect, that is something that you didn't say, there is an error, then I will ask you to call me up. You have my phone number and you can call me collect.

What will have to happen is that we will go back before a magistrate, just like the gentleman who swore you in and you will have to swear to the changes.

A. OK.

Q. If you call me I will arrange this if there are any inaccuracies in the transcript.

Now, at this point, is there anything that you would like to say at all?

A. Yes, may I ask you a question?

Q. Sure.

A. For my own curiosity, what did you try to establish, a lost camera or that two cameras took the pictures?

Q. No; as I stated at the very, very beginning, we have read your testimony from the Warren Commission report and in some areas either a particular subject matter was not discussed, or if it was discussed, it was not discussed in the detail we would have liked to have seen it discussed. It was in these areas, a number of them, I hoped to have asked you questions to clarify and get more information in these areas which we——

A. OK but, since you dwelled so long on the subject, what detail did you try to establish?

Q. I wasn't trying to establish anything, simply to try to get as much information as I could about certain points which were of interest to us, not a question of establishing simply trying to get——

A. I don't see how many feet away would make any difference.

Q. Just trying to get as much information as I could in certain subject areas, one was the photographs, others which came up during the course of the interrogation.

A. I am just curious whether somebody switched.

Q. If there is nothing further, then thank you very much.

The time is now approximately 12:47 p.m. and that is the end of the statement.

A. Thank you. That was short.

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]

CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER

I, Jewel E. McGrath, shorthand reporter, do hereby
certify that the testimony of the witness which appears in the
foregoing deposition was taken by me in shorthand and thereafter
reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said deposition
is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that
I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and
further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or
counsel employed by the parties thereto, or financially or other-
wise interested in the outcome of the action.

Jewel E. McGrath
Shorthand Reporter

C O N T E N T S

<u>Witness</u>	<u>Direct</u>	<u>Cross</u>	<u>Redirect</u>	<u>Recross</u>
Marina Oswald Porter	1			

EXHIBITS

<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
JFK Committee Exhibit 1	32
JFK Committee Exhibit 2	32

DEPOSITION

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

Deposition of Marina Oswald Porter called for examination by counsel for the committee, pursuant to notice, in the offices of the committee, House Annex No. 2, Third and D Streets SW., Washington, D.C., beginning at 9:30 a.m., before Annabelle Short, a notary public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the respective parties:

For the committee: James Wolf, counsel; Gary Cornwell, deputy chief counsel; Mrs. Caryl Emanuel, administrative assistant to Mr. Wolf; Ms. Surell Brady, staff; James McDonald, counsel; and James M. Leahy, National Archives.

For the witness: James Hamilton, counsel.

Mr. WOLF. It should be noted the time now is 9:30 and it is August 9, 1978. We are in the offices of the House Select Committee on Assassinations in Washington, D.C., in the office of the deputy chief counsel, Gary Cornwell. Present at the time are Gary Cornwell, James Wolf, Surell Brady, members of the select committee staff, James Hamilton, and Marina Oswald Porter.

Mr. HAMILTON. May I make a correction to that?

Mr. WOLF. Surely.

Mr. HAMILTON. I believe Mrs. Porter's name now is Mrs. Kenneth Porter or Mrs. Marina Porter.

Mr. WOLF. I would ask at the current time that the court reporter administer an oath to Mrs. Porter.

[Whereupon, Marina Porter was called as a witness by the committee and, having been first duly sworn by the notary public, was examined and testified as follows:]

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Hamilton, I believe I have previously given you copies of the committee's rules and the committee resolutions, is that correct?

Mr. HAMILTON. That is correct.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Mrs. Porter, you are not under a subpoena for the giving of the statement, is that correct?

A. That is right.

Q. I would ask that all your responses that you give today be from your present memory and not from what has been written in the

literature since 1963. If you have any question, if you don't understand any question I pose, I would ask that you just state that on the record and I will try and clarify my question.

You have previously given the committee one deposition and the same procedure will be followed with this. We will give you a copy of this deposition and ask you to read it and verify it and then return it to us. At that time we will give you a copy of the deposition for your permanent records. Do you understand?

A. Yes.

Q. For the record I should say that pursuant to the committee rules I have been designated by the committee as a counsel authorized to take statements under oath.

Mrs. Porter, what was the first time that you met Lee Harvey Oswald?

A. When?

Q. Yes.

A. It was in Minsk, Russia, in 1960—I don't remember exactly, 1961 or 1962.

Q. What were the circumstances of that meeting?

A. I met him at a dance. It was a medical school event.

Q. How did you happen to go to that dance?

A. I was invited by a student from the medical school to attend and I was introduced to Lee by a mutual friend.

Q. Who was the friend that introduced you?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Could his name have been Yuri Mereginsky? (phonetic)

A. It could be.

Q. Do you recall that name?

A. I recall the name.

Q. Who was that individual?

A. As far as I remember right now he knew Lee and he was introduced to me first and then he introduced Lee to me.

Q. You did not know him before that dance?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember who was the person who introduced you to Yuri?

A. No, I don't.

Q. What did Yuri Mereginsky (phonetic) do?

A. I really don't remember. I think he was a student at the medical school as well.

Q. Did you have contact with him after you met Lee Oswald?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you in contact with him frequently?

A. Well, young people met sometimes in the street and talked or invited you to their house, yes.

Q. What types of things did you do together with him?

A. We usually talked or listened to the music or just strolled in the street or in the park.

Q. Do you recall any discussions you had with him about what topics you talked about?

A. Well, since Lee was an American, of course young people were very interested in life in other foreign countries so that was usually the discussion, about how is the life in America.

Q. Was he a native of Minsk?

A. I don't know.

Q. He was a student though?

A. He was living in Minsk at the time.

Q. How did he introduce you to Lee?

A. He introduced him as Alex Oswald, a friend of his.

Q. A friend of his?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he say how he knew Lee?

A. Not at the moment of introduction.

Q. Did he later say how he knew Lee?

A. I do not recall.

Q. Was Lee a close friend of his or was he a casual acquaintance?

A. Just casual.

Q. Did Lee spend a lot of time with him when you were not present that you know of?

A. I don't know about that.

Q. Did Lee discuss him frequently?

A. His name was mentioned occasionally if he would bump into him sometime or visit him.

Q. What would Lee say about him when he was discussing him?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did he ever discuss with you how he became knowledgeable in obtaining a visa to get into Russia?

A. He told me that he entered Finland as a tourist and went to the Russian Embassy and asked them for a tourist visa and they granted it and then he decided to stay.

Q. He asked the Russian Embassy in Finland for a tourist visa?

A. That is what he told me.

Q. Did he go directly to Russia from Finland?

A. I assume he did.

Q. Have you heard that he went from Finland to London prior to going to Russia?

A. I don't think so.

Q. You never heard that before?

A. If I heard it, I don't remember right now.

Q. Lee never discussed with you staying in London at any time during his travels?

A. I don't recall that.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you how he knew the procedures for somebody who was an American to defect once they got into Russia?

A. Well, he did not discuss procedure in detail like you would like me to answer. Like the procedure, I do not know but he said when he was staying in Russia as a tourist they did not permit him to stay any longer so he said that he just give up his citizenship in order to stay.

Q. Did you ask him how he decided what steps to take at that time?

A. Pardon me?

Q. Did you ask him subsequently how did he know what to do?

A. Well, not really.

Q. Did he ever talk to you about it?

A. He probably did.

Q. What did he say to you about it?

A. Well, I guess there is lots of redtape in Russia. You just have to go visit them and beg with them and plead with them.

Q. That was to obtain Russian citizenship?

A. Yes; there are lots of official papers to fill out.

Q. If you were a tourist in Russia, would you know what department or what office to go to to try to obtain Russian citizenship?

A. I don't know.

Q. Is that generally known?

A. I would not think so.

Q. Excuse me?

A. I don't think so. I assume that you go to the Special Ministry of Internal Affairs or Foreign Affairs, something like that.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you his trips to the American Embassy when he was trying to defect?

A. A little bit.

Q. What did he say about them?

A. Well, I cannot tell you in detail. He had a discussion with the American Ambassador or representative of the American Government.

Q. What did he say about his discussions with the American representative?

A. Well, he told him that he would like to stay and he said he just threw the passport on the table in front of them and——

Excuse me. May I confer with my counsel?

Q. Surely.

[At this point the witness conferred with counsel.]

A. After that he went to the Russian authorities and asked them for political asylum.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. That was after he had gone to the American Embassy?

A. That is what I recall right now.

Q. Did he mention to you the names of any of the Russian officials he dealt with?

A. Later on when I have to go through all this legal procedure to apply for my visa he told me the name of the man that he talked with before but I forget the name right now, but he told me that was the same man he talked to before.

Q. What was that man's position?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Do you know what office he was with?

A. No. It was very scary to go through all this, policemen standing outside.

Q. What did he say about the Soviet officials questioning him when he went to see that Soviet official?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did you ask any questions about why he wanted to stay in Russia?

A. I don't know.

Q. When he discussed going to the American Embassy, what did he say about the attitude of the American officials after he had thrown his passport down?

A. I don't recall what exactly he said.

Q. What were the names of the officials he met there?

A. I don't know.

Q. You don't remember?

A. I don't remember. I did know at the time.

Q. Did Lee ever mention being asked questions by the secret police, the KGB?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Would that surprise you if he was asked questions by them?

A. No.

Q. You would assume they would question him?

A. Well, I will assume, of course.

Q. Did Lee discuss with you his suicide attempt when he was trying to obtain Soviet citizenship?

A. No.

Q. He never discussed that with you?

A. No.

Q. When did that first come to your attention?

A. After the assassination.

Q. Did you ever notice the scar that he had on his wrist?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ask him how he obtained it?

A. I did and he said he didn't want to talk about it.

Q. And you didn't ask him any further questions?

A. Well, I did a few times. I was curious, but it put him in a very bad mood or upset so I just dropped the subject.

Q. Did Lee ever tell you why he thought he was allowed to stay in the Soviet Union?

A. If he did, I don't remember right now.

Q. Why do you think he was allowed to stay in the Soviet Union?

A. I really don't know. Maybe one of their good moods. You never know with Russians.

Q. After you met Lee at the dance for the first time, what was the next occasion that you saw him?

A. Well, it is so many years ago. I do believe he called me in the next few days.

Q. He called you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he call you on the phone?

A. Yes.

Q. How did he obtain your phone number?

A. He asked me when he took me home after the dance and I gave it to him.

Q. How often did you see Lee in the 2 to 3 weeks after that first dance? Did you meet him frequently?

A. I don't remember.

Q. What subjects were discussed when you were first starting to date him?

A. Oh, we went to the shows and we discussed friends, and I was asking him questions about America, of course.

Q. I did not hear.

A. I was asking questions about America, how the Americans live.

Q. What type of questions would you ask about America?

A. Well, about the schools and professions and the price of food and if it is pretty plentiful right here.

Mr. WOLF. For the record it should be noted that Mrs. Caryl Emanuel has just entered the room who is an administrative assistant to myself.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. After you were dating Lee, when was the first time that he discussed the possibility of marrying you?

A. Only a short time before we were married.

Q. Approximately how short a time was that?

A. A month and a half.

Q. What was your reaction the first time he discussed being married?

A. Pardon me?

Q. What was your reaction the first time he discussed getting married?

A. Well, I asked him, since he is American, would he have the desire or possibility to go back to the United States and he said no, he will be living in Russia.

Q. Is he the one who brought up the subject of marriage or did you bring it up?

A. Well, I really don't remember how things happened. It is so many years ago.

Q. At that time you were dating him quite frequently after a month's time?

A. Yes.

Q. How soon after you first discussed getting married with Lee did you in fact get married?

A. We had to wait—I do not recall how many days or maybe a month, maybe a week—for permission to get married and then it was granted.

Q. Did you tell anybody of your decision to marry Lee prior to your application for marriage?

A. Of course I did. I had to ask my aunt and uncle if they object or not.

Q. What was their reaction?

A. Well, not a very pleasant one. My uncle told me I'm a big girl right now and if that is what I want—he really was against it somewhat but he said even if he said no I will do it anyway so I might as well have his blessings.

Q. Which uncle was that?

A. Uncle Ilya.

Q. Were you living with your uncle at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. What position did he hold?

A. Well, he was not a colonel yet. What is before that?

Mr. HAMILTON. A major.

The WITNESS. A major, I guess.

Mr. HAMILTON. At least in the American Army.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. In the Soviet Army?

A. No; he was working for MVD.

Q. And what is that?

A. Minister of Internal Affairs.

Q. What activities did they engage in?

A. As far as I know, he was an engineer by profession.

Q. Did he have an important position in that organization?

A. I assume he did.

Q. What were his responsibilities?

A. I don't know. He would never discuss his job at home.

Q. Did Lee, apart from the times he went to obtain Soviet citizenship, ever approach the Government on any other occasions?

A. Say that again, please.

Q. Did Lee, apart from the time he applied for Soviet citizenship, ever approach the Government on any other occasions?

A. I don't know.

Q. How would he have obtained the apartment he was living in?

A. Well, they gave him a job in Minsk and sent him to work at the radio factory and nearby it was a building where the employees of this factory were living.

Q. And all the employees of the factory were living in the same building?

A. I think so.

Q. And all the apartments in that building were the same size?

A. I don't know. I never visited anybody except the lady upstairs once and her apartment was similar to ours.

Q. Was Lee's apartment larger than most others due to the fact that he was a foreigner?

A. No; it was not larger but it was completely private, a kitchen and bath in the hall.

Q. Did all the people who worked in that factory have the same type of apartment?

A. I don't think so. I told you I have only been in one, but I assume from conversations it all depends on the size of your family.

Q. Was it unusual for Lee to have an apartment all by himself?

A. I think so. It was not unusual in terms of a foreigner to have privileges, but for a young man to have an apartment of his own in Russia is quite unusual.

Q. Do you think your Uncle Ilya helped you and Lee when you were trying to move back to America to facilitate your leaving the country?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Would he have been in the position of being able to do that?

A. I don't know. He was against me leaving for America.

Q. But he had told you that he would not put himself in your way?

A. No; he didn't say that. He got angry with me and he just stayed out of it completely except on a few occasions he told me what a foolish thing I was doing.

Q. Did Lee own a rifle when you were living in Minsk?

A. I think so.

Q. What type of rifle was that?

A. I don't know anything about rifles.

Q. Did you ever see him use the rifle?

A. No.

Q. Where did you see the rifle?

A. It was in the apartment and he told me that he belonged to some kind of hunting club at work.

Q. Was this before or after you married him?

A. After I married him.

Q. So the rifle was in the apartment?

A. It was there; yes.

Q. Where in the apartment was it kept?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Did Lee ever go hunting that you know of?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Did he ever discuss hunting?

A. Well, when we were married he never went hunting but he said that he did go once with friends.

Q. What type of animal did he hunt?

A. Probably birds.

Q. Is it difficult to obtain a rifle in Russia?

A. It is illegal to possess a weapon in Russia. You have to have a permit, you have to be a policeman or some kind of military personnel or be a hunter.

Q. Is it difficult to obtain a permit?

A. I don't know; I never tried.

Q. Did Lee have a permit for the gun?

A. Yes.

Q. You have seen the permit?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if he brought this rifle with him when he was returning to America?

A. I don't know.

Q. Who packed all your belongings when you made the decision to come back to America?

A. We both did.

Q. Was anything left behind in Russia?

A. Yes, our furnishings.

Q. Who was that left with?

A. We sold it to people who were interested in buying it.

Q. Since you acquired a permit for the gun, Lee just could not leave the gun with somebody else; could he?

A. I don't know the procedure of it, what can be done.

Q. But you don't know what Lee did with the gun?

A. No.

Q. Do you know the difference between a rifle and a shotgun?

A. No.

Q. Could you describe the gun for us that he had there?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember anything about it?

A. No.

Q. It was definitely a rifle and not, for example, a handgun?

A. Yes.

Q. It was long?

A. Yes.

Q. Approximately how long?

A. Please don't ask me these questions. I cannot describe something that I don't have a recollection of it.

Q. But it was a long rifle or some sort?

A. I never measured it. It was a large object.

Q. Where were you working when you first met Lee?

A. I was working at the local hospital drugstore.

Q. What was the name of the hospital you were working at?

A. I think City Hospital No. 3.

Q. What were your responsibilities at that hospital?

A. I was a pharmacist. I was preparing prescriptions for the patients.

Q. How did you come to live in Minsk?

A. Well, I finished pharmacy school in Leningrad and I was assigned to a job.

Q. Who assigned you to the job?

A. The school officials usually assigned students where to go so I had the job in the city of Leningrad but then I have personal difficulties with my stepfather and I felt like I was in the way so since I had relatives in Minsk, I just bought the ticket and went there.

Q. When you went to Minsk did you already have a job lined up in Minsk?

A. No; I did not have a transfer or a job waiting for me there.

Q. Did you ask when you were working in Leningrad for them to obtain a job for you in Minsk?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I was not certain that I could have one. So with little connections and going from one office to another I got permission first to stay there. When you apply for a job you have to have permission to stay and it is difficult if you don't have one or the other. My aunt had connections.

Q. Which aunt is that?

A. It is another aunt. It is my mother's sister, Luba.

Q. Where was she living at that time?

A. She was living in Minsk with her husband in another apartment.

Q. How did you let her know you were coming?

A. Pardon me?

Q. How did you let her know you were coming? Did you phone them in advance or write in advance?

A. No; I just appeared at the doorstep and they were shocked.

Q. And you brought all of your belongings with you?

A. I didn't have very much to bring.

Q. You didn't intend returning to Leningrad though, did you?

A. Excuse me?

Q. Did you intend returning to Leningrad?

A. If I don't find a job I had to.

Mr. WOLF. We will now take a brief break while the court reporter swears in another witness in the adjoining room.

[Whereupon, at 10:05 a.m., a recess was taken until 10:10 a.m.]

Mr. WOLF. The time is approximately 10:10 and the deposition will resume with all persons present except Caryl Emanuel at the present time.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Do you know what type of engineer your uncle was?

A. He finished—just a minute, please. College of Forestry Engineering. Does that sound right?

Q. What type of things did he do for that company?

A. No, not a company.

Q. The organization.

A. He usually worked with whatever concerned wood. When the kids in college have exams he usually grades their papers. He was not a teacher.

Q. Did your uncle assist you in obtaining a residence permit when you got to Minsk?

A. Yes, he did. Since I had to live with him he had to sign the papers that he has room for me in his apartment.

Q. Who did those papers go to?

A. I think it is like a police or militia station in the city.

Q. Did he speak to anybody about your staying there as well as signing the papers?

A. I had to go alone. I went alone. He just signed the papers.

Q. Did he call anybody on the phone, do you know?

A. I don't know.

Q. Shortly after you met Lee, Lee was taken to the hospital; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What hospital was he taken to?

A. Just a city hospital.

Q. And that was one where both foreigners and—

A. No, no, no. No foreigners. Just a regular hospital.

Q. I am saying both foreigners and people who live there regularly would be taken there?

A. I assume. There were only three or four hospitals in the city. You just go to the one you like.

Q. Did Lee participate in any political activity when he was in Minsk?

A. What do you call political activity?

Q. Did he attend meetings where politics was discussed?

A. No.

Q. Did he listen to the radio when there were political discussions on?

A. Yes.

Q. What type of commentary would he make about the political discussions?

A. He usually listened to BBC and Voice of America on the radio and tried to compare what is said on the radio and what the Russian newspaper printed.

Q. Did Lee make any attempt to join groups or organizations which were engaged in political activity?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. When you said before that Lee sought political asylum, what exactly did you mean by that?

A. Just what I said. You have to file under some kind of category and I guess if you ask for political asylum you get more protection or at least Russia—maybe they give you a place to stay, I guess.

Q. Were you surprised when you were allowed to leave Russia?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Why were you surprised?

A. Oh, it is very unusual for a Russian citizen to leave the Soviet Union.

Q. Is that any Russian citizen?

A. Yes, unless you are a diplomat and you had permission to travel abroad.

Q. Did your uncle speak to anybody about your leaving the Soviet Union?

A. To whom do you mean?

Q. Any government officials who might have asked him about it.

A. Not that I know of.

Q. You were a member of what organizations when you were in Minsk?

A. I was more or less forced to become a member of the Komsomol organization. That is a youth organization. Prior to becoming a party member you do have to belong to this organization but not everybody who belongs becomes a party member.

Q. Did you want to become a Communist Party member?

A. Heavens no.

Q. How do you say you were more or less forced to become a member?

A. Well, at work everybody belonged to a professional union and everybody belonged to this. Well, it is not really pressure put on but they ask you to fill out some application and things like that, so I filled out the application and I was accepted, I assume. I paid the dues but I never attended the meetings.

Q. You never went to one of their meetings?

A. No.

Q. Did you remain a member of that until you left Minsk?

A. No. I got publicly discharged at one of the meetings; it was the only one I attended when they asked me to come and accused me of not ever attending and being a bad member of the organization and I was not qualified.

Q. When was that?

A. That was after I was married to Lee.

Q. After you were married to Lee?

A. Yes.

Q. Was your marriage to Lee discussed at that meeting?

A. Not at that particular meeting but I felt at work kind of a cold wind, you know. Not isolation but—I don't know how to describe it but I know that they did not very much approve of my marriage to a foreigner.

Q. In the book that Priscilla MacMillan Johnson has written called "Marina and Lee" you say the members warned you that Lee might be a spy.

A. It was an accusation like at the last meeting when they told me I could not be a member any more. It was just like confidential talk and during the lunch hour.

Q. What was your reaction?

A. Pardon?

Q. What was your reaction when they accused Lee of being a spy?

A. Well, I just really ignored it. It kind of upset me.

Q. It upset you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you discuss the possibility of living with a spy with your uncle?

A. It seems to me in Russia everybody keeps their ears open and are afraid of what they might say.

Mr. WOLF. For the record it should be noted that Caryl Emanuel has just reentered the room.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Was it common for members to be expelled from Komsomol?

A. No. Occasionally this happened when the members are—for example, when young people misbehaved themselves like the alcoholics or they have fits or are dishonest or things like that.

Q. On your entry visa to the United States you did not list that you were a member of Komsomol. Why is that?

A. Lee told me that it would be difficult for me if I listed any of the—excuse me. I did not phrase myself right.

I don't know how to put it but anyway he told me that because Americans don't know what kind of organization it is they will probably think that maybe they will be against it so it is better for me not to list it. Actually I was only a member on a piece of paper. that is all.

Q. And at the meeting when you were expelled, was there a formal vote to expel you?

A. Yes.

Q. What were the grounds listed for your expulsion?

A. I was not a desirable member.

Q. Why were you not a desirable member?

A. They said that I did not pay my dues, I didn't care for it, I am antisocial in my behavior.

Q. Did they ask you about your marriage to Lee in that meeting?

A. No. If they did, I do not recall.

Q. Was Lee present at that meeting?

A. No.

Q. Was Lee's apartment characteristic of the apartments furnished to foreigners living in the Soviet Union?

A. I did not have the experience with the apartments that foreigners occupy, so I cannot compare.

Q. Was he also given money by the Government?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Why was that?

A. I assume that it was typical of Russians to give compensation for the foreign resident, foreign citizen who lived there because maybe make them more comfortable to live in Russia.

Q. Do you know whether foreigners received money from the Government other than Lee?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any other foreigners who did not receive money from the Government?

A. No. I didn't know many foreigners. I just knew Lee.

Q. You assumed that was common practice?

A. Yes.

Q. While in Russia did you and Lee hear President Kennedy speak over the radio?

A. Well, I heard but I don't know what it was about because I did not speak English but Lee was listening to it and I was present in the room.

Q. Did you know who it was, who was speaking?

A. He told me; yes.

Q. What did Lee say at that time?

A. He was very proud of the new President of his country.

Q. Did Lee ever mention his experience in the Marines when you were living in Russia?

A. Only his Japanese girl friend that he mentioned.

Q. Who was that?

A. I don't remember her name.

Q. What did he say about her?

A. That she was very nice and that she was a very good cook and that she prepared special dishes for him, that he was pampered.

Q. Did Lee ever mention Governor Connally while you were living in Minsk?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. What did he say?

A. As far as I recall right now I think he wrote a letter to Mr. Connally asking for help to return to the United States and when the letter arrived it was a big large white envelope, I think, with the Connally picture on it as a stamp or anyway the picture of Mr. Connally on the envelope.

Q. You are saying Mr. Connally responded to the letter?

A. I assume it was because the letter was written in English so I know only what Lee told me about it.

Q. And Lee told you that that was a picture of Governor Connally?

A. He said it was an advertisement because he will be running for some kind of office.

Q. What did Lee tell you the letter said?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Was Lee pleased or displeased about the letter?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did it make him angry, do you recall?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss any other American officials apart from Governor Connally and President Kennedy when you were living in Russia?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. Do you know how Lee acquired the rifle that we spoke about before that he had in Russia?

A. I do not know. I assume right now that when you become a member of this hunting group you have a permit to go and obtain a rifle somewhere. I have no idea whether you buy a rifle or they give it to you.

Q. Were they very expensive to buy?

A. I have no idea.

Q. When you and Lee were living together after you were married, did you assume that your apartment was bugged?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Why is that?

A. Well, even if you turn off all the electric appliances in the house, still this meter that is inside of the apartment, the electric meter, will be running very slowly but surely. I don't know if it has anything to do with it but we were afraid to talk. We would whisper.

Q. Did you discuss with Lee outside of the apartment that you thought it was bugged?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he think it was bugged as well?

A. Sometimes we even spoke loudly, "Hey, would you like to listen to all the conversation?", something like that.

Q. What was Lee's reaction to what he thought was the bugging of the apartment?

A. Well, it was accepted. What can you do?

Q. Why did you think they were bugging your apartment, or were all the apartments bugged, do you think?

A. I don't think all the apartments were bugged.

Q. So why were they bugging the apartment that you and Lee lived in?

A. I really don't have the answer to that question but I assume because he was a foreigner and they didn't know much about him so they want to continue to keep an eye on him and that was the only way to do it.

Q. Was that the usual practice in Minsk, in Russia?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did you and Lee think you were under any other types of surveillance?

A. We assumed that we were.

Q. You assumed that you were.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever see any evidence of it?

A. No; but I heard gossips from mutual friends that sometimes there have been people assigned to follow somebody like a foreign tourist or something like that and you will never know who will be watching after you.

Q. What type of materials would Lee read during this period of time?

A. When he was in Russia?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, they have some foreign magazines that you can buy at the newsstand. I do believe it was a Life magazine then that was printed and he usually bought that. I think there was an English newspaper. He studied the Russian language and he read some Russian literature just for entertainment.

Q. What kinds of literature would it be?

A. Whatever was available at the house, whatever novel may be popular at this time.

Q. Did he read about politics at this time in novels?

A. I don't recall. Maybe historical books about **Russian history**.

Q. What friends of Lee's do you recall while you were there?

A. Right now none of them but if you mentioned the names I might recall.

Q. Even not specific names. Did he have many friends?

A. Well, Pavel Golovachev.

Q. Who was that?

A. When he introduced me he said he is his **closest friend**. He met him before he met me. He was one of the first men that he met in Minsk and he did speak English and it was good for him to practice talking with Lee.

Q. Was he a native of Minsk?

A. He was living there at the time. When you say native—

Q. Was he Russian?

A. He was born there.

Q. Do you know if he was born in Minsk?

A. I don't know.

Q. But he was living there at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. What other friends of Lee's did you meet?

A. One immigrant family from Argentina, Mr. and Mrs. Ziger and their two daughters.

Q. How did Lee know them?

A. Mr. Ziger was an engineer at the same radio factory that Lee was working at.

Q. And he was from Argentina, you say?

A. He was formerly, I think, a Polish Jew and they lived in Argentina for over 20 years, I believe. They immigrated long ago and their daughters were born there and they got homesick so they asked to return to their native country. After World War II this part of Poland became part of Russia. All their relatives were in Poland and they were very lonely and they tried to go back to Argentina but they were never granted a permit.

Q. Did Lee discuss politics with him?

A. Well, by the time I met Ziger, Lee was just as bitter about living in Minsk as they were so they had lots of things in common. Of course they discussed politics.

Q. What other friends of Lee's did you meet?

A. Well, none that I remember any more.

Q. Do you remember any Cuban students who were living in Minsk?

A. Yes; I never met them personally but you can recognize the Cubans because the Russians are quite fair complexioned and they speak Spanish. You can see them in the street because they were exchange students from Cuba.

Q. Did Lee have friends among the Cuban students?

A. He might have.

Q. Did he ever speak to you about them?

A. I don't recall right now but I think he met a few of them.

Q. Do you recall a Cuban student by the name of Alfred?

A. No; what was his name?

Q. Alfred.

A. That is not a Cuban name, is it?

Q. I don't know the last name.

Did he ever express his views about the Cuban students in general terms?

A. In general terms?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, he said that it is pretty cold right here, a severe Russian winter, and that they are homesick, they miss their country. They had been sent to this country to study but they were not very pleased on account of it was not as free as even in their country.

Q. Where would Lee meet these Cuban students?

A. Well, in Russia you don't have to have a special meeting place; you can just talk to people in the park, on the street, on the bench.

Q. Were any of them working at the factory he worked at or were they just students?

A. I think they were just students.

Q. So it would not be at the factory?

A. I don't know if any of them worked in the factory.

Q. Did Lee know a Marvin Kantor?

A. Who was he?

Q. He was an American student at that time living in Minsk.

A. Living in Minsk? No.

Q. Never heard the name?

A. No. I thought he was the only American there.

Q. May have been living in Minsk.

Do you know Muhammad Reggab?

A. Pardon me. Would you repeat the name?

Q. Reggab, R-e-g-g-a-b. First name Muhammad. He was also a student allegedly living in Minsk at that time.

A. No.

Q. The name is familiar with you?

A. No.

Q. What hobbies did Lee engage in when you were living in Minsk?

A. Mostly reading, went boating in the summertime, picnicking. That is not a hobby, just recreation.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you his work at the radio factory?

A. Yes, he did, and he didn't like it. He had lots of complaints about it.

Q. What did he complain about it?

A. He thought he was better than his job.

Q. What did he say he could do about that?

A. I don't recall him saying anything but complaining.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you his being in touch with the police prior to his defection, the Russian police or the KGB, prior to his going to the American Embassy?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee discuss with you his offer to give secrets to the Russian Government?

A. No.

Q. Have you heard that it has been alleged that he offered to give military secrets to the Russian Government?

A. Well, I read in the newspapers lots of speculations. How true that is I don't know.

Q. But he never discussed that with you?

A. No.

Q. What else did Lee tell you about his activities when he was in Japan?

A. Not much. He never talked much about his experiences in Japan. Well, he told me once, and later on I found out it was a fib, that he was shot in some kind of military activities he said.

Q. When did he tell you that?

A. I don't remember the day.

Q. Why did he tell you that? How did it come up?

A. I don't know. Probably just to show what a brave soldier he was.

Q. How did you find out it was a lie?

A. After he died and I read about it.

Q. You didn't know before that?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee mention any other people he knew in Japan besides that one girl you have told us about?

A. No.

Q. Did he talk about his friends in the Marines?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever discuss the kind of work he did in Japan with the Marines?

A. Not with me.

Q. Did Lee ever mention meeting with any Russians when he was living in Japan?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Did he ever discuss Russian agents who were working in Japan?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss the U-2 airplane with you?

A. No. Is that an American plane or Russian?

Q. Are you familiar with the U-2 which was the plane that was shot down over Russia?

A. I heard about it at the time.

Q. You heard about it at the time.

A. Was that where the American was accused of being a spy and he was captured by the Russians?

Q. Yes; and his name was Francis Gary Powers.

A. Yes. I don't know if it was when I was married to Lee, but I remember the incident. Whether it come from Lee or from the newspaper I don't remember, but I am aware of the incident.

Q. You were aware of it?

A. Yes. All the Russian citizens were talking about it.

Q. Did Lee ever talk to you about it?

A. I don't recall. Before I came to this country I thought only Americans sent spies around the world; Russians never did things like that.

Q. Are you familiar with a letter that Lee wrote to the American Embassy requesting the return to him of his passport?

A. Well, the letters were composed in the English language. How many and what he wrote in them I don't know, but I knew he was sending letters to the American Embassy or to the Russian authorities to let him get out of Russia.

Q. When was the first time he told you he wanted to get out of Russia and back to the United States?

A. After we were married.

Q. Did Lee discuss with you the reaction of the Russian authorities or the U.S. authorities to the letters he was sending?

A. Of course it was a big matter for both of us and up to the date that they allowed me to leave the country, I really did not believe that it would amount to anything.

Q. Did Lee say he had been contacted by the CIA?

A. Where?

Q. When he was in Russia. Or agents of the CIA?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever discuss the CIA with you?

A. I never knew what the CIA was until they started asking me the questions. Until I came to this country I never knew what the CIA was.

Q. When was the first time you became aware of what they were?

A. I do believe after the assassination.

Q. Did he ever discuss with you American spies without using the name CIA?

A. Well, it was an incident when the doctor at the Embassy who examined me and was very kind and nice to me—

Q. What was his name?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Is that a Dr. Davidson?

A. It sounds familiar.

Well, we were living here, we were in America already, and then Lee told me that this man was accused of being a spy so the Russians threw him out of the Soviet Union. To me it sounded like a ridiculous accusation; a man that nice cannot be a spy.

Q. Was that the first time Lee discussed him with you?

A. Yes.

Q. What was his reaction?

A. Russians accuse everybody of spying against them.

Q. What did Dr. Davidson do when you met him in the Soviet Union? What were the circumstances of your seeing him?

A. Well, he gave me a physical examination and he knew that I was very worried and scared to leave the country and he kind of patted me on the shoulder and said, "Don't worry, it will be a nice life for you." It was a nice reassurance, both very human and very warm. He talked about his family.

Q. Was Lee with you during this examination?

A. No.

Q. What did he say about his family?

A. He said that his mother was of Russian descent, I think I recall that, and I found out from him that some Russian people live in the United States which I did not know before.

Q. Did he give you the names of anybody to contact in the United States?

A. I think he might have mentioned some names but I don't remember right now.

Q. Did you ever contact any of the people he mentioned?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee have any contact with Dr. Davidson apart from your physical examination?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Do you remember when you went to the American Embassy with Lee? Do you remember that event?

A. Yes.

Q. Who did you meet at the Embassy?

A. I don't remember the name. I remember the building.

Q. Would it be either Mr. Snyder or Mr. McVicker?

A. Yes; both names sound very familiar. I do not remember the faces now.

Q. Was that the first occasion you had ever met them?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you heard Lee discussing them previously?

A. I don't remember.

Mr. WOLF. For the record it should be noted that Miss Brady has just left the room for a few moments.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Did Lee discuss with you his prior contact with the Embassy before you and he went together to the Embassy?

A. No.

Q. Did he discuss the letters he had written to the Embassy?

A. Excuse me. I do not understand the question. Prior to our marriage?

Q. No; prior to the two of you going to the Embassy together.

A. Yes; I am sorry. I misunderstood you.

He went to the Embassy first.

Q. Did he then discuss with you his trip to the Embassy?

A. He went to Moscow and then he called me to come over.

Q. What did he say to you when he called?

A. Just to get a few days off from work and buy a plane ticket and fly there.

Q. Did he indicate that the people at the Embassy were friendly or not friendly?

A. Well, he told me that they will be friendlier than the Russians are.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you his being asked to work as an American agent or as an American spy by any individual?

A. No; you mean in Russia?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. Have any of the people who you met in the Embassy at that time been in contact with you since you left Russia or with Lee?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss them after you got to the United States?

A. No; except this doctor that we discussed during this incident about being a spy.

Q. How did it come that you were examined by the doctor?

A. Pardon me?

Q. How was it arranged for you to be examined by the doctor?

A. Well, I assumed that before you entered this country you have to have a physical that you are healthy enough, you don't have any disease, I guess.

Q. So you were told that you had to have an examination?

A. Yes.

Q. You didn't request it?

A. No.

Q. Who told you that you needed it?

A. Somebody at the Embassy.

Q. One of the people at the Embassy?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the doctor give you anything to take out of the country or did you leave anything with the doctor?

A. No; you mean a message?

Q. Yes; or any physical possession.

A. No.

MR. WOLF. It should be noted that Miss Brady has just returned to the room.

By MR. WOLF:

Q. Apart from the one time you had your physical examination, did you meet the doctor at any other time?

A. No; whomever I met at the Embassy it was only for the official visits and I didn't know who was there or how many people.

Q. After you left Russia, where did you go?

A. Straight to America through a few foreign countries.

Q. Which countries did you stop in?

A. By train we went from Minsk, I believe—anyway through Poland to Germany to Holland.

Q. Did you stop in Poland? Did you get off the train?

A. Oh, just for a few minutes. No, no, I don't think we stopped in Poland. Yes, we did. I am sorry. Yes, because I remember that people over there at the station, the Polish people, they tried to exchange their money for American dollars.

Q. Did you meet anybody particularly when you stopped?

A. No.

Q. And it was only for a few minutes?

A. As far as I recall, yes.

Q. Did the train stop in Germany?

A. I do believe they had one or two stops.

Q. Were they long or short?

A. Short.

Q. Did you meet anybody on the train who you became particularly friendly with?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee?

A. No; not that I know of.

Q. Where was the final destination of the train?

A. Amsterdam.

Q. Is that where you got off the train?

A. I think so, yes.

Q. What did you do then?

A. We spent a day and a night in Amsterdam. I don't know whose house, a rented house or a room or something. It was not a hotel, it was a house.

Q. Who found it?

A. I don't know. Lee made all the arrangements.

Q. When did he make the arrangements?

A. I assume that the Embassy gave him the accommodations that he can rent a room inexpensively.

Q. When you were still in Russia?

A. I assumed that.

Q. But when you first got off the train in Amsterdam, what was the first thing that Lee did?

A. I don't know. I guess picked up the suitcases.

Q. Did you get into a bus or a cab and go directly to an apartment or did you walk around the city?

A. I don't remember if we took the taxi and went to this house and then walked or whether we walked around and then went to the house. I don't remember.

Q. Was it a house or an apartment that you stayed in when you were in Amsterdam?

A. It looks like it is a boardinghouse to me right now in my memory. It was not a motel or a hotel.

Q. It was not?

A. It looks like it is a private roominghouse.

Q. Did you meet anybody at the apartment?

A. No.

Q. When Lee went downstairs was there a person at a desk?

A. There was no desk as far as I remember.

Q. No desk?

A. I don't remember. I do not speak English.

Q. Did Lee meet anybody at a desk downstairs?

A. I don't know. I was too preoccupied carrying the baby and worrying. I was very tired.

Q. Who did you meet when you were in Amsterdam?

A. Nobody that I recall.

Q. Did you and Lee spend the entire time together?

A. Maybe he left the room for time to obtain the tickets for the boat.

Q. But apart from that you spent the time together?

A. Yes.

Q. And you don't recall meeting anybody?

A. No.

Q. Did you walk around the city together?

A. Yes; I think it was Sunday because I remember everything was closed. Maybe it was after hours or it was a Sunday, I don't recall. All the shops were closed so we just window-shopped a little bit.

Q. Do you remember if Lee paid for the apartment you stayed at before or after you left Amsterdam?

A. I think the Embassy gave him a loan of some money and I assume with that he paid for the room.

Q. Did you meet the person who ran the roominghouse?

A. No; I saw some lady that brought dinner and that is all.

Q. You ate dinner downstairs in a big room?

A. No; I think it was in the room we were renting.

Q. And they brought dinner into your room?

A. Yes.

Q. What was Lee's reaction or his attitude when he reached Amsterdam? Was he happy to be out of Russia?

A. Yes; he said that is the free world. That was his attitude.

Q. Returning to the rifle for a moment, when you were window-shopping with Lee in Amsterdam, for example, did you pass any stores that had guns or rifles in the window?

A. If we passed, I never paid any attention.

Q. Would Lee ever make comments if you were walking around Minsk, when he walked to stores in Minsk—

A. They don't have stores in Russia where they sell guns. I don't know where he purchased them.

Q. When he was in Minsk and Amsterdam, for example, did he ever discuss his rifle with you if you did not bring up the subject?

A. What was there to discuss?

Q. Would he talk about guns generally?

A. I don't like guns so what am I going to talk about guns? What do I know about guns? Nothing.

Q. When you were in Minsk did you ever see ammunition, bullets in your apartment?

A. If I have, I don't recall right now. If you have a gun, you are probably supposed to have ammunition.

Q. Were you afraid of the gun, of guns?

A. Well, I disliked them.

Q. Would you be afraid of ammunition if it was left near the gun?

A. Well, I don't know what to expect from it. Could it explode or not by itself?

Q. But in Minsk you don't recall if you ever saw any ammunition?

A. I don't recall.

Q. How much of all your possessions when you were in Minsk did Lee bring with you on the trip to Amsterdam? Did you have to leave a lot of things in Russia?

A. We don't have very much to leave behind. We just took the simple clothing that we brought back, some personal things, maybe a few books.

Q. Who did the packing? Did you both pack?

A. I assume we did but Lee did most of the packing.

Q. Did Lee purchase the tickets for the boat when you were in Amsterdam?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know, were those arrangements for the boat made in advance by the Embassy as well?

A. I assume it was.

Q. When you left Minsk did Lee tell you what part of America you were going to?

A. He said to Texas.

Q. Why were you going to Texas, did Lee tell you?

A. Because Lee had a brother who lived in Fort Worth.

Q. And he stated that was the reason he was going to go to Texas?

A. Yes.

Q. On the boat over to New York do you recall if Lee was friendly with anybody in particular?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall meeting anybody in particular?

A. The only person that I recall was the steward at the dining table. We were assigned to a certain dining table and only one gentleman that I talked to.

Q. Did you discuss anything in particular with him?

A. The gentleman spoke a few Russian words to me like hello and just how are you and things like that and I asked through Lee how come he spoke Russian and he said that his father was Russian and mother is from Holland and from childhood he remembered a few phrases and that is all.

Q. Did Lee when he was discussing Texas with you tell you that he wanted to live there permanently?

A. Well, I don't remember temporary or permanently. He was hoping to get a job here.

Q. Did he ever discuss any other parts of the United States where he would like to live?

A. No; he said he liked New Orleans because his aunt lived there.

Q. Had he been in New Orleans?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he tell you about New Orleans?

A. That it is a lovely city and it is a very interesting city to live in.

Q. Did he say that he had friends there?

A. No; he said he has relatives there.

Q. Relatives. And he also had relatives in Fort Worth?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he speak about friends he had in Fort Worth?

A. No.

Q. When you first got to Fort Worth did Lee introduce you to his brother?

A. Yes; they met us at the airport.

Q. And you lived with his brother for a little while?

A. Yes.

Q. Who else did Lee introduce you to when you first got to Fort Worth?

A. A few Russian immigrants.

Q. What were their names?

A. Mr. Gregory was the first one that I recall meeting.

Q. Is that Paul Gregory?

A. Yes—no, no, no. I think Paul is his son. It was the elderly Mr. Gregory. I don't remember his name.

Q. Were these people Lee knew before he had gone to Russia?

A. I don't think so. I do believe that he went to the library to get a few Russian books that they have in the library for me to read and somebody mentioned Mr. Gregory's name and he got in contact with him.

Q. Who got in touch with Mr. Gregory, Lee?

A. Well, I really don't remember who contacted whom. Anyway he came home and he told me that he met a Russian gentleman.

Q. Did Lee introduce you to any of his previous friends from Fort Worth or from Dallas?

A. No.

Q. Who else beside Mr. Gregory do you remember who was in the Russian community?

A. Well, through him I have been introduced to other immigrants here. I met Galya Clark.

Q. Any others?

A. Well, Anna Miller and George de Mohrenschildt.

Q. Did you meet them at parties or did Lee bring them over to your house or what were the occasions that you would meet these people?

A. Well, they came to our house and then we had been invited to their homes for a day or for dinner.

Q. Apart from these people in the Russian community, were you ever invited to anybody else's house or did you have other people over to your house who were friends of yours?

A. I don't remember any.

Q. When Lee obtained this job did he discuss the people he worked with?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever meet anybody he worked with?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee read any books still at this time? You said that was his hobby in Minsk.

A. Yes, he did. He went to the library quite often and would bring some books and he would read them.

Q. Were they in English or in Russian?

A. In English.

Q. Did he make an effort for you to obtain any book to read?

A. Yes, I read every book that was in the library that was in the Russian language.

Q. Were there many?

A. No; there were not many.

Can we have a break, please?

Mr. WOLF. Sure. Any time you like.

[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., a recess was taken until 11:28 a.m.]

Mr. WOLF. We will now go back on the record.

It is now approximately 11:30. Attorney Jim McDonald is in the room.

We also have present from the National Archives, Mr. James M. Leahy who has brought some exhibits with him today that are in the custody of the National Archives.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Mrs. Porter, I would like to show you five different cameras at the current time and ask you if you recognize any of them and if so which ones.

A. I don't recognize any of them.

Q. You don't recognize any of them?

A. No.

Q. You have never seen cameras that looked like that previously?

A. Well, I am not an expert on cameras at all so I cannot say that, that I recognize any of them.

Q. Well, have you ever used a camera similar to any of those?

A. Well, I used a camera once in my life when I took a picture of Lee but I don't know what the camera looks like.

Q. You don't remember what the camera looks like?

A. No.

Q. Have you any memory?

A. I have been told what button to push and that is all I recall.

Q. Did you ever take any other pictures?

A. Yes; on a Polaroid camera but I have to read the directions on how to use it from time to time.

Q. Does a Polaroid camera look like the ones you see before you?

A. My own is nothing like that.

Q. Nothing like that?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if you have ever seen cameras like that before, not if you have used them but if you have ever seen them before?

A. Well, I have seen some people wear a camera like that around their neck, a tourist.

Q. You can open that if you want to and see what it looks like.

A. No; it would not do me any good to see it.

Q. Have you ever seen a camera like that before?

A. It would be silly to say I never saw a camera like that. I might have seen it but I don't recall. I cannot identify any of those cameras and say that I used them or seen them before.

Q. This camera here, does this look at all familiar to you?

A. No.

Q. Which is identified as Commission exhibit No. 750.

A. No; I don't recall.

Q. You don't recall?

A. No.

Q. This camera here which is identified as Commission exhibit No. 136, does that look at all familiar to you?

A. No.

Q. This camera here, which is FBI exhibit D-145, does that look familiar to you?

A. No; none of those cameras look familiar.

Q. This exhibit here which is identified as FBI exhibit D-80, does this look familiar to you?

A. No.

Q. And this camera here which is a Minox 1:3.5 F-15 millimeter with the serial No. S2339303, does this look familiar to you?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever see any of the cameras before you in the possession of Lee?

A. I do not recall now at all the camera we used to have. The camera could be here but I would not recognize it at all.

Q. You just don't remember?

A. No.

Q. If I show you this camera which was Commission exhibit No. 750 and raise the top part so you can see there is a viewfinder and ask you just to look at the camera, would that refresh your recollection that that was the camera you allegedly took the photographs of Lee with?

A. Well, I honestly do not remember if I look straight at the object or look down.

Q. But seeing the camera today you still have no memory of what the camera looked like?

A. No; I am sorry I am unprofessional about it.

Q. Whatever your memory is, that is what we want to find out.

A. I definitely never saw that before.

Q. Which are you referring to?

A. These two little ones.

Q. The record should note that she is referring to the Minox camera which is D-80 and the other Minox camera which is identified on the record as Minox 1:3.5.

A. And by that I mean in my possession or Lee's possession.

Q. You never saw a camera like that?

A. No.

Mr. WOLF. I would like to thank the National Archives for their cooperation in bringing the cameras here today. We are done with them, and they may be returned to the Archives.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Was Lee interested in photography?

A. Didn't he have a job once to do something with photography?

Q. Did he discuss it with you?

A. His job? No.

Q. When he was in Russia did he ever take pictures?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember what the camera looked like?

A. No.

Q. Were they general tourist type pictures or were they specific pictures?

A. He would take pictures of me or a view around the city with our friends.

Q. Did he have one camera or more than one?

A. I think only one. I do not recall.

Q. And the camera that he had in Russia, is that the same camera he used to take pictures when he got to the United States?

A. I really don't remember. I assume it was the same one.

Q. Returning to your trip from Russia to Amsterdam, was Lee gone for a long period of time by himself when you were on the train? Would he leave your compartment or seat and talk to other people for a long period of time?

A. No.

Q. Returning for a few moments to questions about your life in Russia, did you date other men before Lee?

A. Of course I had.

Q. Did any others propose marriage to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you consider them as serious proposals of marriage?

A. Well, it is hard to justify right now at 19 how serious you can be.

Q. Well, you decided to marry Lee within a month or a little over a month after meeting him.

A. Yes.

Q. How did you treat the other proposals of marriage you had received?

A. Well, I just didn't know.

Q. What primarily attracted you to Lee to marry him?

A. Well, I was in love with the man. I fell in love with the man. He was neat in his appearance. He was quite polite. I liked his accent.

Q. And you decided to marry him despite the wishes and advice of your uncle?

A. Yes.

Q. How strenuous did your uncle object?

A. Well, it was not any argument over it. I just knew he was not very happy about that.

Q. Concerning your leaving Russia, your uncle was opposed to that as well?

A. Yes.

Q. How vocal was his opposition to your leaving Russia?

A. He was very cold toward me and his objections about me leaving the Soviet Union didn't come directly through him all the time; mainly it was through his wife. She tried to persuade me to stay there.

Q. And despite her protestations you decided to leave?

A. Well, Lee and my daughter were the only close family that I ever really had. At least I felt belonging to somebody, not being in somebody's way.

Q. Didn't you feel close to your aunt and uncle who you were living with?

A. Yes; especially my aunt.

Q. You felt especially close to your aunt and you left?

A. I knew I could not live with them forever and I had to make my own life somehow.

Q. Did you during this time keep a diary?

A. Me?

Q. Yes.

A. No; I never kept a diary.

Q. You never kept a diary. Did you keep any notes or letters that you had written to Lee or Lee had written to you?

A. I had no reason to write letters to Lee except when I was on vacation, maybe a postcard. We had not been away from each other that long.

Q. Did he write you any letters when you were on vacation?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you still have those letters?

A. No; I don't have anything.

Q. Did you ever get approached by anybody when you started going out with Lee who you thought was an agent of the Soviet Government to give information about Lee?

A. No; never.

Q. Prior to meeting Lee did anybody in the Soviet Government discuss with you whether or not you would be interested in working for the Soviet Government?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if it was common practice or was it practice for the government to approach people to work for them and get information on another individual?

A. You mean information?

Q. Yes.

A. Not for a spy, no. Like wanted and desirable. In Russia you don't discuss politics that openly and you always have to look over your shoulders and see if somebody will squeal on you, something like that.

Q. After you and Lee left Russia did Lee ever visit any of the people he had met over there who also left subsequently, any of the Cubans?

A. Would you please repeat the question.

Q. After you and Lee were in the United States did Lee ever visit or have someone come to visit him, any of the people whom you had known in Russia?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever have any contact with them that you know of? Did he write letters to any of the people?

A. Yes; he wrote to friends.

Q. In Minsk?

A. Yes.

Q. Any other people?

A. Pavel Golovachev.

Q. Did he ever have any contact with the people that Mr. Davidson had talked to him about—Dr. Davidson's mother?

A. Not that I know about.

Q. Did he ever talk about going to visit the Cuban students or his old friends?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever talk about writing them, aside from Pavel?

A. No; I do not recall if he corresponded with Mr. Ziger or not. I do not know.

Q. Mrs. Porter, we have asked you during the previous break to review JFK executive session exhibit 71 which at the current time consists of photographs Nos. 1 through 109. I would ask you—

Mr. HAMILTON. For the record, I take it when you say JFK exhibit this is an exhibit of the JFK subcommittee and not a Commission exhibit.

Mr. WOLF. That is correct. That is an exhibit that has been formerly introduced in the hearing.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. I would ask you, did you have an opportunity to review that during the break we have had?

A. Yes; I have.

Q. Mrs. Porter, could you please once again flip through the book and inform us of any of the pictures that you recognize?

A. No. 5 picture looks familiar.

Q. Could you state, where do you recognize that gentleman from?

A. Maybe from the newspapers or I might have met him at Mr. Garrison's investigation in New Orleans.

Q. Had you met him prior to Mr. Garrison's investigation in New Orleans?

A. No.

Q. Please take your time and carefully look at each picture.

A. I recognize No. 28.

Q. How did you first meet the person in No. 28? Do you know who that is?

A. That is George de Mohrenschildt's wife, Jeanne.

Q. When was the first time you met Jeanne de Mohrenschildt?

A. I don't know whether I met her in Dallas or Fort Worth but that is one of the first months that we came to this country.

No. 57, picture of Lee. No. 58 is a picture of myself. Is that Jack Ruby, No. 60?

Q. Excuse me. What number?

A. No. 60.

Q. Yes; No. 60 is a photo of Jack Ruby. What is the first time you recall seeing that individual?

A. After Lee was shot I seen his picture on television and in the newspaper. I do not recognize any more faces.

Q. Those are the only photos you recognize?

A. Yes.

Q. For the record it should be noted that No. 5, which Mrs. Porter identified, was a photograph of Clay Shaw.

I also show you now, Mrs. Porter, three additional photographs that will be inserted into the photo book that we will refer to as 110, 111, and 112. I ask you whether or not you recognize any of those individuals?

A. No; I don't.

Q. You do not.

A. No.

Q. I now show you, Mrs. Porter, a composite drawing that is labeled on the bottom as Maurice Bishop. The committee released that sketch approximately 2 weeks ago and it has been published in several newspapers.

Mr. HAMILTON. In what context are you asking?

Mr. WOLF. In the context that it was released?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. WOLF. It was released in the hope that anybody that has any information about that man might get in touch with the committee.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. In conjunction with the sketch the three photographs were also released at that time and that context was if anybody has any knowledge of who these individuals are, they should get in touch with the committee.

I would ask if you recognize any of the individuals in the three photographs or the person in the sketch?

A. No; only this picture on the television screen 1 week ago or so.

Q. One week ago?

A. That was the first time.

Q. And you had not seen it before?

A. Never.

Q. And any of the three individuals in the three photographs?

A. No.

Q. Thank you.

I now would like to show you, Mrs. Porter, six photographs and see if you can identify these for us.

A. This is a picture of me and my daughter June when she was a child.

I do not know where they were taken though. Do you want to number them some way?

Q. We will put numbers on the back of these and Mrs. Porter is referring to them at this time. Picture No. 1 she has referred to as—

A. That is me and my daughter.

Q. Do you recall when this was taken?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if people took pictures of you apart from Lee?

A. Well, I don't recall the picture taking incident, period. I don't know who took the picture.

Q. Did Lee take pictures of you?

A. I don't know. I don't remember.

Q. You don't remember?

A. No; it could have been in New Orleans because I was expecting a baby then.

Q. These pictures we will ask you to identify. You don't remember if Lee took any pictures of you?

A. No.

Q. Picture No. 2.

A. That is a picture of my daughter.

Q. Picture No. 3.

A. That is a picture of my daughter. Nos. 4 and 5 are pictures of my daughter as well. No. 6 is me and my daughter.

Q. Which daughter?

A. June.

Q. Mrs. Porter, do you remember the incident when these pictures were taken?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee photograph pictures of you and your daughters at any time?

A. In this country?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes; in Dallas once, on a balcony, he took a picture of my daughter.

Q. Any other times?

A. Possibly.

Q. Do you recall now any other times?

A. Well, we took a picture once at the bus station through this thing called the photomat where you put a quarter or a dime or whatever price in it and maybe Lee took pictures of me during our life together; yes.

Q. Do you have any memory of these specific pictures being taken?

A. No.

Q. These pictures, for the record, were developed from negatives that were found in the National Archives.

Do you know, have you heard the name before, Pavel Golovachev?

A. Golovachev; yes.

Q. And how do you know him?

A. I already told you before. He was one of the friends of Lee in Russia.

Q. When you met him do you recall any specific discussions he and Lee had?

A. Most of the time they spoke in English. As I mentioned, Pavel liked to practice his English with Lee. They were quite close friends. Whether they discussed politics, I don't know, but just the current news.

Q. Do you know of a Sergey Bzlov?

A. No; I don't recall this name.

Q. The last name is possibly Uslov.

A. No.

Q. Did Lee ever tell you that he and Pavel had discussed any type of assassinations?

A. No.

Q. Now, when you arrived in Dallas did you ask Lee to commence learning English?

A. Excuse me.

Q. Did you ask Lee that you would like to learn English?

A. Well, I did not ask him if I liked to learn English. I knew I must and I had to learn in order to communicate with people here.

Q. What did you do to start learning how to speak English?

A. George Bouhe, a Russian immigrant, tried to teach me English.

Q. At the current time are you a U.S. citizen?

A. No; I am not.

Q. What citizenship are you at the present time?

A. The Soviet Union.

Q. Do you have to do anything with the Government of the Soviet Union to maintain your citizenship?

A. No.

Q. Do you have to report to the Embassy at all, periodically?

A. No; every year I have to report to immigration authorities of this country.

Q. Of our country?

A. Yes; of my address.

Q. And did that practice start as soon as you entered the United States?

A. I don't remember when it started.

Q. After you entered the United States did you have any contact with the Soviet Embassy here in this country?

A. Just recently I did place a telephone call from my home to the Russian Embassy. It took me 3 days to reach somebody on the phone that was willing to discuss.

Q. The Soviet Embassy in this country?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that in Washington?

A. Yes; I placed the call from my home to Washington, D.C.

Q. What was the purpose of your phone call at that time?

A. It seems to me that since the assassination I have no contact to my family, my letters don't go through, and I am pretty sure that it is not the Americans who are holding my letters so I want to know from the Russian Embassy to whom I should write or can they help me to send my letters to my family and I don't care if they have been photographed, taped, it does not matter. They suggested that I send a telegram which I did.

Q. How recently was that?

A. I have had no reply.

Q. How recently?

A. Two weeks ago.

Q. How do you know that none of your letters are getting through?

A. Because I talked with my sister on the phone. I do believe twice, maybe three times, since I was in this country and she said she never received any of my letters.

Q. Where is your sister now living?

A. In Leningrad.

Q. In 1962 did you have to go to the Soviet Embassy at that time to maintain your Soviet citizenship?

A. No.

Q. So once you got into this country—

A. Excuse me, 1962, was I here already?

Q. Yes.

When you got to the United States did you have to go to the Soviet Embassy to maintain your Soviet citizenship?

A. No.

Q. You never reported to the Soviet Embassy?

A. No.

Q. Did anybody from the Soviet Embassy contact you while you were living in this country?

A. No; they have not but I think since our discussion progressed I recall I had another contact with the Russian Embassy when I was writing the letters to go back to them when Lee was threatened.

Q. But apart from that incident.

A. I never visited the Embassy.

Q. But apart from that incident nobody from the Soviet Embassy has ever been in contact with you?

A. No.

Q. And you have not been in contact apart from that incident and your recent phone calls with anybody in the Soviet Embassy?

A. No.

Q. When Lee returned with you to Dallas and Fort Worth did anybody from the U.S. Government approach Lee about his experiences in Russia and want to talk to him about his experiences in Russia?

A. We had some visitors and Lee told me that that was a representative of the FBI. Of course they talked in English and he told me that they just were checking on him, that is all.

Q. How soon after you came to Dallas was that visit?

A. Quite shortly after.

Q. How many people from the FBI came? Was it one or was it two?

A. I don't recall the first time if it was one or two men but Lee went outside and talked with him or with them.

Q. How long did that conversation last?

A. Well, I cannot really say how many minutes.

Q. Was it short, long?

A. Thirty minutes. It was not very long.

Q. Thirty minutes?

A. It could be.

Q. What was Lee's attitude at the end of that conversation?

A. He was very upset and angry and he told me that he wanted them to leave him alone.

Q. Were you ever approached by anybody when you and Lee returned to Dallas to talk about your experiences in Russia?

A. No. Once at Ruth Paine's house a man came and through her interpretation I have been asked by this man if anybody ever approached me from Russia or any other countries to work for them and if they do, please contact them.

Q. Who was that person who was at that house, Ruth Paine's?

A. I think it was Mr. Hosty.

Q. Approximately when was that? How shortly after you arrived in Dallas with Lee?

A. Well, I arrived in 1962 and it was in 1963 sometime.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss any other agency of the U.S. Government aside from the FBI?

A. No.

Q. He never mentioned the word CIA?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. When was the first time when you were living in Dallas that you saw that Lee owned a rifle?

A. I really don't remember the day or month.

Q. Not the day or month but what was the first occasion? What were the circumstances when you saw it?

A. I don't remember.

Q. What is the first time you remember seeing the rifle currently?

A. I believe it was in Dallas but I would not be sure. I would not swear to it. Believe me, I tried to remember my best recollection.

Q. I am just asking now that you do remember, what was the circumstance? Was it in a closet? Was he holding it? What was the first time you currently remember seeing the rifle, any rifle?

A. Well, the things flash in my memory right now of him going out after dark wearing a raincoat and he told me that he was going to practice in some shooting range. I don't mean that was the first time as I see it flashing right now.

Q. It may not be the first time but you remember one incident when he was in the raincoat?

A. Yes.

Q. And you saw the rifle at that time?

A. I am not saying that is the first time.

Q. But you saw it at that time?

A. And down in New Orleans he was sitting in the dark on the porch.

Q. The time you saw him in the raincoat, was that before you moved to New Orleans or after?

A. I believe it was in Dallas because it was quite hot outside. I mean it was very silly for somebody to put a raincoat over your body in such hot weather.

Q. It was not going to rain that day?

A. No.

Q. Did you see the rifle or did you ask him, "Why are you wearing a raincoat?"

A. I probably did but I do not remember the conversation.

Q. Did you ask him where he was going to go practicing?

A. Well, he said that you can take a bus and go somewhere but I don't know where.

Q. Did you see the rifle itself at that time?

A. I don't remember if it had any cover to it. I don't remember.

Q. It was at night after——

A. It was after dark.

Q. After dark.

A. It was very dark but whatever time, it started getting kind of in between.

Q. Did you ask him how he could go target shooting in the dark?

A. It never occurred to me.

I have to explain, I never had any interest in rifles.

Q. You said you didn't like guns.

A. No; but I never took Lee seriously with this thing. I thought a boy playing with a big toy and that it would be just temporary. I never realized how serious it was at the time.

Q. When was the first time that you say that Lee possessed a gun as opposed to a rifle?

A. I honestly don't remember.

Q. What is the first time you remember seeing the gun?

A. Just a minute. Could that be when he asked me to take the picture of him and he was wearing this gun or holding the rifle?

Q. He had a gun in that picture.

A. Yes; and it was ridiculous to take a picture. It was puzzling me why anybody would want to take a picture dressed like that with all the equipment.

Q. Did you ask him?

A. Yes. We had a fuss and a fight over it.

Q. About the gun and the rifle?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he say?

A. The picture was taken and it was ridiculous.

Q. Did you ask him though about the gun and the rifle and tell him that you didn't like guns? He knew that.

A. He knew that.

Q. What was his reaction?

A. That it was none of my business.

Q. Apart from the time Lee went to go target shooting that you have told us about, what other times do you remember seeing the rifle?

A. Well, like in New Orleans he would be sitting and cleaning and polishing the silly thing.

Q. And when you say cleaning, what was he doing to the rifle?

A. Oh, he was putting rags around and putting oil or something on it.

Q. Did he do that in Dallas as well?

A. He might have, but I do not remember it now to give you the detailed description of it.

Q. When was the first time that Lee told you he had used the rifle apart from the target practice?

A. I think the General Walker incident.

Q. Could you relate the details of that incident to us now?

A. Well, I really cannot describe the details but they would be quite accurate in the testimony that I gave at the Warren Commission and if you refresh my memory I might be able to tell you.

Q. What happened the days before the Walker incident; did Lee act unusual at all?

A. Well, he would be sitting—he made a little kind of not an office, a little closet that he has a chair there and maybe a desk—not a desk, improvisation of a desk, and he would be writing something down and he told me not to bother him so he was quite secretive about it.

Q. And that was a few days before?

A. A few days, a few weeks. I do not remember exactly the time.

Q. Was Lee restless a few days before the incident? Was he calm? Did he sleep well?

A. I don't recall his mood.

Q. Did Lee ever talk in his sleep?

A. Not that I remember.

Q. Again in the book "Marina and Lee" you said that a few days prior to the Walker incident you recollect that he was talking in his sleep.

A. That could be true.

Q. Do you remember, would he talk in English or would he talk in Russian?

A. I don't remember the incident right now.

Q. Did Lee go to work the day that he told you he shot at General Walker?

A. I don't remember that either. What day of the week was it?

Q. It was a Wednesday.

A. Was it Wednesday? Well, I am sorry. I simply do not remember.

Q. How did Lee first tell you about the shooting of General Walker?

A. Well, he was gone most of the night and came home very late and turned the radio on.

Q. How did you feel that evening when he did not come home?

A. He did not come home for a long time and I do believe that I found a note addressed to me what to do in case something happened to him and I was petrified and didn't know what to do.

Q. When did you find the note?

A. After he went out.

Q. Was it unusual for him to be out late?

A. No; since he was leaving the house sometimes for this practicing that he supposedly was going to.

Q. So you were not surprised that he was out that evening?

A. Well, I was surprised that he came home that late.

Q. Were you worried where he was?

A. Of course I was.

Q. Did you contact anybody?

A. No; I didn't.

Q. What did he say when he returned?

A. Well, he turned the radio on and he was very pale and he was listening to the news, changing from station to station. I asked him what it was all about and he said that he tried to shoot General Walker. I told him, how dare you take somebody's life and you should not do things like that, I mean you have no right to do it. He said, well, if somebody shot Hitler at the right time you will do justice to humanity so since I don't know anything about the man I should not talk about it.

Q. Did you know who General Walker was?

A. He told me he was a Fascist. That is all I know.

Q. Had you heard the name before?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee ever mention to you a man named Scotty?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee ever—

A. Just a minute. I heard this name before and I don't know if it came from Lee or somebody that he could be working with. I think it is a little bit confusing. Scotty could be a dog. I am sorry.

Q. Did he ever mention a man who spoke with a Scottish accent?

A. Oh, you mean with a Scottish accent? No; never.

Q. Did he ever mention a man who lived with General Walker?

A. No; I thought the man lived alone after what I read later on.

Q. When Lee came back that night was he disheveled?

A. What's disheveled?

Q. Was he dirty? Were his clothes still neat?

A. Well, honestly I only remember that he was very pale and that is all I recall.

Q. When do you recall him leaving the house that day prior to his shooting at General Walker?

A. I don't recall if he came from work and then left or whether he left after work. I don't remember.

Q. Was he dressed in the same clothes that you saw him previously when he returned?

A. I just don't remember.

Q. Did he have the rifle with him when he came back?

A. No; I think he said he left it hidden somewhere and I do believe the next day at night he went and got it. That is what I remember right now. That is the testimony I am giving you, what I remember.

Q. That is what we want, your present recollection.

Did he tell you he had shot at him with a rifle or did he mention that he had used a gun?

A. Well, I think it was a rifle.

Q. Did he tell you where he hid the rifle or the gun?

A. I think he might have mentioned that it was in the shrubs somewhere.

Q. Did you discuss with him whether it would be found and the police would be looking for him?

A. It was such an unpleasant and terrifying incident that I was just trembling all day long. I was looking through the windows; I was expecting police coming any second.

Q. Did you suggest to Lee that he go back and get the gun or rifle or did he do it by himself?

A. I think he did it by himself.

Q. What did he do with the gun or the rifle when he went back and got it?

A. Kept it in the house.

Q. Did you see it again?

A. Well, I never made a point of going and checking the rifle every day to see whether it was there or not.

Q. Where in the house would he keep it?

- A. In the closet.
- Q. On a shelf or was it on the floor?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. Was it wrapped in anything?
- A. It could be just kind of standing in the corner.
- Q. Propped up in the corner of the closet?
- A. It could be.
- Q. Was it covered? Was it wrapped in anything?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. Was the closet crowded? Did it have many things in it?
- A. Usually his personal belongings, his clothes, his books, whatever, and he told me to stay out of it; that is his own private thing.
- Q. This was his closet?
- A. Yes.
- Q. If you opened the closet, was it easy to get the rifle or did you have to move a lot of things aside before you got it?
- A. I never did it.
- Q. If you opened the closet door, would you see the rifle immediately?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. The photographs you took of Lee with the rifle and the pistol, do you know where Lee developed those photos?
- A. Well, didn't he work for some time with photography?
- Q. You don't know where he developed the films?
- A. No.
- Q. Did he have any photographic supplies around the house?
- A. It is so hard to dig through your memory that long back. He might have; I don't know.
- Q. When you saw the rifle that he had, was that the same rifle he had in Russia?
- A. I don't remember. How can you transport a gun from one country to another when you have to go through the inspection on the border?
- Q. So you don't think he brought the gun with him?
- A. I don't see how it logically or possibly could happen.
- Oh, you mean the same gun. Well, he bought the rifle right here.
- Q. He bought it here?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How did he buy the rifle here?
- A. Well, I learned later afterward that he ordered through some mail.
- Q. At that time did you know that he had ordered a rifle?
- A. Well, since I had seen the rifle I knew he purchased it. How he purchased it I do not know.
- Q. The first time you saw it did you ask him, "Where did you get the rifle?"
- A. No; but I was very upset that he spent money on such an unnecessary, stupid thing when we barely could survive on what he was making.
- Q. Did you ask him how much it cost?
- A. No.
- Q. Where did Lee keep his gun? The rifle was in the closet.

A. Well, it never was on display on the wall but everybody can see it. It was always hidden somewhere back in the closet. We did not live in one place very long; we moved from apartment to apartment.

Q. In the apartment where the rifle was kept in the closet, was the gun also kept there or was it kept somewhere else?

A. I assume it was together.

Q. Did you see it in that closet?

A. Well, see, my recollection about—do you recall the gun?

Q. Yes.

A. The pictures I took showed two.

Q. It showed a rifle and a gun.

A. Yes.

Q. The question I have is just where did he keep the gun if the rifle was in the closet?

A. I honestly do not know.

Q. When you were living with Lee at this time, did he ever take the gun out to go target shooting with that as well as the rifle?

A. I recall only the rifle because it was quite bulky and he had to hide it under his raincoat but I do not recall the gun at all.

Q. When he brought the rifle back after he had hid it in the bushes from General Walker's house, what did he carry it in? He didn't just carry the rifle over his shoulder.

A. No; he didn't, but I told you that he was wearing this raincoat.

Q. And that is what he did when he went to bring the rifle back in?

A. He was wearing the same raincoat.

Q. Do you remember that specifically? Wouldn't you think it is strange that if it is a nice day and it is not going to rain people would ask him, "Why are you wearing a raincoat?"

A. You have to be an idiot to do that.

Q. If you were afraid that he was going to get caught with the rifle, don't you think he would have brought it back some other way other than by wearing a raincoat?

A. I cannot speculate on that.

Q. How did Lee get to General Walker's house?

A. Well, after all this happened and got in the news media, he was laughing about Americans being so used to cars they don't know that people can walk and run, so I assumed that maybe he took a bus, since we didn't have a car, to a certain point of his destination and then walked from there.

Q. Was that how Lee got to where he hid the rifle as well?

A. Well, he did not discuss the details with me and I don't know where General Walker lived. I didn't know whereabouts.

Q. He didn't brag about how he got away?

A. Well, he bragged how quickly he could run or somebody was looking where he was not.

Q. Did he say somebody gave him a ride away from General Walker's house, that he went in somebody else's car?

A. No.

Q. After the incident with General Walker, did you and Lee discuss his use of guns and shooting at people?

A. Well, we had less arguments about it because I was against it.

Q. Did you consider getting rid of the guns, the gun and the rifle?

A. Well, what would I do with them? Where would I throw them, in the trashcan? Throw them in the river, in the trashcan, so Lee would not have them in the house.

Q. Who was your closest friend at that time?

A. Well, I liked all the Russian immigrants that I met here and they were close to me but George de Mohrenschildt was the one who visited us more often than the others and I liked his personality very much.

Q. Was he your closest friend at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you discuss—not shooting anybody, with George de Mohrenschildt, but did you discuss the fact that you wished that Lee did not have guns around the house?

A. Well, I do not remember if I discussed this with George.

Q. Did George know Lee had guns around the house?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Did his wife know?

A. If I gave you previous testimony or somebody else gave previous testimony, that is the truth. Right now I do not recall whether George knew or did not know.

Q. His wife, do you know if she ever saw the gun around the house?

A. I don't know.

Q. Which previous testimony are you referring to?

A. The Warren Commission. I told him the truth about this. I had a fresher memory then than I have now.

Q. Yes.

Whenever you testified before the Warren Commission, whatever you told them was true?

A. Yes.

Q. Shortly after the shooting of General Walker, the attempted shooting, you and Lee moved to New Orleans; is that correct?

A. That could be correct. Say it again.

Q. After the shooting of General Walker.

A. Shortly after.

Q. After that you and Lee moved to New Orleans?

A. Yes. I was very happy about this move because I thought maybe his behavior will change and he will be closer to the relative that he spoke so highly about.

Q. When did you first start talking with Lee about moving to New Orleans?

A. I think he approached me with the move to New Orleans because it seems to me that he was very short of jobs around here so he wanted to try to find something in a different city.

Q. When was the first time that you and Lee discussed moving?

A. I don't remember the day or month.

Q. Was it before the shooting of General Walker?

A. No; after.

Q. So you never discussed moving until the shooting of General Walker?

A. I think so.

Q. Did you think that it would be easier for Lee to obtain a job in New Orleans than in Dallas?

A. Well, he was drifting from one job to another one in Dallas so I was hoping that he would have more opportunities in another city.

Q. Did he discuss with you before your move any of the other opportunities he knew about in New Orleans?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. Did he discuss people he knew in New Orleans?

A. He spoke about his aunt and uncle who might help to get a job for him.

Q. Did he ever discuss anybody else in New Orleans?

A. No. Besides relatives, I did not do any discussion with strangers.

Q. Did anyone ever visit you while you were still in Dallas that Lee introduced you to as a friend or somebody he knew in New Orleans?

A. No.

Q. When you were in Russia, Lee discussed moving to both Dallas and New Orleans you said.

A. Yes.

Q. Did he discuss at any time that he knew anybody in New Orleans?

A. Not that I remember. As a friend?

Q. As a friend.

A. Just as a relative.

Q. Just as a relative?

A. Just as a relative.

Q. Did you ever hold the rifle that Lee had when he was in Dallas? Did you ever physically hold it to look at it or examine it?

A. I hope not.

Q. Do you remember any time that you did it?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever hold the gun that Lee had when you were in Dallas?

A. I don't think so.

Q. You never examined it or looked at it?

A. I had no interest in it. I am afraid of them. I don't know how to use it or how to hold it properly.

Q. What were the details of Lee's alleged threat against Mr. Nixon that you have related in your book at that time?

A. Whatever testimony I gave you before as to Mr. Klein, that is correct as far as I recall that now. I didn't go into details. What I recall is that he was living in a house with the gun, I think, and at mid-day; it was light outside.

Q. Pardon me?

A. It was not dark outside.

Q. Where was Lee holding the gun? I mean was he just holding it in his hand?

A. I don't remember. He was putting it in his belt or maybe a newspaper. I don't know. I don't want to give details which will be——

Q. Don't give details if you don't remember them. We only want details if you remember them.

A. I was scared because he was going with the gun and he said, "Mr. Nixon is coming to town and I am just going to look around." I said: "Well, how can you look around? Why do you need a gun just to look around?" So we were having a big argument and fight.

Q. Did you know who Mr. Nixon was?

A. Yes; I heard of him in Russia; yes.

Q. You heard of him in Russia?

A. Yes.

Q. And you knew that that was the same Mr. Nixon that you had heard of?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you tell Lee that precipitated the fight?

A. Pardon me?

Q. What started the fight between you and Lee?

A. Well, I didn't want him to leave the house with the gun.

Q. What happened?

A. Well, he stayed home all day; he didn't go out.

Q. Did he just voluntarily stay home?

A. Well, I already told you before that everybody asked him the same silly question, how does a small woman lock him in the bathroom, and things like that. I did not know. He wanted to provoke me. I just now can speculate about his state of mind, what the reasons were for it. Maybe just to punish me.

Q. How did he get into the bathroom?

A. Well, we fought and I cannot give you the details right now. First there was a struggle and I guess I pushed him in so somehow he went there and I held the door for a long time, but I could not go on holding the door, so I finally begged and pleaded with him and he said he would not go and I believed him. So then I told him to take the clothes off. I know that he cannot go without the clothes, so he sat and read the book then.

Q. Was he trying as hard as he could?

A. Before I said I didn't hold the gun. Well, if I asked him to give me the gun then, for example, during the fight, I could have held it and hidden it somewhere so he would not leave.

Q. How did he give you the gun? Was he still in the bathroom?

A. Could be. It was a second floor and there were stairs. There was a little like a platform there or a small hall. I don't know if he gave it to me or I took it. I don't remember.

Q. Was he trying as hard as he could, do you think, to get out of the bathroom?

A. Well, at the beginning he would probably have tried but, well, it was quite loud and I was embarrassed that the neighbors that lived below would hear us fighting and fussing.

Q. Were you fighting during this period of time before you moved to New Orleans? Were you fighting frequently with Lee?

A. Yes; we didn't have a very peaceful life.

Q. Did he talk about going back to Russia during this period of time?

A. What period of life are you talking about, in New Orleans?

Q. No, no. Before you moved to New Orleans.

A. I don't think so.

Q. You don't recall his discussing moving back to Russia?

A. No; I remember the New Orleans period much clearer because then I had to write those letters.

Mr. WOLF. If you like, we could take a break now for lunch because it is a convenient breaking time.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is up to you.

Mr. WOLF. Any time you want to take a break let us know.

The WITNESS. Could we go off the record?

Mr. WOLF. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. WOLF. Back on the record.

We are going to take a lunch break. At the current time it is approximately 12:40.

I would also like to state on the record that regarding the cameras that Mrs. Porter examined previously, concerning the two Minox cameras, so there is no confusion on the record, the Minox which was not part of the material in the National Archives and which has serial No. 2339303 is approximately 1½ inches longer than the one which is currently in the National Archives.

At this time we will take a break for lunch.

[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., a recess was taken until 2:15 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. WOLF. We are ready to resume now. It is 2:15 and the people present are Mrs. Porter, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. McDonald, Mrs. Emanuel, Mr. Cornwell, and myself.

[Whereupon, Marina Porter resumed the stand and testified further as follows:]

DIRECT EXAMINATION—RESUMED

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Mrs. Porter, did Lee keep a diary at any time during his life?

A. He was doing some writing while we were living in Russia and later on it was called as a diary. At the time I did not know what all his writings were about.

Q. When did he write that?

A. When we were living in Russia.

Q. Did he start it after you were married?

A. I don't know when he started. He started to continue what was previously started but I saw him sitting in the evening writing something.

Q. And that was while you were in Minsk?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he continue that diary in the United States?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Do you know, did he write any of that diary on the boat between Amsterdam and New York?

A. Could have been.

Q. Did you ever ask him what was in the diary when you saw him writing it?

A. Yes; I asked on occasion.

Q. What would he say?

A. His thoughts maybe.

Q. Could you read the diary?

A. No.

Q. The diary was in English or in Russian?

A. In English.

Q. Would he write it every night when you were living together, a little bit every night, or was it written lengthy one night and then he would not work on it for some time and then write again some other time?

A. Well, sometimes 2 or 3 days maybe in a row and then skip for a week or a few days.

Q. Returning to the incident with Lee and General Walker, how long after Lee shot at General Walker did he bring the rifle home?

A. As far as I recall right now I assume it was the next day.

Q. Did you see him bring it back home?

A. Well, if I saw it I don't remember right now.

Q. What was the first time after that shooting you saw the rifle that you remember now?

A. Right now I don't remember.

Q. After he brought the rifle home, do you remember if Jeanne or George de Mohrenschildt ever saw the rifle?

A. I cannot tell you that, not because I am hiding but because I cannot recall.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss—

A. May I ask you a question?

Q. Sure.

A. Did George de Mohrenschildt ever give testimony before the Commission?

Q. Yes.

A. Don't go into details, it is none of my business.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss General Walker with you after the alleged shooting incident?

A. Well, he didn't discuss in detail, we just had an argument over him trying to kill the man and it does not matter what his beliefs are, I felt he has no right to take anybody's life away. As I told you before, he just tried to persuade me that he was not a good man, that he felt quite strongly that he was doing a justice to the people, and I was fool enough not to understand him. I didn't know anything about it.

Q. If he felt that strongly about it, do you think he might have tried to do something again to General Walker?

A. I am not sure of anything, at least Lee's behavior; it is unpredictable.

Q. He never discussed it with you?

A. No; you mean that he discussed a second attempt?

Q. Another attempt.

A. No; he did not.

Q. Do you think he might have participated in another attempt without telling you about it?

A. Your guess would be just as good as mine.

Q. But given his strong feelings about General Walker, it would be possible?

A. Well, I am not in a position to answer this question because I am not a psychiatrist. I cannot predict how one person might react even though under anger or disliking somebody.

Q. When Lee discussed moving to New Orleans did you ask him where he would be able to obtain a job in New Orleans?

A. Where?

Q. Where.

A. He mentioned that his uncle was working somewhere on the boat docks—how do you call it, the shipyard or whatever you call it.

Q. Shipyards. Did he contact his uncle prior to going to New Orleans?

A. Lee came to New Orleans first. I did not travel with him so whom he approached and who he visited first I do not know.

Q. When he left, what did he tell you he was going to do and who did he tell you he was going to see?

A. He said he was going to see his Aunt Lillian.

Q. Did he tell you any other individuals he would see?

A. No.

Q. Do you know how much money he took with him for that trip?

A. No; I never was aware of how much money Lee had on him.

Q. Did he say how long he would be gone for that trip?

A. Well, he went to New Orleans and he said when he found a job he will call me up.

Q. Did he leave you money behind so you would have some support while he was gone?

A. I don't remember.

Q. How would you be able to support yourself?

A. If he did, it was not much.

Q. If he was gone for a long time, how would you be able to support yourself if you were not working at that time?

A. Well, I was living with Mrs. Ruth Paine at the time so he just dumped me on her hands.

Q. How did Lee get to New Orleans?

A. I assume he took a bus.

Q. Do you remember specifically any discussion of a car?

A. What do you mean by a discussion?

Q. A discussion that perhaps if somebody would drive him.

A. I don't remember that. Maybe Mrs. Paine took him to the bus station. Is it possible?

Q. When Lee left for New Orleans you did not know when he would be returning?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee ever mention the name David Ferrie to you?

A. No.

Q. What was the first time that you heard that name mentioned?

A. Well, the name rings a bell but—David Ferrie. It was after the assassination that I heard this name.

Q. After the assassination.

A. Maybe Mr. Garrison.

Q. Do you recognize the name Al Landry?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if Lee knew him?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you recognize the name Edward Voebel?

A. No.

Q. You don't know if Lee knew him?

A. No.

Q. Do you recognize the name Alvin Beauboeff? I believe it is French.

A. The last name sounds Russian and I am sure I heard the name Beauboeff many times in Russia.

Q. Do you recognize that name in conjunction with the New Orleans area?

A. No.

Q. Kerry Thornley?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss during the period of time you were en route to New Orleans—

A. Would you please repeat the last name?

Q. Yes; Thornley, T-h-o-r-n-l-e-y.

A. May I ask you what was the name of the boy who picked him up the last day that he went to work, the day before the assassination?

Q. No; that is not the name.

A. That is not?

Q. No; that is somebody different. Did Lee ever discuss his Marine Corps friends?

A. Never.

Q. Do you recognize the name Albert Cheramie?

A. No; I don't.

Q. Did he ever discuss any relatives aside from the Murrets?

A. Relatives?

Q. New Orleans that was.

A. I forgot the name.

Q. Aunt and uncle, Murrets.

A. Well, they have a daughter and he spoke fondly of her.

Q. Did he have any cousins that he referred to in New Orleans?

A. That is what I am talking about.

Q. Just that one daughter?

A. She was a cousin to him.

Q. Yes; where was she living?

A. I don't know but I saw her at Aunt Lillian's house. I don't know if she was living with them or in her own apartment.

Q. Did he ever refer to relatives living in Mobile, Ala.?

A. Yes; we made a visit over there once to see another cousin of his supposedly in the seminary or he was studying to be a priest.

Q. Did Lee have frequent contact with him?

A. I think he saw him a few times. I don't know how frequently.

Q. Where would he see him?

A. Only one incident that I remember when we went to see him at the seminary.

Q. How did you get there?

A. I think by the bus or maybe his aunt gave us a ride or some of the relatives. I don't recall that. I just remember being in Mobile, Ala., and meeting this gentleman.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss the Civil Air Patrol in New Orleans?

A. Civil what?

Q. Civil Air Patrol.

A. No.

Q. CAP.

A. What is it?

Q. An organization.

A. No.

Q. While in New Orleans did Lee ever discuss General Walker?

A. With whom? With me?

Q. With you.

A. I don't think so.

Q. Did he discuss it with other individuals?

A. We didn't have any visitors ever, practically none. If he discussed with somebody, I would not know about it.

Q. Do you recognize the name Palmer MacBride?

A. No.

Q. Prior to your going to New Orleans did any of Lee's friends stop by your house in Dallas?

A. Would you please state that again. Prior?

Q. Before you went to New Orleans did any of Lee's friends stop by your house in Dallas?

A. Well, if anybody stopped by, that would be our few actual friends and the only friends we had were the Russians.

Q. Nobody unusual stopped by?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee ever mention that somebody was writing a book and that he may be mentioned in the book?

A. I don't recall that at all.

Q. Did Lee discuss during that time in New Orleans the civil rights legislation of President Kennedy?

A. Not with me anyway. I never heard him discussing that.

Q. You never heard that. Did he ever discuss activities other groups were engaging in concerning civil rights for black people?

A. He was involved with some Cuban. I don't know if it was pro-Castro or anti-Castro movement that was in New Orleans if that is what you call it.

Q. Did Lee discuss with you the Cuban activities in New Orleans?

A. Yes; he did.

Q. What did he say about them?

A. Well, I really don't remember what he said about it but I knew he sympathized with them in whatever they were doing.

Q. Well, you said there were both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in New Orleans.

A. I said I do not recall whether they were pro-Castro or anti-Castro groups. I knew it had something to do with Cuba, Cuban dissent.

Q. And he sympathized with what group? Do you remember the name of the group?

A. Well, when he was arrested in New Orleans, supposedly the name of the group was Fair Play for Cuba.

Q. Were there any other groups that he spoke about?

A. That is all that I can recall.

Q. Did he ever mention Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi?

A. What?

Q. Keesler Air Force Base which is located in Mississippi.

A. No.

Q. He never discussed friends from the Air Force base?

A. Well, I didn't know that he had anything to do with the Air Force.

Q. Well, they are people he may have known who were in the Air Force.

A. I don't know.

Q. How did Lee get in touch with you to tell you to come to New Orleans?

A. Well, he called. I guess he called Ruth Paine that we can come over into the apartment.

Q. Did you speak to Lee on the phone?

A. Probably.

Q. Did you ask him what he was doing in New Orleans during that time?

A. Yes. Well, that was very casual conversation between husband and wife.

Q. Did he mention anything about people he had met, things he had been doing?

A. No.

Q. Did he mention any places he had been outside of New Orleans?

A. No.

Q. Do you know, did he go straight from Dallas to New Orleans or did he make any stops on the way?

A. Well, I would not know that for a fact. He did not tell me that he stopped anywhere.

Q. Have you heard that he stopped places?

A. No.

Q. But he never told you any place he stopped?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever mention Morgan City, La., in particular?

A. Morgan City, no.

Q. How did Lee come to the job he acquired in New Orleans?

A. I don't know by now. Was it a coffee company?

Q. Reilly Coffee Co.

Did he mention anybody at that company?

A. Well, no, not that I recall right now, but I think he was circling job ads in the newspaper and applied that way.

Q. He never told you that he knew some people who helped him get the job there?

A. I don't recall that.

Q. How did Lee find the apartment where you met him at?

A. How did he find it?

Q. Yes.

A. When we moved there he had already rented the apartment.

Q. Did you like the apartment?

A. No.

Q. Did you ask him why he chose that?

A. Well, I knew why. That is all we could afford, I guess. I liked his Aunt Lillian's house much better.

Q. He didn't tell you that anybody had referred him to this apartment or suggested that he stay there?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee mention anybody who he had met during his stay in New Orleans who was particularly friendly or particularly helpful to him?

A. I don't remember that really. I doubt that he mentioned it. Lee was a kind of loner. We didn't have very many friends or visitors.

Q. Did he discuss the French Quarter of New Orleans with you?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he say about it?

A. Well, he took me there once or twice. We could not afford to go to fancy restaurants. We would just see how other people are having fun.

Q. Did he seem to know his way around that part of town fairly well?

A. Yes.

Q. When you went with him did he meet people he knew there?

A. No; we just strolled along, the three of us.

Q. Did Lee ever mention trips to Mobile, Ala., apart from the ones you told us about the trip to the seminary?

A. By himself?

Q. By himself.

A. I don't remember right now if he did.

Q. Did you ever go on any trips with Lee outside of New Orleans?

A. I told you I went to Mobile, Ala., with him.

Q. Apart from that.

A. Would you please say it again.

Q. Apart from that trip, did you and Lee ever go on a trip together outside of New Orleans?

A. No; it mostly was in New Orleans. We would take a bus and go somewhere.

Q. Was anyone teaching Lee how to drive during this period of time?

A. In New Orleans?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. Had you ever seen him trying to drive?

A. Once but it was in front of Ruth Paine's house when we were in Dallas. He was practicing in her car.

Q. Do you think he could have passed a driving test?

A. I don't know. I don't drive a car so I don't know.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss a trip to Baton Rouge?

A. The name of the town is familiar—not from the newspapers, of course. I might even have been there.

Q. Under what circumstances would you have been there?

A. I don't remember how I got there.

Q. Would this be with Lee?

A. Yes.

Q. Would this be for a day or for longer?

A. Can we take a recess?

Q. Yes.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

The WITNESS. It seems to me I had been in Baton Rouge but I do not recall the circumstances, why, with whom.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Do you remember any trip to Gulfport, La., which is on the gulf?

A. I remember the first time seeing the Gulf of Mexico.

Q. Were you there with Lee in Gulfport?

A. Somehow I don't see Lee in my memory. I see his aunt and a cousin. I don't know where Lee was.

Q. How did you get to any place when you wanted to leave New Orleans if you did not drive and Lee did not drive?

A. Well, if we had been somewhere we would have a witness because the third person—since I did not drive and we do not have a car so it has to be somebody's car and somebody driving.

Q. Do you recall one of Lee's cousins giving him any driving lessons when he was in New Orleans?

A. I do not recall that but it could be this young lady cousin of his. I don't know.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss a trip to Metairie, La., with you?

A. No. Is this near New Orleans?

Q. It is not that far. Did he ever discuss looking for work other than the Reilly Coffee Co. where he was working?

A. Well, he said he looked for several jobs according to the newspaper ads but that was the only one that was available at the time.

Q. Once he was at Reilly, did he discuss looking for other jobs?

A. I don't recall that he was very happy with his job. It seemed to me by then he never was happy with any job that he got.

Q. Did he mention any of his associates at Reilly Coffee Co.?

A. Yes. He said that during the lunch period he would visit with some black young man. I don't remember his name but they became friendly. I never saw the man.

Q. How did he spend his typical lunch hour; did he tell you?

A. Well, he usually ate a sandwich and a coke.

Q. Did he tell you?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever tell you that he found particular people very difficult to work with?

A. Well, when Lee had difficulties on the job it was always somebody's fault.

Q. Did he ever mention who it was?

A. Names? If he mentioned names at the time, I do not remember them right now.

Q. Are you familiar with the name John Hurt?

A. No.

Q. You never heard that?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss anybody in Raleigh, N.C.?

A. No.

Q. Are you familiar with Sam Mancuso?

A. No. I heard this name recently in the news or somewhere else, but never then.

Q. Adrian Alba?

A. No.

Q. A Thomas Beckham?

A. No.

Q. You have never heard that name?

A. No.

Q. Emmett Barbee?

A. No.

Q. Anna Dante Marachine?

A. A beautiful name but I never heard it.

Q. Did he ever mention a Mancuso Restaurant in New Orleans?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever discuss a building known as the Newman Building?

A. No.

Q. Or did he ever discuss the International Trade Mart?

A. No.

Q. When was the first time you were aware that Lee was engaged in Cuban activities while he was in New Orleans?

A. Well, first he brought some kind of pamphlets in the house and then he was arrested for it and he made some kind of speech on the radio or something like that, so just little by little.

Q. What did you say when you first saw the pamphlets? Was that the first time that you were aware of his activities?

A. Pardon me. What did you say first?

Q. What did you say to Lee when you first saw the pamphlets—if that was the first time you knew about his Cuban activities?

A. Of course I was relieved with him that he was being such a revolutionary minded person. At least it was more peaceful than playing with the rifle. Some papers couldn't hurt.

Q. He was arrested for distributing the pamphlets; is that correct?

A. That is what he told me.

Q. That is the only way you found out that he was arrested?

A. Well, he didn't spend the night at home so when he came in the morning he told me he was in jail and I asked him what for.

Q. What did you do when he didn't come home that night?

A. Well, apparently I was waiting up for him all night; I was worried. I don't remember exactly what I did.

Q. Did you call anybody or call the police?

A. No, I didn't call anyone because I didn't know anybody in New Orleans besides his relatives.

Q. Did you call his relatives to find out if he was all right?

A. I don't recall doing that.

Q. Was Lee working at Reilly Coffee Co. when he was arrested?

A. I don't know. I don't remember.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss a place known as the Court of the Two Sisters in the French Quarter?

A. No. Is that the restaurant? The name sounds familiar but I don't know where I heard it. Say it again.

Q. The Court of the Two Sisters.

A. Well, I doubt that it came from Lee because I had been visiting New Orleans up until Lee died and somebody might have mentioned that name to me.

Q. Did he ever discuss the Ryder Coffee House?

A. No.

Q. Was Lee usually home with you in the evenings?

A. Usually, yes.

Q. Did he ever go out alone?

A. Yes; I suppose so.

Q. Did you ask him what he did on those times when he would go out?

A. Well, he went to the library, he said, or just walk around the block.

Q. Would he go to the library at night?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it open in the evenings?

A. It would be open until eight or seven or something like that.

Q. What people came to visit you and Lee together in New Orleans? When you and Lee were together, what people came to visit?

A. Not very many besides Mrs. Paine being there for a very short time.

Q. Any of the people who lived in New Orleans?

A. I think Mrs. Paine once. She knew somebody in New Orleans, a friend of hers, and they came to visit us once, an American couple.

Q. What was the name of that couple?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Was Lee ever visited by people who he seemed to know and you might not have known?

A. No; only once somebody rang the doorbell and he was in the house and he answered the door and he said it was some solicitors and that was all.

Q. Did you see them there, the people who were at the door?

A. Just from a distance but now I don't even remember whether it was a man or woman or two of them. I don't know.

Q. How long did the conversation with Lee last?

A. Not more than 5 minutes.

Q. Was Lee ever visited by Cubans at the house?

A. No.

Q. You have no memory of any Cuban individuals coming to the house?

A. No.

Q. After Lee lost the job at the Reilly Coffee Co. what did he do during the days?

A. Well, he was preoccupied with his pamphlets again and he became very sloppy in his appearance; very irritable.

Q. Did he stay around the house most of the day?

A. Well, sometimes he said he would go look for a job and get dressed and go out and spend most of the day out. I don't know where he was but I assume he was looking for a job. The next day maybe he does not go anywhere and then try again.

Q. Was Lee ever away overnight at any time during your stay in New Orleans?

A. Only when he was arrested.

Q. That was the only time?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you and he ever travel together and stay overnight anywhere?

A. I don't remember if we stayed overnight when we went to see his cousin, I don't recall.

Q. Lee frequently went to the library you said.

A. Yes.

Q. Did he have his own library card?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see the library card he had?

A. No; but he checks the books out.

Q. Did you ever see the library card he used?

A. If I seen it, I don't remember.

Q. Did he ever discuss his attitudes about the airlines?

A. Well, he wanted to hijack a plane once and he wanted me to help him out.

Q. That was to go where?

A. To Cuba.

Q. To Cuba. Did he ever discuss which particular airline he was going to hijack a plane of?

A. No.

Q. Did he every say anything in particular about Eastern Air Lines?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you the subject of homosexuality?

A. No.

Q. There were many people at that time in New Orleans who were homosexuals. Did he ever discuss the general attitude?

A. Well, to tell you the truth, I found out many years later what it is all about, you know.

Q. He never discussed that with you at all?

A. No.

Q. Never indicated an attitude? If you saw somebody who was apparently homosexual, he never indicated what his attitude would be?

A. I don't know his attitude.

Q. Did you ever accompany Lee when he went to the library?

A. Excuse me.

Q. Did you ever accompany Lee when he went to the library?

A. I think on one occasion.

Q. Was it close to your house?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember the name or where that library was?

A. No; I knew it was a walking distance and it was on the same side as the house was.

Q. Are you familiar with Rosewell Thompson?

A. Who?

Q. Rosewell Thompson.

A. No.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss what kind of jobs he would be interested in if he left the Reilly Coffee Co., the type of work he would like to have?

A. Well, he was dreaming about having an intellectual job rather than just a plain common mechanical labor job or something like that.

Q. Did he ever discuss a job as an electrician?

A. No; he would not be qualified.

Q. Was Lee active in discussing local politics with you?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever discuss that to your knowledge?

A. Well, I don't know how to answer this question. Something in

A. Well, maybe I was looking for the wrong thing, I don't know. local politics.

Q. Anything about the sheriff, the mayor, elections.

- A. No.
- Q. Did Lee vote in elections?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Did he ever discuss registration to vote?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. Did he ever discuss working in a hospital?
- A. No.
- Q. Did he ever mention Marydale Farm?
- A. Say it again.
- Q. Marydale Farm.
- A. That is the name of a person?
- Q. No; of a place.
- A. No.
- Q. Did he ever mention the name Louis Roussell?
- A. No.
- Q. Are you familiar with the name Sergio Arcacha Smith?
- A. I heard this name somewhere before but I don't remember where.
- Q. Do you know if you heard it from Lee?
- A. I doubt it.
- Q. Do you think you have heard something since the assassination or prior to the assassination?
- A. I think so, after the assassination.
- Q. You stated Lee discussed with you hijacking a plane to go to Cuba.
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did he ever discuss that with anybody else?
- A. No.
- Q. Did he ever discuss his desire to go—
- A. I say no. How can I be positive? Not as far as I know of.
- Q. Did he ever discuss his desire to go to Cuba with anyone else while he was in New Orleans?
- A. I would not know that.
- Q. Did Lee mention the Cuban Revolutionary Council?
- A. I cannot remember under such a name.
- Q. It is also referred to as the initials CRC.
- A. Well, that does not ring a bell either but when he went to Mexico he was planning to go to the Cuban chancellor so revolutionary—I don't know what kind of consul exists in Mexico.
- Q. Did Lee ever discuss eating lunch while he was working at Walgren's drugstore?
- A. I thought he had his lunch on the grounds of the factory.
- Q. Did he buy his lunch at the factory?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Did he take lunch from home?
- A. I don't recall that either.
- Q. Are you familiar with the name Loran Hall?
- A. No.
- Q. Are you familiar with the name Lawrence Howard?
- A. No.
- Q. Did Lee ever mention the Carson City garage?
- A. No.
- Q. Are you familiar with that at all?

A. No; where is it?

Q. It is next door to the Reilly Coffee Co.

A. No.

Q. Did you ever go to Lee's place of work at the Reilly Coffee Co.?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you go there?

A. Well, I just wanted to see where he works, just to see him during the day. I took a bus and I asked because I didn't speak English very well so I just asked for the name and they said no such a person worked there so maybe I got into the wrong building. So I never saw him there. I went to some building and asked to speak with Lee and they said no person under this name worked there.

Q. Did you ask Lee about it that night?

A. Yes; and he told me I had no business to disturb him at work so that was that.

Q. You didn't tell him you were surprised that he was not at the company?

A. I might have.

Q. What did he respond?

A. I don't remember. I just remember he was angry with me for doing that.

Q. Were you at the Reilly Coffee Co. to the best of your knowledge?

A. Well, maybe I was looking for the wrong thing, I don't know. I would not swear to it. OK?

Q. When you were in New Orleans were you aware of people who were homosexuals?

A. No.

Q. Was that a concept that you were totally unfamiliar with?

A. Well, I learned about homosexuals or what homosexuality is much later in my life.

Q. You were not familiar with that when you were in Russia, just what the concept is?

A. No.

Q. Thinking back on it now did Lee appear to have friends who happened to be homosexual?

A. No.

Q. Do you think there is a possibility that he did and you just didn't know his friends or that you did not know that they were homosexual?

A. I would not know or have seen anything unusual about the behavior pattern.

Q. When did you and Lee decide to leave New Orleans?

A. When?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, he decided that he will go to Mexico—I am sorry. Would you please repeat the question? When did we decide?

Q. To move back to Dallas and leave New Orleans?

A. He lost this job. Do you want me to try to remember the month?

Q. Well, what is the time sequence and the month if you can remember it?

A. Well, I cannot remember the month but I know he was planning to go to Mexico and I was expecting the baby so Mrs. Paine again offered a helping hand and I left New Orleans with her and Lee was

left behind and he said he will follow pretty soon. He told Ruth that he will come over later.

Q. Did he plan to go to Mexico before you made the decision to leave New Orleans?

A. I don't recall.

Q. When he discussed hijacking the plane, at that time did you already decide to move back to Dallas?

A. I am sorry. I do not remember when the decision was made.

Q. Did Lee tell you why he wanted to go to Mexico?

A. He was disappointed in Latin America so he wants to go and try Cuba.

Q. Why did he choose Mexico?

A. I assume it was a closer place to have a place that has a Cuban Embassy.

Q. How did he travel to get to Mexico?

A. He told me he was going to take a bus.

Q. Did you ask him about how expensive it would be?

A. If I asked, he told me it was not very much. I don't know the price?

Q. Did you think he would come back to see you in Dallas after he went to Mexico?

A. Well, to tell you the truth I did not think that I will ever see him again.

Q. How did you feel about that?

A. It was a pathetic situation.

Q. When Mrs. Paine took you back to Dallas, what is the next time you heard from Lee?

A. I don't recall the time lapse. It could be a week.

Q. Was it in Dallas or did he phone you while you were in Dallas?

A. I recall—how correct I am I don't know but he came back and called from the Dallas—no. I think he took a taxi or somebody dropped him off at Paine's house.

Q. He didn't call you after the time you left New Orleans and before he returned?

A. I don't remember.

Q. When he went to Mexico by bus did he stop anywhere along the way?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever tell you about his travels?

A. Well, he said that he did not succeed, they refused him.

Q. What was his attitude?

A. He was very disappointed.

Q. Who was the "they" who refused him?

A. The consular at the Cuban Embassy.

Q. Did he mention any other embassy?

A. I would not speculate on that. It could be another embassy.

Q. Did he discuss the Russian Embassy?

A. I don't remember right now.

Q. Did he tell you anything else he did while he was in Mexico?

A. As entertainment?

Q. As entertainment or anything else he might do.

A. He discussed certain visits to certain authorities he had to see and that is all.

Q. Did he discuss any parties that he may have gone to?

A. No.

Q. Did he discuss any particular people at the Embassy?

A. He mentioned the names of certain persons that he saw at the Embassy but I don't recall them.

Q. Did he return from Mexico to New Orleans?

A. I think the next time I saw him it was at Ruth Paine's house.

Q. But did he tell you what he did after he went to Mexico?

A. Well, I recall right now that he made the Mexican trip and came back to Dallas.

Q. So he took all his belongings from New Orleans to Mexico and then went from Mexico to Dallas?

A. No; I took the belongings.

Q. So Lee had nothing left in New Orleans?

A. Just a few personal things and clothing in one bag, that is all.

Q. So you believe Lee came directly from Mexico back to Dallas.

A. Yes.

Q. How did he get there?

A. Same bus.

Q. Is it possible that he returned to New Orleans before he came to Dallas?

A. It could be. I would not know about it or I would not remember that.

Q. Did he tell you of any places he may have been apart from Mexico on that trip?

A. No.

Mr. WOLF. We will take a 5-minute break.

[Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., a recess was taken until 3:20 p.m.]

Mr. WOLF. We will resume. It is 3:20 now and Mr. McDonald will be asking Mrs. Porter a series of questions for the next period of time.

Mr. McDONALD. Thank you.

By Mr. McDONALD:

Q. Mrs. Porter, after you left New Orleans it was your understanding that Lee was going to go to Mexico City.

A. Yes.

Q. Is it your testimony that you did not see him again until he returned from Mexico?

A. Yes.

Q. After your return to Dallas, after you left New Orleans in approximately September or maybe early October, do you recall going with Lee to the Texas State Employment Commission?

Let me amplify that a little bit. Do you recall going with Lee and with some other people, a group of people, yourself and at the time you would have been pregnant and perhaps Lee and some other friends or other people?

A. No; I don't recall that. You mean in Dallas?

Q. Yes.

A. No; I don't recall. I might have been, I would not deny that.

Q. It would have been a government-type office where Lee would have gone to inquire about a job, where he would have sat down with either a man or a woman at a desk and discussed his job skills.

A. I am sorry but I could not remember at all.

Q. I will just try to see if I can refresh your memory. Do you recall ever being in a government-type office where you waited for Lee to finish his business and you either stood or sat in a waiting area, a waiting room, or near the wall?

A. I am afraid not. I have to be with somebody.

Q. Was Lee's brother living in Dallas at that time?

A. No; he was living in Fort Worth.

Q. Fort Worth?

A. I would not say that that didn't happen, I just cannot recall at all.

Q. Is it possible that Lee could have stopped in Dallas before he went to Mexico?

A. I don't see why not. I am sorry. From New Orleans to Dallas and then back?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would not know about that. He never said anything about it.

Q. But you were not with him if he did this?

A. No; I did not see him from the time I left New Orleans and left him behind and the next time he was in Dallas.

Q. Was Lee's brother older than Lee?

A. Yes.

Q. How much older?

A. Not very much. Maybe 3 years.

Q. Do you recall if Lee ever owned a leather jacket, a black leather jacket, something we call like a motorcycle jacket with little stars on the lapel?

A. No; he never had a jacket like that that I remember.

Q. Any kind of shortwaisted jacket that would be leather.

A. Not shiny leather, no.

Q. Do you recall his having at any time a jacket that would have had little silver stars?

A. That would be more or less military kind of style?

Q. Yes.

A. The only thing I noticed was a military raincoat that was a greenish color as I recall.

Q. Did it have stars on it?

A. No; I think it had something like that, a lapel with a button. No stars, but it was long.

Q. It was long.

Knowing Lee as you knew him would it be out of character for him to say to someone else that—I will give you a hypothetical. If he had been talking to someone, say an employment counselor, about his discharge from the Marines, would it be out of character for him to say to that person, namely Lee, does not willingly subject himself to authority? In other words, he does not like to take orders from anybody?

A. I would not know what to say, how to answer this question. Since I did not speak English, I do not know what he might have said. He could be very rude sometimes and if that were described as the rudeness in his character, yes; I would expect that. As far as taking orders, I knew him personally and he didn't like to take orders.

Q. Did not like to.

A. No; but as far as toward me, just to somebody or say to a stranger, I would not know.

Q. Did he speak Spanish?

A. No.

Q. Did he speak any other language other than—

A. I think he maybe knew a few words in Spanish.

Q. Do you know if Lee had ever attended the Texas State Fair?

A. State fair?

Q. Yes.

A. I believe we went to Six Flags Over Texas, it is an amusement park.

Q. You went there with Lee?

A. Yes; did I or didn't I? I am sorry, I don't remember that. I do not remember ever being at the State Fair of Texas with Lee.

I am sorry. I might be confused. Sometimes the period in New Orleans and the period in Dallas kind of get squashed together and it might have been an amusement park or a zoo somewhere else. It could be one picture in my mind.

Q. Do you know if Lee ever went for a job interview at a lumber company in Dallas?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know if he ever went for an interview at the Wimer Lumber Co.?

A. I don't know that either.

Q. Did Lee ever wear eyeglasses?

A. No; maybe sunglasses but not for reading.

Q. You never saw him reading with glasses?

A. No; only with sunglasses.

Q. Did he ever talk to you or ever mention anything about joining a labor union; namely, the Teamsters?

A. I don't recall anything with that name.

Q. You testified earlier that at one time in New Orleans Lee had worked for his uncle at a dock. I think that was the testimony.

Mr. WOLF. The shipyard.

Mr. McDONALD. The shipyard. I am sorry.

By Mr. McDONALD:

Q. Do you know whether Lee ever drove a forklift truck that would lift boxes or something like that in a warehouse type situation? Do you know if he had that kind of skill to drive what is called a small forklift truck?

A. I would not know. See, for example, if I gave testimony that he was working for his uncle—now I do not recall if that is when we were married or if it was earlier, his job. I do not just remember now but I never saw him operate any kind of machinery or driving anything except maybe practicing on the car a few times.

Q. You mentioned that Lee spoke a few words of Spanish. What do you mean by that?

A. Well, you and me might know what hello would be and goodbye.

Q. Do you know how he learned?

A. Well, I think Lee was kind of interested in languages. He took time to study Russian and I would not be surprised if he was ever exposed to Spanish-speaking people he would pick up a few words from them.

Q. Was he the kind of person that liked to brag, that liked to say things about himself, to exaggerate?

A. I would say so.

Q. That he would try to impress people?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were living in Dallas again after New Orleans in the fall of 1963, do you know whether Lee had any Mexican friends, Mexican-American or Cuban?

A. I never seen them or met any of them. If he associated with Spanish-speaking people, it is possible but I never knew about that.

Q. We are talking about a period of time from early October 1963 up to the assassination.

A. Well, we weren't together at the time. He was living alone.

Q. On Beckley Street?

A. Yes; so I just saw him maybe once a week, the weekend, and he was lonely.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of during this time in Dallas that he ever attended Cuban political type meetings, groups of Cubans in Dallas? Do you know whether he ever went to those kinds of meetings?

A. Him and Michael Paine went to some kind of meeting that I know of but I would not know what kind of meeting it was.

Q. How do you know this?

A. They went together.

Q. And it was a political meeting?

A. More or less.

Q. The kind of meeting that he went to, did Lee agree with the philosophy being espoused by that group to your knowledge?

A. Well, what I recall right now that he went, he was kind of skeptical about it, whether he would buy the whole package or not. Not everything.

Q. During this period do you recall what Lee's personal views were?

A. Well, I am not a politically educated person so whenever they start to discuss something that is not of interest to me, I don't listen to it, I don't get involved. I am sorry I did not answer your question.

Q. Let me just rephrase it. During this time prior to the assassination you said earlier that he was dissatisfied with life in the United States and wanted to go to Cuba. Do you know if he changed his views toward Cuba after he was refused a visa to go to Cuba? Do you know whether he changed his views to become anti-Castro?

A. He was bitter in not being considered to go wherever he had planned. This period everything was going bad. That is more or less normal life. He gave up all his silly ideas and we were going to be living together as husband and wife and raising a family and that he will keep the job. That is what I thought at the time.

Q. But the meeting that he went to with Michael Paine —

A. I don't think it has anything to do with Cuba or any kind of Spanish-speaking people or anything like that as far as I recall.

Q. What do you recall the nature of that meeting to be?

A. Well, to tell you the truth, I don't remember the name of the group that Michael Paine maybe was interested in.

Q. During this period of time did Lee ever mention to you the names of any of his friends or associates?

A. No.

Q. Does the name Leopoldo sound familiar?

A. No.

Q. How about Angelo?

A. No. I heard the name Angela reading the newspaper articles sometime. The name will come up but that was long after the assassination.

Q. Can you recall in, we will say, the week preceding the assassination you were living in Irving—did you ever write a letter to Lee?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever write to him while you were in Dallas?

A. Write where to? When I was in Dallas?

Q. Yes. When you were in Irving, do you recall writing a letter or letters to Lee addressed to him at Ruth Paine's house?

A. I doubt it.

Q. Could you at that time write in English?

A. No.

Q. Can you recall ever writing to him in Russian?

A. I don't recall but the only letters I could write would have been in Russian.

Q. And if you did you would have had to have someone address the envelope for you in Irving.

A. I know the English alphabet because I studied French in school so I could copy the address from the Latin alphabet.

Q. Can you recall writing a letter to him?

A. No. I don't see the purpose of my writing a letter to him because I see him once a week. What am I going to tell him? We are fine? I doubt that I did it.

Q. Did you ever hear him —

A. Unless it was a birthday card which is possible.

Q. When was his birthday?

A. October 18.

Q. October 18. Did you ever hear the name, did he ever mention to you the name of a Cuban political group called Jure?

A. No; these pamphlets that he had that said "Hands Off of Cuba," it was just a protesting phrase or the name of the organization. I do not know.

Q. I think we could say those pamphlets that he passed out in New Orleans, the Fair Play for Cuba, at that time in New Orleans would you say his views were pro-Castro?

A. Yes. As far as I know up to now he liked Fidel Castro very much.

Q. After he got back to Dallas, can you recall any conversations or remarks that he might have made that would have indicated that his views had changed? I know I asked you this before but I want to ask it again.

A. That is OK.

Beside seeing him disappointed that he was—well, maybe he was a little bit bitter. He might even—I am sorry; I would be speculating saying that he might have made the remark that he expected more, you know.

Q. Can you recall anything specific along those lines?

A. No.

I must tell that most of his things he kept to himself because he didn't think that I was qualified to discuss all these matters with him.

Q. You mentioned just a minute ago about the meeting with Michael Paine and you made a comment about Lee's not being sure that he agreed or whatever. What did you mean by that? Could you explain that?

A. First of all they spoke English to each other and one would express one view and the other a different view. It was not argument, more or less peaceful discussion, but I knew it was some kind of disagreement in point of view. I would not recall what he was for and against. Some kind of political rally. I don't remember what it was all about.

Q. Do you know whether it involved Cuba at all or was it anti-Kennedy?

A. No; it was not anti anybody. It was anti anybody.

Q. But it was political. You seem to be saying that it was some kind of political meeting.

A. I am sure now that it was.

Mr. HAMILTON. I didn't understand something you said. You said anti anybody.

The WITNESS. Well, like no words were mentioned. This is anti-government, anti-Castro, anti-Kennedy.

Mr. HAMILTON. So what you are saying, just so we will have the record clear, is that you don't know if the meeting was anti anybody; is that correct?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.

By Mr. McDONALD:

Q. After you left Lee in New Orleans did you ever hear from him or anyone else that he had traveled through Dallas on the way to Mexico?

A. No.

Q. Before you left each other in New Orleans, did he give you any hint that he might come by way of Dallas?

A. You have to go through Dallas in order to get to Irving.

Q. I mean come through Dallas to go to Mexico.

A. Oh, no, no. I never heard that.

Q. If he had in fact come through Dallas, would it be likely that he would have called you?

A. Yes. I would not know that because I never heard him mention that he was going through Dallas.

Q. Have you ever heard of the name Sylvia Odio?

A. No.

Q. Just in summary getting back to that Texas State Employment Commission, you can't recall ever going with him to an employment office?

A. I do not recall at all and I would not swear I never had been there either but I just don't remember.

Q. Can you recall any incident where—

A. Excuse me. I might help. Is that in Dallas?

Q. Yes.

A. Now I am more familiar with Dallas than I was then so if the name of the street could ring a bell because I tried to establish the fact.

Q. Let me see if I can get the street. I will look for that street address if I can, but just one further question.

Do you remember any occasion where perhaps you and Lee were picked up by his brother and perhaps his brother's wife in their car and you traveled to any kind of office or to go shopping or to do whatever? Did the four of you ever travel together, go anywhere together?

A. Yes; to the shopping center; Montgomery Ward.

Q. How about in Dallas?

A. And something in Dallas that I can try to bring my memory back. I see some stairs in a building that looks official. It is not the church; it is some kind of granite or something, but I do not remember sitting anywhere on a bench waiting for Lee.

Q. Did you stand up waiting for him?

A. Somehow I just remember the steps.

Q. But you remember going?

A. I don't remember anybody waiting in the car or how I got there; I don't know. What period of my life are you talking about?

Q. This would have been in Dallas sometime soon after Lee got back from Mexico.

A. That means I have to travel from Irving.

Q. And it would be before he started working at the depository. In other words, he was unemployed; he was looking for a job.

A. Well, I don't think so because somehow this building stays in my mind. It was quite warm weather; it was like the summer. This could be Fort Worth just as well instead of Dallas.

Q. Do you know while you were in New Orleans before you went back to Dallas and Lee went to Mexico whether he studied any books on Mexico City or Cuba? Do you know whether he was reading on those?

A. He always was reading something and I would not know what books if they were in English. I do not recall what the names of the books were or what they were all about.

Mr. McDONALD. All right. I have no further questions.

Thank you.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Mrs. Porter, I will continue asking the remainder of our questions.

To go back for 1 minute, you recollect to get to the United States, the Embassy in Russia loaned Lee money; is that correct?

A. What did you say?

Q. The American Embassy in Russia, did they loan Lee money to get to the United States?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember how much money was loaned to Lee?

A. Well, since I read about that later on, I think it was like \$500 or so but I would not be sure.

Q. Where did Lee get the money to pay back the Embassy?

A. Well, every week from his paycheck he put some aside and paid them back.

Q. Did he pay back the same amount every week to the Embassy?

A. I would not know because I never handled the money.

Q. Would you be surprised if he paid a large sum of money back in one time to the Embassy?

A. Yes; unless he saved it for 3 or 4 or 5 weeks.

Q. Other than that it would surprise you if he paid \$350 back at once if he had been paying small amounts previously?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any idea where he could have gotten money of that amount?

A. I would speculate that he borrowed from his brother to pay a big sum and pay his brother back. That is the only way I can see he would get the money.

By Mr. McDONALD:

Q. I have one further question and that is I think this Texas State Employment Commission was located on Industrial Boulevard in Dallas where the Industrial Boulevard is right on the other side of the—it is across from Dealey Plaza on the other side of the triple underpass.

A. I still didn't think it was Dallas. I think it was Fort Worth. Does the building have steps with the middle rail in between? Some kind of rail in between?

Q. I am not sure; I don't know.

Mr. McDONALD. OK. Thank you. Goodby. [In Russian.]

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Returning to Dallas, Mrs. Porter, when Lee came back from Mexico City did he move into the house with you at that time?

A. Would you say it again.

Q. When he came back from Mexico City, you had gone to live with Mrs. Paine.

A. Yes.

Q. Did Lee move in with you at that time?

A. No.

Q. Where did he stay?

A. He stayed in Dallas. He rented a room and he said he would try to save the money that way so we can rent an apartment later on.

Q. How often would he come to visit you?

A. Once a week on the weekend.

Q. How did he get there?

A. The neighbor who worked the same place would give him a ride.

Q. And he would stay for the whole weekend with you?

A. Most of the time.

Q. Would he stay overnight on Saturday night?

A. Yes.

Q. And then return on Sunday night or on Monday morning?

A. Probably Monday morning.

Q. Do you recall that the FBI contacted you approximately 10 days before the assassination?

A. It was quite close to the assassination but I do not remember; 10 days, 14 days, 1 week.

Q. Approximately. What did they talk to you about at that time?

A. Well, Ruth was the interpreter. As I told you, they asked me if I had been in contact to let them know.

Q. Were you surprised that they came to you?

A. No.

Q. Why were you not surprised?

A. Because we had visits from the FBI before; at least that is what Lee told me, that they were FBI like in Fort Worth.

Q. Was this the first visit you had had since you returned to Dallas from New Orleans?

A. As far as I recall.

Q. Did you find it unusual that Lee did not come home the weekend of November 14?

A. We had an argument. What was the day?

Q. This is the weekend prior to the assassination. Was Lee home that weekend?

A. I wish I could remember my testimony.

No; I knew it was unusual that he came just before the assassination.

Q. That was Thursday night?

A. Not the weekend.

Q. That was a Thursday night, is that correct?

A. I think he missed the weekend before.

Q. Was that unusual if he missed that weekend?

A. Now I don't remember what the circumstances were, what was the reason.

Q. Did he come to visit you most weekends?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall any particular weekends that he did come to visit?

A. Except the one that you mentioned.

Q. Except that one?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you speak to Lee on the phone that weekend?

A. Well, I remember the incident when he gave me the telephone number where he can be reached and I called him and they said nobody by this name lived there and I assume right now that that is the reason we had the argument over that he was hiding his name. Maybe that is the reason he was angry with me and didn't show up this weekend but I am speculating now. I have to read my own books.

Q. When he came on Thursday night, the night prior to the assassination, were you surprised that he came that night?

A. Yes.

Q. He had not phoned you in advance?

A. Not that I am aware.

Q. Could you describe his attitude that night? Was he calm? Was he nervous?

A. He was quite calm and he tried to give me indications that he wanted to make up over the argument that we have. I was also surprised that he come earlier than I expected him.

Q. Earlier?

A. Earlier.

Q. Had he called you to let you know a day earlier?

A. Yes.

Q. About what time did he come?

A. Just after work.

Q. How did he get there?

A. With this neighbor.

Q. Did he discuss President Kennedy that evening, his visit to Dallas?

A. I tried to discuss it with him. I was very enthusiastic about it, over it, and I tried to get as much information from him as I could and he refused to talk about it.

Q. Was that unusual?

A. Judging right now, yes.

Q. Did he usually want to discuss President Kennedy?

A. Yes.

Q. What would his usual comments about President Kennedy be?

A. Well, my impression was that he liked him very well.

Q. Did he mention Governor Connally that night?

A. No.

Q. Where were you when you first heard that President Kennedy was assassinated?

A. I was at Ruth Paine's house and she is the one who told me.

Q. What were your thoughts at that time?

A. Like everybody else's thoughts. It was shocking news.

Q. When did you first think that it might have been Lee who was involved in the assassination?

A. When Ruth told me that the shots came from the school book depository it just looked like somebody cut the string of my heart. I don't know how you describe this kind of feeling; it was very uneasy.

Q. Why would you think at that time that Lee would do it if, as you say, he liked President Kennedy?

A. Well, I did not think that Lee would do it but, for instance, the thought crossed my mind. I don't know why the thought crossed my mind. Somebody but Lee was playing with the rifle and I can remember the incident with Walker.

Q. But General Walker was something——

A. I believe it is not him so I went into the garage to see if the rifle was there. I knew that he had the rifle.

Q. That is why you were worried?

A. Yes.

Q. When you say you knew he had the rifle, you mean you know he owned the rifle.

A. Yes.

Q. And did you go look if the rifle was there?

A. I cannot describe the feeling, it would just come and go.

Q. Did you look to see if the rifle was still in the house?

A. I do not recall that but I mean when the police came and asked me if my husband owned a rifle, I had to say yes and we went in the garage and the rifle was not there. The whole life passed in front of me and from then on it was a nightmare.

Q. Lee's attitude toward President Kennedy was certainly different than his attitude toward General Walker, am I correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you had any prior indication of any dislike for President Kennedy on his behalf?

A. No; that is what is so strange about the whole event.

Q. When is the first time after you had heard of the assassination that you spoke with Lee?

A. I believe it was in jail when he was arrested.

Q. And what did you discuss with him at that time?

A. I was afraid to discuss the matter so it was just a general husband-wife conversation, just around the routine life about the house. He asked about the children.

Q. Did he discuss any people who might help him out of his problems?

A. Not with me. He discussed that, him and his brother were talking over the legal procedures of the matter, so I do believe now that he might have asked his brother to get in touch with somebody.

Q. What was the first time that the police came to your house? That was on the Friday?

A. When did it all happen, Friday?

Q. Friday.

A. It was not Friday then.

What did you ask me?

Q. When was the first time the police came to Mrs. Paine's house?

A. Quite shortly after the assassination.

Q. Were those the Dallas police or the FBI, do you know?

A. Well, to tell you the truth, it was official people. They showed their badges but as I recall it was the FBI or police or maybe both.

Q. What did they do?

A. Well, they asked to search the house.

Q. Did they speak to you or to Mrs. Paine or both of you?

A. They spoke—I do not even remember. I don't think they had an interpreter so she is the one that had to act as an interpreter. They just told me that I have to follow them to the police station for they have some questions to ask me.

Q. Did they search the house at that time?

A. Yes; they looked around.

Q. How many police officers were there? Were there a lot, or a few, or what?

A. I don't even remember the number. Everything is so long ago.

Q. Did they stay a long time?

A. Well, one second seems like a year sometimes.

Q. I know this is difficult for you and I am just asking for the best of your recollection.

A. OK. What was the question again? How many people?

Q. How many and how long did they stay in the house?

A. Well, I don't think I can judge very nicely or correctly right now.

Q. Did they take anything with them at that time?

A. I do not know. They just told me to get ready and dressed. I mean I didn't have a chance to change my clothes. They told me to get the baby and follow them. I don't know if it was 15 minutes or 1 whole hour.

Q. Then you went down to the police station. What happened at the police station? Did you see Lee that day?

A. Yes; I did. I don't remember if I saw him that day or the next day.

Q. Did they ask you questions at the police station?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall how long they kept you at the police station?

A. It seemed like forever.

Q. Were you alone?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did you have an interpreter or did Mrs. Paine go with you?

A. Would you believe it? I don't recall the names of who was around me.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss with you when you were speaking with him in jail the shooting of Officer Tippett?

A. No.

Q. Was that mentioned at all?

A. No.

Q. Prior to Lee's being arrested did he ever discuss with you, are you familiar with the name William James Lowery?

A. No.

Q. Did they ever discuss with you after he was arrested that he had ever done undercover work? Did they say he was a person in Dallas who had been infiltrating the Communist Party?

A. Who discussed with me?

Q. Did Lee ever discuss that with you about informants within the Communist Party in Texas?

A. I don't recall that. Once in a while the Communist Party was mentioned in the conversation but I do not remember when exactly, what period of our lives it was.

Q. What would he say about it, do you remember?

A. Well, he said that, for example, the Communist Party here is not exactly illegal but they have a very difficult time to survive and the Communist Party in Russia is different than the Communist Party here and he was in favor of them.

Q. The Communist Party?

A. Yes.

Q. Here?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he ever discuss the Communist Party that you recall when you were in Dallas?

A. Pardon?

Q. Did he ever discuss the Communist Party during this time in Dallas?

A. Well, this could be in Dallas and in New Orleans but it was in America.

Q. Did he ever discuss informants generally, what his feelings were about informants?

A. No.

Q. Who did you stay with that Friday night after you were done at the police station? Did you go back to Ruth Paine's house?

A. I think so.

Q. Were you left alone or were you kept—

A. There were so many people going in and out of the house I don't know who was who.

Q. After Lee was shot do you recall how you first met James Martin?

A. He was an employee of this hotel where the Secret Service took me to stay for a while.

Q. How come you were taken to that hotel? Did you want to stay with Mrs. Paine?

A. I do not recall whose idea it was. After the assassination it seemed like everything went blurred and I do not know who was making decisions for me.

Q. Did you object to the Secret Service staying with you at that time?

A. No; they were very nice to me.

Q. You liked them?

A. Yes.

Q. And they are the ones who chose that hotel to go to?

A. I would not say that because I do not know whose idea it was. I did not choose where I go.

Excuse me. Can we have a break, please?

Mr. WOLF. Sure.

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., a recess was taken until 4:20 p.m.]

Mr. WOLF. We can continue at the present time and it is approximately 4:20.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Mrs. Porter, we were discussing the Secret Service agents who were keeping you in protective custody at that time.

A. I want to express my thanks to the American Government or whoever appointed them to me; they were very helpful and very wonderful people.

Q. The Secret Service people?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they stay with you at your request or do you know if somebody suggested that they stay with you?

A. I did not ask for them because I didn't know what the procedure is supposed to be. I think they were appointed by someone.

Q. And you had no objections to their staying with you?

A. No.

Q. And you stated that you met Mr. Martin at this hotel where the Secret Service people took you.

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Martin was an employee at that hotel?

A. Yes; I have been told he was, I did not know for a fact.

Q. Did Mr. Martin eventually come to be your business manager or representative in any way?

A. Yes.

Q. And in what matters was Mr. Martin going to represent you?

A. In what matters?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I had so many people around with advisers and whatever I forgot who suggested I was supposed to have a business manager so he volunteered.

Q. Did you know if he had any experience in that field?

A. No: I didn't know about that.

Q. Did Mr. Martin ever tell you that he knew Jack Ruby?

A. No: not that I remember.

Q. Did he ever discuss Jack Ruby with you?

A. Well, I did not speak English then so I don't know.

Q. Who would be your interpreter between yourself and Mr. Martin?

A. Well, one man from the FBI did speak Russian and was interpreter during the time the FBI was questioning me and then it was a man from the Secret Service, I think Mr. Gupatza.

Q. And he would always be present when you spoke to Mr. Martin?

A. No.

Q. You could not speak to Mr. Martin if there was no interpreter.

A. Somehow we communicated but how I really don't remember, how two people communicate who speak two different languages.

Q. Did you speak English to him?

A. By this time I was forced to pick up a few English words.

Q. So you knew some English?

A. I would not call this some English when, to give you an example, like you would say, "Give me an apple," you just maybe pointed to an apple or drew a picture or more or less sign language.

Q. Did you speak to him in English at all though that you recall?

A. I don't recall.

Q. After Mr. Martin you came to be represented by a Mr. McKenzie, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. How were you introduced to Mr. McKenzie?

A. I do believe that Lee's brother, Robert, heard of Mr. McKenzie, through whom I don't know, and was recommended by him and he took me into his office.

Q. I see. Robert.

A. Robert Oswald.

Q. Robert is the one that took you to Mr. McKenzie's office?

A. I think so.

Q. Was this after Mr. Martin no longer represented you?

A. Yes.

Q. And in your discussions with Mr. McKenzie did you ever speak English with him or did Robert Oswald do all the discussions with him?

A. Well, I guess I assume it was Robert who did the talking for me to my best interests.

Q. Did you ever discuss anything with Mr. McKenzie very much?

A. I don't really recall because I think at that time I had a Russian-speaking friend, she was Russian, Kathryn Ford.

Q. Would she accompany you?

A. I assume now that she was there, too.

Q. Do you remember?

A. No; I don't.

Q. If there was a meeting between Mr. McKenzie, Robert Oswald and yourself, you would not be able to participate in that, is that correct?

A. Robert, I recall that like I, would be in Mr. McKenzie's office and Kathryn Ford would be present there.

Q. Did Mr. McKenzie ever introduce you to any of his other partners?

A. Yes; he had an associate. I think his name was Baird—no, I am sorry. I don't recall. I knew he was a younger gentleman.

Q. Did he ever mention a Wheater White?

A. No.

Q. Is that name familiar to you?

A. No.

Q. Did Mr. McKenzie ever tell you that his law firm had done previous work for Jack Ruby?

A. No.

Q. Did Mr. McKenzie ever discuss with you Richard Nixon?

A. No.

Q. Did you discuss with Mr. McKenzie the time Lee was going to go out and shoot Richard Nixon?

A. Well, to tell you the truth, right now I don't remember how this information got into the Secret Service or I told him my own or somebody.

Q. Which information?

A. About the Nixon incident. I really do not recall right now how it got into the press or knowledgeable to you and everybody else.

Q. Well, you must have——

A. I do not remember who was the first one that I told that.

Q. But you told somebody.

A. Of course I did. Nobody cooked this up.

Q. Did a Mrs. Skotnicki?

A. Skotnicki?

Q. Yes; are you familiar with her?

A. I do assume that was Kathryn Ford's name before she was married to Mr. Ford. The name is familiar to me because her two children——

Q. Was her husband's name Stanley?

A. I never met her husband and if I did I forgot. She was not married to Mr. Skotnicki then.

Q. And she did interpreting for you?

A. Yes.

Q. And to your recollection she was not married at that time?

A. Who? Mrs. Skotnicki?

Q. Yes.

A. It is the same person. When I met her she was Kathryn Ford. Before that she was married to Mr. Skotnicki but I do not recall his first name.

Q. But you do not know when?

A. I did not know her when she was married to Mr. Skotnicki.

Q. Did you ever meet her husband?

A. Mr. Skotnicki?

Q. Yes.

A. I hope we are talking about the same Skotnicki.

Q. I think so. Did you ever meet him?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Well, you later——

A. Maybe after the assassination sometime.

Q. Is this the Mrs. Skotnicki, did you buy her house one time and move into it?

A. Yes.

Q. That is the one you live in?

A. I bought a paper from Mrs. Ford.

Q. So we are talking about the same person?

A. Yes.

Q. And you bought the house from Mrs. Ford?

A. Yes; which will be the same as previously Mrs. Skotnicki.

Q. Correct. Did you meet any of the neighbors who were in that area?

A. Did I meet?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, of course I did.

Q. Did you meet living across the street I believe a Mr. Johnny Grizzaffi?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. What can you tell us about Mr. Grizzaffi?

A. Well, not much. I don't know him that well but I was grateful, he gave me a whole can of salmon when I was expecting my son.

Q. What can you tell us about him? The way you said, "Oh, yes," you seem to have some recollection of him.

A. Well, I don't know his personal traits but, you know, being in their house and I can describe him physically. He was a family man and his business once upon a time was next door to my husband's business so I had occasion to——

Q. That is your present husband?

A. Yes; I had occasion to see him. He owned a liquor store.

Q. Did Mr. Grizzaffi ever discuss Jack Ruby with you?

A. Not that I remember.

Q. Did you ever meet any of Mr. Grizzaffi's friends?

A. No; I met his children and his wife. We were living across from each other.

Q. I am now going to ask you a series of names again to see if you know these people or if Lee knew these people when either of you were living in Dallas at either time.

The first name is Russell Matthews, also known as R. D. Matthews.

A. No.

Q. The next one is Irwin Weiner.

A. No.

Q. If you have heard of these names even subsequently, please tell us.

A. Oh, sure.

Q. Louis McWillie.

A. No.

Q. Joe Campisi or Sam Campisi.

A. No.

Q. Lawrence Meyers.

A. No.

Q. Lenny Patrick.

A. No.

Q. James Henry Dolan.

A. No.

Q. Barney Baker.

A. No.

Q. Harry Hall.

A. Hall?

Q. Hall, H-a-l-l.

A. I know Mrs. Hall, Leta Hall, but I don't know anybody by the name Mr. Hall.

Q. Alex Gruber.

A. I used to know a man named Alex living in Fort Worth but I do not recall his last name.

Q. What did he do?

A. I don't know what he did.

Q. How did you know him?

A. Well, when I was visiting a friend in Fort Worth he was visiting her house and——

Q. When you were with who in Fort Worth?

A. Leta Hall. I think she goes by Elena.

Q. Eleanor.

A. The first name is familiar but I don't recall his last name.

Q. A Ralph Paul.

A. No.

Q. A Jack Todd or a James Robert Todd.

A. No.

Q. A Paul Roland Jones.

A. No.

Q. A Robert Ray McKeown.

A. No.

Q. An Andrew Armstrong.

A. No.

Q. George Senator.

A. No.

Q. Had you ever heard the name Jack Ruby prior to the time that he shot Lee?

A. No.

Q. Did Lee frequent any nightclubs or bars in Dallas at any time?

A. I don't think so. Lee didn't drink so—well, I just assumed that he never did because when he left the house, for example, if he left the house and said, "I am going to the library." I cannot swear that he did not ever stop at a nightclub but knowing him as far as what kind of entertainment he would like it is just my personal opinion that he would not go and spend his time at a nightclub.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss the Dallas Police officers, what his attitude toward the Dallas Police was?

A. No.

Q. He would discuss with you the FBI, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. But he never discussed the local Dallas Police?

A. No; one way or the other.

Q. One way or the other?

A. No.

Q. Did he have any friends as policemen that you knew of?

A. No.

Q. You have spoken of George de Mohrenschildt before.

A. Yes.

Q. And you considered him one of your best friends in Dallas.

A. Yes.

Q. Did he ever discuss with you work he may have done for either U.S. or foreign intelligence services?

A. Never.

Q. What did Mr. de Mohrenschildt do for a living?

A. He was a geologist by profession and I think he was working for some kind of an oil company then.

Q. Did he ever discuss with Lee going to work for an intelligence service?

A. I would not know that. I never overheard him say that.

Q. Did he ever discuss with you intelligence activities in Russia or ask you about them as general conversation?

A. When I knew George I did not know that he was born in Russia or lived there at the time. I thought he was of Russian descent.

Q. But he knew you came from Russia.

A. Yes.

Q. Did he just ever ask any general questions of you about intelligence activities inside Russia?

A. No.

Q. What did George de Mohrenschildt talk about with Lee when they were discussing President Kennedy? Do you know what his attitude toward President Kennedy was?

A. Not really, but it was not hostile.

Q. I am sorry.

A. It was not hostile.

Q. Were you surprised to hear Mr. de Mohrenschildt had committed suicide?

A. Yes; shocked likely. Well, I did not see George de Mohrenschildt for the past many years.

Q. What was the time before his suicide that you either talked to him or saw him?

A. Well, it was many years before that and I stumbled over him and Jeanne one day at some kind of—it was a Russian movie showing somewhere and the Russians attended.

Q. Was this in Dallas or Fort Worth?

A. No; I am sorry. That was not the last time. I do believe it was the Russian Easter and Natasha Grizzaffi was giving the party and I saw Jeanne and George then. We didn't speak for a long time but—

Q. Have you heard anything about Mr. de Mohrenschildt's suicide aside from what you have read in the papers?

A. No.

Q. Have you spoken to Jeanne since the suicide?

A. No. It is hard for me to comprehend the character of a very life-loving person to commit suicide and I didn't see the change of his moods or personality, so it was hard to swallow. In my mind he was a person that was not capable of doing that.

Q. You have stated Lee's attitude toward the FBI was one of hostility: is that correct?

A. Well, he always blamed them for losing the job.

Q. Which job was that?

A. Any job that he lost he thought that was because they were just, like he said, snooping around and maybe the boss did not like the idea that he was in the Soviet Union.

Q. Would Lee ever provide information to the FBI?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. You stated on one occasion you saw Lee discuss with Mr. Hosty outside the house for at least one-half an hour information, have a discussion that lasted at least one-half hour. What could have been discussed for that length of time if Lee was not giving information to Mr. Hosty?

A. Well, I would not know what kind of question he might ask a person who might be under suspicion.

Q. But to your knowledge—

A. He never discussed in detail just exactly what they talked about.

Q. To your knowledge Lee never volunteered information to the FBI?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. When did you first meet Priscilla Johnson MacMillan?

A. I think in 1964.

Q. And what were the circumstances of that meeting?

A. Well, he had lots of approaches from different writers or publishing companies to write the book about and I did not want to or did I have the rights to do anything like that and I was approached by Priscilla MacMillan, and then she was Johnson, or by Harper & Rowe and by telegrams or maybe it was a written request and I refused. Then one day she arrived in Dallas and was on my doorstep. I liked the person very much and never changed my opinion of her since then.

Q. How shortly after you refused that offer did she arrive in Dallas?

A. I do not recall how many weeks or months. I did not agree right away.

Q. Were you turning down all the offers from all the other publishers during that time?

A. It is not because of the money matter; it was just that I didn't think—well, it was such a shameful position I was in I didn't feel that I have any right to even discuss the things for me.

Q. What did you like about Priscilla Johnson that led you to decide to work with her?

A. I like her physical appearance. I like the way she spoke Russian beautifully. She told me that she was living in Russia for a few years, I assume. She was a very pleasant person and her intelligence I was very much impressed with.

Q. Did she ever discuss with you any work she may have done for the CIA?

A. No. I would never have believed that she did.

Q. She never discussed with you any such work?

A. No.

Q. Did she ever discuss the CIA with you?

A. No. We discussed so many things during the book.

Q. Did she ever ask you whether or not Lee had worked for the CIA?

A. She might have asked during the interviews. She asked so many questions that she has to know the answer to.

Q. How soon after you met Mrs. Johnson, Mrs. MacMillan now, did you decide to allow her and Harper & Rowe to be the publisher?

A. Well, I do not remember how many days or 1 week formality would take but I think she would have been more than qualified to do a good job.

Q. You were with Mrs. MacMillan in 1964 when you discovered some bus tickets that Lee had allegedly used to go back and forth to Mexico.

A. I do not remember that at all.

Q. You do not remember that?

A. No. It is not that I don't want to discuss it but it would be more confusing for you and for me and for everybody if I start to speculate because I don't recall how I found the tickets, period.

Q. You know that those have been found; you just don't remember how they have been found?

A. If Mrs. MacMillan stated under oath that I am the one that showed her the tickets, that is enough for me. I take her word for it, but to remember that I have no recollection.

Q. You are aware that those have been found?

A. I forgot about them until you mentioned them right now.

Q. When was the last time you talked to Mrs. MacMillan?

A. Last night.

Q. Last night?

A. Yes.

Q. Is she a close friend of yours?

A. Yes.

Q. Concerning again the trip to Mexico, is it possible that Lee went with somebody else to Mexico and back?

A. I don't see why not.

Q. Did Lee ever discuss going to Mexico with anybody?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever discuss a minister or a preacher?

A. No.

Q. Do you think Lee would have ever worked for a U.S. intelligence agency?

A. Well, knowing Lee as little as I know of him and the unpredictable steps that he would take in his life, I cannot say anything that he might do, but as a person that I knew and then when I was working with Priscilla there was so little I knew of him, I think as secretive as he was I would be surprised if he would take orders or be confining somebody. I doubt it. I don't know.

Q. Concerning the leaflets he distributed in New Orleans, who paid for those leaflets to be made?

A. I would not know. I have no idea. I thought that somebody just gave them to him to distribute around.

Q. Did he ask you to put your name on any of the leaflets?

A. Well, he asked me to put my name on something but I didn't think it was those leaflets.

Q. Did you read those pamphlets when you first found them?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Do you remember if Lee used his own name on those pamphlets?

A. I do not recall if the pamphlets had been signed or just distributed around.

Q. What name did they have on the pamphlets? Did Lee have his name on the pamphlets?

A. I do not recall that the pamphlets have any name on them. I remember that Lee used to sign his name different than his real name on some things but which things they were I do not recall right now.

Q. In your conversation with Mrs. MacMillan last night did you discuss the bus tickets at all?

A. No. I forgot about them until you mentioned them a few minutes ago.

Q. And you don't remember whether they were found at this time?

A. No.

Q. Or who found them?

A. Me and Mrs. MacMillan did not discuss about what questions the committee might ask, what to say, what not to say. The conversation was very personal.

Q. We are talking about the bus tickets. Do you remember where they were found or who found them or anything concerning their discovery?

A. No.

Mr. WOLF. Mrs. Porter, Gary Cornwell is now going to ask you a few followup questions.

By Mr. CORNWELL:

Q. In your conversations last night with Priscilla, did you discuss anything about the committee's work?

A. Well, just told her that I am very scared. She said how did I like my lawyer and I said very well. She said, "Would you describe him?"

Mr. HAMILTON. I am not sure I want this in the record.

The WITNESS. Well, she just tried to cheer me up, you know.

By Mr. CORNWELL:

Q. Did you discuss anything about other witnesses who may have appeared before the committee?

A. No.

Q. Nothing about the subject matter of our inquiry?

A. Priscilla never told me what she was asked here and I do not want to know. I do not jeopardize her reputation by even asking questions even though how curious I would be.

Q. You did find out that she had been asked questions?

A. I knew she testified, she had been called before the committee, yes.

Q. Nothing about what she had been asked or what she said?

A. No.

Q. As I understood your testimony a moment ago, you first met Priscilla back around 1964.

A. I think so.

Q. And it was roughly in that time period that you also agreed—

A. 1964 and 1965. I don't remember exactly what month we met but we worked for many months together and we have been in contact ever since.

Q. That is also roughly the time period in which you agreed that you and she would work together on a book: is that correct?

A. Excuse me. I did not understand your question.

Q. Is that also the time period—

A. Are you talking about 13 years or a few months?

Q. No; I am talking about in 1964.

A. Yes.

Q. That is when you agreed that you and she would work together on a book?

A. That is correct.

Q. Was there any formal agreement?

A. Yes; there was.

Q. Or contract?

A. There was a contract between Harper & Rowe and me and Priscilla.

Q. The financial terms, in other words, whatever they were, were they all ironed out at that time period?

A. Yes.

Q. I am not interested in how much money you may have made from the book but I would like to know what, if any, control you had over the final form that the book might take as to the accuracy of it?

A. Well, I confided in Priscilla—are you talking about the financial matters?

Q. No, ma'am, just the accuracy of the book. Did you have any control over that?

A. Well, I trust Priscilla well enough or I would not start the job. The book was not designed to make something entertainment or just to make money. It was a therapeutic thing for me as well as I tried to explain to me or to people somehow—not just me: I just contribute very little to the book. It was up to Priscilla to fish out all the facts and everything and put them together some way.

Q. So the agreement—

A. I gave her the right to use her own judgment because it was her book.

Q. That was basically the question.

A. OK.

Mr. HAMILTON. Could I ask a followup question?

Mr. CORNWELL. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did you read the manuscript before it was published?

The WITNESS. I had offered to read the manuscript.

Mr. HAMILTON. But you did not read it beforehand?

The WITNESS. No.

By Mr. CORNWELL:

Q. And following that then, after you saw the book in its final form, did you read it in its entirety?

A. Yes; I did.

Q. With respect to the matters in the book that you have personal knowledge about, and I take it there are some things in there you simply have no personal knowledge about, but with respect to the things that you do, did you find inaccuracies in the book or things that did not comport with your memory?

A. Well, as far as the facts that came from me or—

Q. Yes, ma'am.

A. That is true but some conclusion that she has to come to on her own, maybe even analyzing my character, that was up to her to decide but the facts were not twisted.

Q. OK. So the facts then that you have knowledge of as portrayed in the book are accurate to the best of your memory?

A. Only the facts that concern my and Lee's life. I am not responsible for other characters, I don't know how true that is.

Q. I understand. At least the facts that concern you and Lee and that you had personal knowledge of after reading the book seemed accurate?

A. Yes.

Q. And it would only be the conclusions or the inferences drawn from that that might be Priscilla's and might differ from yours, is that correct?

A. Yes; that is true.

Q. Then with respect to those conclusions and inferences, what about the book might you disagree with?

A. Well——

Q. Let me explain the reason why I ask the question.

A. It was long ago since I read the book and I am not going to read it again.

Q. The committee has a number of objectives, everything from evaluating the performance of our own intelligence agencies to trying to understand for sure what happened in Dealey Plaza on November 22 and of course trying to understand Lee and his personality and his thought processes to the extent we can because the American public has a great interest in that. The last thing is really what I was wanting to know.

What about Lee and his personality or his possible motivations, things that you might peculiarly have an ability to render an opinion on? Would you differ from that book on that?

A. Well, since the person is dead and I was not a mature person or a qualified psychiatrist to analyze his motives for doing so and so, it was a tedious job for the Warren Commission. All the reporters and lots of curious people working on it, you are doing a very hard job trying to put puzzles together. Priscilla did her best and an honest job of trying to put things in some kind of perspective that a normal person could understand and I guess anybody can do just that.

Q. Sure. The point is not whether—we are not trying to find fault with the book, all we are trying to do——

A. I am not defending the book.

Q. If you have a different view on those subjects because you were one of the closest people to Lee, that is what we would like to know.

A. Well, I would buy Priscilla's conclusions. From my own personal experience I did not come up with anything different. Priscilla did not have the attitude to condemn or pronounce guilty from the first page, she was just working through the dark as well as I was and everybody else, so I would still, in my mind agree with that conclusion more than the conspiracy theory because I do not know anything about the other matters. I do not know anything about ballistics, you know, to disprove that Lee didn't do it. I would like that very much but I know so little. Do you understand me?

Q. Yes.

A. Make a perfect picture.

Q. I think so. As I understand what you are stating it is that the conclusions that were drawn in the book, even though Priscilla drew them on her own, you agree with them.

A. Well, she didn't just dream them up.

Q. I understand, but it was her right to draw the conclusions.

A. Yes.

Q. And she of course wrote the book.

A. I did not give her the right but I respect her for doing a good job, too, and she was very honest. Some things were not very meaningful.

Q. Your opinions on the subjects are the same as hers?

A. Yes.

Q. As set forth in the book?

A. No; not my opinions because she made some opinions from a psychology point of view. I don't know enough about that to make an opinion.

Q. Is there any aspect of the book which you have a different opinion on?

A. Like, for example, Priscilla was in a position to analyze. Maybe somebody will criticize her for being an immature psychiatrist but she tried to draw some kind of picture to compare me being without parents and him being without a father that might motivate us to be married to each other, but those traits of character it is not up to me to say she is right or wrong. I cannot assume that is correct.

Q. The reason I am asking the question again is we are trying to get an insight.

A. The facts were not twisted to meet somebody's theory.

Q. There are various ways to get an opinion about what Lee was all about and what happened, and one of them is the way Priscilla went about it which was to gather facts from a number of different areas and try to draw inferences from them. What I want to know is from your perspective do you agree or disagree with her?

A. Yes; I agree with her because she didn't just take my word for it or my opinion on the matter, she compared them with somebody's statements which were completely unknown to me and somehow the puzzle fit.

Q. You were asked this question a moment ago but let me ask you to focus on it one more time. Lee's mother expressed the opinion that Lee may have had intelligence ties, U.S. intelligence ties, of some sort. Can you recall any specific conversations with Lee which shed light on the possibility one way or the other that he may have had such ties?

A. I do not know any of those facts at all.

Q. Did he ever express either sympathy for or antipathy to any U.S. intelligence agency apart from the FBI that you have already described?

A. Well, Mrs. Marguerita Oswald is entitled to her opinion as I am entitled to mine and I would love for Lee to be innocent more than anybody else, do you understand, but I do not know enough to make the opposite statement from what I am giving here right now.

Q. Did he ever express to you any desire to work for any Government agency?

A. No.

Q. Incidentally, why did the book take so long to get into print from 1964 or 1965?

A. Well, it is not an easy book to write about, especially when you try to be so accurate and not just to bluff around because it was lots of research.

Q. There was no factor that caused that delay other than the process of trying to assimilate the facts?

A. I hate to repeat myself but it is a hard message to deliver.

Q. Is that the only reason?

A. Yes; you don't try just because you have to write so many pages a day, you have to work hard. Priscilla had personal tragedies in her life which put her in the mood to write. It was just a long process of working at it.

Q. Is that fact that—

A. Excuse me for the interruption but when Mrs. MacMillan approached me she was not concerned about money, or I don't know but she told me she just wants to do a very honest job to try to explain the things why Lee did it for the American people. Do you understand? While I did not phrase myself very clearly, she thought, well, I was refusing to do the book but she said at least that much I owe to people to show a little bit of the inside of the person that is already there. Just as if I owe this much to history, I guess.

Q. Is it anything more than a mere coincidence that the book has come out during the time period that our committee has been working on it?

A. Well, it is just coincidence.

Q. Did you and Mrs.—

A. I think it is completely absurd how people can put two and two together.

Q. Did you and Priscilla ever discuss the timing of the publication of the book?

A. Well, I hope this thing—she said, "Well, I still have some more work to do." and then she said finally "either do it or—." She did have a deadline but somehow I did not want—you don't push artists to go and paint a picture in a hurry. I was in a position to push her but I didn't want to because I wanted a qualitative job.

Q. At the time that the book was finally sent to press did you and she discuss the fact that this would be a good time to publish it?

A. No.

Q. Any discussion along those lines?

A. No: exactly the opposite. It was a bad time to publish 7 years later and she was very apologetic about it took her so long.

Q. You told us earlier a few moments ago that you presently have no memory of finding the materials, I believe it was in September 1964, which you cleared, among other things, the tickets to Mexico City.

A. Yes.

Q. When did it first come to your attention that Priscilla said she was there when the tickets were found?

A. When this come to my attention?

Q. Yes; when did that subject matter first come to your attention?

A. The only time I think about it is when you were asking or somebody asked this question. I didn't understand your question, I guess.

Q. I believe there was a reference to it in her book.

A. There could be but I did not come here prepared to deal with that book and see what I am going to tell you.

Q. Is that the first occasion perhaps on which you had focused on the fact that she said she was there when you saw it in the book?

A. If Priscilla said that—I mean I do not recall right now but she kept the records, whatever I told her before in our interviews and work and things like that, so I am sure she has approval of it. The thing is why should she put something in a book that I would not tell her. Who would tell her?

Q. The question was when did it first come to your attention? When did you first note that she apparently was there?

A. I still don't understand. Who was there, Priscilla?

Q. Yes.

A. Where was she?

Q. When the materials were found.

A. Well, right now I don't recall by whom and how they were found and I never thought about the tickets until just a few minutes ago you asked me this question, so I cannot recall the time I found the tickets right now at the present moment.

Q. Did you see it in her book?

A. I read the whole book but I do not remember the details right now.

Q. Did you discuss it with her upon seeing it in the book?

A. No; you mean yesterday or——

Q. At any time after you saw it in the book.

A. We discussed many episodes from the book, you know, but I cannot recall which ones.

Q. So you don't recall ever discussing that part of the book with her on any occasion?

A. I would not swear to it that we did not discuss it. This would be one of the parts of the book that we did but I cannot remember right now.

Q. You told us earlier that on occasion when Lee would do something which caused an expenditure of family funds there would be an argument over that.

A. Yes.

Q. I believe at least at one point you described that sort of situation in connection with his purchase of the guns.

A. Yes.

Q. I understand that the family budget was sort of marginal throughout at least 1963 at the time period we have asked you most of the questions about.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall any discussion along those lines about the impact on the family budget in connection with his distribution of the pamphlets in New Orleans?

A. You asked me a few minutes ago who paid for those pamphlets. It never occurred to me that they had been bought by Lee.

Q. That is the reason I asked the question.

A. I would not know that. I never questioned that because I assume somebody just gave him that to distribute.

Q. The thought was maybe I could jog your memory and there had been some discussion that now you spent your money on another foolish thing and he gave you a reply perhaps about who did pay for the pamphlets.

A. No.

Q. Did he ever offer an explanation to you that someone else had bought any of the firearms, it is not going to hurt the budget because somebody else bought them?

A. I just freshly came from Russia and a lot of things over there we don't pay for indirectly. I really never questioned that because—

Q. At least he never made a statement to you to that effect?

A. No; or I never asked him about it.

Q. The committee has received some evidence that prior to going to Russia, Lee had spent some time trying to learn the Russian language, and that maybe he was not proficient at it, but at least at the point in time at which he arrived there he had some acquaintance with it, enough to get along. Was that a trait of his which you observed on other occasions that when he got ready to do something he felt was important he spent a period of time preparing for it?

A. I would say yes.

Q. Do you recall him specifically making any special preparations for the Mexico trip?

A. I don't recall them right now.

Going back to say that Lee was always preparing for something, he not always prepared himself, but he was quite calculating in that respect, and sometimes quite clever. He would masquerade somehow, or apparently did not know that much of what was going on inside of his head.

Q. Do you remember him doing anything specific to prepare for the Mexico trip?

A. No; I don't.

Q. As one example, do you recall him specifically acquiring any books on Spanish in order to be prepared to speak Spanish when he got to Mexico?

A. I would not have remembered that but it would have been possible. We have to speak. Maybe he would have bought a dictionary but I don't recall right now. It would not surprise me.

Mr. CORNWELL. That is all.

By Mr. McDONALD:

Q. In 1962, in December, you are living in Dallas, Tex. Christmas, whether Lee took any trips away from Dallas?

A. OK.

Q. Do you recall during that time period in December, before

A. Well, December. In December. Christmas. No, I don't. I don't think he left.

Q. Do you recall whether he was away from home for any period of time overnight?

A. No.

Q. Where were you living at that time?

A. I assume in Oak Cliff.

Q. Specifically do you know whether Lee ever traveled to Florida?

A. Not that I know of, no.

How would he travel to Florida? By bus, I guess. No.

Q. Do you recall him ever saying he had been to Florida?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall during this period of time whether he discussed his interest in Cuba?

A. No; that was not the period that we were interested in Cuba.

Q. When did he become interested in Cuba?

A. I think in New Orleans.

Q. Do you know during this period, we will say late 1962, whether he—well, your testimony was that he had no interest in Cuba at that point.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you recall at all whether he traveled to Florida?

A. If my memory serves me right, I never heard him mention Florida or know anything about him going to Florida.

Q. Did he ever talk about anti-Castro military operations?

A. Not during this period. If you are interested in this period of time, no, but the New Orleans period it could be.

Q. Do you recall Lee ever telling you that he had been arrested during that period of time?

A. During December?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. It is your best recollection that you can't recall him being away for an extended period of time?

A. No.

Q. Would you remember that if he had been?

A. Well, let's figure out. How long does it take to get from Dallas to Florida, I assume by the bus?

Q. By bus at least probably 2 days.

A. One way?

Q. Yes.

A. And 2 days back. That is 4 days. I don't remember Lee being gone for 4 days or 2 days or 1 day.

Mr. McDONALD. All right. Thank you. I have no further questions.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Mrs. Porter, do you have any notes, letters, that you have kept that you still have from Lee? You said you have not kept a diary.

A. I never kept a diary.

Q. Do you have any other notes or letters or any other types of materials that would be—

A. Let's make this clear. You said I kept a diary.

Q. No; I said you never kept a diary.

A. No.

Q. Do you have any other notes or material?

A. No; everything was confiscated. By any miracle if something was left, I don't know about that.

Q. Mrs. Porter, would you be willing to make your tax returns, yours and Lee's tax returns for the years 1962 and 1963 available to the committee?

A. Would I be able to?

Q. Would you be willing to do that?

A. I can't, I was unemployed. How can I? I didn't work.

Q. But Lee at that time was employed.

A. Yes.

Q. And I assume he did file tax returns that the Warren Commission obtained. Would you be willing to make those tax returns available to the committee?

A. I don't think I have them.

Mr. HAMILTON. I think before she answers that I would like to confer with her on that.

Mr. WOLF. Surely. Why don't I ask one other question first and then you can confer on a different subject.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. This is a very general question. Has any information been released since 1964, for example, in the Warren Commission which operated that has changed your mind or your attitude about whether or not Lee may have been involved in a conspiracy and, for example, 2 or 3 years ago when the Senate released information that our Government had been trying to assassinate Fidel Castro? A lot of people thought that kind of information was very significant. Has any information come out since 1964 that has changed your opinion whether or not he was involved in that conspiracy?

A. Well, I do not read that much about the assassination but I am curious like everybody else and I would like to find something that proved that Lee was innocent for my personal reasons. So I do read some things but they don't lead to anything, sometimes they even sound absurd to me. You know, there are just so many theories that simply—

Q. Is it still your personal opinion that he did not have associates or was not involved in a conspiracy?

A. That was my opinion.

Mr. WOLF. Thank you.

Why don't we go off the record for a few minutes.

Mr. HAMILTON. I want to answer the question about the tax returns on the record.

Mr. WOLF. Yes; you may confer.

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., a recess was taken until 5:35 p.m.]

Mr. WOLF. We can go back on the record now and it is approximately 5:35.

I believe Mr. Hamilton would like to respond to a question we previously asked Mrs. Porter.

Mr. HAMILTON. I will let Mrs. Porter respond. Why don't you repeat the question you had about the income tax return?

Mr. WOLF. Sure.

By Mr. WOLF:

Q. Mrs. Porter, would you be willing to sign a release to give the committee access to Lee's tax returns for the years 1962 and 1963?

A. That is a better question. Yes; I have no objection whatsoever. The way you phrased your question first, I didn't understand what you wanted me to do.

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mrs. Porter.

Mrs. Porter, at this time we have concluded those questions we have to ask you at the current time. We realize obviously after taking time to examine all your prior statements that you previously gave, that first of all you have testified to many bodies—the Warren Commission, the

Garrison trial—and have given interviews to many organizations—the FBI, the Secret Service and other people. As I am sure you are aware, various people have analyzed some of your statements and there are inconsistencies in some of the statements over time, and they are inconsistent, for example, on when you first saw the gun, or did he use aliases, or when you first knew of Lee's trip to Mexico, and did Lee practice shooting with the rifle as well as many other subjects that have been publicly documented.

I would ask you at the current time if you would like to make any general statement that you wish about these inconsistencies as either, by way of explanation or any other type of statement you would like to make concerning these subjects or any other subjects?

At a future point in time it probably will be necessary to examine you in detail on each of these prior statements.

The WITNESS. Well, the testimony I was giving to different people, organizations, was given at different times so as my memory may have collapsed at one time or maybe something came back, maybe the testimony will vary. At the beginning, if it is possible to understand for people, I am just a human being and I did try to protect Lee—that was my natural instinct that I followed. Some things I did not want to talk about because I tried to protect Lee. So they can hold this against me, there is nothing I can do about it.

I had to protect myself, too. I didn't have any home to turn back to. I was not eligible or qualified to live right here so I really was trying to save my skin, to put it bluntly, but it was not for the reasons that I was protecting somebody, that I was part of any crime, that is not so. That was just a very human mistake that you make but it was not—maybe legally you call this perjury, I don't know. But it was not because I was afraid that I might betray some secrets that I knew in order to be punished for.

I don't know how to put this generally but I swear that I never worked for any government of any country. I was not aware of the crime that he was planning and I am sorry that all this happened like the rest of us suffer. So I don't think I can add any more.

Mr. WOLF. All right.

Mrs. Porter, that concludes the questions we will have to ask you today. It will be our responsibility to go back to our committee members and Congressmen who are not here today and discuss with them whether or not they would like to pursue questioning you at a future date.

The WITNESS. You mean tomorrow?

Mr. WOLF. No; it will not be tomorrow.

The WITNESS. I would like to make a request that I would prefer not to testify publicly.

Mr. WOLF. We will inform the committee of that request.

The WITNESS. I still feel leery about the reporters, the crowd that is present. I cannot really concentrate on my answers that well.

Mr. WOLF. We understand that, Mrs. Porter. You are in the unique position, of course, of having known Lee better than anybody else currently alive.

The WITNESS. Well, if you have to repeat the same questions, maybe somebody else can make a statement about my answers. I would prefer that.

Mr. WOLF. Sure.

The WITNESS. Unless you have new questions to ask.

Mr. WOLF. We will inform our Congressmen of your position and I would think be able to tell you in the very near future, probably within 2 weeks, what the results of that committee decision will be. If you don't testify publicly, it may be that one of the attorneys again on the staff would either come to Dallas or you could come back here to have a session like this and it would be a much briefer session than today's was.

The WITNESS. Well, maybe legally you do have a right not to trust me. After all, I came from a Communist country. You don't know me from Adam. My testimony does not seem to be very consistent. Is that the words?

Mr. WOLF. Yes.

The WITNESS. Of course you have a right to doubt me but it is a very uncomfortable position to be in that somebody would try to trust you and try to pin the tail on the donkey—please scratch that.

Mr. WOLF. We understand, Mrs. Porter. Your testimony though today was to the best of your ability to testify to these events as of today.

The WITNESS. Yes; and every time I testify I try my best to help any committee that tries to get this matter cleared up.

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mrs. Porter.

Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. I would like to thank you on the record for your courtesies to Mrs. Porter and to me.

The WITNESS. Thank you for your kindness to me, and I hope nobody holds this against you.

Mr. WOLF. You are quite welcome. Thank you.

Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you very much for taking your time to come here and answer our questions.

The WITNESS. I wish it was a more pleasurable circumstance to be on the record.

Mr. WOLF. I would like to thank Mr. Hamilton who has done this voluntarily through the District of Columbia Bar Association.

[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the deposition was concluded.]

THE DEFECTOR STUDY

Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session

March 1979

CONTENTS

	Paragraph
I. Foreword	1-13
II. Morris and Mollie Block	14-24
III. Harold Citrynell	25-29
IV. Bruce Frederick Davis	30-34
V. Shirley Dubinsky	35-38
VI. Joseph Dutkanicz	39-49
VII. Martin Greendlinger	50-55
VIII. Nicholas Petrulli	56-64
IX. Libero Ricciardelli	65-76
X. Vladimir Sloboda	77-85
XI. Robert Webster	86-103
XII. Lee Harvey Oswald	104-149
XIII. Soviet citizenship	150-158
XIV. Propaganda use and financial arrangements	159-163
XV. Residence, employment and financial arrangements	164-168
XVI. Soviet relationships and exit visas	169-174
XVII. KGB contact	175-188
Addendum : American Debriefing Practices	189-199

I. FOREWORD

A. BACKGROUND

(1) From a comparative analysis of 11 defectors who were similar to Lee Harvey Oswald, the committee sought to determine what, if anything, was unusual about Oswald's defection.

(2) To determine which individuals the committee would study, a letter was sent to the CIA requesting the names of persons who defected to the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1964. In response, the CIA provided a list of the names and variations of the names of 380 Americans who were in the U.S.S.R. during that time period.

(3) The CIA was subsequently requested to provide more information on the 380 defectors to enable the committee to select, for a detailed analysis, those most similar to Oswald. The CIA provided a computer listing of the name, 201 file number,* date and place of birth, and a compilation of information derived from the 201 file, as well as citations for various other Government agency reports.

(4) From this second list of defectors, the committee eliminated those that appeared to have (a) been born outside the United States; (b) gone to the U.S.S.R. sometime other than the 1958-62 time period; and (c) remained outside the United States until 1964. The committee decided to examine the files on the remaining 23 individuals, listed below:

Name	Date of birth	Place of birth
Amron, Irving	Nov. 6, 1912	United States.
Block, Mollie	Mar. 30, 1920	New York, N.Y.
Block, Morris	Mar. 10, 1923	Do.
Citrynell, Harold	May 4, 1936	Do.
Davis, Bruce Frederick	Mar. 11, 1925	Rome, N.Y.
Dubinsky, Shirley	Aug. 22, 1922	New York, N.Y.
Frank, Richard Cyril	Nov. 18, 1913	Rochester, N.Y.
Frank, Susan Heligman	Mar. 14, 1928	New York, N.Y.
Gold, Robert	Mar. 25, 1932	Massachusetts.
Greendlinger, Martin	Mar. 3, 1906	New York, N.Y.
Halperin, Maurice H.	Mar. 17, 1934	Boston, Mass.
Jones, Louis Henry	Sept. 25, 1894	Arlington Heights, Ohio.
Lawson, John Howard	May 27, 1931	New York, N.Y.
Martin, William H.	June 15, 1911	Columbus, Ga.
Martinkus, Anthony V.	June 30, 1937	Chicago, Ill.
Meyer, Karl Henry	Mar. 11, 1931	Mountain, Wis.
Mitchell, Bernon F.	Feb. 21, 1926	San Francisco, Calif.
Parker, James Dudley	Feb. 13, 1921	Oakland, Calif.
Petrulli, Nicholas	Sept. 17, 1906	Brooklyn, N.Y.
Pittman, John Orion	June 18, 1917	Atlanta, Ga.
Ricciardelli, Libero	Oct. 23, 1928	Needham, Mass.
Webster, Robert Edward	Apr. 2, 1911	Tiffin, Ohio.
Winston, Henry		Hattiesburg, Miss.

(5) The committee then examined the October 25, 1960, request from the State Department to the CIA for information on 13 individuals they considered defectors. That list included the following:

*A 201 file contains general information concerning a person, as opposed to other files that may concern projects and so forth.

(a) Lee Harvey Oswald.

(b) Seven individuals whose files the committee had decided to examine under the previous criteria: Block, Mollie; Block, Morris; Davis, Bruce Frederick; Martin, William H.; Mitchell, Bernon F.; Ricciardelli, Libero; Webster, Robert Edward.

(c) Two individuals whose names appeared on the computer listing but had been excluded because they were not born within the United States: Dutkanicz, Joseph—Date of birth: June 9, 1926, place of birth: Corlice, Poland; Sloboda, Vladimir—Date of birth: January 7, 1927, place of birth: Redkomien, U.S.S.R.

(d) Three individuals who had not previously been known to the committee as defectors: DuBois, David—Date of birth: March 9, 1925; David Graham McConns—place of birth: Seattle, Wash.; Jones, Sergeant (FNU); Fletcher, Sgt. Ernie.

(6) The CIA response to this State Department request is dated November 21, 1960. It included available information on the above defectors and stated:

In addition to those appearing on your list, there is included information on Virginia Frank Coe and Maurice Hyman Halperin. While these individuals have not renounced their American citizenship or declared themselves in any way, both are employed by the bloc countries in which they now reside.

(7) The committee had selected Halperin from the computer listing as a defector who fit the previously stated criteria, but had no knowledge of Coe.

(8) In a February 27, 1978, letter from the committee to the CIA, access to all existing 201 files were requested for the following 29 individuals:

(a) The 23 individuals from the computer listing;

(b) Dutkanicz, Sloboda, DuBois, Jones, and Fletcher (because their names appeared on the defector list with Oswald's name); and

(c) Coe (because the CIA added his name as a possible defector).

(9) Five of the individuals were immediately dropped from this defector analysis. The CIA could not identify Sergeant Jones without additional identifying data, none of which could be found. DuBois and Coe were eliminated because they defected to Communist China and did not offer any insight into Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union. The information on Martin and Mitchell was considered too sensitive in nature by the CIA to be provided to the committee.

(10) The committee also requested the FBI, the Department of Defense and the State Department to provide selected information on the 24-name defector sample.

(11) From the available information, the committee performed an analysis of treatment provided by the Soviets to individuals during the approximate period Oswald was there. The committee used the following criteria for its detailed examination:

Background

Date of defection

- Defected with whom
 - Rejection of American citizenship
 - Length of time for Soviets to grant residence
 - Type of residence permit granted
 - Circumstances after defection and prior to resettlement
 - Propaganda statements made to Soviet press
 - Relationships with Soviet citizens
 - Place of residence in Soviet Union
 - Military training prior to defection
 - Employment in Soviet Union
 - Income provided
 - Financial aid provided
 - Contact with Soviet officials, especially KGB personnel
 - Known surveillance
 - Time period for Soviets to grant exit visa
 - Time period for United States to grant entrance visa
 - Time period for spouse or children to obtain exit visa
 - Time period for spouse or children to obtain entrance visa
- (12) During this analysis, 13 individuals were eliminated for the following reasons:
- (a) Lack of substantive information: Fletcher, Ernie; Gold, Robert; Jones, Louis; Lawson, John; Meyer, Karl; Parker, James.
 - (b) Communist Party members who made frequent trips to the Soviet Union, were on official party business in the Soviet Union, or had resided outside the United States for an extended period before entering the Soviet Union, making a comparison to Oswald's situation difficult: Frank, Richard; Frank, Susan; Halperin, Maurice; Pittman, John; Winston, Henry.
 - (c) Residents in the Soviet Union for over 20 years, making a comparison to Oswald's situation difficult: Amron, Irving; Martinkus, Anthony.
- (13) The defector sample eventually compared to Lee Harvey Oswald was reduced to 11 individuals, 2 of whom were married: Block, Mollie; Block, Morris; Citrynell, Harold; Davis, Bruce; Dubinsky, Shirley; Dutkanicz, Joseph; Greendlinger, Martin; Petrulli, Nicholas; Ricciardelli, Libero; Sloboda, Vladimir; Webster, Robert.

II. MORRIS AND MOLLIE BLOCK

- (14) Morris Block attended the Sixth World Youth Festival in the Soviet Union during 1957. (1) Immediately after the conference he traveled to Communist China, prompting the State Department to impound his passport for misuse. (2) In 1958, he made an unsuccessful attempt to reach the Soviet Union with a falsified passport. (3)
- (15) Then, in July 1959, Morris Block arrived in Gydnia, Poland with his wife and child. (4) After being kept in seclusion for 1 month, they were transferred to Moscow where they were met by a "Soviet representative." (5) The Blocks were taken to the Lenin-gradskaya Hotel and provided excellent accommodations while they applied for travel visas to China. (6) Although the Soviet representatives had reached an agreement with the Blocks to participate in a press conference, it did not take place. (7)

(16) In September 1959, the Soviets suggested the Blocks accept Soviet asylum, and later issued them Soviet internal passports for foreigners. (8) The Soviet authorities immediately settled the Blocks in a two-room, 19 ruble-a-month apartment in Odessa, and provided them 1,000 rubles to buy furniture. (9) Morris Block obtained a job as a mechanic in a Soviet shipyard while Mollie Block taught in the Polytechnic Institute. (10) Their combined income was 166 rubles per month. (11)

(17) A Ukranian newspaper published a letter by Block in December 1959, stating his intent to live in the Soviet Union. (12) He severely criticized life in the United States and detailed a long history of unemployment and alleged "persecution" by the FBI after his return from China. (13) Again he denounced the United States in an interview with his local newspaper in 1960. (14)

(18) Because Morris Block had difficulty with the Russian language, he was assigned a young girl to teach him. (15) An affair resulted and Mollie Block arrived in Moscow with her daughter in February 1960. (16) The same Soviet official met Mrs. Block, this time taking her to the Hotel Metropole. (17) Until June she remained there, with the Soviet Red Cross paying expenses. (18) When her daughter was hospitalized due to a nervous disorder, Mollie Block moved into a one-room apartment and began work as a typist-translator for the Soviet Publishing Office in Moscow. (19)

(19) In August Morris Block arrived in Moscow and requested to remain there with his family. (20) Because the Soviets insisted, 2 months later Mollie and Morris Block returned to their previous jobs in Odessa. (21) Their daughter did not join them until May 1961. (22)

(20) After numerous visits to the Soviet authorities, the Blocks received permission to visit the American Embassy in Moscow. (23) Mollie Block requested the Embassy provide passports for herself, her husband, and an immigration visa for their daughter. (24) She also requested financial aid to repatriate. (25) The U.S. authorities were willing to aid the Blocks since their passports had expired, but the Soviet authorities refused to grant exit visas and forced a return to Odessa. (26) The Blocks were subsequently approached on three occasions to renounce their U.S. citizenship and become Soviet citizens. (27) They refused to do so. (28)

(21) The State Department asked the American Embassy on January 30, 1963, to issue Mollie Block a passport for return to the United States only, her daughter an alien entry visa and Morris Block an emergency certificate of identity and registration for return to the United States only. (29) They did so. (30)

(22) Then in late February 1963, the Blocks lost their Soviet documentation. (31) In May the Soviet Government stated they would not reissue temporary documents and the Blocks would have to accept permanent registration instead. (32) Applications for exit visas were filed during the summer months of 1963, refused, and filed again in April 1964. (33)

(23) Morris Block became annoyed at the Soviets' broadcasting propaganda through the loudspeaker at his place of employment in early 1964. (34) He disconnected it and was severely punished by

several young Soviet workers.(35) The Soviets would not grant permission for the Blocks to visit the Embassy in Moscow or grant exit visas so they could leave the Soviet Union.(36)

(24) Mollie Block provided an account of their difficulties to a correspondent for the New York Times that was visiting Odessa.(37) When the article concerning Soviet treatment of the Blocks was published, the Soviets began harassing the Blocks.(38) The U.S. consular officials discussed the Block case with Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then the Blocks were expelled from the U.S.S.R.(39) Morris Block was charged with acts of hooliganism and Mollie Block was charged with handing out anti-Soviet propaganda to foreign students at the Polytechnic Institute.(40) They departed from the U.S.S.R. to the United States on July 11, 1964.(41)

III. HAROLD CITRYNELL

(25) Harold Citrynell entered the Soviet Union with his wife and child on February 27, 1958.(42) He crossed the Czechoslovakian border as a tourist, intending to establish residence and become a citizen.(43)

(26) After several days in Moscow, Citrynell applied to the Office of Visas and Registration for permanent residence and Soviet citizenship.(44) He wrote a statement containing 13 reasons prompting his request for Soviet citizenship, one which may have been his inability to obtain employment in his desired field.(45) Within a few days Citrynell was notified that he had been accepted and that the Red Cross would take care of him and his family.(46)

(27) Citrynell was provided a one-bedroom apartment in Kharkov and a job in a mine surveying instrument factory with an "above average salary for the job."(47) He stated that while living in Kharkov, he felt that his neighbors and coworkers had participated in a planned effort to make him dislike the Soviet Union.(48)

(28) In the autumn of 1958, Citrynell decided to return to the United States.(49) He requested an exit visa and began writing government offices and influential people.(50) He stated that after October 1958 his detention was involuntary.(51)

(29) Before Citrynell's departure on June 29, 1959, the Red Cross requested he sign a statement agreeing never to say anything derogatory about the Soviet Union or any individual in it.(52)

IV. BRUCE FREDERICK DAVIS

(30) After serving approximately 5 years in the U.S. Army, Bruce Frederick Davis left his post in Germany.(53) He defected to East Germany in August 1960, and spent a month in East Berlin before entering the Soviet Union.(54)

(31) In October 1960, two articles appeared in Izvestia and Pravda with statements by Davis attributing his defection to disillusionment with U.S. foreign and military policy.(55) Although Davis physically defected, he did not officially denounce his American citizenship and was documented by the Soviet as a stateless person.(56)

(32) Davis was settled in Kiev as a student at the Kiev Institute

of National Economy.(57) He was provided a free dormitory room and a stipend of 900 old rubles a month.(58) This is three times what Soviet students receive, but normal for a non-Soviet-bloc student.(59) In October Davis wrote a friend of his in the Army and stated he was given an outright sum of 10,000 old rubles; it is unknown if this is true.(60) He was promised a free apartment if his unauthorized travel was discontinued and his grades were improved.(61)

(33) In August 1962, Davis appeared at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to request an American passport.(62) He phoned the Embassy the following day and stated he would not be completing the application as he had been arrested for his participation in a brawl in Kiev.(63) He returned to the Embassy in October 1962 and was issued a passport and entry visa into West Germany.(64) Davis allowed the passport and visa to expire due to a new Soviet girl friend he had met.(65)

(34) In 1963 Davis visited the Embassy on an unauthorized trip in January to make statements concerning his dissatisfaction and deliver papers from another disgruntled U.S. citizen.(66) In May he made another trip to renew his passport and reapply for a West German visa.(67) Davis was returned to military control in July 1963.(68)

V. SHIRLEY DUBINSKY

(35) Shirley Dubinsky wrote several letters from East Berlin to Soviet Premier Khrushchev denouncing her American citizenship and requesting Soviet citizenship in October 1961.(69) On December 25, 1962, she arrived in Moscow after purchasing a 3-day tour from a travel agency in Switzerland. (70) She refused to leave the Soviet Union when her visa had expired.(71)

(36) The American Embassy in Moscow was informed by the Hotel Metropole that an American guest there, Dubinsky, was acting "queer." (72) She was committed to a mental hospital on January 5, 1963, with \$100 in her possession. (73) The diagnosis was a "schizophrenic break." (74) Soviet psychiatrists advised that Dubinsky was unable to travel and extended treatment was necessary. (75) The American Embassy informed the State Department of the situation. (76)

(37) It was reported that Dubinsky had visited the offices of the Department of Visas and Registration, apparently to obtain Soviet citizenship. (77) When she attempted to visit the offices of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin she was turned over to Intourist. (78)

(38) A repatriation loan, in the form of a plane ticket to New York, was awarded to Shirley Dubinsky, and she returned to the United States on February 1, 1963.(79)

VI. JOSEPH DUTKANICZ

(39) Joseph Dutkanicz informed the American Embassy that in 1958 while he was stationed in Germany with the U.S. Army, he was approached by KGB officers and, because of threats and inducements, was recruited.(80) His wife stated that he often spoke of fleeing to the

Soviet Union during 1959.(81) The Soviets recommended that Dutkanicz defect in May 1960 and a Western bloc investigation for security reasons prompted him to do so.(82) Two weeks prior to his scheduled return to the United States in June 1960, Dutkanicz took his wife and three children on a trip.(83) They visited Czechoslovakian Embassy in Vienna, then, passing through Czechoslovakia, were escorted to the Ukraine, Soviet Union.(84) After being driven to L'vov, the family was settled in first-class accommodations, with KGB assistance.(85)

(40) Tass announced the Dutkanicz family had sought assistance in July 1960.(86) Articles began appearing that gave autobiographical statements on the history and motivation for defection in anti-American terms.(87) Later an article by Dutkanicz was published that indicated he was living in L'vov with his family and contained anti-Hitler and anti-U.S. propaganda.(88) Two radio broadcasts were made in Moscow also.(89)

(41) Dutkanicz stated he never applied for or requested Soviet citizenship.(90) A private bill bestowing citizenship on him, Supreme Soviet decree No. 135/3, was enacted in March 1960, before he defected.(91) September 1960, a Soviet passport was delivered to him.(92) His wife was documented as a foreigner upon request and his children as Soviet citizens.(93)

(42) Dutkanicz was given employment as a technician in a TV factory for an undisclosed salary and his wife taught English conversation lessons for 10 rubles a month.(94)

(43) Although they moved into an apartment in 1961, the daily contact by Russian agents that Dutkanicz's wife described during their first 6 months, did not end.(95) During a March 6, 1967, visit to the American Embassy she stated that the secret police (KGB) were in constant contact with her husband, telephoning daily, and that "the same agents who facilitated the family's placement in L'vov in 1960 were watching them closely."(96)

(44) The American Embassy received a letter from Dutkanicz's wife, Mary, on September 14, 1961, requesting a visa to visit her sick mother in the United States.(97) It stated she thought her husband was only visiting the Soviet Union at the time of his defection and that her passport had been taken from her.(98) She appeared at the Embassy on December 5, 1961, for a passport, stating her mother had died.(99) Mary was sent back to L'vov to apply for an exist visa.(100) She had been told by her husband to say that they had been blackmailed by threats against his family in L'vov.(101)

(45) An application to the Red Cross was filed in February or March 1962 for a loan of 500 rubles to be used for a trip to Moscow.(102) The request is denied "although the so-called Soviet Red Cross had given large sums of money to other defectors who were American born and had no KGB connection."(103)

(46) During Mary Dutkanicz's visa processing visits to the Embassy, she revealed that her husband was thoroughly disillusioned and wanted to return to the United States regardless of any charges.(104) She explained that her husband was encouraged by the fact he had received an undesirable discharge from the Army, not dishonorable.(105)

(47) Dutkanicz requested the Embassy to aid his children and himself in returning to the United States on March 22, 1962 (the day after his wife departed to the United States).⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ The FBI and CIA did not want Dutkanicz brought back on their account, but on August 15, 1962, the State Department advised the Embassy to issue him a passport.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ The file reflected that the Embassy could not reach Dutkanicz on the phone prior to November 22, 1963.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

(48) Dutkanicz's children, ages 11, 9, and 8, stated that on July 25, 1963, they were taken from their home and placed in boarding schools (the 11-year-old had been in school previously).⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ They were allowed to see their father once and he had cried, saying that "they" wanted to do something to his nervous system to make him an idiot.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

(49) Mary Dutkanicz was informed that her husband had been found in a drunken state, placed in the hospital in L'vov and died in November 1963.⁽¹¹¹⁾ The U.S. consul was informed in March 1964, that the three children would be allowed to leave the Soviet Union.⁽¹¹²⁾ The children were to be documented as Soviet citizens for the departure, but were to travel on U.S. passports after crossing Soviet borders.⁽¹¹³⁾ In May 1964, the children joined Mary Dutkanicz in the United States.⁽¹¹⁴⁾

VII. MARTIN GREENDLINGER

(50) A mathematician at New York University, Martin Greendlinger attended the World Youth Festival held in Moscow in 1957.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ He met Yelena Ivanovna Pyatnitskaya, nee Kapustina, a student at the Lenin Pedagogical Institute.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

(51) Greendlinger returned to the Soviet Union in April 1958, and within a month had married Yelena.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ He had been encouraged to believe her passport and Soviet exit visa would be issued in 3 to 4 months by OVIR.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ Greendlinger meant to bring his wife, her daughter by a previous marriage, and possibly a child of their own marriage to the United States.⁽¹¹⁹⁾

(52) In July 1959 Greendlinger left his home in Borisoglebsk and returned to the United States alone.⁽¹²⁰⁾ After a year, the Soviet authorities had issued his wife an exit visa to depart from the U.S.S.R.⁽¹²¹⁾ The U.S. Embassy, however, refused to issue an entrance visa due to her membership in Komsomol after 1947 and in a trade union after 1951.⁽¹²²⁾

(53) Greendlinger applied to the State Department for his wife's entry visa in August 1960.⁽¹²³⁾ In September he received a U.S. passport to visit his wife and child for a month and was awarded a National Science Foundation fellowship for 1 year.⁽¹²⁴⁾

(54) It was December 1960 before Greendlinger returned to Moscow.⁽¹²⁵⁾ He and his wife spoke to American Embassy personnel about acquiring an entrance visa.⁽¹²⁶⁾ The Embassy stated his wife could not receive an entrance visa to the United States because there could be no waiver of section 243(g) of the act.⁽¹²⁷⁾ The CIA file on Greendlinger states:

This apparently involved Komsomol membership, although the Soviet wives of Parker and Oswald—q.v.—had many more drawbacks and were let in.⁽¹²⁸⁾

(55) When Greendlinger applied for visas at the British Embassy he was told that his wife would be issued a visa if he could get a job in England and guarantee support. (129) He settled in Ostankine, a suburb of Moscow, and worked as a mathematician. (130) Finally, the National Science Foundation approved his studying math at Manchester, England. (131) No further information is known. (132)

VIII. NICHOLAS PETRULLI

(56) An American laborer, Nicholas Petrulli purchased an organized tour to Western Europe and the U.S.S.R. for \$965. (133) He entered the Soviet Union at Vyborg on August 10, 1959, using a regular 7-day tourist visa issued in Washington the previous month. The tour passed through Leningrad en route to Moscow where it was to remain until August 18. (134) Petrulli did not show up at the train station to depart from Moscow. (135) He canceled his ship reservations through an Intourist guide and remained in the Ukraina Hotel. (136)

(57) Petrulli spoke to several Americans in the hotel restaurant in the following week about his decision to remain in the Soviet Union. (137) He had no communistic sympathies or ideological leaning toward the U.S.S.R. and had no grievances against the United States. (138) Petrulli believed there was a good opportunity to obtain employment in the Soviet Union, although he did not know the language, people, or country. (139)

(58) A resident American correspondent encouraged Petrulli to tell the Embassy in Moscow about his intention to defect. (140) On August 28, 1959, Petrulli was interviewed for 2 hours by an Embassy official, Snyder. (141) The correspondent was present when Petrulli explained his reasons for staying and how he had learned the procedure for remaining from the hotel manager and Intourist guide. (142) He stated no one had induced or influenced him. (143) Petrulli stated that upon the guide's advice, he had drafted a letter to the Supreme Soviet requesting Soviet citizenship, but had not sent it yet. (144) He stated he had informed the Intourist guide he was virtually out of money. (145) He did, however, have possession of ship and plane tickets for his return to the United States. (146) Petrulli was given the name of a Catholic priest in Moscow he subsequently spoke to who warned about possible exploitation, and so forth. (147)

(59) The following day Petrulli sent the letter to the Supreme Soviet. (148) He told the Embassy it contained five points as specified by the Intourist guide: (1) date and place of birth; (2) names and addresses of relatives; (3) property and bank accounts (none); (4) skills, education, and work record; and (5) moral and ideological reasons for wanting Soviet citizenship. (149) Petrulli would not relate what he had written for No. 5 or if it was derogatory to the United States. (150)

(60) Petrulli visited the American Embassy on September 2, 1959, turned in his passport, stated he had sent the letter to the Supreme Soviet and asked to renounce his U.S. citizenship. (151) Snyder explained the irrevocability of renunciation and told Petrulli to return in the afternoon. (152) He did so and Snyder administered the oath of renunciation. (153)

(61) Several people were told by Petrulli that he felt "morally and economically at home in the Soviet Union," that they were trying to do things right, that people were not in a hurry and not nervous wrecks.(154) He said he had many jobs in the United States and he was not happy there; he liked the Soviet Union better.(155)

(62) Petrulli visited the American Embassy again on September 8, 1959 and asked for a written statement of his citizenship status for the Soviet authorities.(156) When told that the Embassy would inform him as soon as the State Department informed them, Petrulli began requesting information on visa requirements to the U.S.(157) The Soviet authorities had not responded to his letters on job requests and Petrulli felt he was getting the run-around.(158) His hotel was being paid for by the Soviets but he was without money, friends or the ability to communicate with Russians.(159) Petrulli left the Embassy and told an American correspondent he just wanted to go home.(160)

(63) On September 14, 1959, a Soviet official informed Petrulli he should have applied at the Soviet Embassy in Washington for citizenship.(161) The manager of the Ukraina Hotel told him he had 2 days to vacate the premises.(162) Both men told him he had to leave the Soviet Union and needed some type of traveling document from the American Embassy.(163)

(64) The next day Petrulli was back at the Embassy.(164) It is unknown if he applied for a passport during this visit, but a September 19, 1959, newspaper article stated that the State Department had declared Petrulli legally incompetent and returned his U.S. citizenship.(165) He was given a one-way passport to the United States and returned to his home in New York on September 22, 1959.(166)

IX. LIBERO RICCIARDELLI

(65) Libero Ricciardelli decided that exposing his family to a socialistic system of government might straighten out domestic problems and guarantee his children's future well-being.(167) In 1958 he visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and asked to visit Soviet Russia.(168) Ricciardelli obtained Soviet visas to tour Moscow for six days with his wife and three children, and did so in February 1959.(169)

(66) When his Intourist guide learned that he wanted to defect, she recommended that Ricciardelli visit the visa department, Intourist Service Bureau.(170) He did so and was informed that he must depart on the expiration date on his visa.(171) Ricciardelli did not depart and was not pressured to do so.(172) He continued to visit the visa department and wrote the President of the RSFSR as was recommended to him by Intourist.(173)

(67) Financial aid was requested by Ricciardelli because he had only \$500 and 6 days of meal tickets on him.(174) The director of the Soviet Union Red Crescent or Red Cross and a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with Ricciardelli and discouraged remaining in the Soviet Union.(175) An investigation concerning Ricciardelli's application for a visa at the Soviet Embassy in the United States was begun.(176)

(68) Ricciardelli contracted influenza which developed into rheumatic fever and was placed in a hospital for 3 weeks.(177) While there, he was visited by representatives of the Red Cross and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who announced he could remain in the Soviet Union and the Red Cross would be responsible for him.(178) They helped Ricciardelli fill out forms, and the Soviet in charge of Intourist at the hotel arranged for aid from the International Red Cross.(179)

(69) After Ricciardelli returned from the hospital, he was questioned from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. by a journalist from "Izvestia" and presumably a Red Cross representative(180) Ricciardelli signed a statement that dealt with living conditions in the United States as compared to the Soviet Union and information that would protect the Soviets from allegations he was being held against his will.(181) These articles later appeared in "Pravda" and "Izvestia."(182) When Ricciardelli could understand enough Russian to read the articles, he did so and felt they were slanted, self-serving statements condemning life in the United States.(183)

(70) Although Ricciardelli applied for Soviet citizenship, his wife refused to do so.(184) Subsequent to this application for citizenship, the director of the Red Cross in Moscow and a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged for a move to a climate more suitable to Ricciardelli's health.(185) He had requested a home in Kiev or L'vov.(186)

(71) In July 1959, Ricciardelli arrived in Kiev and was presented with an Internal Russian Passport, indicating he was a Soviet citizen.(187) No oath of allegiance was taken and Ricciardelli did not give up his U.S. passport and did not feel as if he had given up his U.S. citizenship.(188) The Soviets considered all his children Soviet citizens although his wife refused to accept the passport offered to her.(189)

(72) Ricciardelli sketched ideas for new tools and machines as a mechanical engineer for the Main Operation for Building Construction.(190) He was required to join a trade union but refused to vote or give speeches at the meeting when asked.(191)

(73) With his salary of 150 new rubles, Ricciardelli rented a third-floor walkup apartment consisting of four rooms and a bath.(192) As rent was only seven to nine rubles a month, there was also money for a TV and radio.(193) For 2 rubles a month, Ricciardelli kept a phone in his apartment, though it took him 2 years to get it installed.(194) Ricciardelli traveled on five or six trips to Moscow from Kiev and went on a vacation to Gagua, Caucasus on the Black Sea.(195)

(74) There were few visitors to the Ricciardelli apartment, and those that came believed it was wired for sound.(196)

(75) In the summer of 1960, Ricciardelli visited the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Moscow and applied for visas.(197) After his children had received an education, Ricciardelli felt it would be easier to return to the United States from Czechoslovakia than the Soviet Union.(198) Two years later when the entrance visas were granted, the Soviets refused to grant exit visas.(199)

(76) Ricciardelli's domestic problems had increased by August 1962 and he decided his wife should return to her parents' home in Illinois

and he would return to his parents' home with the three children. (200) Ricciardelli applied for a renewed U.S. passport and was told his citizenship was terminated when he accepted Soviet citizenship. (201) On March 27, 1963, his wife left the Soviet Union for the United States after filling out an application to have him granted a permanent resident visa as the husband of a U.S. citizen. (202) Ricciardelli applied as an alien to return to the United States on a permanent resident visa. (203) The U.S. Embassy granted the visa in June 1963, and after a 14-day delay over whether his oldest daughter was a Soviet citizen, he and his children flew to New York. (204)

X. VLADIMIR SLOBODA

(77) Vladimir Sloboda became a naturalized citizen of the United States on August 14, 1958, and was assigned to the 513th Military Intelligence Group, U.S. Army, with duty station at Frankfurt, Germany. (205)

(78) In August 1960, Sloboda defected into East Germany, requesting Soviet asylum. (206) Although his wife said he was extremely worried about gambling debts, his 201 file, maintained by the CIA reflects that "emotional state and fact of Army countermeasures caused by arrest of 154 MID agents recently" are probably responsible for defection. (207) Sloboda later explained he had been blackmailed and framed into defecting. (208)

(79) Immediately after Sloboda's defection, he was utilized by the Soviets for propaganda purposes. (209) In an August interview on Moscow TV, Sloboda based his defection on the expressed views that the United States was a warmonger with spy activity in Germany. (210) The September issue of *Golos Roding* repeated this as did other articles and various press releases. (211) According to one of the later articles, Sloboda was given Soviet citizenship in August 1960, the month he defected. (212)

(80) Sloboda's British wife requested that the Soviet consul in London arrange transportation for herself and three children to the Soviet Union. (213) Travel arrangements were made to Leningrad and all expenses, such as shipment of furniture and transportation tickets, were paid for by the Soviets. (214) A Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) resettlement officer made arrangements for travel from Leningrad to L'vov. (215) When she and the children joined Sloboda on November 19, 1960, he was already having doubts about his defection. (216)

(81) Soviet authorities provided Sloboda with approximately 300 rubles a month and a three-room flat in L'vov for his parents, wife and children. (217)

(82) In early 1962 Sloboda's wife requested an exit visa from the L'vov authorities. (218) She called the American Embassy and informed them that both she and her husband were desperate to return to the United States. (219) In March she received an exit visa and passport. (220) Sloboda and his wife then visited the British Embassy to discuss bringing her son and daughter out of the Soviet Union with her. (221) Sloboda explained to the Embassy that he was afraid to visit

the American Embassy. (222) He stated that his wife and oldest and youngest children had been issued Soviet internal passports for foreigners. (223) He stated his other child was a U.S. citizen with an expired passport. (224)

(83) Sloboda's wife took the youngest child to England, leaving the eldest at the International Boarding School and the other son at day school. (225) On her departure she was given 50 rubles to purchase a present for her mother. (226)

(84) The British Embassy sent a representative to visit Sloboda in August 1962. (227) They learned that "he had been subjected to fairly frequent questioning by the KGB in L'vov since he visited the embassy in Moscow." (228)

(85) In March 1963, Sloboda's wife sent him a telegram stating she was returning to the Soviet Union so the eldest sons should not be sent. (229)

XI. ROBERT WEBSTER

(86) Robert E. Webster, an employee of the Rand Development Co., made several trips to the Soviet Union in order to prepare for the 1959 U.S. exhibition in Moscow. (230) While there for 7 weeks, beginning in May 1959, Webster steadily dated the hostess employed at the Hotel Ukraine's tourist restaurant. (231) She worked there during the period correspondents accompanying Vice President Nixon's visit to the U.S.S.R. resided there, and was suspected of being a KGB agent. (232) Webster informed his girlfriend he wished to divorce his wife in the United States and return to the Soviet Union to marry her. (233)

(87) Webster first revealed his desire to defect on July 11, 1959. (234) He approached the two Soviet officials in charge of arrangements for the exhibition at the fairgrounds and requested information concerning the procedures for a U.S. citizen to remain in the U.S.S.R. (235) Webster was told to call one of the officials in their Solkolniki Park office and a meeting was set up. (236)

(88) A few days later, the English-speaking official Webster had met previously, escorted him to a private room in a restaurant. (237) A representative of the Soviet Government questioned him about his desire to remain in the Soviet Union. (238) The representative was also interested in whether Webster had told other Americans of his interest to defect and instructed him not to. (239) While intoxicated with vodka Webster was told to write a letter to the Supreme Soviet requesting to remain as a Soviet citizen. (240) He did so, and was given a biographic data sheet to take with him and fill out. (241)

(89) Subsequently when Webster submitted the data sheet, he stated that his dissatisfaction with the United States was due to the tendency of American employers to hire a man and then fire him when he had learned the job. (242) This reason was not acceptable because Webster had not personally experienced this. (243) He rewrote the form to state that in the United States, Government controlled big business. (244) He also wrote that he wished to work, marry, have children, earn a degree and learn the Russian language in the Soviet Union. (245) Although he stated he wished to cooperate in every way with the Soviet Union, the Soviet authorities tried to dissuade Webster from defecting. (246)

(90) In the last of July or early August, Webster attended what he described as a serious, no drinking meeting held in a private restaurant room at the Metropole Hotel.(247) Webster told two Soviet chemists he could help them make the Rand spray gun he had demonstrated at the U.S. Exhibition.(248) On September 9 he was told he had been accepted by the Soviets.(249) Although he had requested to work in Moscow, Webster was informed he would be sent to Leningrad.(250)

(91) The following day the Soviet officials registered Webster at the Bucharist Hotel, and instructed him not to leave.(251) He was given 1,000 old rubles and asked to write a note to a Rand employee requesting the money be left for him at the hotel because he was on a tour of Russia.(252)

(92) There was a short party for Webster on September 11.(253) He was immediately flown to Leningrad with an interpreter and met by an Intourist representative.(254) He applied for work at the Leningrad Scientific Research Institute, Polymerized Plastics and lived in the Baltiskaya Hotel for a month.(255) He was allowed to call his girlfriend and she was allowed to visit and make plans for a vacation.(256)

(93) On October 17, 1959 Webster was staying in Moscow.(257) He attended a meeting at the central office, visas and registration (OVIR) with the original Soviet representative he had contact with, an unknown Soviet, H. J. Rand, his assistant George H. Bookbinder and Richard E. Snyder of the U.S. Embassy.(258) Webster stated he was free to speak, and told Snyder when he had applied for Soviet citizenship, he had been granted a Soviet passport on September 21, 1959.(259) He filled out a form entitled "Affidavit for Expatriated Person" and wrote his resignation to Rand Development Corp.(260)

(94) Webster later explained he had no Soviet documentation at the time, having in his possession an American passport which he never sent to Snyder as requested.(261) Webster stated the Soviets had instructed him to say his reasons for defecting were political.(262)

(95) Webster's girlfriend joined him the following day and both went on a month vacation at the Suitland Sanitarium in Sochi.(263) They returned to Leningrad and began work at the institute, where his girlfriend was employed as an assistant and translator.(264) Webster received 280 rubles per month and a semiannual bonus of 50 to 60 rubles.(265) He lived with his girlfriend in a new apartment building and had three rooms with a bath.(266)

(96) After writing a summary of his life, listing his relatives and where they worked, submitting pictures of himself and undergoing a medical examination, Webster was granted a Soviet internal passport.(267) In December 1959 or January 1960, he turned over his American passport and obtained the Soviet passport at the OVIR office in Leningrad.(268)

(97) On January 27, 1960, a letter was delivered to Webster from his father.(269) It contained news of his mother's nervous breakdown and word that his father had assumed financial support of Webster's children.(270) At that point, Webster decided to return to the United States.(271)

(98) A note in Webster's file stated that on April 6, 1969, he was to give a speech on the United States, although there was no indication whether he, in fact, did make the address. (272)

(99) The original Soviet representative in Moscow arranged for Webster and his girlfriend to visit there for the May Day celebration. (273) Webster entered the U.S. Embassy unchallenged, due to his American clothing. (274) He informed John McVicker that he wished to return to the United States. (275) He was told to apply for a Soviet exit visa. (276)

(100) Webster requested two notarized invitations for his return to the United States, to be made by his father, copies to be sent to the American Embassy. (277) His girlfriend helped him fill out the application for a Soviet exit visa and gave her consent, which was required. (278)

(101) Webster's girlfriend gave birth to Svetlana Robertovna Webster in August 1960. (279) The child was immediately adopted by Webster and registered. (280) During the majority of the time after this, Svetlana's Russian grandmother also lived in the Webster apartment. (281) Webster was assigned a new translator at the Institute. (282)

(102) Two months after submitting his application for a Soviet exit visa, Webster was turned down and told he could not reapply for 1 year. (283) Soviet officials visited him from Moscow, inquiring why he was unhappy and suggesting that he send for his family from the United States. (284) One year later, he reapplied, and in February 1962, Webster was granted a Soviet exit visa. (285)

(103) In March 1962, the American Embassy gave Webster instructions on how to obtain an American entrance visa. (286) His father sent him a plane ticket for his passage home, and Webster quit his job. (287) It was May before Webster actually surrender his internal Soviet passport for his exit visa. (288) Webster arrived in the United States as an alien under the Russian quota on May 20, 1962. (289) He had never intended to aid his girlfriend in leaving the Soviet Union. (290)

XII. LEE HARVEY OSWALD

(104) In comparing Oswald's defection to the other 11 individuals in this study, certain points must be taken into consideration. The Warren Commission requested through the State Department that the Soviet Government provide "any further available information concerning the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald during his residence from 1959 to 1962 in the Soviet Union, in particular, copies of any official records concerning him." (291) In May 1964 the Soviet Union provided approximately 15 documents concerning the sojourn employment and medical history of Oswald while in their country. (292) The documents also dealt with the departure of Oswald and his wife from the U.S.S.R. (293)

(105) No documents appear to be from the KGB or make mention of Oswald's being debriefed by it. (294) There are some dates, times, and facts in the documents that differ from Oswald's statements. (295)

The signatures of most of the Soviet officials are illegible.(296) The authenticity of these documents could not be established, but they must be taken into consideration. It was the only case in this study in which the Soviet Union added to the existing body of information.

(106) The committee also had available to it statements and a diary that handwriting experts determined were written by Lee Harvey Oswald.(297) The diary covered the period Oswald was in the Soviet Union.(298). The committee found all of Oswald's writings concerning his life in the Soviet Union to be generally credible. To a great extent, they parallel the documents provided by the Soviet Union on Oswald in 1964; that is, that he was in the Soviet Union during the time period stated; that he attempted suicide; that he worked at a radio plant in Minsk; that he met and married a Russian woman; that he was originally issued a residence visa for stateless persons and then a residence visa for foreigners; that he obtained exit visas for himself and his family, and left the Soviet Union.(299)

(107) The committee tried to determine the credibility of both the Soviet documents and Oswald's writings, and in doing so endeavored to obtain any additional information. Witnesses before the committee stated that the Soviet Government would have additional information on Oswald from its surveillance of him.(300) Through the State Department, the committee requested the Soviet Union to provide any documentation on Oswald they might possess. (301) The Soviet Union was requested to allow the interviewing of the Soviet citizens Oswald mentions throughout his diary.(302) The State Department was informed by Soviet officials that no additional information was available and Soviet citizens could not be interviewed.

(108) Thus, information that the committee has collected and used concerning Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union for this study, is only partially complete.

(109) Lee Harvey Oswald was issued an entry visa to the Soviet Union by the U.S.S.R. consul in Helsinki, Finland, on October 14, 1959. (303) Stamps on Oswald's passport show he entered Finland October 10 and left on October 15.(304)

(110) On October 16, Oswald arrived in Moscow after crossing the border from Finland at Vyborg. (305) He was escorted to the Hotel Berlin by an Intourist representative who met him at his train.(306) There, he registered as a student on a 5-day luxury tourist ticket and met his Intourist guide Rimma Shirikova. (307)

(111) Oswald wrote in the October 16 entry of his diary, referring to Rimma:

I explain to her I wish to apply for *Rus.** citizenship. She is flabbergassed but *agrees* to help. She checks with her boss, main office *Intour*, than helps me *add* a letter to *Sup. Sovit* asking for citizenship. meanwhile boss *telephons* passport & visa office and notifies them about me.(308)

Rimma insisted they continue sightseeing the following day and asked Oswald himself and his reasons for defecting.(309) Oswald believed his explanation concerning his Communist beliefs makes Rimma uneasy.(310)

*Spelling is as it appears in document.

(112) On October 20 Oswald was told by Rimma that the Passport & Visa Department had requested to see him. (311) Oswald wrote in the October 21 entry of his diary:

Meeting with a single official, balding stout, black suit, fairly good English, asks what do I want? I say *Sovite* citizenship, he ask why I give vague answers about "Great Soviet Union" He tells me "U.S.S.R. only great in literature wants me to go back home" I am stunned I reiterate, he says he shall check and let me know *weather* my visa will be (extended it *expiers today*). (312)

Oswald wrote that at 6 p.m. a police official informs him he must leave the Soviet Union in 2 hours. (313) At 7 p.m. he decided to commit suicide and wrote "when Rimma comes at 8 p.m. to find me dead, it will be a great shock." (314) Oswald stated that about 8 p.m. Rimma found him unconscious and he was taken to the hospital in an ambulance for stitches. (315)

(113) The Ministry of Health records supplied, reflect that Oswald was admitted to "Botkin Hospital at 16:00 (4 p.m.) on October 21, 1959 upon request at 15h. 19." (316) He received an examination in the admission's department at 4:30 p.m. where a skin wound was found on the lower third of the left forearm. (317) Oswald was given four stitches and an aseptic bandage for the immediate wound and kept in a psychosomatic department for observation. (318) The report stated that Oswald's mind was clear his perception was correct and he inflicted the injury upon himself in order to postpone his departure from the Soviet Union. (319) Oswald was transferred to the somatic department on October 23. (320)

(114) Oswald's hospital records stated that he was visited by the head of the Service Bureau, and daily by an interpreter. (321) His place of employment was listed "K-4-19-80 Service Bureau. Radio-technician," which was the only other mention of the Service Bureau. (322)

(115) The authenticity of the hospital records can in no way be determined. One indication that they may not be valid documents was the April 25, 1953 date that appeared at the bottom of Oswald's blood analysis. (323)

(116) Oswald wrote in his diary that while in the hospital he was visited daily by Rimma and on October 23 by Rosa Agafonova from the hotel tourist office. (324)

(117) Oswald's diary and the hospital reports reflected he was discharged from the hospital on October 28. (325) He wrote in the diary that Rimma chauffeured him from the hospital to the Hotel Berlin where he picked up his clothes and money, \$100, and moved to the Hotel Metropole. (326) Oswald stated he was invited to visit with Ludmilla Dimitrova, Inturist office head, and Rosa. (327)

(118) Oswald also wrote, that on October 28 he visited the pass and registration office with Rimma. (328) He stated there were four unknown officials that asked questions about the last official he had met with and his desires for the future. (329) Oswald requested Soviet citizenship again and provided his discharge papers from the Marine Corps as identification. (330) Oswald described this meeting in a discouraging manner. (331)

(119) On October 31, Oswald visited the American Embassy in Moscow.(332) Consul at the Embassy, Richard Snyder, informed the committee that he had no information concerning Oswald before he walked into the Embassy.(333) Snyder said:

He handed me a handwritten statement which stated, in effect, that he renounced his American citizenship. I used the pretext that the Embassy was not officially open that day and, therefore, I was not in a position to prepare the required form to go through with the renunciation and invited him to come back on the first business day of the Embassy if he so wished. I retained his passport at that time.(334)

Snyder recalled that Oswald had made some comment that "he had worked, or advised, or something to that effect, what I would try to tell him and that he didn't want to waste his time or mine." (335) Snyder was told by Oswald that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and that he intended to give information he possessed to the Soviets.(336)

(120) Oswald wrote in his diary that when he returned from the Embassy he was contacted by two American reporters in Moscow, named Goldstein and Mosby.(337) Although he did not grant interviews to either, he answered a few questions for Mosby.(338)

(121) Alice Mosby wrote an article, dateline November 14, containing Oswald's statements to her.(339) It said that imperialism and lack of money while a child were Oswald's main reasons for saving \$1,600 and coming to the Soviet Union.(340) "He had announced on October 31 that he renounced his U.S. citizenship and was seeking Soviet citizenship for purely political reasons." (341) Oswald was denied the Soviet citizenship he had requested but was allowed to live freely in Russia.(342)

(122) Among Oswald's belongings was a handwritten account of his "interview November 14 with Miss Mosby." (343) Oswald wrote that Mosby agreed to let him see the story before it was sent out.(344) He explained to her the political reasons he went to the Soviet Union and applied for citizenship and how he developed those political beliefs.(345) Oswald made no comment about his present situation in the Soviet Union.(346)

(123) In Oswald's diary he stated that during December he stayed in the hotel studying Russian, seeing no one except Rimma, who called the ministry for him.(347) She had told the hotel he would be receiving a great deal of money from the United States so he paid no bills that month.(348) Oswald recorded that he only had \$28 left.(349) The passport office had met with Oswald again and he wrote that the same questions were answered by three new officials.(350)

(124) Oswald's application to the Visa and Registration Office, Interior Department, Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council for the issuance of an identity bore the date December 20, 1959.(351)

(125) Oswald wrote that the passport office issued him a Soviet document "for those without citizenship on January 4". (352) He stated he was told that he would be sent to Minsk and that the Red Cross would provide him with money.(353)

(126) The Soviet document that bore a January 5, 1960, date was Oswald's receipt stating that the legal status of a person without citizenship has been explained to him, and his receipt for an identity card Series P No. 311479 issued by OVIR Moscow City Executive Committee on January 4, 1960, with expiration date January 4, 1961. (354)

(127) Oswald wrote that January 5 he was given 5,000 rubles by the Red Cross, 2,200 of which paid the hotel bill and 150 of which purchased the train ticket to Minsk. (355)

(128) In the January 7 entry, Oswald described being met at the train station in Minsk by two Red Cross workers, then proceeding to the hotel where he met two Intourist representatives. (356)

(129) An application and autobiographical sketch written by Oswald in connection with his employment at the radio factory in Minsk bore the date January 11, 1960. (357) Oswald also received the signatures of the doctor and trainer in safety and fire precautions of the Minsk radio plant. (358) On January 13, he was hired in the experimental shop at the radio factory as a checker. (359) Oswald stated that he received 700 rubles a month from his job and another 700 rubles a month from the Soviet Red Cross. (360) He wrote "therefore every month I make 1400 R, about the same as a director of the factory." (361)

(130) In a March 16 entry Oswald wrote: "I receive a small flat one-room kitchen-bath near the factory (8 min. walk) with splendid view from 2 balconies of the river. Almost rent free (60 Rub. a month) it is a Russian dream." (362)

(131) On January 4, 1961, Oswald wrote that he was called into the passport office and asked if he wanted Soviet citizenship. He said no, but requested his residential passport be extended. (363) A document provided by the Soviet Government reflected that an identity card for a person without citizenship, Series P No. 311479, belonging to Lee Harvey Oswald, was entered from January 4, 1961 to January 1, 1962. (364)

(132) Another document provided by the Soviets was a certificate from the Minsk Radio Plant, Administration of Electrotechnical and Instrument Manufacturing Industry, Council of the National Economy, U.S.S.R., bearing dates January 1, 1960, and July 15, 1961, that Lee Harvey Oswald was employed as an assembler there. (365)

(133) The American Embassy received an undated letter from Oswald on February 13, 1961. (366) He stated that he had not received a reply to a December 1960 letter he had written to the Embassy, so he was writing again. (367) Oswald requested that his American passport be returned and suggested that some agreement be reached concerning any legal action proceeding against him so he could return to the United States. (368) He stated: "They have at no time insisted that I take Russian Citizenship." (369) "I am living here with nonpermanent-type papers for a foreigner." (370) The return address listed on the envelope was Ulitsa Kalinina, House 4 Apartment 24, Minsk; and Oswald said he could not leave without permission. (371)

(134) In a letter dated February 28, 1961, Snyder requested that Oswald appear in person at the Embassy to determine his citizenship status. (372) Snyder explained that the December 1960 letter, which Oswald had mentioned, was never received. (373)

(135) Oswald wrote the Embassy again in March 1961. He stated he could leave Minsk without permission and would find it inconvenient to visit Moscow for an interview.(374) He requested that preliminary inquiries be sent in questionnaire form. (375)

(136) Oswald attended a trade dance in Minsk on March 17 and described meeting Marina N. Prusakova.(376) Records provided by Ministry of Health, U.S.S.R., reflected that on March 30 Oswald was admitted to a clinical hospital—ear, nose, and throat division.(377) According to these records, he was discharged on April 11, 1961, and he wrote in his diary that he proposed to Marina 4 days later.(378)

(137) The date on a certificate of marriage for Marina and Lee Oswald from the Minsk Civil Registrar Office of Leninsky District is April 30, 1961.(379) The entry in Oswald's diary concerning his marriage also bears this date.(380)

(138) In a letter dated May 1961, Oswald informed the Embassy he had married a Russian-born woman who would travel to the United States with him.(381) He wrote that a marriage stamp was placed on his present passport for an individual without citizenship.(382) Oswald said, "I am asking not only for the right to return to the United States, but also for full guarantees that I shall not, under any circumstances, be persecuted for any act pertaining to this case."(383)

(139) The July 8 entry in Oswald's diary described an airplane trip to Moscow for his first interview at the Embassy since his attempt to denounce American citizenship.(384) Oswald stated that he took no oath, affirmation, or allegiance of any kind, nor was he required to sign any kind of papers in connection with his employment.(385) He denied being a member of the factory trade union or ever having been asked to join.(386) Oswald gave his earnings as 90 new rubles per month.(387) This contradicted an earlier entry in his diary that he made the equivalent of 70 new rubles as a salary and 70 new rubles supplement per month.(388)

(140) Oswald denied making statements of an exploitable nature concerning his original decision to reside in the Soviet Union. (389) He remembered being interviewed in his room at the Metropole Hotel by a reporter from Radio Moscow concerning his impressions of Moscow as an American tourist. (390) He stated he had never been asked to make any statements for radio, press or audiences since his arrival. (391) This contradicts his first comment and what he wrote in January 13—March 16, 1960 entries in his diary. "I meet many young Russian workers my own age. * * * All wish to know about me even offer to hold a mass meeting so I can say. I refuse politely."(392)

(141) When asked if he had provided information he had acquired as a radar operator in the Marine Corps, Oswald stated "that he was never in fact subjected to any questioning or briefing by the Soviet authorities concerning his life or experiences prior to entering the Soviet Union and had never provided information to any Soviet organ." (393)

(142) Oswald stated he never applied for Soviet citizenship. (394) His original application was for permission to remain in the Soviet Union and a temporary extension of his tourist visa pending the outcome of his request. (395) Oswald stated he had addressed this appli-

cation and mailed it to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet although it appeared to have been delivered to the central office of the Moscow OVIR. (396) Apparently this was the basis of a notification Oswald stated he received 3 days later that permission had been granted for him to remain in the Soviet Union. (397) Subsequently he was issued a "stateless" internal passport. (398)

(143) The Embassy returned his passport to him after it was amended to be valid only for direct return to the United States. (399) The passport expiration date was September 10, 1961, but Oswald needed the passport to apply for exit visas immediately in Minsk. (400) Oswald wrote "July 9 received passport. Call Marina to Moscow also." (401)

(144) Oswald wrote after he and Marina returned to Minsk on July 14, that meetings to persuade Marina not to go to the United States began. (402) Her visit to the Embassy was known. (403)

(145) The 20 or so papers, birth certificates, affidavits, photos, and so forth needed to apply for exit visas were turned in by Oswald between July 15 and August 20. (404) He writes in the diary that "they say it will be 3½ months before we know wheather (sic) they'll let us go or not. (405) The date on Oswald's application to the OVIR Militia Department, Minsk City Executive Committee for the issuance of an exit visa from the U.S.S.R. is July 15, 1961. (406)

(146) The application Marina had to sign to give permission for her husband to leave the Soviet Union bears a July 19 date. (407) According to Marina's visa application she requests an exit visa to join him on his departure from the Soviet Union, August 21, 1961. (408)

(147) The personnel department chief and plant director where Oswald worked, issued a report to the Minsk City Militia Department in December 1961. (409) It stated that Oswald:

(1) Takes no part in the social life of the shop and keeps very much to himself.

(2) Reacts in an oversensitive manner to remarks from the foreman.

(3) Is careless in his work.

(4) Does not perform satisfactory as a regulator, and

(5) Does not display the initiative for increasing his skills as a regulator. (410)

(148) Oswald wrote in his diary that on Christmas Day 1961 Marina was told at the passport and visa office that she and Oswald were granted exit visas from the Soviet Union. (411)

Oswald's application to the Minsk Militia Department for the extension of his identity card bore a January 4, 1962, date. (412) He wrote in his diary he was granted a residence document for foreigners. (413) Identity card for an alien series AA No. 549666, received by Lee Harvey Oswald was issued January 4 and was valid until July 2, 1963. (414)

(149) On February 15 Oswald wrote that, June Lee Oswald was born. (415) His diary stated that Marina formally quit her job on March 24 and he received a letter stating her entrance visa to the United States had been approved the following day. (416)

XIII. SOVIET CITIZENSHIP

(150) Lee Harvey Oswald was not a Soviet citizen during his residence in the Soviet Union. He requested Soviet citizenship by mail on October 16, 1959. On October 21, a Soviet official interviewed Oswald and tried to dissuade him from defecting to the Soviet Union. Later that night a police officer told him he would have to leave the Soviet Union within 2 hours.

(151) Oswald immediately attempted to commit suicide. His hospital records reflected it was done in an effort to postpone his departure. After a week in the hospital, Oswald applied at the pass and registration office for Soviet citizenship. Three days later he orally denounced his American citizenship at the Embassy. Although he did so in order to convince the Soviets to grant him citizenship, he was granted a residence visa for foreigners without citizenship. Oswald received this visa on January 4, 1960, 2½ months after his original application. Oswald told American reporters in November that the Soviets would allow him to stay. The January 4 date appears in Oswald's diary and on the residence document provided by Soviet authorities.

(152) One year later the residence visa was extended after Oswald refused the Soviet citizenship offered to him. When he wrote to the U.S. Embassy in February 1961 he stated the Soviets had not insisted on his acceptance of citizenship. Oswald wrote that he had "nonpermanent type papers" for a foreigner. In January 1962 the Embassy had reissued Oswald's American passport and the Soviets issued him a residence visa for foreigners.

ANALYSIS

(153) Oswald was not the only American who had difficulty obtaining citizenship while residing in the Soviet Union. Ricciardelli repeatedly requested citizenship from the Visa Department of the In-tourist Service Bureau. He was told that he would have to leave the Soviet Union on the expiration date that appeared on his visa. Ricciardelli did not depart and was told he would be allowed to remain only after being hospitalized for rheumatic fever. A Soviet passport was given to Ricciardelli 7 months after he requested it. Although his wife refused a Soviet passport his children were considered Soviet citizens.

(154) Webster waited 2 months for acceptance by the Soviets. He received Soviet citizenship only after altering his stated reason for defection and assuring the Russians he could manufacture the Rand spray gun he was exhibiting in the Soviet Union.

(155) Soviet authorities did not grant citizenship to Dubinsky or Petrulli, both of whom left the country. Davis was documented as a "stateless person" and allowed to reside in the Soviet Union.

(156) Sloboda waited 1 month to be granted Soviet citizenship as did his oldest and youngest child. His wife and middle child were issued internal passports for foreigners.

(157) The Soviets offered citizenship to the Blocks, but they received internal passports for foreigners. After a number of years in the Soviet Union the Blocks were pressed to accept Soviet citizenship, which they would not do.

(158) In the case of Dutkanicz, the Supreme Soviet, by special decree, granted him citizenship 1 month prior to his defection.

XIV. PROPAGANDA USE AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

(159) Richard Snyder, the American consul at the Embassy in Moscow was asked about the Soviet use of defectors for propaganda. He said:

I think that if there is a usual pattern—and, again, this is difficult to use words like ‘usual’ because there are never two cases alike in this sort of thing—but if there is a usual pattern, it is that there is some exploitation of the defector in Soviet public media, usually after the details of his defection have been settled, particularly the detail as to whether the Soviet Union desires to have him. Up to that point, publicity in the Soviet Press probably is not to be expected. (417)

He testified that in the Oswald case, there was no known Soviet press or propaganda (418) Marina Oswald’s testimony before the Warren Commission was to the contrary. She said that “Lee took part in radio broadcasts, propaganda in favor of the Soviet Union, which he felt helped him to stay in the Soviet Union. (419)

(160) Oswald wrote in his diary he had been asked to give a speech, which he did not do. He also informed the American Embassy in Moscow that he had made several statements to Lev Sefvayev on his impressions of Moscow as a tourist. The committee found no information that any statements made by Lee Harvey Oswald were used for Soviet propaganda purposes.

(161) The committee also found no information that the Soviets had used Citrynell, Dubinsky, Greendlinger, Petrulli, or Webster for propaganda purposes. There was no apparent correlation between Soviet citizenship being granted to an individual and subsequent propaganda exploitation as suggested by Snyder. Dubinsky and Petrulli were not granted any type of residence visa and remained in the Soviet Union only a short time. Citrynell and Webster became Soviet citizens with relatively little difficulty. There was no information available on Greendlinger’s circumstances. Absence of data does not necessarily mean the Soviets made no propaganda use of these five individuals or Oswald.

(162) Three of the defectors that had anti-American propaganda statements published—Ricciardelli, Sloboda, and Dutkanicz—were Soviet citizens. Two other defectors whose anti-American statements received Soviet press, the Blocks, had residence visas for foreigners. They were, however, frequently pressured to accept Soviet citizenship. Davis was the only defector documented as a “stateless person,” as was Oswald, who had anti-American statements published for propaganda purposes.

(163) Two defectors made the type of propaganda statements during radio broadcasts that Marina Oswald Porter describes Oswald as making. Both these defectors, Sloboda and Dutkanicz, had contact with the KGB while stationed in West Germany with the U.S. Army. They were still serving in the Army when they entered the U.S.S.R.

XV. RESIDENCE, EMPLOYMENT, AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

(164) All the individuals within this study, including Oswald, who received permission to remain in the Soviet Union, were assigned to reside in cities within the western portion of the country. Oswald was assigned employment, as were the others, with the exception of Davis, who was a student at the Kiev Institute. Sloboda also received 300 rubles a month, although his employment is unknown.

(165) Income comparison was difficult as the number of household members varied over time. Income of additional household members, an important variable, was usually unknown. The devaluation of the ruble in 1960 confused amounts in some cases. (420)

(166) Salary was known for Oswald and five other defectors. Financial aid received from organizations like the Soviet Red Cross was also known in most of these cases. Oswald received the lowest salary among the defectors in this study, 70 new rubles. Davis, a single male attending the Kiev Institute, received the salary closest to that made by Oswald. He was paid 90 new rubles and lived in a free dorm room. Oswald, however, was the only individual known to receive a monthly stipend in addition to his salary. He wrote that each month he received the equivalent of 70 new rubles, technically from the Red Cross. It was, in fact, probably arranged for by the M.V.D. (421) This would bring Oswald's monthly income to 140 new rubles. The Blocks and Ricciardellis made close to this amount, but had families to support in addition to themselves. Sloboda and Webster both received over 250 new rubles a month.

(167) The defectors also received occasional financial aid. The amount varied greatly from the 10,000 rubles (presumably old rubles, equaling 1,000 new rubles) that Davis wrote a friend he had received and 50 rubles given to Sloboda's wife to buy a present. Oswald received the equivalent of 500 new rubles to pay hotel and transportation bills to Minsk. No defector received payments above 100 new rubles except Oswald and Davis. The CIA 201 file on Davis states that because the sum Davis wrote he had received was so fantastically high it was perhaps a mistake. (422)

(168) Although Oswald received more aid than most of the other individuals studied, it is possible that it supplemented the low salary he received. Oswald wrote "it was really payment for my denunciation of the United States in Moscow * * * As soon as I * * * started negotiations with the American Embassy in Moscow for my return to the United States my Red Cross allotment was cut off." (423)

XVI. SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS AND EXIT VISAS

(169) Two American citizens married Soviet citizens while residing in the U.S.S.R. Oswald had been in the Soviet Union 18½ months when he married Marina N. Prusakova. Two months prior to the marriage, Oswald wrote the American Embassy concerning an agreement that might be made for his return to the United States. A month after the marriage he informed the Embassy his wife would be returning to the United States with him. Marina applied for an exit visa to leave the Soviet Union and waited 4 months for it to be granted. Oswald, who

had applied for a Soviet exit visa approximately 11½ months earlier than Marina, learned his had been granted with Marina's. He had waited 5½ months for an exit visa.

(170) Greendlinger's second trip to Moscow in April 1958 resulted in his marriage to Yelena Ivanovna Pyatnitskaya within the month. He had been encouraged to believe her passport and Soviet exit visa would be issued in 3 to 4 months by OVIR. After a year, the Soviet authorities issued his wife an exit visa to depart the Soviet Union. The U.S. Embassy refused to issue her an entrance visa due to her membership in Komsomol and a trade union. Because Greendlinger left the Soviet Union in July 1959, it took, at most, 16 months for the Soviets to grant Greendlinger an exit visa. His wife's Soviet exit visa took approximately 12 months to obtain.

(171) Webster did not marry the woman with whom he lived in the Soviet Union and did not try to arrange for her departure from the U.S.S.R. He applied for a Soviet exit visa for himself and, after a 2-month wait, was refused and told he could reapply in a year. Webster waited the year and reapplied for an exit visa. The Soviet authorities granted it, and Webster departed for the United States after 14 months.

(172) Others living in the Soviet Union were also refused immediate issuance of exit visas. The Blocks had their requests denied or not acted upon for at least 12 months until they were expelled for acts of hooliganism and handing out anti-Soviet propaganda. Citrynell reported he was detained in the Soviet Union involuntarily for 8 months.

(173) It may be assumed Mary Dutkanicz obtained an exit visa because she was allowed out of the Soviet Union on March 22, 1962. Her husband made immediate efforts for his children and himself to depart also. Sixteen months later his children were taken from their home. They spoke to their father once and learned his fears that the Soviets would render him an idiot. Three months after the children's removal, Dutkanicz was reported as dead to his wife. The children were allowed to depart from the Soviet Union 6 months after the reported death, or 25 months after their mother had left.

(174) In this analysis, only one Soviet exit visa was granted in a shorter time period than was Oswald's. Sloboda's wife received an exit visa within 3 months of application. Nevertheless, this was the only case in which the visa was an exit-reentry visa, and application procedures may have been different. Reasons for Oswald's short wait obtaining an exit visa are unknown.

XVII. KGB CONTACT

(175) During Oswald's efforts to regain his American passport, he was questioned by Embassy personnel about his activities in the Soviet Union. He was not candid in all of his responses. This places into doubt Oswald's statement that he had never been subjected to any questioning of briefing by Soviet authorities concerning his life prior to entering the Soviet Union and that he had never provided information to any Soviet organ. Oswald had previously informed the Embassy that he would provide information he learned as a radar operator in the Marines.

(176) Other questions are raised about Oswald's statement by an October 17, 1959, entry in his diary that his Intourist guide "asks me about myself and my reason for doing this." The committee was informed by KGB officers who had defected from the Soviet Union that Intourist guides were frequently used by the KGB as agents or sources of information. Oswald's diary reflects he saw a great deal of his Intourist guide.

(177) Oswald's diary also described various meetings with Soviet officials to discuss his desire to reside in the Soviet Union. He met with at least five representatives of the pass and registration or visa department. Later Oswald had a meeting with the Soviet Red Cross, and he is met in Minsk by two other Red Cross employees and two Intourist representatives. Oswald wrote in his diary that he kept contact with one of the Intourist representatives for 3½ months, and 6 months after that, she attended his 21st birthday party.

(178) Oswald's diary also contained entries concerning his associates. (424) Marina told the FBI that:

She believes he was observed and perhaps his neighbors and associates were questioned concerning his beliefs and his activities * * * there is a possibility that there will be speculators and espionage agents among tourists and immigrants in Russia * * * for this reason * * * tourists and immigrants are investigated to a degree in Russia." (425) Marina also informed the FBI that she knew Oswald's contacts and knew of no contact by Russian intelligence or government agencies. (426) Marina did not believe Oswald had been given any assignment to perform, either in Russia or the United States. (427)

(179) The committee requested permission of the Soviet Embassy to conduct interviews of the Soviet citizens that were reported by Oswald to have had contact with him. (428) This permission was refused, as was the committee's request for additional Soviet documents concerning Oswald's surveillance. The committee had no other available means to determine possible connections between the described individuals and the KGB.

(180) The committee interviewed Webster concerning any contact he may have had with the KGB while in the Soviet Union. (429) Webster said the KGB had never contacted him, that there was no reason for them to do so, as the government officials that had aided him in his defection had his entire story. (430) He stated he had never been questioned relative to intelligence matters. (431)

(181) File reviews revealed that Mrs. Block thought they would have been of interest to the KGB while in the Soviet Union, but that they had no knowing contact with them. (432) She said that the Soviet representative who resettled them asked a lot of questions. (433) She only recalled his inquiries about how an illegal U.S. passport, or one with a false identity, could be obtained. (434)

(182) The committee found that Ricciardelli had contact with a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Red Cross. It was the Red Cross that relocated him to Kiev. He stated that visitors to his apartment believed it to be bugged. File reviews produced no information concerning KGB contact with either Ricciardelli or Citry-

nell. Citrynell was known to have had contact with the Office of Visa and Registration and the Red Cross. The only defector requested not to make derogatory comments about the Soviet Union after leaving was Citrynell. He was asked for a signed statement concerning this by the Red Cross.

(183) Apparently, Dubinsky and Petrulli never met with any Soviet authorities other than their Intourist guides. They were refused citizenship or any type of Soviet residence visa and remained in the Soviet Union only for a short period. Dubinsky's treatment may characterize Soviet treatment of foreigners they consider mentally unbalanced.

(184) The committee found Dutkanicz and Sloboda had contact with the KGB before and after their defection to the Soviet Union. Dutkanicz was recruited in a bar in West Germany by the KGB. Upon his defection, his family was resettled in L'vov with KGB assistance. The KGB watched over Dutkanicz closely and kept in daily telephone contact with him.

(185) Sloboda, a reported KGB agent before defection, was subjected to frequent questionings by the KGB. His wife, however, reported the only Russian Intelligence Service officer she knew was the resettlement officer.

(186) In reviewing the circumstance concerning KGB contact with these 12 defectors, it could be concluded that only those having had contact with the KGB prior to their defection, had contact with Soviet intelligence afterward. This conclusion, however, would be in direct conflict with the testimony before the committee of experts in Soviet intelligence and officers who defected from the KGB.

(187) The committee received testimony that: (1) Americans entering the Soviet Union were of intelligence interest to the KGB; (2) Americans offering to defect to the Soviet Union were rare and paid particular attention to by the KGB; (3) in any case similar to that of Lee Harvey Oswald, the defector would have been debriefed for intelligence information. (435)

(188) In the cases of these defectors, representatives from the Soviet Red Cross, Intourist, the Office of Visa and Registration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB fulfill overlapping roles. In addition, KGB officers use the employees of the various other agencies as agents to gather information. It is probable that KGB officers misrepresent their employment while debriefing unknowledgeable defectors. It is also possible that the defectors misrepresented any contact they may have with foreign intelligence agencies, thus files might not accurately reflect experiences in the Soviet Union. Consequently, contact between the KGB and Lee Harvey Oswald cannot be ruled out. In most cases, the files reviewed in the FBI and CIA did not in fact contain indications of debriefing of the defectors by either agency in the United States. Thus, most individuals were never asked if the KGB had made contact with them during their stay in the Soviet Union.

ADDENDUM: AMERICAN DEBRIEFING PRACTICES

(189) The committee conducted a review of defectors' files in order to determine whether defectors other than Oswald were routinely debriefed upon their return to the United States. The committee

requested that the CIA provide a list of persons traveling to the Soviet Union during the period from 1958 to 1963, including both visitors and those persons considered by the agency to be defectors. (436) In response, the CIA provided a computer listing of 380 individuals entitled "U.S. Persons Who Have or May Have Defected to the U.S.S.R. Between 1958-1963." (437)

The Agency stated that this listing represented U.S. persons including some non-U.S. citizens who owed some measure of allegiance to the United States, who either had defected or had shown some intention of defecting to the U.S.S.R. within the requested time period. (438)

(190) As this list was compiled from a more detailed computer program on American defectors, a more detailed description concerning these individuals was requested and provided in an expanded version of the original list. This machine listing included the following information where relevant or available for each individual: name, date, and place of birth, 201 file number, arrival in Soviet Union, departure from Soviet Union, employment in Soviet Union, most current address, and other miscellaneous information compiled from the individual's 201 file and citations for/or other agency documents regarding this individual.

(191) The committee compiled a list of persons who appeared from the information available in the Agency's expanded list, to be U.S. citizens born in the United States, who defected or attempted to defect to the Soviet Union between the years of 1958 and 1963 and who returned to the United States within the same period of time. In addition, the committee included individuals from an October 1960 State Department request for information from the CIA regarding these persons whom they considered to be defectors to the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc countries. (439)

(192) The committee requested files on 29 individuals who fit the above-described criteria and the CIA provided files on 28 individuals on whom they maintained records. These 201 files were reviewed as well as any existing Domestic Contact Division files regarding these persons. The committee's files review revealed that, in the case of six of the individuals, there was no indication that they ever returned to the United States. (440) In some of these cases, the files contained a report from a source who observed or spoke with the subject and then reported the contact to the CIA, but there was no indication of direct contact with any of these persons on the part of the CIA.

(193) In regard to the other 22 defectors, the file review showed that there is no record of CIA contact with 18 of them. Again, four of these files contain reports by sources who advised the Agency of their contact. Included in this group are Joseph Dutkanicz and Morris and Mollie Block. (441) One file regarding a former military person, Bruce Frederick Davis, contained a report of a debriefing. (442)

(194) The circumstances of the CIA's contact with the four remaining defectors differed in each case. The file of Irving Amron reflected that he had actually been living in the U.S.S.R. since 1933 and returned to the United States in 1962. He was debriefed in 1964 by a CIA officer after applying for employment in response to a newspaper advertisement. (443) Another returning defector, Harold Citrynell,

was unwittingly interviewed by a CIA officer abroad upon the official's departure from the Soviet Union enroute to the United States. (444) While Citrynell's file indicated that the Agency considered it desirable that a full and controlled debriefing by the CIA and FBI be conducted and CIA wrote to the FBI suggesting a joint debriefing, there is no evidence in Citrynell's 201 file nor in any DCD documents that suggested further contact on the part of the CIA. (445)

(195) More extensive debriefings were conducted of the other two defectors. Robert E. Webster, a plastics expert with the Rand Development Corp., whose defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 was highly publicized, returned to the United States in June of 1962. (446) Webster had been employed in the Soviet Union at the Leningrad Scientific Institute of Polytechnic Plastics. (447) Shortly after his return to the United States, Webster was debriefed in home territory by CIA's representatives in conjunction with representatives from the Air Force. (448) It was decided that a more extensive debriefing was in order and Webster was subsequently brought to the Washington, D.C., area where he was debriefed for a period of 2 weeks. (449) The debriefing reports included a chronology of Webster's life and the CIA's assessment of him as well as a large body of information regarding life in the Soviet Union, Webster's work there, and biographic information on persons he had met during his residence there. (450)

(196) Likewise, Libero Ricciardelli who had lived in the Soviet Union for nearly 4 years, was contacted for purposes of debriefing soon after his return to the United States in late June of 1963. (451) His initial debriefing included such subjects as the motivation to defect to the U.S.S.R. as well as activities engaged in during his Moscow stay, relocation from Moscow to Kiev, and general aspects of life such as residence controls and costs. (452) While the CIA believed it was infeasible to debrief Ricciardelli more thoroughly due to his current status of attempting to regain U.S. citizenship, the Agency expressed an interest in eliciting more information on such topics as cost of living, medical care, consumer goods, highways, transportation, and restrictions upon travel within Kiev. (453)

(197) It becomes clear from the review of files on these defectors that debriefing of defectors by the CIA was, in fact, somewhat of a random occurrence. Nonetheless, in the instances in which the Agency did choose to debrief returning American defectors, the Agency appeared to be interested in topics of general interest regarding life in certain areas of the Soviet Union. In this regard, the persons who were debriefed were similar to Oswald in that they defected and returned within the same general time period and each spent his time in the Soviet Union in areas of interest to the CIA.

(198) It appears from an examination of all available materials that Lee Harvey Oswald was not interviewed by the CIA following his return to the United States from the Soviet Union. Although persons in a branch of the Soviet Russian division expressed an interest in interviewing Oswald, they never followed up on this interest. There was also no indication that the Office of Operations interviewed Oswald.

(199) While the CIA did conduct interviews of some tourists who visited the Soviet Union during the period 1959-63 as well as some American citizens who defected to the Soviet Union and then returned

to the United States, there was no standard policy to interview all persons in either category. Thus, the fact that Oswald was not interviewed was more the rule than the exception according to procedures followed by the CIA at that point in time.

Submitted by:

JOHANNA SMITH,
Researcher.

REFERENCES

- (1) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency, (JFK Doc. No. 014951).
- (2) Ibid.
- (3) Ibid.
- (4) Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Morris and Mollie Block (JFK Doc. No. 014935) (hereinafter FBI notes, Block).
- (5) Ibid.
- (6) Ibid.
- (7) Ibid.
- (8) See ref. 1. See also footnote 4, FBI notes, Block.
- (9) See ref. 1.
- (10) Ibid.
- (11) Ibid.
- (12) Ibid.
- (13) Ibid.
- (14) Ibid.
- (15) See ref. 4, FBI notes, Block.
- (16) Ibid.
- (17) Ibid.
- (18) Ibid.
- (19) Ibid.
- (20) Ibid.
- (21) Ibid.
- (22) Ibid.
- (23) Ibid.
- (24) See ref. 1.
- (25) Ibid.
- (26) See ref. 4, FBI notes, Block.
- (27) Ibid.
- (28) Ibid.
- (29) See ref. 1.
- (30) Ibid.
- (31) Ibid.
- (32) Ibid.
- (33) Ibid.
- (34) See ref. 4, FBI notes, Block.
- (35) Ibid.
- (36) Ibid.
- (37) Ibid.
- (38) Ibid.
- (39) Ibid; See also ref. 1.
- (40) See ref. 4, FBI notes, Block.
- (41) See ref. 1.
- (42) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014952).
- (43) Ibid.
- (44) Ibid.
- (45) Ibid.
- (46) Ibid.
- (47) Ibid: see also Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Harold Citrynell (JFK Doc. No. 014936) (hereinafter FBI notes, Citrynell).
- (48) See ref. 42.
- (49) Ibid.
- (50) Ibid.
- (51) Ibid.
- (52) Ibid.

- (53) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014995).
- (54) Ibid.
- (55) Ibid.
- (56) Ibid.
- (57) Ibid.
- (58) Ibid.
- (59) Ibid.
- (60) Ibid.
- (61) Ibid.
- (62) Ibid.
- (63) Ibid.
- (64) Ibid.
- (65) Ibid.
- (66) Ibid.
- (67) Ibid.
- (68) Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Bruce Frederick Davis (JFK Doc. No. 014937).
- (69) Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Shirley Dubinsky (JFK Doc. No. 014938) (hereinafter FBI notes, Dubinsky).
- (70) Ibid.
- (71) Ibid.
- (72) Ibid.
- (73) Ibid.
- (74) Ibid.
- (75) Ibid.
- (76) Ibid.
- (77) Ibid.
- (78) Ibid.
- (79) Ibid.
- (80) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014954).
- (81) Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Joseph Dutkanicz (JFK Doc. No. 014939) (hereinafter FBI notes, Dutkanicz).
- (82) See ref. 80.
- (83) See ref. 81, FBI notes, Dutkanicz.
- (84) Ibid.
- (85) Ibid.
- (86) See ref. 80, CIA notes.
- (87) Ibid.
- (88) Ibid.
- (89) See ref. 81, FBI notes, Dutkanicz.
- (90) See ref. 80, CIA notes.
- (91) Ibid.
- (92) Ibid.
- (93) Ibid.
- (94) Ibid; see also ref. 81, FBI notes, Dutkanicz.
- (95) Ibid.
- (96) See ref. 80, CIA notes.
- (97) Ibid.
- (98) Ibid.
- (99) Ibid.
- (100) Ibid.
- (101) See ref. 81, FBI notes, Dutkanicz.
- (102) See ref. 80, CIA notes.
- (103) Ibid.
- (104) Ibid.
- (105) Ibid.
- (106) Ibid.
- (107) Ibid.
- (108) Ibid.
- (109) Ibid.
- (110) Ibid.
- (111) Ibid; see also ref. 81, FBI notes, Dutkanicz.
- (112) See ref. 80, CIA notes.
- (113) Ibid.

- (114) Ibid.
- (115) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014957).
- (116) Ibid.
- (117) Ibid; see also Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Martin Greendlinger (JFK Doc. No. 014942) (hereinafter FBI notes, Greendlinger).
- (118) See ref. 115, CIA notes.
- (119) Ibid; see also ref. 117, FBI notes, Greendlinger.
- (120) See ref. 115, CIA notes.
- (121) Ibid.
- (122) Ibid.
- (123) Ibid.
- (124) Ibid.
- (125) Ibid.
- (126) Ibid.
- (127) Ibid.
- (128) Ibid.
- (129) Ibid.
- (130) Ibid.
- (131) Ibid.
- (132) Ibid; see also ref. 117, FBI notes, Greendlinger.
- (133) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014963).
- (134) Ibid.
- (135) Ibid.
- (136) Ibid.
- (137) Ibid.
- (138) Ibid.
- (139) Ibid.
- (140) Ibid.
- (141) Ibid.
- (142) Ibid.
- (143) Ibid.
- (144) Ibid.
- (145) Ibid.
- (146) Ibid.
- (147) Ibid.
- (148) Ibid.
- (149) Ibid.
- (150) Ibid.
- (151) Ibid.
- (152) Ibid.
- (153) Ibid.
- (154) Ibid.
- (155) Ibid.
- (156) Ibid.
- (157) Ibid.
- (158) Ibid.
- (159) Ibid.
- (160) Ibid.
- (161) Ibid.
- (162) Ibid.
- (163) Ibid.
- (164) Ibid.
- (165) Ibid.
- (166) Ibid.
- (167) Smith notes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file on Libero Ricciardelli (JFK Doc. No. 014948) (hereinafter FBI notes, Ricciardelli).
- (168) Ibid.
- (169) Ibid.; see also Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014965).
- (170) See ref. 169, CIA notes. .
- (171) Ibid.
- (172) Ibid.
- (173) Ibid.
- (174) Ibid.; see also ref. 167, FBI notes, Ricciardelli.
- (175) See ref. 169, CIA notes.

- (176) Ibid.
- (177) Ibid. ; see also ref. 167, FBI notes, Ricciardelli.
- (178) Ibid.
- (179) Ibid.
- (180) Ibid.
- (181) Ibid.
- (182) Ibid.
- (183) Ibid.
- (184) Ibid. ; see also ref. 169, CIA notes.
- (185) Ibid.
- (186) Ibid.
- (187) See ref. 167, FBI notes, Ricciardelli.
- (188) Ibid.
- (189) Ibid.
- (190) Ibid.
- (191) Ibid.
- (192) Ibid.
- (193) Ibid.
- (194) Ibid.
- (195) Ibid.
- (196) Ibid.
- (197) Ibid.
- (198) Ibid.
- (199) Ibid.
- (200) Ibid.
- (201) Ibid.
- (202) Ibid.
- (203) Ibid.
- (204) Ibid.
- (205) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014966).
- (206) Ibid.
- (207) Ibid.
- (208) Ibid.
- (209) Ibid.
- (210) Ibid.
- (211) Ibid.
- (212) Ibid.
- (213) Ibid.
- (214) Ibid.
- (215) Ibid.
- (216) Ibid.
- (217) Ibid.
- (218) Ibid.
- (219) Ibid.
- (220) Ibid.
- (221) Ibid.
- (222) Ibid.
- (223) Ibid.
- (224) Ibid.
- (225) Ibid.
- (226) Ibid.
- (227) Ibid.
- (228) Ibid.
- (229) Ibid.
- (230) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014967).
- (231) Ibid.
- (232) Smith notes from the Central Intelligence Agency Domestic Contact Division file (JFK Doc. No. 014967).
- (233) See ref. 230, staff summary, Webster.
- (234) Ibid.
- (235) Ibid.
- (236) Ibid.
- (237) Ibid.
- (238) Ibid.
- (239) Ibid.
- (240) Ibid.

- (241) Ibid.
- (242) Ibid.
- (243) Ibid.
- (244) Ibid.
- (245) Ibid.
- (246) Ibid.
- (247) Ibid.
- (248) Ibid.
- (249) Ibid.
- (250) Ibid.
- (251) Ibid.
- (252) Ibid.
- (253) Ibid.
- (254) Ibid.
- (255) Ibid.
- (256) Ibid.
- (257) Ibid.
- (258) Ibid.
- (259) Ibid.
- (260) Ibid.
- (261) Ibid.
- (262) Ibid.
- (263) Ibid.
- (264) Ibid.
- (265) Ibid.; see also ref. 232, Smith notes from CIA Domestic Contact Division, file on Webster.
- (266) See ref. 230, staff summary, Webster.
- (267) Ibid.
- (268) Ibid.
- (269) Ibid.
- (270) Ibid.
- (271) Ibid.
- (272) See ref. 232, Smith notes from CIA Domestic Contact Division, file on Webster.
- (273) See ref. 230, staff summary, Webster.
- (274) Ibid.
- (275) Ibid.
- (276) Ibid.
- (277) Ibid.
- (278) Ibid.
- (279) Ibid.
- (280) Ibid.
- (281) Ibid.
- (282) Ibid.
- (283) Ibid.
- (284) Ibid.
- (285) Ibid.
- (286) Ibid.
- (287) Ibid.
- (288) Ibid.
- (289) Ibid.; see also ref. 232, Smith notes from CIA Domestic Contact Division, file on Webster.
- (290) See ref. 232, Smith notes from CIA Domestic Contact Division, file on Webster.
- (291) Commission exhibit 984 Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), vol. XVIII, p. 402 (hereinafter Warren report volume).
- (292) Commission exhibit 985, Warren report vol. XVIII, pp. 404-405.
- (293) Ibid.
- (294) Id. at pp. 406-479.
- (295) Ibid.
- (296) Ibid.
- (297) Commission exhibit 3096, Warren report, vol. XXVI, p. 706.
- (298) FOIA Doc. No. 13-1 for review August 1976 Commission exhibit 24. Warren report, vol. XVI, pp. 94-105 (JFK Doc. No. 014933) (hereafter Oswald Diary) page numbers refer to FOIA No. 13-1 (JFK Doc. No. 014933) not Warren Commission volumes).

(299) Ibid; see also ref. 2, Commission exhibit 985, Warren report hearing, vol. XVIII, pp. 404-479.

(300) Deposition of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, May 30, 1978, Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 014724) pp 23-26; see also Brady notes, interview of X (JFK Doc. No. 015001); see also Brady notes, interview of Y (JFK Doc. No. 105000).

(301) Outside contact report (with Vladilen M. Vasev and Ikar I. Zavrazhov), June 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 008873).

(302) Ibid.

(303) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 419.

(304) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, pp. 162-163.

(305) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, pp. 408-409.

(306) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 1.

(307) Ibid.

(308) Ibid.

(309) Ibid.

(310) Ibid.

(311) Ibid.

(312) Id. at pp. 1-2.

(313) Id. at p. 2.

(314) Ibid.

(315) Ibid.

(316) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Commission, vol. XVIII, p. 466.

(317) Ibid.

(318) Id. at pp. 464, 470.

(319) Id. at pp. 470-471.

(320) Id. at pp. 461-465, 473.

(321) Id. at pp. 465, 472.

(322) Id. at p. 461.

(323) Id. at p. 462.

(324) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, pp. 2-3.

(325) Ibid., pp. 3-4; see also Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 461.

(326) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 3.

(327) Ibid.

(328) Id. at p. 4.

(329) Ibid.

(330) Ibid.

(331) Ibid.

(332) Ibid.

(333) Deposition of Richard E. Snyder, June 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 18 (JFK Doc. No. 009264).

(334) Id. at pp. 18-19.

(335) Id. at p. 53.

(336) Staff interview of Richard E. Snyder, April 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Doc. No. 007488).

(337) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 5.

(338) Ibid.

(339) Commission exhibit 2716, Warren Report, vol. XXVI, p. 90.

(340) Ibid.

(341) Ibid.

(342) Ibid.

(343) Commission exhibit 2717, Warren Report, vol. XXVI, p. 91; see also ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 21.

(344) Ibid.

(345) Ibid.

(346) Ibid.

(347) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 6.

(348) Ibid.

(349) Ibid.

(350) Id. at pp. 6-7.

(351) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, pp. 404, 408-409.

(352) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 7.

(353) Ibid.

(354) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 414.

(355) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 7.

(356) Id. at pp. 7-8.

(357) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, pp. 424-427.

- (358) Id. at pp. 428-429.
- (359) Id. at p. 433.
- (360) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, pp. 8-9.
- (361) Id. at p. 9.
- (362) Ibid.
- (363) Id. at p. 12.
- (364) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, pp. 415-416.
- (365) Id. at p. 430.
- (366) Commission exhibit 932, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 133.
- (367) Ibid.
- (368) Ibid.
- (369) Ibid.
- (370) Ibid.
- (371) Ibid.
- (372) Commission exhibit 933, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 135.
- (373) Ibid.
- (374) Commission exhibit 940, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 151.
- (375) Ibid.
- (376) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 13.
- (377) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 450.
- (378) Ibid., see also ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 13.
- (379) Commission exhibit 986, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, pp. 529-530.
- (380) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, pp. 13-14.
- (381) Commission exhibit 936, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 142.
- (382) Ibid.
- (383) Ibid.
- (384) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, pp. 14-15.
- (385) Commission exhibit 935, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 137.
- (386) Ibid.
- (387) Ibid.
- (388) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, pp. 8-9.
- (389) Commission exhibit 935, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 137
- (390) Id. at p. 138.
- (391) Id. at p. 137.
- (392) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 8.
- (393) Commission exhibit 935, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 138.
- (394) Id. at p. 137.
- (395) Ibid.
- (396) Ibid.
- (397) Ibid.
- (398) Ibid.
- (399) Id. at p. 138.
- (400) Ibid.
- (401) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 15.
- (402) Ibid.
- (403) Ibid.
- (404) Ibid.
- (405) Ibid.
- (406) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, pp. 437-439.
- (407) Id. at p. 442.
- (408) Id. at p. 444.
- (409) Id. at p. 433.
- (410) Ibid.
- (411) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 16.
- (412) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, pp. 419-429.
- (413) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, pp. 16-17.
- (414) Commission exhibit 985, Warren Report, vol. XVIII, p. 423.
- (415) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, p. 17.
- (416) Id. at p. 18.
- (417) Warren Report, vol. V, p. 274.
- (418) Id. at p. 278.
- (419) Id. at p. 617.
- (420) Osgood Caruthers, "Soviet to Issue New Ruble and Put Worth at \$1.11," New York Times, November 15, 1960, p. 1; see also, Harby Schwartz, "Soviet Hints Rich Cut Ruble Hoards," New York Times, October 23, 1960, p. 25; see also Max Frankel, "Soviet Will Revalue Ruble: Income Tax to End by '65," New York Times, May 6, 1960, p. 1 (JFK Doc. No. 015002).

- (421) Commission exhibit 25, Warren Report, vol. XVI, p. 121.
- (422) See footnote 53, CIH notes.
- (423) Commission exhibit 25, Warren Report, vol. XVI, p. 121.
- (424) See ref. 298, Oswald Diary, pp. 8-14, 16, 19-20.
- (425) Commission exhibit 1403, Warren Report, vol. XVII, p. 774.
- (426) Commission exhibit 1401, Warren Report, vol. XXII, p. 754.
- (427) Ibid.
- (428) Outside contact report (with Vladillen Mr. Vasev and Ikar I. Zavrazh-nov) June 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Doc. No. 008873).
- (429) Staff interview of Robert E. Webster, Mar. 16, 1978, House Select Com-mittee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Doc. No. 014999).
- (430) Ibid.
- (431) Ibid.
- (432) See ref. 4, FBI notes, Block.
- (433) Ibid.
- (434) Ibid.
- (435) Deposition of David E. Murphy, Aug. 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 14-15, 16-18 (JFK Doc. No. 014723); see also executive session testimony, DC SB. Nov. 16, 1978, hearing before Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 24-25; see also testimony of John Limond Hart, Sept. 15, 1978, hearing before the Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress 2d Ses-sion, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, vol. III, p. 526-27; see also notes, staff interview of May 19, 1978 (JFK Doc. No. 015001); see also notes staff interview of Nosenko, May 30, 1978 (JFK Doc. No. 015003).
- (436) Letter from House Select Committee on Assassinations to CIA, Jan. 6, 1978.
- (437) Attachment to CIA memorandum Jan. 27, 1978.
- (438) Ibid.
- (439) Letter from Hugh S. Cumming to Richard M. Bissell, Oct. 25, 1960.
- (440) Among the six defectors who did not return to the United States were Martin and Mitchell.
- (441) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014954).
- (442) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014952).
- (443) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency.
- (444) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014952).
- (445) Ibid.
- (446) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014967).
- (447) Ibid.
- (448) Ibid.
- (449) Ibid.
- (450) Ibid.
- (451) Classified staff summary of review of the Central Intelligence Agency (JFK Doc. No. 014965).
- (452) Ibid.
- (453) Ibid.



OSWALD IN THE SOVIET UNION:
AN INVESTIGATION OF YURI NOSENKO

Staff Report
of the
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Ninety-fifth Congress
Second Session

March 1979

CONTENTS

	Page
I. Excerpts of Testimony of Yuri Nosenko before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, June 20, 1978-----	477
II. Statement of Yuri Nosenko made to House Select Committee on Assassinations, August 7, 1978-----	525
III. Excerpts of Deposition of Bruce Solie before House Select Committee on Assassinations, June 1, 1978-----	529
IV. Excerpts of Deposition of David Murphy before House Select Committee on Assassinations, August 9, 1978-----	531
V. Excerpts of Deposition of James C. Michaels, July 27, 1978, and Alekso Pop-tanich, August 11, 1978, before the House Select Committee on Assassinations-----	535
VI. Letters of Central Intelligence Agency of September 1, 1978, and Federal Bureau of Investigation of January 8, 1978-----	541
VII. Testimony of the Deputy Chief S.B. Division before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, November 16, 1978-----	571

INTRODUCTION

A hearing held before the committee on September 15, 1978, considered aspects of the information that Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB defector, had relative to Lee Harvey Oswald. It also considered the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in handling Nosenko and his information. These materials supplement that hearing.

I. EXCERPTS OF TESTIMONY OF YURI NOSENKO BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, JUNE 20, 1978

The initial phase of the committee's investigation of Yuri Nosenko focused primarily on a file review. Only by carefully reading and analyzing the voluminous Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency files on Nosenko could it begin to evaluate Nosenko's information on Oswald and understand the complex series of events of the last 14 years, during which Nosenko went from being a virtual prisoner, kept in solitary confinement, to a CIA consultant.

Once the files were read, the investigation moved into a different phase that consisted of the questioning of many of the individuals who had been involved with Nosenko over the years. They included Richard Helms, past director of the CIA, CIA division and deputy division chiefs, interrogators and polygraph operators. Former KGB officers were also interviewed, and most importantly, the committee spent hours questioning Nosenko himself.

The first individuals interviewed by the committee were two former KGB officers. They provided the committee with background and operational material about the KGB. They explained its internal structure, its goals and the functions of various sections. They were questioned extensively about KGB techniques and procedures. From them, the committee received information concerning such relevant topics as the KGB attitude toward American defectors, KGB recruitment of foreigners, KGB control over those entering and exiting the country and KGB debriefing and surveillance techniques.

There were two factors, however, that significantly limited the value of the information supplied to the committee by these ex-KGB officers: (1) Neither had been assigned to the same KGB directorate as Nosenko, and (2) one of them had information about the KGB that was outdated.

It was after speaking to these two men that the committee began interviewing Yuri Nosenko. Nosenko was cooperative during these sessions and spoke at length about his life, his defection, the treatment he received from the CIA and about Lee Harvey Oswald. Nosenko was interviewed by the committee on three different occasions. The first two sessions lasted all day and the third was approxi-

mately 2 hours, during the course of which he gave the committee a sworn deposition. Then, on June 19 and 20, 1978, Nosenko was questioned at an executive session of the committee. Questions and answers from the second day of that executive session follow :

EXCERPTS OF TESTIMONY OF YURI NOSENKO BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS, JUNE 20, 1978

Mr. KLEIN. You have testified before this committee that the KGB did not allow Lee Harvey Oswald to defect because he was uninteresting. You have testified the KGB did not even speak to Lee Harvey Oswald because he was uninteresting; and that you decided he was not interesting without speaking to him.

Do you know what year Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. NOSENKO. 1959.

Mr. KLEIN. In 1959, approximately how many Americans wanted to defect to the Soviet Union or requested permission to defect?

Mr. NOSENKO. There was a defector, I remember, one of the employees, one of the workers, who was helping to organize the American exhibition in Moscow, Mr. Webster.

Mr. KLEIN. Without giving particular names, how many Americans would you say asked permission to defect in 1959?

What would the number be?

Mr. NOSENKO. These two were known to me—Oswald and Webster.

Mr. KLEIN. From 1955 to 1960, what would be your best estimate as to how many Americans asked permission to defect to the Soviet Union?

Mr. NOSENKO. As far as I heard, there I think was one only.

Mr. KLEIN. One other, meaning three altogether.

Mr. NOSENKO. One besides Oswald and Webster, what I know.

Mr. KLEIN. Three?

Mr. NOSENKO. Three.

Mr. KLEIN. Of the three, was Oswald the only one turned down because he was uninteresting?

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know any other defector who was ever turned down because he was uninteresting?

Mr. NOSENKO. No.

Allow me to tell, as you have seen, and you told yourselves, how many Americans are defected. It is a very rare occasion and KGB prefers defection when they are planning, they want, these types of defectors, they like and invite those people who can give them certain information which is valuable.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall telling this committee yesterday that up until 1960 the Seventh Department was recruiting left and right?

Mr. NOSENKO. Absolutely right.

Mr. KLEIN. And that you recruited an individual who was——

Mr. NOSENKO. I simply had given example of this recruitment which took place up to 1960. When Seventh Department was recruiting and giving files to the Intelligence Service, First Chief Directorate, not asking them before, is it person will be for them valuable or not.

Mr. KLEIN. And that KGB officers were getting bonus and promotions when they recruited people?

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. And despite that, Lee Harvey Oswald, when he asked to defect, you turned him down without even speaking to him, to find out if he had any information; is that right?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, we had quite a few recruitments in 1959, a very big amount of them in 1959, very interesting, much, much more interesting—professors and teachers—and another individual—we had quite a few recruitments, and Oswald was nothing on this base, on this foundation.

Mr. KLEIN. Would the KGB have any interest in an American student?

Mr. NOSENKO. As I told you yesterday, KGB interested in students, but particularly those students who are studying the Russian language, Russian history, Russian economy.

Mr. KLEIN. And would they have any interest in an American who had strong anti-American views and who was a professed Marxist? Would they have any interest in that kind of person?

Mr. NOSENKO. Here we are coming to a very interesting and sensitive question. From mid-1950, by the order of Central Committee Communist Party, Soviet Union, KGB was prohibited to make any approachment and recruitment of members of the Communist Party of the West.

Mr. KLEIN. I am not asking about a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. NOSENKO. Your question is, and if he is some type of Marxist here, the question may be he is possibly a member of the Communist Party, and to check it for KGB very difficult if he is a member of Communist Party or not of his country.

Mr. KLEIN. Would they ask him if he is a member of the Communist Party? Would they check it?

Mr. NOSENKO. No; they would not ask him.

Mr. KLEIN. They wouldn't ask him?

Mr. NOSENKO. No.

Mr. KLEIN. Would the Soviet Union be interested in someone who was in the military and worked with radar equipment?

Mr. NOSENKO. It depends. If he was corporal, private, is no big interest. If he was officer, maybe they would be interested.

Mr. KLEIN. The fact that he worked with the equipment wouldn't be enough; they would want to know what his rank was?

Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir, it is not enough because they had sources.

Mr. KLEIN. And in 1959 would the Soviet Union have been interested in someone who served as a radar operator on an air base where U-2's took off and landed?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir, it would be very interested.

Mr. KLEIN. It is your testimony that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was a student, who was a professed Marxist, who had—

Mr. NOSENKO. Students? I never heard that he was a student.

Mr. KLEIN [continuing]. Who had been a radar operator and had worked on a base from which U-2 airplanes took off and landed, that he wasn't even interesting enough for the KGB to speak to him, to find out if he knew any of this information?

Mr. NOSENKO. Mr. Klein, I understand your position, but we didn't know that he had any connection with U-2 flights. That is one thing.

And if you, Mr. Klein, are basing on what was written by Mr. Epstein in the book, it is a little bit from the air taken ideas. Mr. Epstein even telling that how important for KGB to know about such base—that base. We knew it in the fifties when I worked in GRU at the Navy, in 1950, 1951, 1952. We knew every base and in Japan, at this Atsugi base, and we knew what kind of airplanes had been. We didn't know about U-2, no. Sure, it is very interesting, but when Oswald applied, requested to stay in the Soviet Union, we didn't know a word about his knowledge, anything concerning U-2 flights.

Mr. KLEIN. And you didn't ask him if he had any kind of information about that when he wanted to defect, is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. No.

Mr. KLEIN. And you told us that one reason that no one was working on Oswald was because all of your people were concentrating on the American exhibition in 1959, is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir. Not only American exhibition, there were other tourists and among them were interesting targets, very interesting targets.

Mr. KLEIN. You told us yesterday that things didn't—

Mr. NOSENKO. I can explain you why, because an American exhibition in Moscow was by the information which KGB had, I don't know how much it's right, how much it's wrong, but it was suspected quite a number of people from American intelligence community who were working on American Exhibition in Moscow, and when the work is going on against such targets, it is not one officer, it is a big amount of people involved on each case, because it is very serious target.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know what date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that this document be marked for identification and shown to the witness.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection.

[The document referred to was marked as JFK exhibit No. F-2 for identification.]

JFK EXHIBIT F-2

[Doc. 1A]

GRATIS

JFK F 2

VISA AND REGISTRATION OFFICE
 INTERIOR DEPARTMENT
 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
 OF THE
 MOSCOW CITY COUNCIL

Surname: Oswald

Given name: Lee

Father's [middle] name: Harvey

A P P L I C A T I O N

I request the issuance-extension of an identity card for

 (indicate what kind)

I hereby give the following information about myself:

1. Citizenship: American
2. Year, month, and date of birth: October 18, 1939
3. Place of birth: New Orleans (USA)
4. Nationality: American
5. Marital status: single
6. Citizenship of husband/wife: [blank]
7. Date and year of birth of children up to 16 years of age, etc: [blank]
for the first time:
8. When did you enter the USSR/ October 16, 1959
9. How many other times have you been in the USSR, etc: never
10. When, under what number and by whom were you last issued an
entry visa for the USSR:[?] No. 403339, by Consul [name?]
of the USSR in Helsinki.

- 2 -

11. Date and place of last crossing of the USSR border: Vyborg,
Oct. 15, 1959.
12. Purpose of coming to the USSR: [blank]
13. Occupation: Student
14. Place of work: [blank]
15. Address in Moscow: Hotel Metropole, house No. 201, Militia
District: 50

I submit the following documents:

1. National passport No. 1733242. Expiration date: September 10, 1961
2. Identity card: Series P NO: 311479
Issued on: January 4, 1960. By: [illegible signature].
Expires on: January 4, 1961.
3. Four photographs

RELATIVES LIVING IN THE USSR

Surname, given names	Relationship	Citizenship	Place of residence and employment
none			

RELATIVES LIVING ABROAD

Surname, given names	Relationship	Citizenship	Place of residence and employment
Mother in the USA Margaret Oswald	Mother	USA	3124 West 5th St. Fort Worth Texas

Date: December 29, 1959 Signature of applicant: [signed] Lee H. Oswald

Technical remarks:

[Text in English signed by Lee H. Oswald]

[The following Russian text is a translation of Oswald's statement in English]

I have no passport because I have given that document to the American Consul in Moscow. I request an identity card for purposes of residing in the Soviet Union, since I am without citizenship (nationality).
Translated by Shironova.

[Doc. 1A]

GRATIS

VISA AND REGISTRATION OFFICE
INTERIOR DEPARTMENT
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE
MOSCOW CITY COUNCIL

Surname: Oswald

Given name: Lee

Father's [middle] name: Harvey

APPLICATION

I request the issuance-extension of an identity card for

(indicate what kind)I hereby give the following information about myself:

1. Citizenship: American
2. Year, month, and date of birth: October 18, 1939
3. Place of birth: New Orleans (USA)
4. Nationality: American
5. Marital status: single
6. Citizenship of husband/wife: [blank]
7. Date and year of birth of children up to 16 years of age, etc: [blank]
for the first time;
8. When did you enter the USSR/ October 16, 1959
9. How many other times have you been in the USSR, etc: never
10. When, under what number and by whom were you last issued an
entry visa for the USSR:[?] No. 403339, by Consul [name?]
of the USSR in Helsinki.

- 2 -

11. Date and place of last crossing of the USSR border: Vyborg,
Oct. 15, 1959.
12. Purpose of coming to the USSR: [blank]
13. Occupation: Student
14. Place of work: [blank]
15. Address in Moscow: Hotel Metropole, house No. 201, Militia
District: 50

I submit the following documents:

1. National Passport No. 1733242. Expiration date: September 10, 1961
2. Identity Card: Series P NO: 311479
Issued on: January 4, 1960. By: [illegible signature].
Expires on: January 4, 1961.
3. Four photographs

RELATIVES LIVING IN THE USSR

Surname, given names	Relationship	Citizenship	Place of residence and employment
none			

RELATIVES LIVING ABROAD

Surname, given names	Relationship	Citizenship	Place of residence and employment
Mother in the USA Margaret Oswald	Mother	USA	3124 West 5th St. Fort Worth Texas

Date: December 29, 1959 Signature of applicant: [signed]
Lee H. Oswald

Technical remarks:

[Text in English signed by Lee H. Oswald]

[The following Russian text is a translation of Oswald's statement in English]:

I have no passport because I have given that document to the American Consul in Moscow. I request an identity card for purposes of residing in the Soviet Union, since I am without citizenship (nationality). Translated by Shironova.

БЕСПЛАТНО

В ОТДЕЛ СНО И РЕГИСТРАЦИИ УОД ИЗОБРЕТЕНИЙ И ПТО

Фамилия Освальд
 Имя Ли
 Отчество Харвей

Заявление

Прошу о выдаче-продлении вида на жительство для (непущное заче)

указать какого вида

Сообщаю о себе следующие сведения:

1. Гражданство Американское
 2. Год, месяц и число рождения 18 Октября 1939
 3. Место рождения Новый Орлеан (США)
 4. Национальность Американец
 5. В браке нет состоят
 6. Гражданство мужа-жены —
 7. Имя и год рожд. детей до 16-летнего возраста, совместно проживающих, их гражданство
 8. Когда прибыл впервые в СССР 25.10.1959
 9. Сколько раз еще были в СССР, где и время пребывания не был

10. Когда, за каким № и кем была выдана виза из-за границы СССР в последний раз 9/Виза № 403339 Консул СССР в Нью-Йорке
 11. Дата и место пересзда границы СССР в последний раз Выборг 15/10-59
 12. Цель приезда в СССР Студент
 13. Профессия или занятие Студент
 14. Место работы —
 15. Местожительство в гор. Москве, ул. госп. "Метрополит"
 дом № 201, кв. № 50, отделению милиции 50/10/м.

Прилагаю следующие документы

1. Национальный паспорт за № 173324 10 выданный (кем и где)
 сроком до 10/1/9 1961 г.
 2. Вид на жительство для — серия — 195 г.
 выданный (кем и где)
 сроком до — 195 г.
 3. 4 фотокарточки

Роден: Ленин, промишленост за град

29. XII 1959 г. Подпись заявителя *Л. П. Овощ*

ТЕХНИЧЕСКИЕ ОТМЕТКИ: _____

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 15028 (Doc. 2A)

RECEIPT

I, Lee Harvey Oswald, hereby acknowledge that the residence and travel regulations for persons without citizenship and the responsibility for violating such regulations have been explained to me.

1/5/59

Translation of text done by Intourist translator

R. [?] Shironova

Identity Card Series P No. 311479 received 1/5/1960

[s] Lee H. Oswald

Shironova

*Мне г-н Олдинг на первой встрече подробно
рассказал и разъяснил жилищно-бытовые
условия и ответственность за нарушение этого
порядка.*

5/1-59г.

Копия моего письма передана иммиграции

L. H. Oswald

Копия моего письма передана иммиграции
5/1-1960г. L. H. Oswald

Mr. KLEIN. Looking at this document——

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Chairman STOKES. Did counsel want to identify for the record how the document has been marked?

Ms. BERNING. JFK F-2.

Mr. KLEIN. Looking at this document, does it say on the top "Visa and Registration Office, Interior Department, Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council"?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recognize that type of document?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes. It is from Department of Giving Visas and Registrations, which is working under auspices of Directorate of Internal Affairs of Moscow City.

Mr. KLEIN. And does this appear to be an authentic document, an authentic copy of the document?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sure.

Mr. KLEIN. Looking at No. 8, does it say what date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union for the first time?

Mr. NOSENKO. October 1959.

Mr. KLEIN. October what?

Mr. NOSENKO. October 16, 1959.

Mr. KLEIN. I would ask that this document be marked for identification, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection.

Would the clerk indicate for the record?

Ms. BERNING. JFK F-3, Mr. Chairman.

[The document referred to was marked as JFK exhibit No. F-3 for identification.]

American Exhibition Put Ideas Of U.S. Across, Analyst Finds

Psychologist Lauds the Effectiveness of Guides—'Family of Man' Photo Display Had Greatest Impact

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times.

MOSCOW, Sept. 4.—The United States Government has given itself a B+ in popularity and an A+ in communicating ideas at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, which closed this evening.

This is the verdict of a critical and painstakingly prepared report card on the exhibition that will be studied by Washington in the months to come. It rates the effectiveness of the many displays and analyzes the reactions of Russians to the first direct American propaganda effort inside the Soviet Union.

The critique, conducted since the opening of the fair July 30, has been prepared under the supervision of Ralph K. White of the United States Information Agency. Mr. White, a psychologist who has specialized in public opinion and the psychological causes of war, has worked for the Government for

He has systematically and repeatedly interviewed all guides and workers at the fair, watched the crowds, analyzed the comment books, studied the Russians' preferences as registered on the voting machines and the questions asked of the electronic answering machine and has collected hundreds of comments overheard.

Message Got Across

His report and any additions that may be made by the general manager of the fair, Harold McClellan, are not public. But the fair officials' final thoughts can be summarized as follows:

The exhibition enjoyed a "moderate success" in popularity, with 2,700,000 visitors. In communicating ideas that Americans would like to get across to the Russian people, its success was "simply tremendous." The seventy-five young guides and several other Russian-speaking specialists who spoke

with visitors and answered their questions considerably increased goodwill toward the United States.

While not all they said was necessarily believed, Russians once offered many Russians their first chance to hear the American side of things.

The fair was most effective in leading many Russians toward taking an open mind on opportunities available to the common man in the United States. It also successfully suggested that the United States was a middle-of-the-road country, with elements of Social Security, unemployment benefits and educational opportunities for ambitious youngsters of all strata.

This "family of man" photographic exhibit was given top rating in "total impact." There is evidence that, while the general public was most taken with the color television and the automobiles, students and the young, intelligent Russians whom the Americans most want to meet—preferred the "family of man." It had a depth that moved the Russians, whereas the cars and television caused more "impersonal admiration."

While it was clearly not ordinary propaganda, the United States was recognized as the source of the exhibit's human appeal.

Visitors said "why haven't you shown us your best?" considerably more often than "you're exaggerating." Washington will be told the following relating to the attitudes of Russian visitors:

A great majority of Russians may be described as pro-American as well as clearly pro-Soviet. They admire the United States and its people without necessarily favoring its system of government.

The Russians have great tolerance—greater than the organizers of the fair had thought—for almost any amount of material and propaganda favorable to the United States, as long as it does not depreciate the Soviet Union.

The Russians are aroused about the rearming of West Germany and were most interested to attempt to justify from that in the model house and apartment.

While the abstract paintings were important to demonstrate freedom of expression, especially when properly explained, nearly all the abstract sculpture encountered disinterest or hostility.

Lessons Suggested

Washington will receive the following advice about future exhibitions in the Soviet Union: The number of guides should be doubled and they should be free from housekeeping duties.

Circarama, the 360-degree film travelogue, gratified the Russians' evident desire for travel abroad. There should be at least two or more such films to serve more visitors.

The Russians' expectation of more technical displays might be met inexpensively by having three or four times as many machines in motion and providing more technical information about existing displays such as

air-conditioners and business machines, scientific demonstrations and films of industrial processes.

There should be as much emphasis on consumer goods, but half a dozen instead of two dozen cars might be sufficient. The architectural display should be dropped or drastically improved and half the number of toys and sporting goods would suffice.

Relatively less effective than most displays were the children's playground, the bookmobile, the static packaging exhibit and the furniture aside from that in the model house and apartment.

While the abstract paintings were important to demonstrate freedom of expression, especially when properly explained, nearly all the abstract sculpture encountered disinterest or hostility.

U.S. FAIR IN SOVIET JAMMED AT CLOSE

Total Attendance Reached 2,700,000 — Goodwill of Crowds Is Marked

By OSGOOD CARUTHERS
Special to The New York Times.

MOSCOW, Sept. 4 — The American National Exhibition closed in Moscow tonight, with a record crowd of nearly 150,000 visitors on the final day.

In its six-week run some 2,700,000 persons from the farthest reaches of Siberia to the Baltic and from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea, got their first glimpse of American life.

The Soviet exhibition in the New York Coliseum, which closed Aug. 10 after a forty-two-day run, drew 1,100,000 visitors, "the highest attendance of anything in New York since the World's Fair," a Coliseum official said.

Good will permeated the throngs of pushing people today, many of whom had waited through a cold and rainy night for the gates to open.

Crowd Well Behaved
The fair authorities, who had requested police reinforcements

in anticipation of the pandemonium that usually accompanied the closing of a fair, reported that the throngs who nearly filled the 400,000-square-yard site were remarkably self-controlled.

The uniformed militiamen and plainclothes men had their hands full, however, maintaining the almost endless serpentine lines at the more popular displays.

Until the last days were turned out in the dim and glassed pavilions and under the bare trees of the site in Sokolniki Park, the seventy-five Russian-speaking American guides were besieged by thousands of questions about life, politics, culture, industry, science and all problems extant in the United States.

Many of the guides had made contacts with Soviet citizens, young and old, that they did not want to break off, and there were scores of tentative parting and exchanges of addresses, addresses and conversations that were testimony to the impact of the fair on what one guide described as "Moscow's hierarchy and lowerarchy."

Up to the last minutes, there were numerous complaints that not enough American technology, as well as its end products, was displayed. Yet by far the most popular exhibit was Edward Steichen's "Family of Man" display of photographs.

A line of five deep stilled near the entrance to this display, wound around the great golden geodesic dome and snaked back and forth several hundred yards.

Soviet to Get Buildings
Behind the scenes, negotiations still were in progress as to the final disposition of the displays and installations. The Soviet Government agreed at the beginning to purchase the golden dome and fan-shaped glass pavilion for \$375,000.

The fair director, Harold C. McClellan, has proposed that all the other permanent installations be handed over to the Soviet authorities, along with some of the items on display, in exchange for services and labor to dismantle the fair.

Other items, including most of the automobiles, are to go to the State Department, some to the embassy here and the rest for embassies in Western Europe. A large number of items will be given to representatives of the Fund Development Corporation here, who will dispose of them as agents of various exhibitors.

Meanwhile at the American fair, the fashion show drew its final and probably most enthusiastic crowd. When the commentator Vera Bacall of New York said in a final little speech, "See you all in America!" there

was an appreciative gasp. Then Miss Bacall, speaking in fluent English, said, "Friends, catch in her thrice it. 'Friends, we will never forget you.' The crowd cheered and screamed for flowers that the models threw into the air."

Mr. KLEIN. Looking at the newspaper article clipping, on the right-hand side, with the heading "U.S. Fair in Soviet Jammed at Close," do you see that?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. And what is the date of that story?

Mr. NOSENKO. The date is September 4.

Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware of the fact that the American Exhibition ended on September 4, more than a month before Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. NOSENKO. Mr. Klein, I would like you to ask when Americans who were working for this exhibition left Moscow.

Mr. KLEIN. I will ask you another question.

Yesterday, when I asked you if things got back to normal once the fair ended, did you say yes?

Mr. NOSENKO. No; till they were leave the Soviet Union. No. They are the same targets. OK, you are right, it is closed September 4, but does it change the importance of these people against whom the KGB was working? They were still in Moscow.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall yesterday my asking you, did things in your department get back to normal once the fair ended, and do you recall saying yes?

Mr. NOSENKO. Well, I meaning fair ended when left all the people involved in work on American Exhibition, Americans when they left, and they were staying quite a long time after it was closed. It was closed for visits for Soviet citizens, but it took quite a time for them to leave.

Mr. KLEIN. You also testified yesterday that Lee Harvey Oswald was allowed to stay in the Soviet Union after he said that he was going to kill himself if they sent him home. You told us that he slashed his wrist and two psychiatrists examined him and both found him mentally unstable.

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. What was the point of having two psychiatrists examine him?

Mr. NOSENKO. I think simply to be assured that it was right found decision, concerning this person. Two independent.

Mr. KLEIN. After they examined him, the decision was made to let him stay; is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. It is not because of the examination he was allowed to stay, Mr. Klein. You are a little bit mixing things. He was allowed to stay because KGB and Soviet Government had come to the conclusion if this person will kill himself it will be reaction in newspapers, which can in any way hurt the starting, the warming of Soviet-American relations.

Mr. KLEIN. The Soviets were worried he would kill himself in the Soviet Union?

Mr. NOSENKO. Right, if they would not allow him to stay.

Mr. KLEIN. Could the KGB have taken him and put him on the next plane out of Russia and thereby ended their whole problem with Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. NOSENKO. It is a very sensitive question. He can jump out of car. If he decided, if he is mentally unstable, you don't know what he will do.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you think the KGB didn't do that because they were worried he might jump out of the car or do something like that?

Mr. NOSENKO. Simply a mentally unstable person, they didn't want to go it on any such action.

Mr. KLEIN. They would rather keep him in the Soviet Union?

Mr. NOSENKO. No; they would rather prefer they washed their hands, Mr. Klein; they are not making decision, KGB. In Soviet Union decisions are made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and General Secretary and Politburo, not by KGB. KGB a servant of the Politburo and Central Committee Communist Party.

Mr. KLEIN. Going by the facts as you have told them to the Committee—

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Why wasn't he put on a plane and sent back to America?

Mr. NOSENKO. KGB washed their hands. Then from Intourist it was given information Ministry of Foreign Trade; Ministry of Foreign Trade reported to the Soviet Government. As I said, I assumed the chairman was surely asked; he told his opinion of the KGB, and up to the Soviet Government how they would decide.

Mr. KLEIN. Could he have been brought to the U.S. Embassy and told them he is an American, "You take care of him; we don't want him"?

Mr. NOSENKO. It can be done, sure. It can be done, but it wasn't done.

Mr. KLEIN. Instead they elected to allow him to stay indefinitely in the Soviet Union and they have to worry about him every single day, what an unstable American would do, is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. They didn't allow, KGB didn't allow. Soviet Government allowed.

Mr. KLEIN. The facts as you have testified to them are that the KGB allowed this mentally unstable person to stay in Russia, and they sent him to Minsk to live and work in a radio factory. Then the KGB allowed this mentally unstable individual to marry a Soviet woman, and then this mentally unstable individual was allowed to join a hunting club where he had access to a gun.

Can you think of any other cases in all the time you worked in the KGB where a mentally unstable person was treated in this manner?

Mr. NOSENKO. I told you I do not know any other cases of mentally unstable, excluding one code clerk, American, was also mentally ill; he was delivered in Soviet Union. I heard it. I never have worked with him, I never have seen him. And the thing is, I am sorry, but you are putting and stressing a number of questioning, and it sounds so peculiar. What does it mean, KGB allow him to marry?

Mr. Klein, in the Soviet Union there is by decree of Presidium of Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R. a law allowing marriage of Soviet citizens with foreign. A foreigner can marry a Soviet citizen, by the law. There is not a thing that KGB can in any way try not to give, not make it possible, but this is in cases when the person who is marrying a foreigner worked in some sensitive place, let's say, in missiles, rocket industry production, was in process of any place of his working seeing classified material. In these cases, KGB will try to put different type of fences. But it is unlawful. In accordance with Soviet law, marriage is allowed; he doesn't need to ask permission of Soviet Government or anyone. And his wife, Marina, wasn't working in any place which was sensitive from the point of view of Soviet security.

Mentally unstable it doesn't mean that he is raving mad; it is mentally unstable.

Mr. KLEIN. You testified that not only was Oswald not spoken to when he first said he wanted to defect but even after the decision was made to allow him to remain in the Soviet Union, still nobody from the KGB spoke to him, is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. You also testified to the extensive resources that were devoted to put physical and technical surveillance on Oswald. You told us the men involved, the time involved, the facilities involved?

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you find great contradiction—

Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir.

Mr. KLEIN [continuing]. In the fact that, on the one hand, you put all these resources into following Oswald around, trying to see who he talked to and what he did and, on the other hand, you didn't even have a person go and talk to him and say, "Tell us your background; tell us about yourself."

Is there any contradiction?

Mr. NOSENKO. Even in the United States, yes, sure, for you, for me just now American citizens, yes, sure, but there, no.

Mr. KLEIN. They don't talk to people there?

Mr. NOSENKO. They can talk and cannot to talk, but I don't see any contradiction there. Anyone, any foreigner who will be staying, even if this defector not on his own, but, let's say, KGB pushed him to stay, to defect, he still will be watched and on him will be put this same type of work that was put on Oswald, not less.

Mr. KLEIN. You talk about their society being different than ours. It is unusual that they allow an American to defect and live there without ever questioning him, to ask him if he is an intelligence agent?

Mr. NOSENKO. On the contrary, no doubt, let's say he was intelligence agent, what he will tell them that he was sent with mission as intelligence agent? Why to scare him? Let him live how he wants. We will be watching him. He will show by his behavior, by his action.

Mr. KLEIN. They purposely don't speak to him; is that your testimony?

Mr. NOSENKO. In this case they didn't speak to him because he didn't present interest for the KGB and because he was mentally unstable.

Mr. KLEIN. You testified that you read the reports of two psychiatrists who examined Lee Harvey Oswald at the hospital after he cut his wrist, is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. You said both found him mentally unstable?

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. You told us in great detail how the decision was made to have these psychiatrists examine him.

I would ask that this document be marked for identification.

Chairman STOKES. The clerk will identify for the record the number appearing on the document.

Ms. BERNING. It will be JFK No. F-4.

[The document referred to was marked as JFK exhibit No. F-4 for identification.]

JFK EXHIBIT F-4

[Doc. IC 2]

MINISTRY OF HEALTH
OF THE
USSR

(Property on receipt)

Botkin Hospital

MEDICAL HISTORY NO. 313

Patient referred from Bldg. No. 26. 23-10-59

[Ad]mitted 13 h. [1 p.m.] 23-10-1959

[Dis]charged 28 Oct. 1959

Dept.: Bldg. 7, "B"

Dept. 1, [36 or 3b ?]

Days spent in the hospital: 7

Name: Oswald, Lee Harvey

Age: 20, Nationality: American

Education: high school

Works independ.

Lives in (address): Moscow

Perm. residence: in the city

Hotel Berlin, Rm. 320

Result of the treatment:

Place of Employment: K - 4 - 19 - 80 Service

Improvement [?] 35.8

Bureau, Radio-technician

Work capacity: Tempor.

[Admitted] For continuation of treatment

disabled

Clinical diagnosis: incised wound of the
left forearm, 1/3 [first third?]

At the time of discharge: Incised wound
of the 1/3 [first third] of the left
forearm.

2d Signature: [Illegible]

T.D. Dmitrieva

- 2 -

Blood Analysis

Oswald

Dept. 7

Erythrocytes	Hemoglob.	Color indicator
In 1 mm ³		
1 1/2-5mm	80-100	0.8 - 1.0
500,000	16 [illeg.]	1.07
	36 [illeg.]	

Leucocytes	Basophiles	Eosinophiles
Norm 6-8th.	0-0.5%	3-4%
Norm in absol. fig.	30-40	180-200
5,500	1	6

Neutrophiles

Myeloc.	Bacill.	Segment	Lymphoc.	Monoc.	Deviation indic.
—	4%	63-57	24-30%	6-8%	0.06
	240-320	4020-6040	1800-2400	300-640	
	4	50	33	6	0.08

Sedimentation of erythrocytes: 14 mm per h.

April 25, 1953

Signature [illegible]

- 3 -

Urine Analysis No. 54

Oswald

For the physician of : 7 - I
 Color: light amber Reaction: acid
 • Specific gravity: 1025 Transparency: turbid
 Albumin: None
 Sugar: None
 Bile pigments: None
 Urobilin: [illegible]

- 4 -

Sediment Microscopy

1. Epithelial cells:
 Flat ; None
 2. Leucocytes: one [illegible]
 4. Cylinders:
 Hyaline; none
 5. Cells of kidney epithelium: none
 6. Salts: none [one word illegible]
 7. Mucus: none
 8. Bacteria: none
- Signature: [Illegible]

- 5 -

Results of temperature measurement and other tests and procedures.

[See chart]

Epicrisis

Oct. 23

The patient does not speak Russian. One could judge only by his gestures and facial expression that he had no complaints.

His general condition is satisfactory. Pulse (illegible) is

rhythmic RR $\frac{120}{70}$. Abdomen soft, painless.

A 2

Observation

Signat.

Signature: Dmitrieva

Oct. [?] No complaints.

History of present illness.

Oct. 21 The patient was brought by ambulance into the Admission Ward of the Botkin hospital and further referred to Bldg. [or wing] No. 26.

According to his statement in the Admission Ward — with the aid of an interpreter — the patient arrived a few days ago in the Soviet Union as a tourist for the purpose of obtaining Soviet citizenship and remaining in Russia. For this reason he had been saving money for 3 years, and applied to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He did not receive a definite answer and on Oct. 21 was supposed to leave for his home country. In order to delay his departure he inflicted wounds on the lower third of his left forearm and put it into hot water. He lost consciousness and at 16:00 [4 p.m.] on Oct. 21, was brought to the Botkin hospital where he was examined by the surgeon and bandaged.

He was examined by a psychiatrist. [He spent] three days in the psychiatric ward for observation. According to the conclusion of the expert, the patient is not dangerous to other people and may stay in the somatic department. By order of the assistant to

- 7 -

the chief physician he was transferred to room No. 7. General condition satisfactory. Respiration in the lungs is vesicular. Heart is normal. Pulse is rhythmic [illegible] RR $\frac{100}{70}$. Liver and spleen not enlarged.

- 8 -

Patho-anatomic diagnosis

a) Basic

A2

Oct. 25 No [illegible]

[2 words illegible]

Organs without change.

[1 tablespoon 3 times/day?]

Surgical examination.

Observations:

Signature: Dmitrieva

b) Complications

Oct. 26. Internal organs [complic.?]; none

Organs: Normal.

Oct. 27. Examination by the surgeon

Bandage. Stitches [illegible]

Healing of the wound in the forearm by means of first aid. Aseptic bandage.

May be discharged.

- 9 -

Epicrisis

Oct. 28

The patient was brought to the admission ward of the Botkin Hospital by ambulance and was ordered by the assistant to the chief physician [Konnikova ?] to be transferred to Ward No. 7. [2 words illegible]. Incised wound of the first third of the left forearm with the intention to commit suicide. In the admission ward sutures were made. On Oct. 27 he was examined by the surgeon. The healing of the wound was done by first intention. With surgeon's permission, discharged from hospital. The interpreter who was with him every day (from the Embassy?) was informed ahead of time. The condition of the patient is satisfactory.

Signature: [Dmitrieva]

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 985--Continued

[Doc. IC 3]

MINISTRY OF HEALTH
OF THE USSR

{4 Rubles 20 kop
One foreign [2 words illegible]
Receipt No. 1147}

MEDICAL HISTORY NO. 1977

By whom referred: Ambulance 8087

Dept. [illegible]

Admitted: 16.00 [4 p.m.], Oct. 21 '59

Transf. Oct. 23 to Ward 7

Name: Oswald, Lee Harvey

Age: 20 Nationality: American Education: High School

Address: Hotel "Berlin", Room 320 Works independ.

Employment: Radio-technician

Diagnosis: [illeg.] incised wound
of the lower third of
the left forearm.

When admitted: same

Date: Oct. 21, 1959

Signature:

[Karpov ?]

[one word missing] when discharged: Incised wound in the lower
third of the left forearm. Suicide attempt.

Operation: Primary surgical treatment of the wound.

Date of the operation: Oct. 21, 1959

Anesthetics: local

Amount of narcotics: [illeg.] Novoc. [illeg.]

Signature [illegible]

- 2 -

16³⁰ [4:30 p.m.] Examination in the Admission Dept.

In his room in the Hotel Berlin in the attempt to commit suicide,
he cut the lower third of the forearm.

Objectively: In the lower third of the left forearm is a skin
wound [one word illegible] with injury to the blood vessels.

The wound is 3 cm. long

Karpov M.V.

- 3 -

22 Oct. 59

URINE ANALYSIS NO. 46

Oswald

Dept. 26

Color: Light amber

Reactions: acid

Spec. gravity [illeg.]

Transparency: turbid

Albumin - none

Sugar - none

Bile pigments - none

- 4 -

Sediment Microscopy

1. Epithelial cells

flat [illegible]

polymorphic none

2. Leucocytes 4-8 [7]. [illegible]

4. Cylinders

Granulous: none

6. Salts [2 words illegible]

7. Mucus [one word illegible]

8. Bacteria- none

Mary [one word illegible]

Signature [illegible]

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 985—Continued

- 5 -

The patient was admitted to Botkin Hospital on Oct. 21, 1959. He was brought to the hospital because of an incised wound of the left forearm. The wound is of a linear character with sharp edges.

In the admission department he was given primary treatment of the wound and skin sutures.

The character of the injury is considered light without functional disturbances. The patient is of clear mind, no sign of psychotic phenomena.

He explains his attempt to commit suicide by the fact that he arrived from the USA in the Soviet Union on a tourist visa with the firm intention of staying in the Soviet Union. Not having the opportunity to realize his intention because of circumstances beyond his control, and having to leave the Soviet Union on Oct. 21, 1959, he tried to cut the blood vessels of his left arm on the same day.

During his stay in the [admission] department, his attitude was completely normal. He insists that he does not want to return to the USA.

- 6 -

MINISTRY OF HEALTH
OF THE USSR

ACCOMPANYING SHEET NO. 8087

Oswald

Lee Harvey

Age: 20

Taken from a public place

Diagnosis

Incised wound in the lower third of the left forearm [one word illegible]

Admitted to Botkin Hospital at 16.00 (4 p.m.) on Oct. 21, 1959, upon request at 15h.14.

Signature [illegible]

Notes of the ambulance staff.

Valuables, documents and watch were left in the hotel.

Signature [illegible]

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 985—Continued

- 7 -

BLOOD ANALYSIS

Oswald, Lee Harvey

Ward 26

<u>Erythrocytes</u>	<u>Hemoglobin</u>	<u>Color indic.</u>
in 1 mm ³	80-10	0.8 - 1.0
4 1/2 - 5 mm		
4,000,000	81 [%]	1.01
	13.51%	

- 8 -

<u>Leucocytes</u>	<u>[illegible] cells</u>	<u>Eosinoph.</u>
4,000	1 [%]	2 [%]

Neutrophiles

<u>Bacillif.</u>	<u>Segment</u>	<u>Lymphoc.</u>	<u>Monocytes</u>	<u>Deviation</u>
3 [%]	69 [%]	19 [%]	6 [%]	$\frac{0.06}{0.04}$

Erythro. sediment. reaction 10 mm per hour

Oct. 22, 1959

Signature [illegible]

- 9 -

TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT

see chart

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 985—Continued

EPICRISIS

Examined in the department of [plastic?] surgery. He was admitted to the hospital with complaints (according to the interpreter) about [one word illegible] wound in the lower third of the left forearm from the inner side.

Inner organs show no [injuries ?]. [one word missing, one illegible] In the region of the lower third of the left forearm there is [a wound] of linear character with sharp edges, 5 cm. in length. Performed under local anesthetic 1/4 % [one word illegible] novocaine 3 20 [?] [illegible]. Primary surgical treatment of the wound was performed with 4 stitches and aseptic bandage. The injury does not reach the tendons.

[Signed] Markin

Psychiatric examination

A few days ago [the patient] arrived in the Soviet Union in order to apply for our citizenship. Today he was to have left the Soviet Union. In order to postpone his departure he inflicted the injury upon himself. The patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian. Sometimes he answers correctly, but immediately states that he does not understand what he was asked.

According to the interpreter, there were no mentally sick people in his family. He had no skull trauma, never before had he made attempts to commit suicide. He tried to commit suicide in order not to leave for America. He claims he regrets his action. After recovery he intends to return to his homeland.

It was not possible to get more information from the patient.

Suicide attempt. Transfer to ward No. 26

Maria Ivanovna Mikhailina [?]

- 11 -

Oct. 22 According to the translator:

[The patient] arrived from the USA on Oct. 16 as a tourist. He graduated from a technical high school in radio-technology and radioelectronics. He has no parents. He came with the intention of acquiring Soviet citizenship. In this matter he turned to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, USSR. He did not receive a definite answer and was supposed to leave in [2 words illegible]. On Oct. 21 he was found unconscious in the bathroom of the Hotel "Berlin". His left arm, injured by a sharp instrument, was lying in hot water. The ambulance was called and he was taken to the Botkin Hospital.

He had saved money for three years to come to the USSR and to remain in the Soviet Union forever.

His mind is clear. His perception is correct. He remembers how he wanted to commit suicide by cutting his veins with a razor blade and putting his bloodstained hand into hot water. Now he is sorry for the attempt to commit suicide.

Gelershtein

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 985—Continued

- 12 -

SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET TO THE
MEDICAL HISTORY

Course of illness.

Oct. 22 Condition satisfactory. [one word illegible] correct. Nutrition slightly decreased. Heart tones: [illegible]. Liver and spleen: not [illegible]

AD = 90/65

The patient was visited by the interpreter and the head of the Service Bureau.

Prescriptions

Diet A
Urine and blood analysis
[illegible]
surgical examination
Sol. Strych.
0.1% - 1.0
[3 words illegible]

Roentgenoscopy of the thorax

Oct. 23, '59 Lung areas are without focal [illegible] changes. The lung roots are structural.

The diaphragm is mobile, sinuses are free.

The heart is not enlarged. The pulse is rhythmic, of medium amplitude. Aorta is without change.

Signature [illegible]

(N.I. Petropavlovskaja)

Transfer epicrisis

Oct. 23 The patient Oswald, Lee, 20 years of age, was admitted to the Psychosomatic Department on Oct. 21, '59 in connection with a suicide attempt. The patient arrived in the USSR from the USA on a tourist visa with a firm desire to remain in the Soviet Union. Not having the possibility ^{of} realizing his intention because of circumstances beyond his control and being faced with the necessity of leaving the Soviet Union on the 21st of October '59, he tried the

- 13 -

same day to cut the blood vessels in the lower part of his left forearm with a safety razor blade. After [one word illegible] he kept his arm in hot water until he lost consciousness. The patient is in satisfactory condition. He has no complaints. He revealed in English that he graduated from a technical high school, he works in the field of radioelectronics, in 3 years he saved enough money to come to the USSR. He engages in sports (football, basketball, swimming). He is interested in artistic and [illegible] literature. At home, only his mother is living. In his physical [condition ?] there are no pathological deviations from the norm.

Blood analysis on Oct. 22

000
Er.-4,000/⁰⁰⁰H - 81 (13.51%), L - 4,000, P - 3%, S - 69%, L - 19%,
M - 6%, ESR - 10 m/m per h.

Urine analysis Oct. 22*

No albumin and no sugar found. L-4-5

In the neurolog. dept. No [illegible] [syndrome ?]

Psychiatric department

His mind is clear. Perception is correct. No hallucinations or delirium. He answers the questions [illegible] and logically. He has a firm desire to remain in the Soviet Union. No psychotic symptoms were noted. The patient is not dangerous for other people. His condition permits him to stay in the somatic department. By order of the assistant to the chief physician Dr. Ikonnikova, the patient is transferred to the 7th ward.

Gelershtein, I.G.

Mr. KLEIN. Have you ever seen that document before?

Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir. I haven't seen it.

Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware that the Soviet Government provided certain documents to the Warren Commission in 1964?

Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir. I wasn't aware of this.

Mr. KLEIN. Looking at that document in front of you——

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN [continuing]. Is that a hospital record?

Mr. NOSENKO. Oh, yes, sure. It is a hospital record.

Mr. KLEIN. And whose hospital record? Does it have a name on it?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir. It is from Botkin Hospital.

Mr. KLEIN. Whose name is it?

Mr. NOSENKO. Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. KLEIN. Does it say what date he was admitted?

Mr. NOSENKO. Discharged, admitted 23d, discharged 28th.

Mr. KLEIN. What year is that?

Mr. NOSENKO. October of 1959.

Mr. KLEIN. And does it have on the bottom the diagnosis, why he was in the hospital?

Mr. NOSENKO. Incised wound of one-third of the left forearm.

Mr. KLEIN. And that date, October of 1959, is that when Oswald first came to the Soviet Union and cut his wrist?

Mr. NOSENKO. I cannot tell you dates, sir. I do not remember.

Mr. KLEIN. You have in front of you the other document which tells—number 8—what date he came to the Soviet Union. Is that still there?

Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir. This is admittance to the hospital and dischargement.

Mr. KLEIN. Number 8?

Mr. NOSENKO. Arrival, October 16.

Mr. KLEIN. And the date on the hospital admittance is what date?

Mr. NOSENKO. Twenty-third of October.

Mr. KLEIN. And would you turn to the hospital admittance form, the one I just gave you, to the third page, please?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you see where it says "History of Present Illness"?

Mr. NOSENKO. No; I don't see.

Mr. KLEIN. On the third page?

Mr. NOSENKO. I have the third page.

Mr. KLEIN. It has number 6 on the top of the page, but it's the third page on the document.

Mr. NOSENKO. Oh, number 6, History of Present Illness. Yes; just a second.

Mr. KLEIN. Would you glance through that and would you tell us if that is the hospital report from when Lee Harvey Oswald cut his wrist and was taken to the Botkin Hospital?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Now, would you turn to the next to the last page. It has a 13 on the right-hand side.

Do you see that page?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. The next to the last page.

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you see where it says, two-thirds of the way to the bottom, "Psychiatric Department" underlined?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Would you read what is said under that?

Mr. NOSENKO. "His mind is clear; perception is correct; no hallucination or deliriums. He answers the questions legible and logically; he has a firm desire to remain in the Soviet Union; no psychiatric symptoms were noted; the patient is not dangerous for other people; his condition permits him to stay in Psychiatric Department by an order of the Assistant to the Chief Physicians, Dr. Kornika. The patient is transferred to the seventh ward."

Mr. KLEIN. Is there anything in there to indicate he is mentally unstable?

Mr. NOSENKO. Here I do not see.

Mr. KLEIN. Does that report indicate that he was normal?

Mr. NOSENKO. Here I do not see what I have seen. But this you receive from the Soviet Government, and if you think you received the true things, what was in file, you are wrong, Mr. Klein.

Mr. KLEIN. And that document, according to you, is that not authentic copy?

Mr. NOSENKO. KGB can prepare you any document. Take the material, or ask the doctors who are cooperating with KGB and they will prepare you any document.

Mr. KLEIN. I am not asking you what they can do. Are you testifying that this document is not authentic, it is not the document?

Mr. NOSENKO. This document never was in the file of the KGB.

Mr. KLEIN. So——

Mr. NOSENKO. This I testify.

Mr. KLEIN [continuing]. It is your testimony that the KGB sent us a phony document?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. You testified before this committee that there was periodic physical surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald which was ordered by Moscow, to be carried out in Minsk?

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. And you testified in detail about that, and you told us how the physical surveillance consisted of following Oswald for a month or month and a half at a time, and there were a number of people that would be involved, is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. It was a big operation?

Mr. NOSENKO. Big operation? No; it's not a big operation.

Mr. KLEIN. There were a number of people involved, weren't there?

Mr. NOSENKO. It is not a big operation. It is routine. In KGB it is a routine, nothing serious. It's not an operation even. It's surveillance, it's not an operation.

Mr. KLEIN. And have you ever stated that the only coverage of Oswald during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors and associates and review of his mail? Have you ever stated that was the only coverage of Oswald in Minsk?

Mr. NOSENKO. I stated before, and I stated it to you yesterday, and I state now, that the order was given, and I have seen it—to cover him by surveillance periodical, to cover him by an agent watching in places of his living, places he is working, control over his correspondence and control of his telephone conversations.

Mr. KLEIN. My question is, have you ever stated that the only coverage was checking at his places of employment and his neighbors and associates, and not say anything about periodic, physical surveillance?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I cannot tell you what I stated. I was for quite a big period of time, quite a few years, interrogated, by hours, and in different types of conditions, including hostile conditions.

Mr. KLEIN. That was by the CIA?

Mr. NOSENKO. Where they asked questions in such form which later my answer will be interpreted in any way, however they want to interrogate us.

Mr. KLEIN. That was by CIA?

Mr. NOSENKO. And I cannot tell you what I did say. I cannot remember dates. You must understand, it's hundreds of interrogations, hundreds.

Mr. KLEIN. This period that you are telling us about, you were questioned by the CIA during that period, is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes; sure.

Mr. KLEIN. Were you questioned during that period by FBI?

Mr. NOSENKO. I questioned by FBI in February; yes.

Mr. KLEIN. At this time I would ask that this document be marked for identification and shown to the witness.

Chairman STOKES. The clerk will indicate for the record the number appearing on the document.

Ms. BERNING. Exhibit JFK F-5.

[The document referred to was marked as JFK exhibit No. F-5 for identification.]

JFK EXHIBIT F-5

Date 3/5/64

On March 3, 1964, YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO advised that at the time of OSWALD's arrival in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the Fall of 1959, he (NOSENKO) held the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence), KGB (Committee for State Security). This particular Section, of which he was then Deputy Chief, handled the KGB investigations of tourists from the United States and British Commonwealth countries.

The First Section, at that time, and at present, contains fifteen or sixteen officers, holding ranks of Junior Case Officers, Case Officers and Senior Case Officers. At the time of President JOHN F. KENNEDY's assassination, NOSENKO stated he then held the position of Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, (Tourist Department), Second Chief Directorate, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The Seventh Department, consisting of approximately ninety Case Officers, is responsible for KGB investigations of tourists from all non-communist countries.

Prior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR he was completely unknown to the KGB, according to NOSENKO. In this connection he pointed out that immediately upon issuance of a visa to a person to visit the USSR, the Seventh Department (Tourist), Second Chief Directorate, KGB, is notified. At that time a preliminary evaluation is made of the individual and a determination made as to what action, if any, should be taken by the Tourist Department. OSWALD's background was not of sufficient importance for the Tourist Department to have any advance interest in him and NOSENKO stated that his first knowledge of the existence of OSWALD arose in about October, 1959, when KIM GEORGIEVICH KRUPNOV, a Case Officer in his section, reported to him information which KRUPNOV had received from an Intourist interpreter. It was to the effect that OSWALD, an American citizen who had entered the USSR on a temporary visa, desired to remain permanently in the USSR and to become a Soviet citizen. KRUPNOV at this time displayed to NOSENKO a memorandum prepared by KRUPNOV containing information which had been received by KRUPNOV from KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin (which administratively is part of the Hotel Metropole) concerning OSWALD's behavior patterns, an Intourist itinerary for OSWALD, and a two-page report prepared by the Intourist interpreter (a KGB informant) concerning his conversations with OSWALD and his impressions and evaluations of OSWALD. At that time a file was opened in NOSENKO's section incorporating all of the information which KRUPNOV had collected.

On 3/3 & 4/64 at Fairfax County, Virginia File # WFO 105-37111
 by SAs ALEKSO POPTANICH and W. MARVIN GHEESLING: /jma Date dictated 3/4/64

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

WFO 105-37111

NOSENKO and KRUPNOV, on basis of this information, concluded that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB and both agreed that OSWALD appeared somewhat abnormal. NOSENKO could not specifically state what factors caused him to evaluate OSWALD as being abnormal, but on basis of all information available to him at the time there was no doubt in his mind that OSWALD was not "fully normal." At that time the KGB did not know of OSWALD's prior military service and NOSENKO stated that had such information been available to him, it would have been of no particular interest or significance to the KGB.

On the basis of NOSENKO's evaluation of OSWALD he instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD, through the Intourist interpreter, that OSWALD would not be permitted to remain in the USSR permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa and thereafter seek re-entry as a permanent resident through routine channels at the Soviet Embassy in the United States. NOSENKO's instructions were carried out and on the same date or the following day he learned that OSWALD failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Intourist guide. This prompted Intourist to initiate efforts to locate him and after a couple of hours, inquiry at the Berlin Hotel established that OSWALD's room key was missing, indicating that he was apparently in his room. Hotel employees then determined that OSWALD's room was secured from the inside and when he failed to respond to their request for him to open the door, they forced it open. OSWALD was found bleeding severely from self-inflicted wounds and was immediately taken by an ambulance to a hospital, believed by NOSENKO to be the Botkinskaya Hospital in Moscow. NOSENKO did not know specifically whether OSWALD was bleeding from wounds in his left or right wrist or whether from both wrists and he did not know what instrument was used to cause the wound or wounds. The information regarding OSWALD's wounds was received by NOSENKO from KRUPNOV who in turn received it from Intourist sources. NOSENKO did not know how long OSWALD remained in the hospital but stated it was for several days. OSWALD's attempted suicide was reported by NOSENKO to the Chief of the Seventh Department, Colonel KONSTANTIN NIKITOVICH DUBAS, and NOSENKO believed that DUBAS then reported it to the Office of the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO's original decision that the KGB would not become involved with OSWALD was approved by the Chief of the Second Directorate, and it was further agreed that he should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.

WFO 105-37111

A report from the hospital was received which gave the circumstances of OSWALD's admittance to the hospital, treatment received including blood transfusion, and the report stated OSWALD had attempted suicide because he was not granted permission to remain in the USSR. The hospital record also included an evaluation that OSWALD's attempted suicide indicated mental instability. NOSENKO did not know whether this evaluation was based on a psychiatric examination or was merely an observation of the hospital medical staff. NOSENKO also learned that upon OSWALD's discharge from the hospital he was again informed by Intourist that he could not reside in the USSR and OSWALD stated he would commit suicide.

NOSENKO did not know who made the decision to grant OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR, but he is sure it was not a KGB decision and he added that upon learning of this decision the KGB instructed that OSWALD not be permitted to reside in the Moscow area. NOSENKO suggested that either the Soviet Red Cross or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the decision to permit OSWALD to reside in the USSR and also made the decision to assign him to Minsk. NOSENKO attached no particular significance to the fact that OSWALD was settled in Minsk but offered the opinion that since Minsk is a capital city of one of the Republics and is an above-average Soviet city in cleanliness and modern facilities, it was selected in order to create a better impression on OSWALD, a foreigner.

After the KGB was advised of the decision to authorize OSWALD to reside in Minsk it was necessary for KRUPNOV to bring OSWALD's file up to date for purpose of transferring it to the KGB Office in Minsk. This was done and the file was forwarded to Minsk by a cover letter prepared by KRUPNOV. That cover letter briefly summarized OSWALD's case and specifically instructed that KGB, Minsk, take no action concerning OSWALD except to "passively" observe his activities to make sure he was not a United States intelligence agent temporarily dormant. KRUPNOV's letter was read by NOSENKO and signed by DUBAS.

NOSENKO stated that in view of instructions from KGB, Moscow, no active interest could be taken in OSWALD in Minsk without obtaining prior approval from KGB, Moscow. According to NOSENKO no such approval was ever requested or granted and based on his experience, he opined that the only coverage of OSWALD during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors, associates and review of his mail.

651

WFO 105-37111

The next time NOSENKO heard of OSWALD was in connection with OSWALD's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet re-entry visa. NOSENKO did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. His knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of NOSENKO's department by M. I. TURALIN, Service Number Two, (counterintelligence in foreign countries), First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO recalled that TURALIN had orally contacted VLADIMIR KUZMICH ALEKSEEV, Chief, Sixth Section of NOSENKO's Tourist Department, with respect to OSWALD. NOSENKO's Department had no interest in OSWALD and recommended that OSWALD's request for a re-entry visa be denied. NOSENKO could not recall when OSWALD visited Mexico City in connection with his visa application.

NOSENKO's next knowledge of OSWALD's activities arose as a result of President JOHN F. KENNEDY's assassination. NOSENKO recalled that about two hours after President KENNEDY had been shot he was telephonically advised at his home by the KGB Center of this fact. A short time later he was telephonically advised of the President's death. About two hours later NOSENKO was advised that OSWALD had been arrested, and NOSENKO and his staff were called to work for purpose of determining whether the KGB had any information concerning OSWALD. After establishing OSWALD's identity from KGB files and ascertaining that OSWALD's file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO, on instructions of General OLEG M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, telephonically contacted the KGB Office in Minsk and had them dictate a summary of the OSWALD file. NOSENKO did not personally accept this summary, but it was taken down by an employee of his department. As reported by NOSENKO at the time of his interview on February 26, 1964, this summary concluded with a statement that the KGB at Minsk had endeavored "to influence OSWALD in the right direction." As reported by NOSENKO, this latter statement greatly disturbed GRIBANOV since the KGB Headquarters had instructed that no action be taken concerning OSWALD except to passively observe his activities. Accordingly, GRIBANOV ordered all records at Minsk pertaining to OSWALD be forwarded immediately to Moscow by military aircraft with an explanation concerning the meaning of the above-mentioned statement. NOSENKO read the file summary telephonically furnished by Minsk, the explanation from

WFO 105-37111

Minsk concerning the meaning of the above-mentioned statement, and thoroughly reviewed OSWALD's file prior to making same available to SERGEI MIKHAILOVICH PEDOSEEV, Chief of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary memorandum for GRIBANOV. That memorandum was furnished by GRIBANOV to VLADIMIR SEMICHASTNY, Chairman of KGB who in turn reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, USSR, and to NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV. According to NOSENKO, OSWALD's file, as received from Minsk, contained no information to indicate that the KGB at Minsk had taken any action with respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Headquarters. It did contain information concerning OSWALD's marriage to MARINA OSWALD, background data on MARINA, including fact she had been a member of the Komsomol (Communist Party Youth Organization) but was dropped for nonpayment of dues and the fact that the OSWALDs had departed the USSR for the United States. His file also included a statement that OSWALD had been a poor worker. NOSENKO read PEDOSEEV's summary memorandum and he recalled that it contained the definite statement that from the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR until his departure from the USSR, the KGB had no personal contact with OSWALD and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.

NOSENKO was questioned as to whether OSWALD could have been trained and furnished assignments by any other Soviet intelligence organization including the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) or the Thirteenth Department of the First Directorate of the KGB (which deals with sabotage, explosions, killings, terror). NOSENKO stated that he is absolutely certain that OSWALD received no such training or assignments. In this connection he explained that if any other department of KGB wanted to utilize OSWALD, they would have to contact the department which originally opened up the file on OSWALD (NOSENKO's department) and ask permission to utilize him. NOSENKO stated that this would also apply to GRU. NOSENKO further explained that in view of their evaluation that OSWALD appeared to be mentally unstable no Soviet Intelligence Agency, particularly the Thirteenth Department, would consider using him. NOSENKO also advised that further evidence that OSWALD was not of intelligence interest to the KGB is shown by the fact that the KGB Headquarters did not retain a control file concerning OSWALD following his settlement in Minsk. He elaborated by stating that had OSWALD been of any intelligence interest to KGB a control file would also have been maintained at

WFO 105-37111

KGB Headquarters. This file would have been assigned to a Case Officer at Headquarters with responsibility to direct supervision of the case, including the making of periodic visits to Minsk by the Case Officer. In OSWALD's case the only record maintained at KGB Headquarters in Moscow was an index card bearing OSWALD's name and the identity of the department which originated the file concerning him.

NOSENKO advised that he ascertained from reading OSWALD's file that the Soviet Red Cross had made payments to OSWALD. He stated, however, that it is a normal practice for the Soviet Red Cross to make payments to emigres and defectors in order to assist them in enjoying a better standard of living than Soviet citizens engaged in similar occupations. He learned that OSWALD received the minimum payments from the Soviet Red Cross which he estimated to be approximately 50 rubles per month. He did not know when these payments began and did not know for how long they continued.

NOSENKO stated that there are no Soviet regulations which would have prevented OSWALD from traveling from Minsk to Moscow without police authority. He stated that Soviet citizens likewise are permitted to travel from place to place without having to receive special permission.

Following President KENNEDY's assassination, NOSENKO ascertained from OSWALD's file that he had had access to a gun which he used to hunt game with fellow employees in the USSR. He could not describe the gun used by OSWALD but did remember that it was used to shoot rabbits. NOSENKO stated that Western newspaper reports describe OSWALD as an expert shot; however, OSWALD's file contained statements from fellow hunters that OSWALD was an extremely poor shot and that it was necessary for persons who accompanied him on hunts to provide him with game.

NOSENKO stated that there is no KGB and no GRU training school in the vicinity of Minsk.

According to NOSENKO, no separate file was maintained by the KGB concerning MARINA OSWALD and all of KGB's information concerning her was kept in OSWALD's file. He said that no information

WFO 105-37111

in that file indicated that the KGB had any interest in MARINA OSWALD either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she departed the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also advised that KGB had no plans to contact either OSWALD or MARINA in the United States.

NOSENKO opined that after OSWALD departed the USSR he would not have been permitted to re-enter that country under any circumstances. He expressed the opinion that MARINA and her children would have been granted permission to return alone had President KENNEDY not been assassinated.

Since the assassination of President Kennedy he does not know what decision would be made with respect to MARINA OSWALD and her children.

NOSENKO had no information that the Soviet Government ever received any contact from the Cubans concerning OSWALD, and he knew of no Cuban involvement in the assassination.

NOSENKO stated that he had no knowledge that OSWALD had made application to re-enter the Soviet Union other than through his contact with the Soviet Embassy at Mexico City. He pointed out in this connection, that had OSWALD applied at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., or elsewhere, the KGB would not have ever been apprised of the visa request if the visa issuing officer at the Embassy decided on his own authority to reject the visa application.

NOSENKO noted that all mail addressed to the American Embassy in Moscow, emanating abroad or from the USSR itself, is first reviewed by the KGB in Moscow. NOSENKO added that on occasions mail from "significant" persons is not even permitted by KGB to reach the American Embassy. In the case of OSWALD, NOSENKO stated that since he was of no significance or particular interest to the KGB, correspondence from OSWALD would be permitted to reach the Embassy, even though critical. However, NOSENKO had no knowledge that OSWALD ever directed a communication of any type to the American Embassy in Moscow.

WFO 105-37111

NOSENKO stated that no publicity appeared in the Soviet Press or over the radio regarding OSWALD's arrival or departure from the USSR and no publicity resulted from his attempted suicide. Soviet newspapers and radio have carried numerous statements concerning President KENNEDY's assassination which quoted from Western newspaper stories concerning OSWALD's alleged involvement including the fact that OSWALD had previously visited the USSR.

NOSENKO advised he saw nothing unusual in the fact that OSWALD was permitted to marry a Soviet citizen and later permitted to depart the USSR with her. He noted that Soviet law specifically provides that a Soviet citizen may marry a foreign national in the USSR and depart from the USSR with spouse, provided, of course, the Soviet citizen had not had access to sensitive information.

It was his opinion that President KENNEDY was held in high esteem by the Soviet Government and that President KENNEDY had been evaluated by the Soviet Government as a person interested in maintaining peace. He stated that following the assassination, the Soviet guards were removed from around the American Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet people were permitted without interference to visit the American Embassy to express their condolences. According to NOSENKO, this is the only occasion he can recall where such action had been taken. He said that the orders to remove the guards came from "above." He added that his department provided approximately 20 men who spoke the English language for assignment in the immediate vicinity of the American Embassy in Moscow to insure that no disrespect was shown during this period.

On March 4, 1964, NOSENKO stated that he did not want any publicity in connection with this information but stated that he would be willing to testify to this information before the Presidential Commission, provided such testimony is given in secret and absolutely no publicity is given either to his appearance before the Commission or to the information itself.

Date 3/9/64Other Individuals and Organizations
Involved or Interviewed1

On March 6, 1964, YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO inquired if the material he furnished on March 4, 1964, regarding LEE HARVEY OSWALD was given to the appropriate authorities with his request that no publicity be granted the information he furnished. He was advised that this was done.

NOSENKO was asked if an alien residing in the Soviet Union could own a rifle or shotgun. He replied that an alien can own a shotgun, but it must be registered with the Militia. He added that an alien can buy a rifle for hunting only with the permission of the Militia prior to the purchase, and it must be registered with the Militia. He stated that at no time can an alien buy or carry a pistol or a military rifle.

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652, Sec. 1.4

By MAJ NARS Date 4/7/75

On 3/6/64 at Fairfax County, Va. File # WFO 105-37111
by SAS MAURICE A. TAYLOR, DONALD E. WALTER
and ALEKSO POPTANICH AP:lkc Date dictated 3/9/64

35*

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
651

Mr. KLEIN. These hostile interrogations you just alluded to, did they lead you to state other than the truth to these interrogators?

Mr. NOSENKO. I was answering the questions which were put to me.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever not tell the truth?

Mr. NOSENKO. No; I was telling the truth.

Mr. KLEIN. I would direct your attention——

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Just a moment. Before you, you have a Federal Bureau of Investigation report; is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. I would direct your attention to page 29 of that report.

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. The last paragraph, beginning with, "Nosenko stated"—it's underlined. Would you please read that paragraph to us?

Mr. NOSENKO. "Nosenko stated that in view of instruction from the KGB Moscow, no active interest could be taken in Oswald in Minsk without obtaining prior approval from KGB in Moscow. According to Nosenko, no such approval was ever requested or granted, and based on his experience, he opined that the only coverage of Oswald during this stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks of his places of employment, inquiries of neighbors and associates, and review of his mail."

Mr. KLEIN. Did you make that statement?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir. What do you find here wrong?

Mr. KLEIN. Does that statement say anything about physical surveillance?

Mr. NOSENKO. No; it didn't.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you forget to tell them about the physical surveillance?

Mr. NOSENKO. Maybe I forget; maybe they didn't put; I do not know.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall speaking to agents Poptanich and Gheesling on March 3 and 4, 1964?

Mr. NOSENKO. I cannot tell you. I do remember the date; no. I remember I was speaking with agents from FBI.

Mr. KLEIN. When you spoke to them, did you recall that they spoke to you at that time, March 3 and 4, about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. NOSENKO. I told you, they were speaking with me about Oswald, but I cannot tell you the date when.

Mr. KLEIN. Was it in March 1964?

Mr. NOSENKO. They were speaking with me—February and the beginning of March of 1964.

Mr. KLEIN. And did they tape the conversations?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes; they were taping all conversations.

Mr. KLEIN. Did the agents make notes when you were talking?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Did they ever show you those notes?

Mr. NOSENKO. No.

Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware that the statements you were making to them were going to be written down into a report?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sure.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever have an opportunity to see the report?

Mr. NOSENKO. No; the only one which was sent to the Warren Commission, this I have seen.

Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware that the report would be put in your file?

Mr. NOSENKO. Must be.

Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware that report would be shown to a committee such as this investigating the assassination?

Mr. NOSENKO. I didn't know that it would be created, the committee, because it was 1964.

Mr. KLEIN. You didn't know that?

Mr. NOSENKO. No; did you know that this committee—in 1964—will be existing in 1978, 1977?

Mr. KLEIN. And were you telling them the truth when you told them that the only coverage of Oswald, and listing these things and not telling them about the physical surveillance, was that the truth you told them?

Mr. NOSENKO. Well, I told them that there was done the work against Oswald; it was ordered, passive type of work, it's called passive. Whenever it's ordered not to make an approachment, not to make a contact, not to make a recruitment, this is passive.

Anything when enters besides whatever is done, contact, approachments, recruitment, attempt to recruit, it is immediately called active.

Mr. KLEIN. Looking at that report, did you tell them about the physical surveillance which you told this committee about yesterday?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not see here, but I have no doubts. I do not know. Maybe I didn't mention that this date you said, maybe I didn't mention but I was telling them about surveillance.

Mr. KLEIN. Didn't you tell us that you always told the truth and told everything you knew when you spoke to the FBI and the CIA?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. If they would have asked you, "Was there physical surveillance?"—

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes; I will answer yes, it was.

Mr. KLEIN [continuing]. You would have answered yes?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. You also testified before this committee that in accord with the orders from Moscow that there was technical surveillance, and you told us in detail about how they tapped his phone and recorded it and made copies of it and gave it to a certain person.

Again, drawing your attention to page 29 of that same paragraph, does that say anything about the technical surveillance that you told us about?

Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you forget?

Mr. NOSENKO. But, if you ask, even an agent of FBI, I doubt it, no. In KGB control of correspondence, control of telephone, it's not big deal. It's giving order to control a telephone can be given by Chief of Section, not speaking of Chief of Department, not speaking of Chief of Directorate, and not speaking to receive a warrant from the judge. Control of correspondence can be signed, permission to put control over correspondence can be done by the Deputy Chief of Section even.

Do you understand what I want to tell you, it is absolutely considered, KGB, nothing important.

Mr. KLEIN. Is it a big deal to check periodically at someone's place of employment and talk to their neighbors? Is that a big deal?

Mr. NOSENKO. No.

Mr. KLEIN. But you told them about that, didn't you?

Mr. NOSENKO. I tried simply to describe them what kind of, not to take active—what does it mean, passive type of coverage of the target?

Mr. KLEIN. If they would have asked you was there any technical surveillance, then would you have told them?

Mr. NOSENKO. I would have said they were told, even word for word, in this document said not the technical surveillance. They have a certain terminology. Let's say surveillance, it's called to lead the measurement N/N, and to control telephone to lead the measurement M.

Mr. KLEIN. If they would have said, "Was there any technical surveillance of Oswald?" would you have said "yes"?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sure.

Mr. KLEIN. You also testified to this committee that the KGB would have had to have known about Marina Oswald, you said, by the end of the month they would have a batch of papers?

Mr. NOSENKO. You told me, if she had seen him, you something mentioned, 15, 13.

Mr. KLEIN. Because surveillance was on Oswald, they would have had to pick her up?

Mr. NOSENKO. I cannot tell you it was in the moment when he was seeing her or not. You said assume that he had met her 16 and 13, and it became known to KGB through surveillance. I said by the end of month that at least something will have on her, who is she, where she is working, where she studied, where she work.

Mr. KLEIN. They would know that through the surveillance on Oswald?

Mr. NOSENKO. The fact will be known through surveillance; then through other outfits of KGB they will find whatever possible on her.

Mr. KLEIN. Were you ever asked the following question and did you give the following answer:

"Question. Why wouldn't she—referring to Marina—have been investigated when she first met Oswald?

"Answer. They did not know she was a friend of Oswald until they applied for marriage. There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her."

Were you ever asked that question and did you give that answer?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not remember my questions, and answers.

Mr. KLEIN. I would ask that this document be marked for identification, please, and shown to the witness.

Chairman STOKES. The clerk will identify for the record the number appearing on the document.

Ms. BERNING. JKF F-6.

[The document referred to was marked as JKF exhibit No. F-6 for identification.]

[Document is retained in appropriate files.]

Mr. KLEIN. Looking at that document, have you ever seen it before?

Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. You have never seen that before?

Mr. NOSENKO. I never have seen it before.

Mr. KLEIN. And is that a report that says on the cover, "Memorandum for the Record; Subject: Followup Report on the Oswald Case; Source: [cryptonym deleted]." Was [cryptonym deleted] your code name at one time?

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not know.

Mr. KLEIN. "Date of Interview: 3 July 1964." Does it say that on the cover?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. And turning to the very last page, page 18—

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Does it say, "James Michaels"?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. "SR/CI/KGB"?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever hear of a man named James Michaels?

Mr. NOSENKO. No, I do not know a man James Michaels.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall speaking to a man named James Michaels?

Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Would you turn in this document to page 9. On page 9, the last question and answer, would you read the question for us, and read the answer?

Mr. NOSENKO. "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when she first met Oswald?"

"They didn't know she was a friend of Oswald until they applied for marriage. There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her."

Mr. KLEIN. Were you ever asked that question and did you ever—

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember, sir. But if it is, it must be asked and I gave this answer.

Mr. KLEIN. Was that the truth?

Mr. NOSENKO. As far as I remember, those conditions in which I was asked, better ask where I was in this period of time, what conditions I was kept, and what type of interrogations were going on.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you tell us yesterday that you always told the truth?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. When you spoke about Oswald?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Was this question relating to Oswald?

Mr. NOSENKO. I was answering what I could.

Mr. KLEIN. Is that the truth, that they didn't—

Mr. NOSENKO. It's how it is put, how it is put. You see, again, why wouldn't she have been investigated. Here must be question was in this form. The investigation, not the checkup of her, but, let's say, invitation for conversation, something of this kind, it's some kind of here misunderstanding on both parts, that would be mine and interrogator.

Mr. KLEIN. It is an inaccurate transcript?

Mr. NOSENKO. I consider many, many things are inaccurate.

Mr. KLEIN. Is that transcribed accurately?

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not know, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. That answer, do you think it is transcribed accurately, that that's your answer?

Mr. NOSENKO. Well, I can only explain only one thing. Let's say there was KGB found out that he had an acquaintance, Marina Prusakova. They were not married. They didn't know—they didn't apply for marriage. What kind of first

will be investigation? Checkup in archives of KGB of Byelorussia, and on the basis whatever kind of material on her will be found. Let's say, if she was ever on trial by militia, under arrest. If militia had any material, they can expand further. They can also send checkup in the place of her—one, it's in one order, to give us the picture of the character of the target, check on him in place of his work and check in place of his living, in one order.

But more, further investigation, the true investigation—this is called checkup—will be studied and they will start when they see something, let's say, suspicious in behavior of Oswald and this his connection.

In case of Marina, when they found out that they are going to marry, sure, they will be more, farther investigation, thorough investigation; but before it will only be checkup. From this point of view I was answering this question.

Mr. KLEIN. Let me make it simple.

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. If the question was asked exactly as it appears here, "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when she first met Oswald?" would this be your answer? Is that a correct answer as it appears here?

Mr. NOSENKO. Well, it appears here, but I do not remember.

Sure, I answered and this was question, but, gentlemen—

Mr. KLEIN. Was this true? This says, "There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her"—is that right or wrong?

Mr. NOSENKO. This is what I answered, yes. It is right. It is written here.

Mr. KLEIN. You remember answering that?

Mr. NOSENKO. No.

Mr. KLEIN. How do you know you answered that?

Mr. NOSENKO. You are giving me official document.

Mr. KLEIN. You have no recollection of answering this?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not have any recollection of interrogations.

Mr. KLEIN. If you answered that, were you telling the truth?

Mr. NOSENKO. I don't know. I answered. Must be. This is how I answered question.

Mr. KLEIN. You testified to this committee that the KGB decided to have Lee Harvey Oswald examined by two psychiatrists. You told us about how it was decided, who decided it, where it was decided. Then they found Lee Harvey Oswald to be mentally unstable?

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. Have you ever been asked the following questions and given the following answers:

"Question. Did the KGB make a psychological assessment of Oswald?

"Answer. No; nothing, but at the hospital it was also said he was not quite normal. The hospital didn't write that he was mad, just that he is not normal.

"Question. Did the hospital authorities conduct any psychological testing?

"Answer. I don't think so. There was no report like this."

Mr. NOSENKO. No; I told that there was opinion of psychiatrists that he was mentally unstable.

Mr. KLEIN. Is what I read to you correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not know whether it is correct or wrong. I am answering you what I know.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever make a statement like that?

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember statements for 5 years, interrogation.

Mr. KLEIN. I would direct your attention to the Michaels Report.

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Page 7.

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Would you read for us the first and second questions and answers, please.

Mr. NOSENKO. "Did the KGB make psychological assessment of Oswald?"

"No, nothing. But at the hospital it was also said he was not quite normal. The hospital didn't write that he was mad, just that he was not normal, mentally unstable."

Mr. KLEIN. Please keep reading.

Mr. NOSENKO. "Did the hospital authorities conduct any psychological testing?"

"I don't think so. There was no report like this."

"What was the Soviets' opinion of Oswald's personality, what kind of man did they think he was?"

"KGB thought he was of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he is not normal, that he should leave the country."

Mr. KLEIN. Did you say anything in there about two psychiatrists examining Oswald and about reading their reports which said he was mentally unstable? Did you say anything about that there?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not remember what I said to them; but I would like you to find out the conditions in which interrogations were done, how it was done, by what procedures, when two interrogators are seated. I never knew any names—they never announced me names—one playing part of bad guy and other good guy, and it starting slapping then, not physically but I mean, psychologically and in conversation, turning question upside down, however they would like, then this leave, another one will start in softer way.

Mr. KLEIN. When did this—

Mr. NOSENKO. And I would not trust any of their documents in those periods of time. Up to 1967 when we started from the beginning, to work, Mr. Bruce Solie. That is the one thing. Second, my knowledge of language was very poor in 1964. I didn't understand many questions, and none of them, excluding Mr. . . . [Y] knew Russian language and Mr. . . . [Y] was asking me only questions concerning my biography and this type of question, but nonoperative questions.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any recollection of being asked these questions and giving the answers that you just read to us?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I told you, and I will tell, I do not remember their questions, and I do not remember my answers; but I tried to be truthful with them. Then was period of time when I have seen that they were simply was laughing at me; I rejected to answer questions, and whenever they were asking, I would answer, "I do not remember, I do not know, I do not remember."

Mr. KLEIN. These answers, do they say "I do not know, I do not remember" or do these give responsive answers?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not trust this document prepared by people in those years.

Mr. KLEIN. Is it your testimony that these might not be accurate questions and answers?

Mr. NOSENKO. My opinion—I cannot tell you exactly, I say might be.

Mr. KLEIN. You testified—

Mr. NOSENKO. One more thing: If we are going into this, a number of interrogations, I was under drugs, and on me was used a number of drugs, and I know that, and hallucinations and talking during night and sodium and everything, even many others, and a number of things were absolutely incoherent.

Mr. KLEIN. This hostile interrogation that you have been referring to, when did it begin?

Mr. NOSENKO. Arrested me April 4, 1964, started interrogate me in 2 days. They interrupted—I don't know—interrogate a month, two, made break; then again, then again period of no interrogation; then again interrogations, up to 24 hours, not giving me possibility to sleep.

Mr. KLEIN. And this was all after April 4, 1964?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

That is why I will not take as a document anything what concerns interrogations in hostile, absolutely hostile, situation.

Mr. KLEIN. You testified in detail yesterday about the cable which you saw which was sent from Mexico City to the First Chief Directorate in Moscow, and you testified that you actually read that cable and that it told that Oswald was in Mexico City and he wanted permission for a visa to come to the Soviet Union.

Do you remember reading that cable and describing it for us in detail, how long it was?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever say to anyone that after Oswald went to Minsk, the next time you heard of him was in connection with Oswald's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet reentry visa, and you did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of the subject's application; your knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of your department by M. I. Turalin.

Did you ever say that, that you did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of Oswald's application?

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember. I am telling you what I have seen, cable, what was told through Lieutenant Colonel Alekseev to tell to Turalin the opinion of Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department.

Mr. KLEIN. I draw your attention to page 30 of the FBI report in front of you.

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not have it.

[Pause.]

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. On the top of page 30, read for us the underlined section on the top, beginning "The next time"——

Mr. NOSENKO. "The next time Nosenko heard of Oswald was in connection with Oswald's application to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet reentry visa. Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. His knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of Nosenko's department by Turalin, Service No. 2, Counterintelligence in Foreign Countries, First Chief Directorate. Nosenko recalled that Turalin had orally contacted Vladimir Alexeev, Chief of Sixth Section of Nosenko's Tourist Department, with respect to Oswald. Nosenko's department had no interest in Oswald and they recommended that Oswald's request for reentry visa be denied. Nosenko couldn't recall when Oswald visited Mexico City in connection with visa application."

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever say this to an FBI agent?

Mr. NOSENKO. Must be I said it, it's here in document.

Mr. KLEIN. It says in here that Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. Did you say that?

Mr. NOSENKO. Must be; I said this in this way.

Mr. KLEIN. And did you tell us that not only did you know how they advised them by cable but that you read the cable?

Mr. NOSENKO. This is what I recollection.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you tell them the truth?

Mr. NOSENKO. I was trying to tell what I remembered.

Mr. KLEIN. And this FBI report which you just read from, would you look back on the first page and would you tell us the date of that report?

Mr. NOSENKO. March 5, 1964.

Mr. KLEIN. March 5, 1964. Is that before April 4, 1964?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. That was before any hostile interrogations began, is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. And at that time you said that you did not know anything about the cable, is that right?

Mr. NOSENKO. This is what I answered them, how I remembered.

Mr. Klein, I have a question. Do you understand from what psychological turmoil a person passing who defected, do you understand that it is necessary time, time to settle psychologically, he doesn't know how he will be living, what he will be doing, and at the same time a person feels attitude on the part of those who helped him to come CIA? I felt something going on.

Mr. KLEIN. You testified to us that you didn't know who wrote the summary of Oswald's file in the First Department because you never had an opportunity to read it. Did you ever tell anyone that Fedoseyev and Matveev, F-e-d-o-s-e-y-e-v and M-a-t-v-e-e-v of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, took the file and wrote a second "spravka," which you told us was a summary?

Mr. NOSENKO. Summary.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever tell anybody that?

Mr. NOSENKO. Must be I told, it is again right, because you see, not Fedoseyev—Fedoseyev was Chief of First Department, American Department, and I will repeat what I told you yesterday. Matveev has come to take file, but surely Fedoseyev who is Chief of American Department, he had given call to Chief of Seventh Department. He was involved in this; that is why I mentioned him. He was Chief of First American Department. His deputy, Colonel Matveev, has come, and not alone; with him was a couple of officers, has come and told that Gribanov ordered and Fedoseyev giving call to Department, we must take it, and took. Who of them wrote, I do not know, no doubts that Fedoseyev and Matveev were participated in the preparation of documents. They are responsible for First American Department.

Mr. KLEIN. So you have an idea of who would have written, is that correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. American Department, no doubts that this two will be participating or correcting.

Mr. KLEIN. But you didn't read that summary, is that right?

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember reading the summary.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you read it? Do you have any recollection of reading it?

Mr. NOSENKO. No; I haven't seen summary.

Mr. KLEIN. Are you positive that you didn't see that summary?

Mr. NOSENKO. I have seen summaries in the file of Oswald.

Mr. KLEIN. Are you positive you didn't see the summary written by the First Department after they took the file away?

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember seeing. As I told you, I haven't seen it.

Mr. KLEIN. You testified that Oswald was considered normal prior to the time he cut his wrist, and even told us that you were surprised, you had no indication he would do something like that.

Were you ever asked the following question, and did you give the following answer:

"Question. In what way was the Oswald case handled differently from cases of other American defectors?"

"Answer. The main difference is that he was not to be allowed to stay. He was considered to be not normal."

Mr. NOSENKO. This is what cases I know, who were staying.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever say that he was considered not normal, referring to the period before he tried to commit suicide?

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember; but if I said it, it's not right because we didn't know that he was normal or not normal. Up until the moment of he cut his wrist we started to suspect.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever say that he was considered not normal?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not remember.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, if you would have said it, would it have been correct?

Mr. NOSENKO. No; it would not be correct, because he cannot be considered abnormal. We didn't know anything up till he cut the wrist.

Mr. KLEIN. You testified to this committee that you were present at a meeting with the Chief of the Seventh Department Chief of your section, Major Rastrusin; at that meeting, it was decided that Oswald should not be given permission to defect. You told us where the meeting took place, told us who was there.

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. You told us that Krupnov was not even in the Seventh Department at that time?

Mr. NOSENKO. Krupnov appeared a little later.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever tell anyone that on the basis of your evaluation of Oswald, you instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald through Intourist interpreter that Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa?

Did you ever tell anybody that?

Mr. NOSENKO. Sir, I do not remember. If I said it, it was wrong, not right, because Krupnov started participation only in this case when Oswald was allowed to stay. In the moment when Oswald arrived in Soviet Union, when he went in hospital, Krupnov was still not in Seventh Department. He very soon appeared later. Then it was wrong. If I stated it, it was wrong.

Mr. KLEIN. Directing your attention to the FBI report in front of you, I would like to draw your attention to page 28.

Mr. NOSENKO. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. Beginning with the underlined section beginning with the first "On the basis" in the second paragraph, would you read this?

Mr. NOSENKO. "Nosenko and Krupnov on the basis of this information, concluded that Oswald was of no interest to the KGB and both agreed that Oswald appeared somewhat abnormal."

Mr. KLEIN. Not that, the second paragraph, "On the basis of"—

Mr. NOSENKO. "On the basis of Nosenko's evaluation of Oswald, he instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald through the Intourist interpreter Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa, and thereafter seek reentry as a permanent resident through routine channels at the Soviet Embassy in the United States."

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever say that?

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember saying this. It can be that simply misunderstanding, and, you see, this is not transcription from the tape. It is, I will say a summary, and I do not remember. But, if I said this, it is not right because Krupnov didn't participate it in the beginning.

Mr. KLEIN. Also it says—

Mr. NOSENKO. It was participation of Rastrusin.

Mr. KLEIN. Also is it correct when it says in there that you made the decision and—

Mr. NOSENKO. No; I couldn't make decision, being Deputy Chief of Section.

Mr. KLEIN. Does it say anything there—

Mr. NOSENKO. I could say in my opinion; yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Does it say anything there about a meeting to determine what to do, or does it say that on basis of your evaluation, you told Krupnov to do it?

Mr. NOSENKO. It's not right. I said only that Krupnov appeared later. This period, what we are discussing here, was Rastrusin involved, decision cannot be done on my own, being Deputy Chief of Section, decision cannot be done even being Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, at least it must be on the level of Chief of Department.

Mr. KLEIN. So it is incorrect, is that what you are saying?

Mr. NOSENKO. It is incorrect, and Krupnov—I do not remember.

Mr. KLEIN. You told us, when I questioned you about the fact that you didn't tell the FBI that there was physical surveillance, the last question I asked you, if they would have asked you if he was physically surveilled, would you have told them, and you said yes?

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes; sure. I will say.

Mr. KLEIN. Were you ever asked the following question and did you give the following answer:

"Was he physically surveilled" and that is referring to Minsk, and you answered "No; there was none"?

Mr. NOSENKO. It was not right, because it was order given and he was under periodical surveillance.

Mr. KLEIN. I draw your attention to page 9 of the CIA document in front of you, "Memorandum for the Record."

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not have it.

Mr. KLEIN. The Michaels report. I draw your attention to page 9.

Mr. NOSENKO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Would you read the first question and the first answer?

Mr. NOSENKO. "Was he physically surveilled?"

"No; there was none."

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever give that answer to that question?

Mr. NOSENKO. I do not remember; it's not right, the answer.

Mr. KLEIN. I would ask that this tape, which is marked "3 July '64, Reel No. 66," be deemed marked for identification.

Chairman STOKES. Indicate for the record the marking.

Ms. BERNING. JFK F-7.

[The item referred to was marked as JFK exhibit No. F-7 for identification.]

[Material referred to is retained in appropriate files.]

Chairman STOKES. We will recess for about 5 minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Chairman STOKES. The committee is back in session.

During the recess the witness made a request of the Chair that he be permitted to make a brief statement prior to counsel for the committee resuming interrogation.

The Chair is going to grant that request and recognize the witness at this time for such statement as he would like to make.

Mr. NOSENKO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I arrived in the United States in 1964, 12th of February. I felt something was going wrong because the attitude on the part of the officers from CIA who was dealing with me, I felt was going wrong, by a number of remarks, their behavior. Besides, I was in a psychological process. It's a very big thing, when you are coming to live in a new country. I felt the country where I was born, never mind, my defection was strictly on ideological basis, but still psychologically is very big thing and very serious thing.

A very short period of time, April 4, I was invited on checkup for the doctor, and this checkup turned to be arrest. Arrested was in very rude form, nobody beat me physically, no, but in rude form, trying to put dignity of the person, of human being, down, kept in very hard conditions. I was smoking from 14 years old, never quitted. I was rejected to smoke. I didn't see books. I didn't read anything. I was sitting in four walls, metal bed in the center of the room and that is all.

I was hungry, and this was the most difficult for me because how I tried not to think about food. I was thinking about food because all the time I want to eat. I was receiving very small amount, and very poor food. I was sitting some kind of attic; it was hot, no air-conditioning, cannot breathe; windows—no windows, closed over. I was permitted to shave once a week, to take showers once a week.

From me were taken toothpaste, toothbrush. The conditions were inhuman, conditions in this place; and later transferred in another place, which is now I know where it was, the second place . . . [U.S. Government property outside the Washington area] where certain house and the same very, very Spartan conditions; 3½ years. Besides that, on me were used different types of drugs and sleeping drugs, hallucination drugs, and whatever I do not know, and don't want to know.

What I want to tell you, the arrest was done illegally, without due process of law, without—in violation of Constitution, which was found by the Rockefeller Commission. It wasn't mentioned, my name, but simply nameless defector, who was over 3 years in extremely Spartan conditions.

Interrogations were done sometimes 24 hours, not giving me an hour to sleep. Interrogations were in very hostile manner. Simply, what I would say were rejected. How long I will be, why it is without due process, no warrants; "You will be eternally, 25 years." How long we would want you to keep. That is why I consider all interrogations, all materials, which concerns this period of time are illegal, and I am not recognizing them and don't want to see them. And I am asking you not to ask questions based on this interrogations, including trying to play the tape during this interrogations. For me it's difficult to return back. I passed through hell. I started new life in 1969 only because I was true defector. I never raised this question with correspondents. I never went in press, because I am loyal to the country which accepted me, and I didn't want to hurt the country.

I didn't hurt, even to hurt, the intelligence, the CIA. I didn't consider the whole CIA was responsible. Were responsible several people, for this. Thank God they are not working there anymore. They are out. If I will go in press, if I would be telling about these inhumane conditions, I will hurt not only the agencies, the intelligence service of the United States, I will hurt the interests of the United States. Who would like to defect, reading in what conditions and what treatment defectors is receiving.

Sir, I prefer that you be using materials when it was started humane relations with me, which was started at the end of 1967. I still was under arrest but I was transferred from the extremely Spartan conditions, and with me started to work Mr. Bruce Solie, who passed through the whole life, through all cases, through everything. People who were talking with me before were coming with what they were told, how to approach to me, how to treat me. They have come with made opinion, before whatever I will say yes or no. That is why I consider it is all unlawful documents in the period of interrogations done by anyone in CIA up until the end of 1967.

Chairman STOKES. Is there anything further, Mr. Nosenko?

Mr. NOSENKO. No, sir.

[Note: The committee granted Mr. Nosenko's request and the questioning did not continue.]

II. STATEMENT OF YURI NOSENKO MADE TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, AUGUST 7, 1978

In accordance with a request of the staff of the committee (House Select Committee on Assassinations), I make the following statement describing the conditions of my imprisonment from April 1964 till the end of 1967.

On April 4, 1964 I was taken for a physical checkup and a test on a lie detector somewhere in a house. A doctor had given me a physical checkup and after that I was taken in another room for the test on a lie detector.

After finishing the test an officer of CIA, John, has come in the room and talked with a technician. John started to shout that I was a phoney and immediately several guards entered in the room. The guards ordered me to stand by the wall, to undress and checked me. After that I was taken upstairs in an attic room. The room had a metal bed attached to the floor in the center of this room. Nobody told me anything how long I would be there or what would happen to me. After several days two officers of CIA, John and Frank, started interrogations. I tried to cooperate and even in evening hours was writing for them whatever I could recollect about the KGB. These officers were interrogating me about a month or two months. The tone of interrogations was hostile. Then they stopped to come to see me until the end of 1964. I was kept in this room till the end of 1964 and beginning of 1965.

The conditions were very poor and difficult. I could have a shower once in a week and once in a week I could shave. I was not given a toothbrush and a toothpaste and food given to me was very poor (I did not have enough to eat and was hungry all the time). I had no contact with anybody to talk, I could not read, I could not smoke, and I even could not have fresh air or to see anything from this room (the only window was screened and boarded).

The only door of the room had a metal screen and outside in a corridor two guards were watching me day and night. The only furniture in the room was a single bed and a light bulb. The room was very, very hot in a summertime.

In the end of 1964 there were started again interrogations by several different officers. The first day they kept me under 24 hours interrogation. All interrogations were done in a hostile manner. At the end of all those interrogations when I was told that it was the last one and asked what I wanted to be relayed to higher ups I said that I was a true defector and being under arrest about 386 days I wanted to be put on trial if I was found guilty or released. I also asked how long it would continue. I was told that I would be there 3,860 days and even more.

This evening I was taken by guards blindfolded and handcuffed in a car and delivered to an airport and put in a plane. I was taken to another location where I was put into a concrete room with bars on a door. In the room was a single steel bed and a mattress (no pillow, no sheet, and no blanket). During winter it was very cold and I asked to give me a blanket, which I received after some time. Except 1 day of interrogation and 1 day of a test on a lie detector I have not seen anyone besides guards and a doctor (guards were not allowed to talk with me).

After my constant complaining that I needed fresh air—at the end of 1966 I was taken almost every day for 30 minutes exercise to a small area attached to this cell. The area was surrounded by a chain link fence and by a second fence that I could not see through. The only thing I could see was the sky. Being in this cell I was watched day and night through TV camera. Trying to pass the time a couple of times I was making from threads chess set. And every time when I finished those sets immediately guards were entering in my cell and taking them from me. I was desperately wanting to read and once when I was given a toothpaste I found in a toothpaste box a piece of paper with

description of components of this toothpaste. I was trying to read it (under blanket) but guards notice it and again it was taken from me. Conditions in both (first and second) locations were analogical.

I was there till November [sic October] of 1967. Then I again was transferred blindfolded and handcuffed to another location. In this new place I had a room with much better conditions. And Mr. Bruce Solie (CIA officer) started questioning me every day (excluding Sundays) touching all questions concerning my biography, carrier in the KGB and all cases of the KGB known to me. I was imprisoned for the whole 5 years. And I started my life in the USA in April of 1969.

August 7, 1978.

Nosenko, Y. I.

III. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF BRUCE SOLIE BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, JUNE 1, 1978

INTRODUCTION

During the period that the committee was speaking with Nosenko, it was also taking depositions from various officials and former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency. One of the first to be questioned was the security officer who conducted the CIA investigation that determined in 1968 that Nosenko was a bona fide defector. This officer was deposed by the committee on June 1, 1978. Part of the questioning concerned the extent of his investigation into the statements Nosenko made about Oswald and his conclusions about the truth of those statements. Significant sections of that deposition follow:

EXCERPTS FROM DEPOSITION OF BRUCE SOLIE BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, JUNE 1, 1978

Mr. KLEIN. Prior to 1967 Nosenko had been questioned about Oswald. Did you read any transcripts of his answers relating to Oswald?

Mr. SOLIE. I did not see all of that. The interviews concerning Oswald, I believe, were partly done by the FBI and partly done by, particularly after April I think, were done by SR. I have seen parts of it. I may have seen more of it in 1967-68.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever compare the different transcripts relating to Oswald, what Nosenko said to the FBI as opposed to what he said in July 1964, as opposed to what he said in April of 1964? Did you ever do that?

Mr. SOLIE. No. In the first place, there wouldn't be any transcripts of the FBI anyway.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, the statements. The FBI had statements.

Did you ever compare that, compare that with what—

Mr. SOLIE. No, not word by word or line by line, no.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, did you speak to Nosenko about Oswald?

Mr. SOLIE. No. Well, all I have, you have there. I did a writeup on it. I didn't see that it seriously conflicted with what we had.

Mr. KLEIN. This writeup that you are referring to is a three-page writeup, the first page beginning with the word O-s-v-a-l-d, underlined.

Is that the writeup that you are referring to?

Mr. SOLIE. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. And how did it come about that Nosenko provided this information?

Did you ask him for it?

Mr. SOLIE. The transcript will reflect I asked him to prepare it in his own words on a previous day, a day or two before.

Mr. KLEIN. You asked him to prepare what in his own words?

I know that the document says something, but I want for the record for you to state what you asked him rather than referring to the document.

Mr. SOLIE. Why don't I use the record.

Mr. KLEIN. Sure.

Mr. SOLIE. The record reflects on January 3, 1968, I asked Nosenko to give me an account of everything he did in the Oswald investigation.

Mr. KLEIN. And is that three-page—

Mr. SOLIE. The memo was prepared in his handwritten form and what you have here is a typed copy of the handwritten memo.

Mr. KLEIN. And did you ever question him about what he wrote?

Mr. SOLIE. No, because I had no reason to disbelieve him.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever compare what he wrote to what he had said in earlier interrogations by either the FBI or by the CIA?

Mr. SOLIE. All of this information was provided to the FBI. They would be in a much better position for that judgment than I would be. The information was available to the FBI.

Mr. KLEIN. I understand that they had it, so they could have compared it if they wanted to, but did you ever compare it?

Mr. SOLIE. I did not have all the information on the Oswald investigation. That was an FBI investigation.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, was it available to you if you had asked the FBI for their reports of what Oswald had said to them?

Mr. SOLIE. It might, under certain circumstances, but in this case here, as far as our office was concerned, the Oswald matter was an FBI matter.

Mr. KLEIN. Did the Oswald matter have any relevance to the bona fides of Nosenko?

Mr. SOLIE. A factor to be considered.

Mr. KLEIN. So then to that extent wouldn't it be a CIA matter, too?

Mr. SOLIE. I fail to see what you are driving at. You are assuming that Nosenko was dispatched.

Mr. KLEIN. No; that is not correct. My purpose is simply to determine to what extent the Oswald aspect of what Nosenko said was investigated. I have no assumption whatsoever about him being dispatched.

Mr. SOLIE. That he has no more information from what had been obtained from him in various interviews in 1964, and had been furnished to the Bureau.

Mr. KLEIN. That is precisely my question, when you made your judgment in 1967, did you compare what he was saying in 1967 to what he said in 1964? Did you know what he said in 1964?

Mr. SOLIE. There was no conflict as far as I was aware of.

Mr. KLEIN. That was my question.

Mr. SOLIE. As far as I am aware of.

Now, again, the Oswald investigation, I don't know the extent of it. This only concerns one little aspect of Oswald's life.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever have an opportunity to compare all the statements made by Nosenko about Lee Harvey Oswald beginning 1962 or 1964, whenever he was first—well, actually not 1962, in 1964, up to the statement which he wrote out for you in 1968? Is that when this statement was written?

Mr. SOLIE. I think about the first of January.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever have an opportunity to compare all prior statements with this statement?

Mr. SOLIE. No; I wouldn't say all prior, no.

Mr. KLEIN. After Nosenko wrote this account of his contact with Oswald and his knowledge of Oswald, was he questioned by you about what he had written?

Mr. SOLIE. No.

Mr. KLEIN. Was he questioned by anybody, to your knowledge?

Mr. SOLIE. I don't recall whether at a later date the FBI may have touched on Oswald with him. It is possible, but that would have been at a later date.

Mr. KLEIN. For your report, your 1968 report, he was not questioned.

Mr. SOLIE. Yes.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Do you believe that Nosenko has told the truth in what he said relating to Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. SOLIE. Yes; I have no reason to disbelieve him. Again, I am commenting on my specific knowledge. I have not discussed this matter with him. I imagine the committee has discussed this in detail with him. I imagine—

Mr. KLEIN. Considering the fact that you haven't discussed it with Nosenko, would it be fair to say, and if not, correct me, would it be fair to say that you, your belief in Nosenko's credibility as to what he says about Oswald is really based in your belief of his credibility in all the other aspects which you did check out, as opposed to specific knowledge of the Oswald part of the case?

Mr. SOLIE. It has a certain relationship, not necessarily—it is not necessarily conclusive, but if the person tells you the truth about—and you can prove it on this, this, and this, and you have this one you can't quite prove because it is not provable, it would have an effect on your opinion. Then you should look to see are there any holes.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, I am really giving you the converse of this. Does the fact that you know or believe that he is telling the truth on A, B, C, and D, did that more or less lead you to say that you believe he is telling the truth about Oswald because you really were not able to check out the Oswald aspect of this case?

Mr. SOLIE. No; I wouldn't quite say that. There were other cases you couldn't quite check out. You have got to believe it or you don't believe it.

Mr. KLEIN. Then if that wasn't it, what specifically leads you to believe that he was telling the truth when he told you his account of Oswald?

Mr. SOLIE. Well, to make me think otherwise, I have got to see some evidence or someone to show me that he is not telling the truth. You have to have some contrary information.

And I have seen no contrary information.

Mr. KLEIN. So you start off with a presumption that he is telling the truth, and that has to be rebutted to some extent in order to question his statement on Oswald.

Mr. SOLIE. Well, your opinion of something is, you know, an opinion is an opinion. Some things are provable and some things are not provable.

Mr. KLEIN. I am not trying to get into a word game. What I am really saying is he has got three pages that he has written out and given to you.

Mr. SOLIE. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. And you have told me that you believe what he says, and I am trying to understand specifically what you base your belief on, that these three pages are correct.

Mr. SOLIE. I didn't have a part in the Oswald investigation. I did not talk to Nosenko in 1964 concerning the Oswald case, or any other case. It is regrettable that this whole situation arises and in 1967 we are trying to resolve something that should have been resolved in 1964. So Oswald was gone over and over and over in 1964 by the FBI and by SR. I see nothing that says it wasn't true. What am I supposed to do, go over this again point by point by point?

Is there anything I have a reason to disbelieve his statement?

Mr. KLEIN. But when you say it was gone over in 1964, the people who were conducting the interrogations for the CIA in 1964 did not believe that Nosenko was credible, is that correct?

Mr. SOLIE. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. So as far as the CIA was concerned, nobody had ever said that Nosenko was credible when he talked about Oswald.

So my question to you is, you can't base your belief that Nosenko was credible when he talks about Oswald on what the CIA had done.

Mr. SOLIE. And the FBI. The FBI talked to him, too.

Mr. KLEIN. Are you saying that you based your belief in his credibility about Oswald on the FBI, what they found?

Mr. SOLIE. No.

Mr. KLEIN. Let me make it simpler. I am trying to make clear my question. When I read your lengthy report, in many areas you go into long discussions as to why you have accepted a particular claim by Nosenko, why you have accepted he was a KGB officer, why you have accepted he is who he says he is, and why you have accepted that he served in a particular department he says he served.

And you gave specifics. You checked the things out. My question is, on what do you base your belief that he is telling the truth about Oswald; because I have read no specifics in the report or anywhere else explaining that?

Mr. SOLIE. Well, tell me what is there that is checkable?

Mr. KLEIN. I am not saying that there is. I am asking you if there was anything that was checked out, or if there was anything that was done at all to determine whether he was credible when he spoke about Oswald?

Mr. SOLIE. Well, this is one of the factors I had to consider in connection with the entire case. I have accepted it, and I will continue to accept it until someone can show me some contrary evidence, not opinion.

Mr. KLEIN. One of the things that Nosenko states is that the KGB never personally interviewed Oswald. They didn't interview Oswald when Oswald stated he wanted to defect, and they didn't interview Oswald when they decided to allow him to stay in Russia and sent him to Minsk.

In your opinion, based on your knowledge of Nosenko, based on your knowledge of the Oswald case, based on your knowledge of KGB procedures and techniques, do you find Nosenko credible when he says they never interviewed Oswald?

Mr. SOLIE. The question of what is meant by interview, a formal interview, taking him down to the local KGB headquarters, if that is what is meant—

Mr. KLEIN. What I am referring to is a KGB officer speaking face to face with Oswald, maybe not identifying himself as a KGB officer, but speaking to him under whatever identity he chooses, Nosenko says that never happened. My question to you is, do you find this credible?

Mr. SOLIE. Speaking to the best of his knowledge, I will have to—I will accept it.

Mr. KLEIN. Why would you accept that?

Mr. SOLIE. Because it could happen.

Now, that wouldn't say that the KGB didn't have a large book on him.

Mr. KLEIN. Was any work ever done to check out the feasibility of statements such as this? For example, checking to see what the experiences of other defectors were, whether they ever were debriefed by KGB officers? Was that ever done, to your knowledge?

Mr. SOLIE. No; not unless the individual had been interviewed for some other reason, but not to check against the Oswald case because the Oswald investigation was an FBI investigation.

Now, whether there have been some who were in Russia in a proximate period of time and had been interviewed, it is very possible. You would almost have to confine yourself to a proximate period of time because the international situation changed from year to year. So the comparison should be within the approximate period of time.

Mr. KLEIN. Nosenko was given how many lie detector tests, to your knowledge?

Mr. SOLIE. Three.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you consider any or all of these tests to have been valid?

Mr. SOLIE. I consider the last test to be a completely valid test; that is, the 1968 test. I would prefer that you be in actual discussion concerning the polygraph techniques with someone else from our office because I am not an operator.

Mr. KLEIN. I understand that, and I will only confine myself to questions relating to how you incorporated the lie detector information into your report.

The first two tests you do not consider them to be valid, is that correct?

Mr. SOLIE. I consider them not only to not be valid, to be completely invalid.

Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say that Lee Harvey Oswald was a minor aspect of the investigation into Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. SOLIE. No.

Mr. KLEIN. How would you characterize the Oswald aspect?

Mr. SOLIE. It was an important part to be considered.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you think that it received the full consideration and the time and effort to investigate it, the Lee Harvey Oswald aspect?

Mr. SOLIE. There was a tremendous amount of investigation done in 1964.

Mr. KLEIN. If it were to be proven that Nosenko was not truthful in his relation, in what he said about Lee Harvey Oswald, would that be significant as to the question of whether Nosenko was bona fide?

Mr. SOLIE. It would be something I would have to consider.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you think it is possible that he could be lying about Oswald and still be bona fide?

Mr. SOLIE. I do not consider that he was lying about Oswald.

Mr. KLEIN. I'm sorry?

Mr. SOLIE. I do not consider it.

Mr. KLEIN. If it were proven that he was lying about Oswald, do you think that that would change your opinion as to whether he was bona fide?

Mr. SOLIE. It sure would.

IV. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978

INTRODUCTION

Having heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence officer who believed him to be bona fide, the committee spoke to the CIA official who had overall responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko during the years 1964-67, when Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement. Among other things, he was asked about the reason Nosenko was placed in solitary confinement, about why he questioned Nosenko's credibility, and about Nosenko's charge that his statements to the Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the Agency. Portions of that transcript follow.

EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978

Mr. KLEIN. When Nosenko defected in 1964, when he came to the United States, was he in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't want to be cute by saying I believe so. I am not exactly sure of the legal—I mean what his legal status was. Insofar as physical facts, he was in the custody of the IC.

Mr. KLEIN. What division or unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. The Soviet Russian Division.

Mr. KLEIN. Of which you were the Chief?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. And what year did you leave the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. MURPHY. Beginning in 1968.

Mr. KLEIN. And up until what year did the Soviet Russia Division have primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the spring of 1967.

Mr. KLEIN. The investigation by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1967. At that time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet Russia Division to another division?

Mr. MURPHY. My recollection is that it changed in the spring or early summer of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security of which Solie was a member.

Mr. KLEIN. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have the primary responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where he was kept, what he was asked?

Mr. MURPHY. I was responsible for the case.

Mr. KLEIN. OK.

Mr. MURPHY. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the Division.

Mr. KLEIN. But they would report to you?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. There came a time in 1964, April 4, I believe, when the treatment received by Nosenko greatly changed in that hostile interrogations began, is that correct?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of the question.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, elaborate.

Mr. MURPHY. No; the previous pattern of voluntary discussion of issues under consideration changed and Nosenko was not permitted to evade questions or to decide when he would or would not want to respond.

Mr. KLEIN. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before, as far as conditions and how it was changed?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much permitting Nosenko to call the shots. In other words, we wanted his cooperation and we wanted to discuss these things in a reasonable manner, but his preference was not to sit still for a full day's briefing, to want to go out socially all the time, which made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And the most important aspect, I think, of the change was the decision to confront him with inconsistencies as opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.

Mr. KLEIN. What about the day-to-day living conditions, were they changed?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was not permitted to depart.

Mr. KLEIN. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment, not the actual interrogation sessions, but his food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't think so, not that early. I don't remember that.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated by people from the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Mr. KLEIN. And how were the particular subareas on which he was interrogated chosen?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure. I don't know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is a recollection, but I think the decision was made based on what the CIA people thought offered the best opportunity to get an admission and to break on that. In other words, I think it was based on points that they had collateral on. By that I mean other information which said what this man is saying is not the truth or this man does not know about this and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this. And so it was a fully tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to possession of information in the hands of the interrogators which then offered the best opportunity to get through and get the truth.

One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives you other breakthroughs. The decision on what subjects to be interrogated was essentially a factor of the tactics of the debriefing.

Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were determined by a desire to try to catch him, to break him, as opposed to a desire to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence agency? In other words, knowledge of the operation.

Mr. MURPHY. That is an accurate impression. The answer is yes because by the end of April there was a view that the man was not telling the truth, that parts of what he was saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore, made no sense, and although the reasons for his behavior and his statements were not clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense to accept as valid any data he might provide unless you could be sure that that data was in fact correct, and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the motivation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the information was not considered acceptable.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko had to say about Oswald?

Mr. MURPHY. From the very first. I mean, when he first said it back in February or March.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall now the substance of it?

Mr. MURPHY. No; not exactly, anything I said would be polluted by so much back and forth. I know that the thrust of the message was that Oswald was never of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed by them, and I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the affair. There is more detail, but I can't really pin it down.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you accept this statement by Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. I did not. I did not believe that it would be possible for the Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959 in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later, I think, that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it seemed to me that the Oswald story became even more unusual.

I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost to have been tacked on or to have been added as though it didn't seem to be part of the real body of

the other things that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand that Nosenko was—much of what he said was true.

Mr. KLEIN. You are talking about other areas?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much relationship, and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one coincidence but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there and all that sort of thing. That is what I mean.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall any other specifics about what you could not accept in Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, that they just—this is part of the first one—no contact was ever made, that he went up to Minsk and lived happily and well with no contact. The Soviet Union with foreigners don't do that. I mean, he is the only person. Read the accounts of what happened to this poor gentleman, what happened to Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive debriefing of him on the layout of the American Embassy. It didn't seem to be possible.

Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn't constitute any breakthrough. It seemed to me to be strange.

Mr. KLEIN. Would you distinguish between first the fact that nobody debriefed Oswald when he first came to the Soviet Union, nobody tried to find out what he knew as a marine, as a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they decided to allow him to stay, nobody debriefed him to find out if he was some kind of a Western security agent or working for CIA?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, they would be two different points. The first point clearly involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply a chap arriving with this background and no one taking the time just from a military intelligence technical point of view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000 feet what did the blips look like. I don't think they had many American radar operators handling operational traffic involving U-2's.

Mr. KLEIN. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko that although the KGB knew Oswald was a marine, they did not bother to question him, and because of that, never knew that he was a radar operator or that he worked at the base from which the U-2's took off and landed?

Mr. MURPHY. I think it would be strange.

My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no indication here that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector, there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be properly the outfit that would want to be talking to any marine. They will talk to a marine about close order drill. You follow me? It doesn't require that he be known to have been a radar operator or that he be known to have been a—they would talk to him about his military affiliation just as we would.

I realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think the Soviets are 10-foot tall. I don't believe they are. I think they are very, very, very much the other way. What I find difficult on the part of many Americans is that they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental competence that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will talk to a private in the East German Border Guards, period. The GRU would be interested in talking to a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated to a consul in a consular office, which is manned by the Soviets, Soviet locals and what have you, fully accessible to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the Embassy, that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell all. I guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of the things that made, or many other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an atmosphere of disbelief that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally important to the Soviet Union and we can't understand it.

Yuri may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was very hard to believe.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over almost 30 years, is that what is giving you trouble with Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. MURPHY. And other things.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn't questioned like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald was?

Mr. MURPHY. I honestly couldn't find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone that the division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this case, were handling it directly. I don't know of any former Soviet intelligence officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.

Mr. KLEIN. During this interrogation period, beginning in April 1964, would it be fair to say that the questions relating to Oswald and the problems which you have just been discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area for questioning and in interrogating Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. Probably not.

Mr. KLEIN. Why would that have been?

Mr. MURPHY. Because there were many other areas which posed equally interesting aspects yet about which we knew much more and which had occurred abroad and involved collateral knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us to obtain in the Soviet Union.

Mr. KLEIN. Who in the Soviet Russia division made the decision as to who would question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4?

Mr. MURPHY. [CIA employee], chief of the group.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you know of any criteria that he used to pick his interrogators?

Mr. MURPHY. Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko's English was not good, the fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA interrogation. You try not to use too many people because you then lose. In the first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is liable to go back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don't want to expose too many officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot of people in. You have to have people who studied the case and became in depth, know it in depth and therefore, so they use the officers that they had available and there were a variety of criteria.

Mr. KLEIN. AS I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn't know anything about Oswald's background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason that such a person would be used that you can tell us?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had, he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations. I wasn't sure of the point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure very many of us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.

Mr. KLEIN. Two points—

Mr. MURPHY. The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was level-headed, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his career since then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer.

Mr. KLEIN. But wouldn't—

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't what you are saying, he knew nothing at all about Oswald's case. I find that difficult to believe. But I don't know.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I told you the officer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other than what he learned from Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that they would not, if they didn't have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at least given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA knew about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn't do that?

Mr. MURPHY. I would certainly think so.

Mr. KLEIN. The second part of my question was the other point I made to you a week ago when we spoke, to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the particular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is gained from that, it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I say might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is that he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, and my question is would that be—

Mr. MURPHY. That wouldn't surprise me because there were very few people, relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debriefings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad,

might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange. There just wasn't squads and squads of highly trained fluent Russian speaking CI experienced interrogators.

Mr. KLEIN. One thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a number of tapes, and all of the ones I have listened to were totally in English, there was no Russian.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. My question is, was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major operation in the Bureau in 1964?

Mr. MURPHY. It was an important operation, an important case.

Mr. KLEIN. And yet there was nobody with interrogation experience who could be used to interrogate him?

Mr. MURPHY. I am sure some of the people had interrogation experience. I mean [CIA employee] himself had a lot of background in this field. I can't explain why the officer who debriefed him on Oswald did not have prior briefing on Oswald except what I mentioned to you the other day, because it was not a thing that we thought we were going to get through on, because we were weak in that area at that time.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?

Mr. MURPHY. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. KLEIN. Were there ever any conversations in which you took part about whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell the truth?

Mr. MURPHY. There were many, many conversations all the time about various things that could be done, all the techniques that are known, to get him to talk, but as far as I know and in discussions with the medical officer who handled the case, there was never any decision made or any attempt made to use these, because none of them appeared to be likely to produce results and they all would be very harmful and, therefore, not produce results.

Mr. KLEIN. Between 1964 and 1967 when you lost control over the case, in those years, it is your statement that if any drugs were given to him, to get him to tell the truth, you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?

Mr. MURPHY. That is correct.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie detector test in 1964, in April?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. MURPHY. It indicated he was lying on several key points.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that he was given a second lie detector test in 1966?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. MURPHY. Same thing.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. MURPHY. No; I believe the operator who gave him the test in 1966 was the same operator who gave him the test in 1964.

Mr. KLEIN. That is correct.

V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS AND ALEKSO POPTANICH, AUGUST 11, 1978, BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINA- TIONS

INTRODUCTION

In a further effort to clear up the facts surrounding Nosenko's claims that his statements to the CIA should not be used to impeach his present testimony, the committee took depositions from FBI and CIA agents who were present during the 1964 interviews. These agents were

questioned to determine if Nosenko was drugged, whether he was able to understand the questions, and what was the general atmosphere that prevailed during the interviews. Portions of those depositions follow:

EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, JULY 27, 1978

Mr. KLEIN. Are you an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; I am.

Mr. KLEIN. How long have you been employed there?

Mr. MICHAELS. Since January 1956.

Mr. KLEIN. I would like to direct your attention to July of 1964. At that time you were employed by the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; I was.

Mr. KLEIN. At that time did you have occasion to speak to Yuri Nosenko?

Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; I did.

Mr. KLEIN. What was the nature of the conversations that you had with Mr. Nosenko?

Mr. MICHAELS. I was one of the officers who was assigned to debrief Mr. Nosenko on his career in the KGB.

Mr. KLEIN. How many officers were assigned to the debriefing?

Mr. MICHAELS. At that time it was mostly two of us.

Mr. KLEIN. When did you first begin the debriefing of Mr. Nosenko?

Mr. MICHAELS. I don't know the exact date. That it was in April or May of 1964.

Mr. KLEIN. At the time you began debriefing him was he already in what we would call solitary confinement or hostile interrogations?

Mr. MICHAELS. At that time I would say that he was in confinement. The nature of the talks with him at that time was more debriefings than interrogation. Certainly there was interrogation involved in the debriefing but it was not a hostile interrogation.

Mr. KLEIN. What division were you in at the time you began speaking to Mr. Nosenko? What division of the CIA, that is?

Mr. MICHAELS. I was in what was then called the Soviet Russian Division.

Mr. KLEIN. Who was the Chief of that Division?

Mr. MICHAELS. The Chief of the Division at that time was Mr. David E. Murphy.

Mr. KLEIN. How long had you been in that Division at that time?

Mr. MICHAELS. I had been in that division in headquarters for slightly over 1 year.

Mr. KLEIN. Prior to your interviews with Mr. Nosenko had you debriefed any other KGB defectors?

Mr. MICHAELS. I do not believe that I had debriefed any KGB defectors prior to that time.

Mr. KLEIN. Prior to the interview with Nosenko had you been involved in any investigations of any KGB defectors? Investigations into their bona fides?

Mr. MICHAELS. I don't recall that I was involved in any investigation of KGB defectors. I had been involved in the investigation of one East European officer defector.

Mr. KLEIN. At the time that you began debriefing Mr. Nosenko would it be fair to consider you at that time an expert on the KGB?

Mr. MICHAELS. No; I don't think so.

Mr. KLEIN. At that time when you began debriefing Mr. Nosenko had you read files or done any research in order to increase your knowledge about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. MICHAELS. I cannot specifically recall having read any files pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald. Certainly I had read and heard a lot about him in the newspapers, television, and radio. I may have had the opportunity to read some previous debriefings of Nosenko concerning Oswald but I am not sure of that.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you at any time read any FBI interviews with Nosenko pertaining to Oswald prior to your interviews with Nosenko?

Mr. MICHAELS. I am not sure. I may have.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Concerning the physical appearance, at any time did he appear to have been beaten when you were debriefing him or during that period?

Mr. MICHAELS. No; I never saw him at any time that he appeared to have been beaten.

Mr. KLEIN. Did he ever complain to you or state to you that he had been physically abused in any manner?

Mr. MICHAELS. To the best of my recollection, no.

Mr. KLEIN. Did he always appear to understand what you would say to him during your sessions with him?

Mr. MICHAELS. Essentially he understood quite well. If he did not understand he would indicate that he had not understood.

Mr. KLEIN. Did he speak coherently during those sessions?

Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; very much so.

Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to describe him as cooperative during those sessions.

Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; it would.

Mr. KLEIN. Did he ever appear to be drugged during any of the sessions you had with him?

Mr. MICHAELS. No; he did not.

Mr. KLEIN. Did he ever complain of being drugged?

Mr. MICHAELS. I don't believe he ever complained to me about ever having been drugged.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any knowledge of his complaining to anybody else about being drugged?

Mr. MICHAELS. Well, I have heard recent comments.

Mr. KLEIN. I mean at the time did anything occur which led you to believe that he was telling the officials at that point that he was being drugged, back in 1964?

Mr. MICHAELS. My recollection is that he had explained or stated that he thought he was being drugged in some fashion on some occasions but I can't recall that this ever happened as early as the period around July 1964 when I was talking to him about Oswald. It may have been sometime later. But as I say, I have no recollection that he ever raised this directly to me.

Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge, he never raised it with anybody until after the questioning relating to Oswald in July 1964?

Mr. MICHAELS. I could not say that precisely because I do not recall it precisely.

Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge, was he drugged at any time while you were speaking to him?

Mr. MICHAELS. No; he was not. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. KLEIN. Did he ever exhibit any what we might call symptoms of being drugged when you were debriefing him?

Mr. MICHAELS. No; he never exhibited any symptoms that I would relate to his having been drugged.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you believe that he was hostile to you while you were debriefing him?

Mr. MICHAELS. To me personally?

Mr. KLEIN. Yes.

Mr. MICHAELS. No; I don't think he was hostile to me.

Mr. KLEIN. Did he always answer questions that you asked him to the best of his ability, so far as you could tell?

Mr. MICHAELS. I don't recall that he ever refused to answer any question. He would certainly, on some occasions, indicate that he had no knowledge of the matter about which I was questioning him, but where he claimed to have knowledge it was his normal practice to answer readily and rather completely.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. You have seen two question-and-answer transcripts here today. One dated July 3, 1964, and one dated July 27, 1964. To the best of your recollection, did you have any other question-and-answer sessions with Mr. Nosenko on the subject of Oswald?

Mr. MICHAELS. To the best of my recollection, the report that we looked at of the interview of July 3, 1964, was the first substantive discussion or debriefing that I had with Nosenko concerning Oswald. I recall the instance of the interview of July 27, 1964, which was the subject of the second report we

reviewed. I could not say with certainty that I did not discuss Oswald with Nosenko on other occasions. I do not, however, recall specifically any other detailed or in-depth interviews with him on that topic.

Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say that to the best of your recollection, July 1964, that period of time, was the only time that you discussed Oswald with Nosenko, say July, August, somewhere in that area?

Mr. MICHAELS. That is the only time that I recall this type of detailed discussion with him. It is possible that on future occasions when we were together that I could have been given followup questions, specific questions, to ask him or that mention of Oswald may have come into discussion of some other topic.

Mr. KLEIN. But you have no recollection of any other long debriefing sessions about Oswald?

Mr. MICHAELS. No; I do not.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. To your knowledge, was there any followup investigation done based on what Nosenko told you about Oswald?

Mr. MICHAELS. I am not aware of any particular followup investigations that were conducted on the basis of my debriefing of Nosenko on Oswald.

Mr. KLEIN. You stated that Nosenko's physical and mental condition appeared constant throughout your debriefings. To the best of your recollection, would the description that you have given earlier in the statement about his physical and mental conditions hold true for these two July sessions which dealt with the subject of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. MICHAELS. Yes; definitely.

Mr. KLEIN. You do not recall him at any time appearing drugged when he spoke about Oswald?

Mr. MICHAELS. No; not at all.

Mr. KLEIN. To the best of your recollection, he was cooperative and friendly when he spoke about Oswald?

Mr. MICHAELS. He was quite alert and responsive.

Mr. KLEIN. Did Nosenko know that you were from the CIA when you spoke with him?

Mr. MICHAELS. I am sure he did.

EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF ALEKSO POPTANICH BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, AUGUST 11, 1978

Mr. KLEIN. Are you currently a special agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. How long have you worked for the Bureau?

Mr. POPTANICH. About 27 years.

Mr. KLEIN. I would like to draw your attention to 1964. Were you working with the Bureau at that time?

Mr. POPTANICH. That is right.

Mr. KLEIN. And what was your job, the division that you were in at that time?

Mr. POPTANICH. Foreign Counterintelligence, the Soviet area.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you speak fluent Russian?

Mr. POPTANICH. I speak Russian. Fluency is marred to a degree.

Mr. KLEIN. And again, drawing your attention to 1964, did you have occasion, in early 1964, to interview Yuri Nosenko?

Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you recall approximately when you first began interviewing Mr. Nosenko?

Mr. POPTANICH. Well, probably it was sometime in February 1964. Probably early February sometime.

Mr. KLEIN. And for how long a period did you interview him?

Mr. POPTANICH. Off the top of my head, a couple of months, that is all.

Mr. KLEIN. Approximately how many times would you say you met with him?

Mr. POPTANICH. Well, I think we went out there, off the top of my head, twice a week. If you figure about 8 weeks, about 16 times, maybe. I can't say that for sure.

Mr. KLEIN. When you say you went out there, what are you referring to?

Mr. POPTANICH. Went to the safe house.

Mr. KLEIN. And at that time that you interviewed him was he under the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. POPTANICH. Yes, custody or control, however you want to put it.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you have a particular team of people who would take part in your interviews?

Mr. POPTANICH. Yes. There was myself, Maurice A. Taylor, and then there was Donald E. Walter, and I think at a later date Walter dropped out and Tom Mendenhall helped out. He is retired. So is Taylor.

Mr. KLEIN. And approximately how long would each session with Nosenko last?

Mr. POPTANICH. I think about 2 hours.

Mr. KLEIN. And were they conducted in English or Russian?

Mr. POPTANICH. That depends. Some were in English, some were in Russian and sometimes portions in English and sometimes portions were in Russian.

Mr. KLEIN. And were you able to fully understand what he was saying during these sessions?

Mr. POPTANICH. Yes. I think that he made sure that I translated. If I had any problems with the translation he made sure I was corrected because he understood enough English and we only interviewed him in Russian when he was irritated, that is, fully.

Mr. KLEIN. And by the same token, was it your belief that he understood everything that you were saying or that anybody from our team was saying?

Mr. POPTANICH. Oh, yes, because if there were any questions about his understanding of English, he would ask me in Russian. There was no question about being misunderstood.

Mr. KLEIN. There was full comprehension on both sides?

Mr. POPTANICH. Right.

Mr. KLEIN. Did there come a time when you spoke to Nosenko about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you recall approximately when that was?

Mr. POPTANICH. The only way I can recall is by the date of this memo, which is February 28.

Mr. KLEIN. I would ask that these two memos, the first dated February 28, 1964, and signed by Mr. Taylor, Mr. Walter, and Mr. Poptanich; the second dated March 5, 1964, signed by Mr. Poptanich and Mr. Gheesling—I should say, their names are typed on these reports, they are not actually signed. I would ask these be marked for identification.

[The above referred to memos were marked as JFK exhibits 1 and 2 for the record.]

Mr. KLEIN. We have marked these exhibits 1 and 2, August 11, 1978, for this hearing.

Looking at these two reports, sir, do you recognize them?

Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. What are they?

Mr. POPTANICH. Well, they are 302's which report our interviews with Nosenko on February 26 and 27, 1964, and March 3, 1964.

Mr. KLEIN. To the best of your knowledge, are those interviews that you had with Nosenko about Oswald?

Mr. POPTANICH. To the best of my knowledge; yes. I would say that we probably went out there and interviewed him on the 26th the first time and then went back on the 27th and got the information which verified it all, and then on March 3, Marv Gheesling, who was at headquarters at the time, got together with me and we went out and reinterviewed him.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Did he ever have an opportunity to see the finished report before you actually made it an official report?

Mr. POPTANICH. I think that he had. In order to eliminate any questions as far as accuracy, I think he saw a lot of stuff. Exactly what he saw or what things we took him, but I think anything of importance was gone over with him and discussed with him time and time again to make sure we had it accurate.

Mr. KLEIN. Is there any doubt in your mind that the two reports you have in front of you, JFK exhibits 1 and 2 of this date, are accurate reports of what Nosenko told you during those interviews?

Mr. POPTANICH. If these are the reports which were taken out of the file, the original copies of the original which we had typed and dictated on these particular dates, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. KLEIN. As you look through them is there any reason for you to believe that those are not accurate copies of your own reports?

Mr. POPTANICH. No.

Mr. KLEIN. Why don't you look through them?

Mr. POPTANICH. I am not going to be able to remember what he told me 14 years ago.

Mr. KLEIN. On their face——

Mr. POPTANICH. On their face they look like they are accurate reproductions of the 302 we used to take and dictate on.

On the 28th this appears to be basically the one. These were apparently taken from the same report. This looks like all the same material.

Mr. KLEIN. The record should reflect that in the last few minutes you have had an opportunity to look through the two reports which are marked for identification.

Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. So after having an opportunity to look at those reports they do appear to be your records, and it is your belief that these reports are accurate descriptions of what Nosenko told you about Oswald?

Mr. POPTANICH. Yes.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. When you spoke with Nosenko, was there any question in your mind as to whether he might be under some kind of drugs at the time you spoke to him, not self-administered. I am talking about drugs administered, say, by the Central Intelligence Agency in order to get him to tell the truth?

Mr. POPTANICH. No; I couldn't answer that, I don't know.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you see any indication that that was the case?

Mr. POPTANICH. No; he seemed to be himself on all occasions.

* * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Did you have any problems with his statement that the Soviet KGB was essentially uninterested in an American defector who, as it turns out, could have given them information pertaining to his work as a radar operator at an air base from which U-2's took off and landed?

Mr. POPTANICH. Not really. They had a good intelligence network and all his information was dated. It would be probably useless to them except for propaganda purposes. If he is plenty unstable or if he had a problem where they felt they couldn't control him or anything, they probably would never touch him with a 10-foot pole. We wouldn't do it either.

Mr. KLEIN. When you say plenty unstable, you are referring to the fact Nosenko told you they believed Oswald was plenty unstable?

Mr. POPTANICH. Yes, that is my recollection.

Mr. KLEIN. Looking at the top of page 28, on the March 5, 1964 report, just that first paragraph underlined. Is that what you are referring to, the reference there to the fact Nosenko believed he was abnormal and they just weren't interested in him as a result of that?

Mr. POPTANICH. Certainly, if the information he had was dated. A lot of intelligence is dated and of interest today, tomorrow it ain't worth a damn.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you essentially believe from whatever knowledge you had, maybe just your experience as an intelligence officer, what Nosenko had to say about Oswald?

Mr. POPTANICH. I accepted it at face value. He gave it to us. We had no reason to not believe him and I accepted it at face value. If I was predisposed to have my own conclusions and I would say to myself I don't think they would have done this or I think the Soviets would have reacted in a different manner, then I wouldn't believe him, and I think this is the wrong premise to start with when you are interviewing somebody like this. You have to start with the basic premise you accept the information and then you go out and you verify it or disprove it, and that is what we did with almost all the information we got from Nosenko.

Mr. KLEIN. That goes back to my earlier question, were you able in any way to do that with the information about Oswald?

Mr. POPTANICH. I didn't work on Oswald, after this was it, I had nothing to do any more with Oswald information as far as I recollect.

Mr. KLEIN. These reports are quite detailed. Nosenko gives names of other officers and there is a lot of information in here about Oswald. Is it your recollection that Nosenko had a good memory of the entire Oswald case at the time you spoke to him?

Mr. POPTANICH. Well, I think all these guys who come out have good memories, such as yours when you leave this job here you will remember a lot of these things for years to come because you are deeply involved in daily events and these things become ingrained to you. I think this is the same thing with these intelligence officers. They come over here and they talk to us and they have excellent memories, especially those who were predisposed to defect and they build a memory because they want to remember these things.

Now, in Nosenko's case, if he worked with it, I am sure he would remember it, or anybody had talked to him about it, because it was that important, because these intelligence officers sit around and they discuss these things and discuss them over drinks and get half drunk, and that is where you get a lot of your information.

Mr. KLEIN. Along that line, do you recollect that he did have a very good memory of the facts in these reports?

Mr. POPTANICH. Well, I think he had a good memory, yes. He had a good memory on a lot of things.

VI. LETTERS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1978, AND FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OF JANUARY 8, 1979

INTRODUCTION

In an effort to resolve questions that remained on the official positions of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Nosenko and the nature of the investigations into the Oswald aspect of the Nosenko case, the committee submitted questions to both the CIA and the FBI. The questions and the answers follows:

LETTER OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1978

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Office of Legislative Counsel


1 September 1978

Mr. G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel & Director
House Select Committee on Assassinations
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Blakey:

Forwarded herewith are answers to the interrogatories received at close of business on 28 August 1978.

Sincerely,



S.D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA

Attachment

-JFK EXHIBIT F-537-

Question #1

Enumerate the name of any drug given to Nosenko and the date it was administered -- including those given for "therapeutic" purposes -- from January 1964 to 1968.

<u>Drug</u>	<u>Date Administered</u>
Zactrin	August 24, 25, 1965
Tetracycline	August 24 thru 29, 1965
Thorazine	August 30, 1965
Donnatal	August 30, 31, 1965
Donnatal	September 27, 1965
Tetracycline	December 17, 1965
Tetracycline	May 31 thru June 6, 1967
Antihistamine	September 26, 1967
Cough Syrup	September 26, 1967

Question #2

Describe in detail Nosenko's living conditions from April 4, 1964 through 1968. The description should include, but not be limited to the following:

- a. where he lived
- b. the degree to which his movements were restricted
- c. his contact with other people
- d. his access to radio, television and reading materials such as newspapers and books
- e. the degree to which his actions were "observed"
- f. restrictions with regard to his food intake

Answer:

Nosenko was confined at a secure location in the Washington Metropolitan area from 4 April 1964-13 August 1965. From 14 August 1965-27 October 1967, he was confined at an installation on U.S. Government property outside the Washington area. From 28 October 1967-December 1968, Nosenko lived at three secure locations in the Washington Metropolitan area. His movement was completely restricted from April 1964-October 1967. From October 1967-December 1968, particularly after December 1967, there was a gradual relaxation in the control of Nosenko, although during this period he did not have freedom of movement. By the latter

part of December 1968, controls had been relaxed to the point that he was accompanied to restaurants, movie theaters, and other public locations. His contact with other people was limited to Agency personnel only from April 1964-December 1968.

Nosenko did not have access to TV, radio or newspapers from April 1964-October 1967. He was provided with a limited number of books to read from April 1964-November 1965 and from May 1967-October 1967. His reading privileges were suspended from November 1965-May 1967. From October 1967-December 1968, he was provided with an increasing quantity of books and other reading materials. Materials were screened to preclude exposure to current events until mid-1968. In August 1968, Nosenko was given a TV set.

Nosenko was under constant visual observation from April 1964-October 1967. Commencing in October 1967, though Nosenko remained in protective custody, actual visual observation was relaxed. From April 1964-October 1967, Nosenko received a regular diet of three meals a day. Periodically, during this time, his diet was modified to the extent that his portions of food were modest and restricted. After October 1967, Nosenko received a regular diet. From April 1964-October 1967, he was under regular medical observation.

Question #3

Define Nosenko's present and past employment arrangements with the Central Intelligence Agency. Include:

- a. the dates and nature of his employment
- b. the services rendered by Nosenko
- c. itemized accounting of all compensation received by Nosenko
- d. an account of the roles of Richard Helms and John McCone in authorizing Nosenko's employment and compensation arrangements with the CIA.

Prior to Nosenko's defection on 4 February 1964, he was promised \$50,000 for previous cooperation, \$10,000 for his identification, in 1962, of a particular espionage agent, and \$25,000 a year compensation for future services. Mr. Richard Helms approved the foregoing on 17 February 1964. Although no effort was made to fulfill the promise until some five years after Nosenko's defection, the original promise formed the basis for the eventual employment arrangement and other monetary remunerations.

Following acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides in late 1968, Mr. Helms approved an arrangement which resulted in Nosenko's employment as an independent contractor effective 1 March 1969. This first contract called for him to be compensated at a rate of \$16,500 a year. As of 1978, he is receiving \$35,327 a year (see attached annual compensation table for years 1969-1978).

In addition to regular, yearly compensation, Nosenko was paid for the years 1964-1969 in November 1972, in the amount of \$25,000 a year less income tax. The total amount paid was \$87,052. He also received, in varying increments from March 1964-July 1973, amounts totalling \$50,000 to aid in his resettlement on the private economy (see attached table for breakdown). The total resettlement figure, in effect, satisfied that portion of the above 1964 promise to pay Nosenko \$50,000 for previous cooperation.

In 197⁶~~A~~ Nosenko was paid \$10,000 to satisfy that part of the above promise relating to his identification of an espionage agent. Further, he was compensated in the amount of \$28,500, representing the difference between the \$25,000 a year promised and the actual amount paid to him during the period 1 March 1969-1 March 1975.

Since 1969, the Agency has contributed to Nosenko's hospitalization insurance premiums. The Agency has also compensated him for certain unusual medical and dental expenses.

To date, Nosenko continues to work as an independent contractor, with the compensation provision being periodically amended. His work for the Agency includes consultation with both the Agency and the FBI on certain matters of current interest concerning Soviet intelligence activities and personnel

both in the U.S. and abroad. From time to time he is also consulted by various elements of the Agency on current Soviet developments and requirements. He has been and continues to be used as a regular lecturer at counterintelligence courses of the Agency, the FBI, Air Force OSI, and others.

Our records do not show that Mr. John McCone played any role in authorizing Nosenko's employment and compensation arrangements with the CIA.

ANNUAL COMPENSATION TABLE

Effective 1 March 1969	-	\$16,500 a year
Effective 1 March 1970	-	\$18,500 a year
Effective 1 March 1971	-	\$19,500 a year
Effective 1 March 1972	-	\$21,000 a year
Effective 1 March 1973	-	\$22,250 a year
Effective 1 March 1974	-	\$23,750 a year
Effective 1 March 1975	-	\$25,250 a year
Effective 1 March 1976	-	\$26,513 a year
Effective 1 October 1976	-	\$28,103 a year
Effective 1 March 1977	-	\$33,000 a year
Effective 9 October 1977	-	\$35,327 a year
1978	-	\$35,327 a year

RESETTLEMENT FEE TABLE

March 1964	-	\$2,000
April-May 1969	-	\$8,000 (furniture and auto)
June 1970	-	\$25,000 (\$20,000 for down payment on house; \$5,000 for additional furniture, moving expenses, and other costs incidental to the purchase of new home)
July 1973	-	\$15,000 (balance of resettlement figure promised)

4. On what dates and for how long was Nosenko questioned by the CIA about Lee Harvey Oswald--from 1964 to present?

Mr. Nosenko was questioned by CIA about Lee Harvey Oswald on 23 January 1964 and 30 January 1964 in Geneva and on 3 July 1964, 27 July 1964 and 29 July 1964 in the Washington area. The first four debriefings comprised the entire working sessions on the respective days; the fifth debriefing occupied the better part of the day, but not the whole day. In addition, Mr. Nosenko was further debriefed on 3 and 6 January 1968.

5. When Nosenko was questioned by the CIA about Lee Harvey Oswald, who did the questioning?

Mr. Nosenko was questioned about Lee Harvey Oswald by CIA staff officers with broad experience in Soviet counterintelligence matters, in general, and the KGB, in particular.

6. What background, if any, did the interrogator have in interrogations? What knowledge did the interrogator have with respect to Oswald's background?

CIA does not have a separate professional category of interrogator, although it does have activities in which interrogation techniques are employed. CIA operations officers are experienced in questioning and debriefing intelligence sources, and the personnel involved in this questioning were intelligence officers with a background in Soviet and counterintelligence affairs.

7. On the dates that Nosenko was questioned about Oswald does there now exist or did there ever exist:

- a. a tape of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers,
- b. a transcript of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers,
- c. a summary of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers?

a. All five debriefings of Mr. Nosenko, concerning Lee Harvey Oswald, were taped. These tapes were furnished HSCA representatives on 9 and 12 June 1978.

b. We have been able to locate only a few documents that may be described as transcripts. There are, however, detailed memoranda of the debriefings.

c. Summaries of the questions and answers were made and retained.

8. What criteria, if any, was used to determine:

- a. what subjects to question Nosenko about
- b. how much time to devote to each subject

a. The subjects of the questions that were put to Mr. Nosenko were based on the needs and requirements of the intelligence community at that time.

b. Enough time was devoted to the debriefing so that each subject was adequately covered.

9. What significance -- with respect to possible foreign involvement in the assassination as well as to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides-- did the CIA attach during the years 1964-1968 to Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Of course, Mr. Nosenko's status as a bona fide defector related to the credibility of what he said. And this would bear on the credibility of what he said about Oswald. Whether he was a bona fide defector was the subject of serious reservations during the Warren Commission inquiry. His statements to the effect that Oswald was not a KGB agent were reported by Mr. Helms to Chief Justice Warren, but with the caveat that his bona fides not only had not been established but were suspect. It is our understanding that the Warren Commission decided, on the basis of the stated reservations, not to factor Mr. Nosenko's information into its findings.

CIA did question Mr. Nosenko at great length over an extended period of time. It was unable to resolve satisfactorily the question of his bona fides until well after the Warren Commission had completed its work. From the beginning, it was obvious that if Mr. Nosenko was telling the truth, what he stated about Oswald and the KGB tended to negate the likelihood of Oswald being involved with the USSR, as a KGB agent, in the assassination of President Kennedy. Because of the doubts entertained by CIA about Mr. Nosenko, this information was not acceptable for use in that respect by the Warren Commission.

10. What significance -- with respect to possible foreign involvement in the assassination as well as to the issue of Nosenko's bonafides -- does the CIA attach today to Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

With the acceptance of Mr. Nosenko's bona fides, we believe that the statements he made about Oswald were made in good faith.

11. If the answer to question 9 is different from the response to question 10, when did the change occur and why?

This question is not applicable to the preceding questions and answers.

12. What was the CIA's position from 1964 to 1968 on the question of whether Nosenko is bonafide?

13. What is the CIA's position today on the question of whether Nosenko is bonafide?

The point is that CIA, per se, did not reach an agreed position on Mr. Nosenko until late 1968. Various persons within CIA entertained serious doubts about his bona fides, believing in fact that he was a dispatched agent. Had the Agency, as distinguished from those employees, so concluded he could simply have been turned back. The final conclusion was that he is a bona fide defector, a judgment that has been reinforced convincingly by 14 years accumulated evidence.

14. If the answer to question 12 is different from the response to question 13, when did the change occur and why?

This question is not applicable to the preceding questions and answers.

15. What was the CIA's position from 1964 to 1968 on whether Nosenko was telling the truth in the statement he made to the CIA about Oswald?

See answers to questions 9, 10, 12 and 13.

16. What is the CIA's position today as to whether Nosenko was telling the truth in the statements he made to the CIA about Oswald?

See answer to question 10.

17. If the answer to question 15 is different from the response to question 16, when did the change occur and why?

See previous answers.

Question #18

Why were three polygraph tests given to Nosenko?

Answer:

All of the polygraph examinations of Mr. Nosenko had the same ultimate purpose, i.e., to contribute to the resolution of the question of his bona fides.

Question #19

What is the CIA's position with regard to the validity of each of the three polygraph tests administered to Nosenko?

Answer:

The Agency's position in regard to each test is as follows:

Test #1 (April 1964) - This test is regarded as invalid or inconclusive due to the instructions given to the polygraph operator prior to the test. According to the report the examiner was instructed, "that the polygraph interview was part of an overall plan to help break (Nosenko) . . . regardless of whether (Nosenko) passed his polygraph test or not, he was to be informed at the termination of his polygraph interview he was lying, and had not passed his polygraph interview."

Test #2 (October 1966) - This test is considered invalid or inconclusive because the conditions and circumstances under which it was administered are considered to have precluded an accurate appraisal of the results.

Test #3 (August 1968) - This test is considered to be a valid test.

Question #20

Why was Nosenko asked numerous questions pertaining to Oswald on his 1966 polygraph test and only asked two questions about Oswald on his 1968 test?

Answer:

The primary purpose of the 1968 polygraph test was to assist in the resolution of the issue of Nosenko's bona fides. Although the 1968 test included only two questions explicitly relating to Oswald, it also included other questions aimed at determining whether or not Nosenko had any secret mission from the KGB, or whether anyone in the KGB was aware of his intention to defect. If Nosenko was not a dispatched agent, he was a bona fide defector. If he was a bona fide defector, he did not have the mission of concealing some connection between Oswald and the KGB. In point of fact, establishment of his bona fides served to reinforce what he had to say about Oswald--even if some of his beliefs may have not been precise in all respects.

Question #21

Who authorized Bruce Solie to reinvestigate Nosenko's bona fides?

Question #22

Why was Nosenko's bona fides reinvestigated in 1968?

It is incorrect to say that Nosenko's bona fides were reinvestigated in 1968. As of 1967 the Agency had not adopted an official position on this question and his bona fides were still under review, as they had been since 1962. In 1967, the DCI, Richard Helms, authorized an independent review of the question of Nosenko's bona fides in an effort to resolve this longstanding issue and selected Bruce Solie to be the officer responsible for this independent review.

23. Did either the FBI or the CIA have primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald? If neither had primary responsibility, was there any division of responsibility?

While the FBI had primary responsibility for investigations into the assassination of President Kennedy, the traditional division of responsibilities would apply without additional formal arrangements. CIA had primary responsibility for establishment of Mr. Nosenko's bona fides as a defector, and for the investigation of foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence matters abroad. The FBI was responsible for the investigation of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence matters and those matters relating to internal security and law enforcement.

Neither agency had the capability for conducting investigations in the USSR, by way of checking Mr. Nosenko's statements. He could be questioned -- as he was by representatives of both organizations.

24. What communication, if any, existed between the FBI and CIA with respect to evaluating and/or investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

a. A review of CIA's Nosenko/Oswald file reveals that on 6 March 1964 the FBI Director sent a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence in which the former requested that the "Bureau be furnished any information in your possession which would tend to corroborate or disprove Mr. Nosenko's information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald". Attached to the FBI memorandum were copies of two memoranda, one dated 23 February 1964 and the other dated 4 March 1964. Both memoranda were captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald."

b. On 28 April 1964, the Agency responded by CI dissemination CSCI-3/780,996 to the Bureau's request. According to this dissemination, Agency files "contain the following information from Mr. Nosenko on Oswald which may amplify or contradict the information forwarded in reference."

c. A copy of CSCI-3/780,996 is attached. This document appears to be the only one between CIA and the FBI dealing with the evaluation and investigation of the validity of Mr. Nosenko's statements on Lee Harvey Oswald. (A copy of CSCI-3/780,996 was released as document number 498 in response to a request submitted to the Agency under the Freedom of Information Act.)

28 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO, Espionage-Russia

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 6 March 1964, subject as above, file (S) 65-68530, in which you requested information which would tend to corroborate or disprove NOSENKO's information concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD. Our files contain the following information from NOSENKO on OSWALD which may amplify or contradict the information forwarded in reference;

a. (1) Source was queried on the OSWALD affair on 25 January 1964. Source reported that his own Department was involved directly with OSWALD because OSWALD came to the USSR as a tourist in 1959. He had not come to special Soviet attention in any way until Source's Department received a report that OSWALD had asked to become a Soviet citizen. It was implied that Source himself examined OSWALD's request. The KGB decided to look into OSWALD's case to see if there was any operational interest, which part of the KGB might have use for him and what was behind the request. It was decided that OSWALD was of no interest whatsoever so the KGB recommended that he merely go home to the U.S. as a returning tourist and there go through the formalities with the Soviet Embassy of requesting to become a Soviet citizen. OSWALD then made the dramatic gesture of suicide when he received this response. He had been supposed to go on a trip with other tourists but failed to show up for the group. At his hotel it was found that his key had not been turned in at the desk, so it was presumed that he was still in his room. The Soviets sent to the room, knocked and got no answer so finally they broke the door down and found OSWALD lying there bleeding to death. Source himself was not present at this phase of the operation but merely read a report of it.

- 2 -

(2) Now worried about the possibility that OSWALD could do this again if refused asylum, the Soviets decided to give him a temporary residence permit although they had no intention of giving him Soviet citizenship. We asked why he had been sent to Minsk and Source replied that this was merely by chance. They had not wanted OSWALD to stay in Moscow and Minsk was chosen arbitrarily.

(3) Asked about Marina OSWALD, Source said that she was not a confirmed Communist and had been thrown out of the Komsomol for not paying her dues. She had no higher thoughts than to live a good life, have better dresses and such things. She was a stupid woman and had no interest in improving herself. "From the Soviet point of view she already had anti-Soviet characteristics. She was not too smart anyway and not an educated person."

(4) Finally OSWALD got tired of living in Minsk and wanted to go back to the U.S. He had married Marina and wanted to take her with him. The Soviets decided to let them go and used Marina's uncle to talk to them and persuade OSWALD not to spread anti-Soviet propaganda after his departure. The uncle pointed out that the Soviet Government had allowed OSWALD to live here, that he had married here and the Government was going to let his wife leave with him, etc.

(5) Asked why the Government had allowed Marina to leave, Source replied that this was perfectly natural. She was legally married and expressed her desire to leave with her husband. Under Soviet law there is no question but what she would be allowed to leave.

(6) The thrust of Source's account was that neither OSWALD nor his wife had at any time been of any interest whatsoever to Soviet authorities, that there had not ever been thought given to recruiting either of them as agents and that, in fact, the Soviets were glad to get rid of them both.

b. (1) During an interview on 30 January 1964, Source commented that "doctors examined (OSWALD)," and "there were no indications that he was completely a psycho." During an ensuing discussion of the possible involvement of the Soviet Government in the assassination of President Kennedy, Source stated, "No matter how I may hate anyone, but I cannot speak against my convictions and since I know this case I could unhesitatingly sign off to the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this (assassination) in any way." He continued that the KGB was frightened of

- 3 -

MVD/ OSWALD, I could not have discussed such a matter with him. When the possibility of recruiting OSWALD was brought up, the decision was "absolutely not." The only involvement permitted was to arrange for Marina LENINOVNA's uncle in the ~~USSR~~ (Col. Ilya PRISADOV) to ask OSWALD not to spread anti-Soviet propaganda in the US in view of the fact that he had been allowed to stay in the USSR and was being allowed to leave. Source commented that he was aware that the KGB had no subsequent interest in OSWALD because after the assassination of the President, Source had to make a complete investigation and even sent several KGB staff personnel to Minsk to investigate on the spot, "not trusting official papers."

(2) When speaking of OSWALD's request to return to the USSR, Source remarked that OSWALD "went to Mexico to apply for permission to go to the USSR. Our people asked Moscow and we said absolutely not because he is completely undesirable -- there was no interest in him whatsoever."

(3) Asked his opinion on Cuban involvement in the assassination, Source stated that he had no information on this subject, but he did not believe that the Cuban government was involved. He gave as a reason that if any word of such involvement had leaked out, Cuba would have been crushed by the US.

2. This agency has no information which would specifically corroborate or disprove NOSENKO's statements regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD.

3. The information in paragraph 1.a. above is based on notes taken during the first half of the first meeting with NOSENKO on 23 January 1964. The early portion of the tapes of this meeting could not be recovered because of the level of external noise. The information in paragraph 1.b. is taken from transcripts of subsequent meetings. In addition, just after his defection NOSENKO discussed the OSWALD case on several occasions without adding anything to the information contained in your Bureau's 4 March 1964 report.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

(signed: James Angleton)

JAMES ANGLETON

LETTER OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OF JANUARY 8, 1978

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

014401

January 8, 1979

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)

This responds in full to a December 18, 1978, letter to the Attorney General signed by G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA, which asked that the FBI declassify, in toto, a Secret, September 14, 1978, response made to 16 interrogatories pertaining to Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko which were propounded by the Committee in its letter of September 5, 1978.

Declassification of the September 14, 1978, response required coordination with the Office of Legislative Counsel, CIA, which interposed no objection to declassifying certain portions of that response.

The Committee's attention is invited to the fact that CIA did suggest, with regard to the response to interrogatory number "8", that the FBI "... may wish to correct the dates on which the FBI did not have direct access to Mr. Nosenko, to read 3 April 1964 until 8 December 1968."

For the convenience of the Committee, the following declassified, verbatim reiteration of the September 14, 1978, response is provided.

JFK
GEB
1-18-79

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

This responds in full to the following enumerated interrogatories submitted for consideration in a letter, dated September 5, 1978, to the Attorney General and signed by G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, HSCA.

"1. On what dates and for how long was Nosenko questioned by the FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald—from 1964 to present?"

The files of the FBI indicate that Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko was interviewed regarding Oswald and/or the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on February 26 and 27, 1964, and on March 3, 4 and 6, 1964. The FBI files do not record the specific duration in whole or in part as to topical discussions, of those five interviews; however, summary communications indicate the February 27, 1964 interview was conducted on the afternoon of that date and the March 4, 1964 discussion of Oswald occurred at the outset of an afternoon interview on that date.

"2. When Nosenko was questioned by the FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald, who did the questioning?"

The FBI interviews of Nosenko, during which he was questioned about Oswald and/or the assassination of President Kennedy, were conducted by Special Agents (SAs) Alekso Poptanich, Maurice A. Taylor and Donald E. Walter on February 26 and 27, 1964; by SAs Poptanich and W. Marvin Ghesling on March 3 and 4, 1964; and by SAs Poptanich, Taylor and Walter on March 6, 1964.

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

"3. What background, if any, did the interrogator have in interrogations? What knowledge did the interrogator have with respect to Oswald's background?"

There are no retrievable FBI statistics upon which to base a quantification of the interrogatory experiences of the SA personnel who interviewed Nosenko on the five pertinent occasions. Suffice it to say, the techniques of cooperative and hostile interrogations are integral aspects of the training and almost daily duties of SA personnel. In that regard, it is noted that during the February and March, 1964 interviews SA Poptanich had almost 13 years of SA experience; SA Taylor had over 31 years of SA experience; SA Walter had completed almost 17 years of SA experience; and SA Gheesling had over 13 years of SA experience. Further, their respective personnel files disclose the following:

SA Poptanich was then fluent in the Russian language (Nosenko's native tongue). The Annual Report of Performance Rating, dated March 31, 1962, noted that SA Poptanich, during the previous twelve months, had participated in the interrogation of a Soviet defector and his knowledge of the Russian language and mores of the Russian people proved most helpful relative thereto.

SA Taylor, on September 11, 1962, received an incentive award in recognition of the superior fashion his responsibilities were discharged over an extended period of time. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Washington Field Office, in submitting a recommendation for the incentive award, commented that SA Taylor had demonstrated exceptional ability in the interrogation and debriefing of three Soviet defectors, all of whom were intelligence officers. SA Taylor's Performance Rating for the period April 1, 1963--March 31, 1964, noted he was recognized as the finest interrogator on the Soviet espionage squad in the Washington Field Office, which accounted for his assignments to interview Soviet defectors.

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

SA Walter was the recipient of a personal letter of commendation, dated October 3, 1963, from the Director, FBI, for his superior work in the handling of a very sensitive, complicated, fast moving, and highly publicized espionage case. Previously (on November 7, 1954), he had received a meritorious salary increase for his outstanding work on another espionage case, successful interrogation being the key aspect of that investigation.

SA Gheesling, at the time of the pertinent Nosenko interviews, served as a Supervisor at FBI Headquarters and had considerable experience in espionage, intelligence and counterintelligence investigations. SA Gheesling supervised the field investigation of Oswald (from the latter's return to the United States on June 13, 1962 until September, 1962, and from November 22, 1963 through mid-1964). He was assigned exclusively to supervisory responsibilities relative to the assassination of President Kennedy.

While the specific knowledge of Oswald's background, possessed by these SAs at the time of the Nosenko interviews, can be answered only by the SAs themselves, SA Gheesling's prior assignment to supervision of the Oswald investigation would tend to indicate that he, at least, was quite knowledgeable of data contained in FBI files concerning Oswald.

- "4. On the dates that Nosenko was questioned about Oswald, does there now exist or did there ever exist:
- a. a tape of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers;
 - b. a transcript of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers;
 - c. a summary of the questions asked and Nosenko's answers?"

As noted in FBI memorandum dated June 19, 1978, captioned as above, and which was prepared in response to HSCA letter, dated June 13, 1978, to the Attorney General, FBI records searches have not located any extant tape recordings

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

or verbatim transcripts of FBI interviews with Nosenko that concerned Oswald and/or the assassination of President Kennedy. A document has been located which indicates that FBI personnel did record the February 26 and 27, 1964, interviews of Nosenko, among others. Since no recordings or transcripts have been located, it can be assumed that the recordings were used by the interviewing SAs to check the accuracy of their notes prior to dictating the results of the interviews. It is further assumed that, upon verifying the accuracy of summary reportings of the interviews, the recordings were disposed of since they had served the purpose for which they were made, although no record of such disposition can be found. Summary reportings of the five pertinent interviews are extant, and were delivered to the HSCA on March 21, 1978.

"5. What criteria, if any, was used to determine:

- a. what subjects to question Nosenko about;
- b. how much time to devote to each subject?"

FBI files do not contain a specific enumeration of criteria used to determine the particular subjects Nosenko was to be questioned about nor the amount of time to be devoted to each subject in the questioning.

"6. What significance — with respect to possible foreign involvement in the assassination as well as to the issue of Nosenko's bonafides (sic)—did the FBI attach during the years 1964-1968 to Nosenko's statements about Oswald?"

The FBI, during the years 1964-1968, considered Nosenko's statements about Oswald to be very significant elements of his initial reportings, the veracity of which had to be assessed in relation to the totality of information furnished by him. The FBI perceived Nosenko's statements about Oswald, depending upon a subsequent, definitive resolution of Nosenko's bona fides, to be the most authoritative information available indicative of a lack of Soviet governmental involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy.

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

"7. What significance — with respect to possible foreign involvement in the assassination as well as to the issue of Nosenko's bonafides (sic)—does the FBI attach today to Nosenko's statements about Oswald?"

The FBI does not perceive any significant evidence of foreign involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy, nor does the FBI perceive any credible evidence that Nosenko's defection was a Soviet ploy to mask Soviet governmental involvement in the assassination. Therefore, the FBI is satisfied that Nosenko reported the facts about Oswald as he knew them.

"8. If the answer to question 6 is different from the response to question 7, when did the change occur and why?"

The FBI had no direct access to Nosenko from April 3, 1964 until April 3, 1969, and therefore was not in a position to make an objective assessment of his bona fides nor of the veracity of information furnished by him. Thus, information provided by him, in early 1964, was accepted at face value and qualified in terms of the source and the conditions under which it was received. On October 1, 1968, the FBI advised the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that, based upon a review of material provided by CIA, the FBI found no substantial basis to conclude that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector; however, the FBI did not reach any overall, definitive conclusions regarding his bona fides because of a lack of access to Nosenko and all collateral information pertinent to such an assessment. Effective May 11, 1977, the CIA and FBI concurred that Nosenko was a bona fide defector, based upon an assessment of the totality of information furnished by him.

"9. What was the FBI's position from 1964 to 1968 on the question of whether Nosenko is bonafide (sic)?"

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

The FBI, from 1964 to 1968, characterized Nosenko as a Soviet defector whose bona fides had not been established.

"10. What is the FBI's position today on the question of whether Nosenko is bonafide (sic)?"

The FBI currently characterizes Nosenko as a former Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) officer who has furnished reliable information in the past, and considers Nosenko to be a bona fide Soviet defector.

"11. If the answer to question 9 is different from the response to question 10, when did the change occur and why?"

The answer to question 8 is considered responsive to question 11.

"12. What was the FBI's position from 1964 to 1968 on whether Nosenko was telling the truth in the statements he made to the FBI about Oswald?"

The FBI did not take a position, from 1964 to 1968, on whether Nosenko was telling the truth in the statements he made to the FBI about Oswald. The statements were accepted at face value and qualified in terms of the source and the conditions under which they were received.

"13. What is the FBI's position today as to whether Nosenko was telling the truth in the statements he made to the FBI about Oswald?"

The FBI is satisfied that Nosenko truthfully reported the facts about Oswald as he knew them.

"14. If the answer to question 12 is different from the response to question 13, when did the change occur and why?"

House Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives (HSCA)

As indicated in the responses to questions 7 and 8, the FBI, as of October 1, 1968, found no substantial basis to conclude Nosenko was not a bona fide defector; as of May 11, 1977, accepted a CIA assessment that Nosenko was a bona fide defector; and has not perceived any significant evidence, from 1964 to date, that Nosenko reported other than the facts about Oswald as he knew them.

"15. Did either the FBI or the CIA have primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald? If neither had primary responsibility, was there any division of responsibility?"

The FBI had primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald that pertained to his (Oswald's) activities in the United States, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The CIA had primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald's activities abroad.

"16. What communication, if any, existed between the FBI and CIA with respect to evaluating and/or investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald?"

The FBI forwarded a letter, dated March 6, 1964, from the Director, FBI, to the Director, CIA, enclosing memoranda dated February 28, 1964, and March 4, 1964, captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald," which summarized the results of FBI interviews of Nosenko regarding Oswald on February 26 and 27, 1964, and March 3 and 4, 1964. The results of a CIA interview of Nosenko on January 23, 1964, regarding Oswald were furnished to the FBI in a letter from the CIA dated April 28, 1964. These particular pieces of correspondence, while not setting forth any specific requests or investigative leads, were furnished for purposes of evaluation.

Where information is not provided, it is either not retrievable from FBI Headquarters files or is not being furnished pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding.


VII. TESTIMONY OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF, S.B. DIVISION BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSAS- SINATIONS, NOVEMBER 16, 1978

INTRODUCTION

At the committee's public hearings, two former officials of the CIA were questioned about the Agency's handling of the Nosenko matter. One, former CIA Director Richard Helms, was also questioned by the committee in an executive session. Helms was a particularly significant witness because he was involved in most of the important decisions made with regard to Nosenko. Basically, Helms testified before the committee that the investigation of what Nosenko said about Oswald was a thankless job, that the CIA did its best to resolve the issue and that, as far as he is concerned, the issue remains unresolved.

The other former CIA official to appear was Mr. John Hart. Hart, the author of a 1976 internal CIA report on the Nosenko controversy and its effects on the CIA, appeared as a result of the committee's invitation to the CIA to send a representative to respond to the committee's staff report. A copy of the staff report had been provided to the Agency prior to the date of the hearings. Mr. Hart spoke for 1½ hours, during which he hardly ever mentioned Lee Harvey Oswald. When asked by the committee to respond to the staff report, he responded that he had nothing to say on the subject, since he was not competent in that area. On further questioning, he did state that the CIA "failed miserably" in its investigation of Nosenko and in its duty to determine Nosenko's credibility with respect to Oswald. He also told the committee that he personally would advise the committee to ignore anything that Nosenko told the committee about Oswald, although he stressed that there was no bad faith on Nosenko's part.

In response to Mr. Hart's testimony, a former official of the CIA who had been in a supervisory position during the Nosenko investigation wrote a letter to the committee and then appeared before the committee in executive session. This official disputed Mr. Hart's evaluation of the CIA's investigation of Nosenko and asserted that the CIA did a competent job.



EXECUTIVE SESSION

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m. in room 2359, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Preyer, Dodd, Fithian, and Thone.

Mr. PREYER. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order. The clerk, Ms. Berning, is asked to call the names of those authorized to sit on this committee.

Ms. BERNING. You, Mr. Chairman; Mrs. Burke; Mr. Thone; Mr. Dodd; and Mr. Fithian will be substituting for Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you.

At this time the Chair will entertain a motion to close the meeting.

Mr. DODD. I would so move, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PREYER. You have heard the motion. All those in favor will answer to the rollcall.

Ms. BERNING. Mr. Preyer.

Mr. PREYER. Aye.

Ms. BERNING. Mr. Thone.

[No response.]

Ms. BERNING. Mrs. Burke.

[No response.]

Ms. BERNING. Mr. Dodd.

Mr. DODD. Aye.

Ms. BERNING. Mr. Fithian.

Mr. FITHIAN. Aye.

Ms. BERNING. Three ayes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PREYER. Our witness today, the Deputy Chief, S.B. Division, Mr. D. C., served as the deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of the CIA in 1962, at the time of Mr. Nosenko's first contact with the agency in Geneva, Switzerland, and since that time, has assisted in further interrogations of Mr. Nosenko.

I understand you have a prepared statement that you propose to read to the committee and that statement includes a letter dated October 11, 1978, to Mr. Blakey, the chief counsel of the committee. Is it correct that you would like that letter to be made a part of the record?

Mr. D. C. If you would, please.

Mr. PREYER. But you propose to read the first part of your statement.

Mr. D. C. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREYER. Without objection, the letter dated October 11, 1978, will be made a part of the record.

[The letter referred to above follows:]

OCTOBER 11, 1978.

Mr. G. ROBERT BLAKEY,
Chief Counsel and Director, Select Committee on Assassinations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. BLAKEY: I have read the transcript of the testimony of the CIA's representative, Mr. John L. Hart, before your Committee on September 15, 1978.

As the former deputy chief of the CIA's Soviet Bloc Division, so prominently and so disparagingly featured in that testimony, I may be able to help the Committee to judge CIA's investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union, as reported by Yuri Nosenko.

Specifically, I can correct certain misleading impressions left by Mr. Hart. I would call to your attention at least twenty errors, fifteen misleading statements, and ten important omissions in his testimony, many of them pertinent to your task and, together, distorting the entire picture.

Having been publicly dishonored by unfounded statements before your Committee, I ask for the courtesy of an opportunity to come before the Committee, publicly if you are to hold more public hearings, to answer not only for myself but also for the Central Intelligence Agency, which has misrepresented its own performance.

I mention below a few of the points of error and distortion, leaving many others to be discussed in person with the Committee. My comments refer to the line numbers in the draft transcript of Mr. Hart's testimony, and are keyed to the Committee's twofold purpose as you defined it: of evaluating the performance of the Agency and of weighing the credibility of Mr. Nosenko.

For clarity I have subdivided these as follows:

- (1) Effectiveness of CIA's performance:
 - (a) in getting the facts about Oswald from Nosenko,
 - (b) in investigating these facts.
- (2) Credibility:
 - (a) of Mr. Nosenko's statements about Oswald,
 - (b) of Mr. Nosenko as a source.

After discussing briefly each of these points, I will make, below, a few general comments on the CIA testimony, and will address myself to the matter of Nosenko's treatment.

CIA's Performance in Getting the Facts From Nosenko

The committee staff report describes accurately the CIA's performance in this particular aspect of its responsibility. Referring to the Agency's questioning of Nosenko on July 3 and July 27, 1964, it says on page 7 that the CIA's questions "were detailed and specific about Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. The questions were chronological and an attempt was made to touch all aspects of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union." Moreover, CIA gave Nosenko a transcript of his own remarks so he could add anything more he knew or correct any errors. (Staff report, pages 8-9.)

Mr. Hart's confusing testimony had the effects of changing the committee's appraisal. Not only giving the Agency a "zero" rating on all aspects of this case, he stated flatly that "There was no effort being made to get at more information he might have." (lines 2848-9) He thus led Mr. Fithian to suggest that the CIA had not even taken "the logical first step" of getting Nosenko's information (3622-8) and led the Chairman to conclude that no investigation of Oswald's activities as known to Nosenko had been made. (4095-8) In this Mr. Hart concurred. (4100)

In fact, CIA got from Nosenko all he had to say about Oswald. CIA's reports contained no less than those of the FBI, who questioned Nosenko as long as they thought they needed to. Your committee seems to have been satisfied that in its 21 to 24 hours with Nosenko it, too, had got everything he had to say. That added only one new fact, about the KGB's voluminous surveillance reports on Oswald, which contradicted Nosenko's earlier reports and, as the staff report notes, in turn contradicted another aspect of Nosenko's story: that the KGB didn't watch Oswald enough to learn of his courtship of Marina.

One wonders, therefore, whether Mr. Hart would give your committee a similar "dismal" or "zero" rating.

In fact, of course, there was nothing more to be got from Nosenko. If there had been, CIA would have gone doggedly after it, just as the FBI and your committee would have. Your staff report said that Nosenko "recited" the same story in each of his three sessions with the committee. The word is apt: Nosenko had "recited" that story before, to CIA and FBI, each of whom questioned him carefully and systematically about it.

It is difficult, then, to accept the new judgment that CIA's performance on this aspect deserved a "zero." It could only be a result of confusion engendered by Mr. Hart.

CIA's Performance in Investigating Nosenko's Reports on Oswald

By alleging *general* prejudice and misunderstanding on the part of CIA personnel handling this case, Mr. Hart confused the Committee on the *specific* question of CIA's investigation of Nosenko's information.

When Mr. Fithian asked specifically whether the CIA had made any attempt to verify Nosenko's information on Oswald's KGB contacts, Mr. Hart replied yes, but then interjected an irrelevant statement about a "climate" of "sick think"; his aim was presumably to leave the impression that even if another KGB man had confirmed Nosenko's statements on Oswald, these dismal CIA people wouldn't have believed him. (3666) Later Mr. Hart backed off even this degree of approbation, hinting that maybe, after all, CIA didn't investigate at all: "No such file (showing investigation via other defectors) came to my attention." (4177) But Mr. Hart knew very well that no other defectors knew about Oswald's connections with the KGB.¹

The truth lies in the Warren Commission report, cited in lines 4146-9, that CIA just didn't have other sources in the KGB or elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. in a position to check Nosenko's story. This is not quite the same thing as saying, as the chairman did, that "we now know that the CIA did not investigate what Nosenko did tell them about Oswald in Russia." (4166) The confusion stems from Mr. Hart's testimony.

If CIA's failure to have on tap another spy in the KGB who knew about the Oswald case constitutes "dismal" performance, then that should be so stated. The record as it stands, at least in the transcript, casts an unjustified slur on CIA's performance in this particular aspect of its task.

By the way, the coincidence that the CIA had even one KGB source on Oswald in Russia is worth the committee's notice. Of the many thousands of KGB people throughout the world, CIA had secret relations with only one, and this one turned out to have participated directly in the Oswald case. Not only once, but on two separate occasions: When Oswald came to Russia in 1959 and again after the assassination when the Kremlin leadership caused a definitive review of the whole KGB file on Oswald.² How many KGB men could say as much? CIA was thus unbelievably lucky to be able to contribute to the Warren Commission at all. (In view of other suspicions of Nosenko, the key word in that last sentence is "unbelievably.")

Credibility of Nosenko's Statements About Oswald

The committee's staff report ably pointed out the contradictions between Nosenko's various statements. Mr. Hart admitted, under Mr. Dodd's insistent pressure, that Nosenko's testimony about Oswald was "implausible" and even "incredible." (3431, 4353, 4396) He went so far as to recommend that it be disregarded. (3426, 3438, 3467)

However, Mr. Hart exhorted you to believe in the rest of Nosenko's reporting and to believe in Mr. Nosenko's good faith. (2656, 3252-78, 3348-55) In other words, he assured you that Nosenko's incredible and unusable testimony about Oswald did not come as a message from the KGB but only from the confused mind of CIA's advisor. Therefore, Mr. Hart would have you disregard it rather than read it in reverse.

¹ Defectors knowledgeable of internal U.S.S.R. procedures and controls were queried by CIA concerning the whole story of Oswald in the U.S.S.R., and the results were reported.

² If memory serves, there was a third occasion, too. Did not Nosenko happen to be in the room in 1963 when a cable arrived in Moscow concerning Oswald's visa application in Mexico City?

To support this recommendation Mr. Hart said: "I cannot offhand remember any statements which he has been proven to have made which were statements of real substance *other than the contradictions which have been adduced today on the Lee Harvey Oswald matter*, which have been proven to be incorrect." (3253-8)

But the Committee only spoke to Nosenko about this one matter. Even so, the committee detected no less than four or five contradictions. Could this, by extraordinary coincidence, be the only such case?

When it confronted Nosenko with his contradictions, the Committee encountered the range of Nosenko's excuses and evasions—even before the CIA sent Mr. Hart to make these same excuses for Nosenko. Nosenko told the Committee that he'd been misunderstood, that he didn't understand English, that he'd been under stress, drugged, or hallucinating. He would evade the question, saying you shouldn't ask him what he'd said before, but should ask about the conditions he'd been kept in. Mr. Hart's testimony must then have resounded like an echo in the Committee room.

Nosenko even told the Committee staff that he couldn't remember what he had said before. The oddity of this will not have escaped the Committee's notice. It shouldn't matter what he'd said before; he was supposedly talking of things he'd lived through: the KGB files he'd seen, the officers he'd worked with. If these were real experiences he need only recall them and his reports would, all by themselves, come out more or less the same way each time (within normal or abnormal limits of memory, and personality quirks, of which we are all almost as aware as Mr. Hart). As the Committee learned, Nosenko's reports did *not* come out straight, so Nosenko resorted to this bizarre excuse—which makes the story appear more learned than experienced.

Nonetheless the CIA asks the Committee to take its word that this is the only time such things happened, the only such testimony by Nosenko that need be disregarded. But this is particularly difficult to accept on such an important matter. The Oswald affair, after all, was exciting worldwide interest, and at the time of the KGB's file review, Nosenko was already a willing secret collaborator of the CIA. One might expect his powers of retention to work unusually well here. Yet it is precisely on this matter that CIA tells you that Nosenko was uniquely fuzzy.

What the CIA did not tell the Committee, what was hidden behind Mr. Hart's "offhand" inability to remember other such bad performances by Nosenko—the man-of-good-faith, was that *this performance was in no way unusual*. It was simply the way Nosenko reacted whenever he was interrogated in detail on important matters. Not only the contradictions, not only the changes in the story, but the excuses and evasions as well: all were standard Nosenko.

This brings us to the next subject.

Credibility of Nosenko as a Source

This is clearly important to the Committee, which must decide whether Nosenko's contradictory testimony on Oswald was an aberration, as the CIA pleaded, or a message from the KGB.

Here are a few of the errors in the CIA testimony which might affect your decision:

(1) Mr. Hart said, after having reviewed every detail of the case for six months with the aid of four assistants, "I see no reason to think that he has ever told an untruth, except because he didn't remember it or didn't know or during those times when he was under the influence of alcohol he exaggerated." (3352)

Comment: Ten years removed from this case, I can still remember at least twenty clear cases of Nosenko's lying about KGB activity and about the career which gave him authority to tell of it, and a dozen examples of his ignorance of matters within his claimed area of responsibility, for which there is no innocent explanation.

Never, before this testimony by Mr. Hart, was drinking adduced as an excuse for Nosenko's false reporting. He had no alcohol in his detention, during which he was questioned, as Mr. Hart reminds us, for 292 days. And not by the wildest excess of faith or credulity can all of the contradictions and compromising circumstances of the Nosenko case (none of which, oddly enough, did Mr. Hart mention) be attributed to Nosenko's faulty memory, which Mr. Hart seemed at such pains to establish

(2) Mr. Hart said that the suspicions of Nosenko arose from the paranoid imaginings and jealousy of a previous defector, whom he calls "X". Mr. Hart told you that "Mr. X's views were immediately taken to be the definitive view of Nosenko and from that point on, the treatment of Mr. Nosenko was never, until 1967, devoted to learning what Mr. Nosenko said." (2404-29, 2488-91)

Comments:

(a) It was not X's theories which caused my initial suspicion of Nosenko in 1962. It was the overlap of Nosenko's reports (at first glance entirely convincing and important) with those given six months earlier by X. Alone, Nosenko looked good (as Mr. Hart said, 2375-9, 2397-8); seen alongside X, whose reporting I had not previously seen, Nosenko looked very odd indeed. The matters which overlapped were serious ones, including a specific lead to penetration of CIA (not a general allegation, as Mr. Hart misleadingly suggested on lines 2419-21). There were at least a dozen such points of overlap, of which I can still remember at least eight. Nosenko's information tended to negate or deflect leads by X.

(b) Later, our suspicions of Nosenko were deepened by concrete matters, not paranoid suppositions, and many of these lay outside Nosenko's own story and hence not explicable by his boasting, drinking, or whatnot.

(c) Mr. Hart said that X "was masterminding the examinations in many ways." (2457) In fact X played no role at all in our "examinations" although he submitted a few questions and comments from time to time. The testimony of CIA on this point is inexplicable; its falsity must have been evident in the files Mr. Hart's team perused.

(d) It is simply not true that "the treatment of Nosenko was not devoted to learning what Mr. Nosenko said." In the Oswald matter alone the Committee has the record of careful, systematic questionings in January and July 1964. Similar care was devoted to his other information. The results fill some of those forty file drawers to which Mr. Hart referred.

(3) Mr. Hart stated, "Quantitatively and qualitatively, the information given by Mr. X was much smaller than that given by Nosenko." (2470)

Comments:

This breathtaking misstatement hides the fact that Mr. X, paranoid or not, provided in the first months after his defection information which led to the final uncovering of Kim Philby, to the detection of several important penetrations of Western European governments, proof (not allegation) of penetration at the most sensitive level of . . . [allied service] and pointers to serious penetrations of the U.S. Government.

Mr. X gave, before Nosenko, the current organization and methods of the KGB, and it was Mr. X who first revealed both of the two KGB operations which Mr. Hart adduced as proof of *Nosenko's* good faith. (See (4) and (5) below.)

To be charitable to Mr. Hart, he admitted to the Committee (2434) that he is "not an expert on Mr. X's case." His testimony, however, suggests that he has not read the references to X in the Nosenko files.

(4) Mr. Hart stated, "Mr. Nosenko was responsible for the discovery of a system of microphones within the U.S. Embassy in Moscow which had hitherto been suspected but nobody had enough information on it to actually detect it." (2328-32)

Comments:

(a) Mr. X had given approximate locations of some of the microphones six months earlier. Neither he nor Nosenko knew precise locations, but both *knew* the mikes were there and both could indicate some specific offices where they could be found. The actual tearing out of walls, which Mr. Hart describes, would have been done, and the microphone "system" found, without Nosenko's information.

(b) Contrary to Mr. Hart's statement (2350-3) the KGB *would* "throw away" already-compromised information to build up a source. Mr. Hart simply hid from you the fact that this information *was* already compromised when Nosenko delivered it.

(c) These microphones were all in the "old wing" of the Embassy. Nosenko also said, and carefully explained why, no microphones were installed in the "new wing." Mr. Edward Jay Epstein, in his book *Legend*, says that 134 microphones were later found there. I think this can be checked, via the State Department. It would seem to have been CIA's responsibility to tell you about this, once they had raised the subject of microphones to support Nosenko's bona fides.

(5) Mr. Hart said, "A very high level KGB penetration in a very sensitive position in a Western European government was, on the basis of Mr. Nosenko's lead, arrested, tried, and convicted of espionage. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets would have given this information away." (2354-62)

Comments: Mr. Hart was presumably referring to a man we can here call "Y", although I do not entirely understand his reticence, for this case is very well known to the public.

Mr. Hart has made two misstatements here:

(a) Y's reports to the KGB were known to Mr. X, and the case had thus been exposed to the West six months before Nosenko reported to CIA. The KGB, recognizing this, cut off contact with Y immediately after X's defection. Y's eventual uncovering was inevitable, even though X had not known his name. Nosenko added one item of information which permitted Y to be caught sooner, and that is all.

(b) Therefore, contrary to the CIA testimony, there is a "reason to believe that the Soviets would have given this information away." The reason—that Y was already compromised—was perfectly clear in the files which Mr. Hart's team studied.

(6) Mr. Hart told you that Mr. X had confirmed Nosenko's claimed positions in the KGB. (2431)

Comment: Mr. X said, on the contrary, that he had personally visited the American Embassy section of the KGB during the period 1960-61 when Nosenko claimed to have been its deputy chief. X knew definitely that Nosenko was not serving there.

(7) Mr. Hart said that DC/SB "had built up a picture which was based on a good deal of historical research about a plot against the West." (4809)

Comment: Like point (2) above, this is part of CIA's effort to belittle the case against Nosenko. My "picture" of Nosenko's role as a KGB provocateur was based on concrete factors, which as I have said above cannot be explained by Nosenko's personality flaws or memory. It was not based on "historical research," as Mr. Hart knew very well—although it is, in fact, supported by a long history of Soviet actions of this sort.

At this point a word may be in order about Mr. Hart's contemptuous reference to "historical research." As I mentioned above, Nosenko's information in 1962 overlapped and deflected leads given shortly before by X, concerning spies in the U.S. Government. Now, a KGB paper of this period, perhaps what Mr. Hart would call a historical document, described the need for disinformation (deception) in KGB counterintelligence work. It stated that just catching American spies isn't enough, for the enemy can always start again with new ones. Therefore, said this KGB document, disinformation operations are essential. And among the purposes of such operations, as I recall the words of the document, the first one mentioned is "to negate and discredit authentic information the enemy has obtained." I believe that Nosenko's mission in 1962 involved just that: covering and protecting KGB sources threatened by X's defection. Does this sound like a "horrendous plot" conjured up by paranoids? It is a straightforward counterespionage technique, perfectly understandable to laymen. But Mr. Hart's purpose was not enlightenment, but ridicule.

The last of the four or five purposes the secret KGB document listed (purposes of counterintelligence disinformation operations) was "to penetrate deeper into the enemy service." By taking on Mr. Nosenko as a counselor, the CIA may have helped the KGB achieve this goal, as well as the first one.

What conclusions can be drawn from these and similar errors in the CIA testimony?

I would submit that despite these efforts to deride and dismiss the arguments again Nosenko, there is, as Mr. Helms testified, a solid case against Nosenko, of which the implications are very serious. The country is not well served by Mr. Hart's superficial and offhand dismissal of that case.

For if Nosenko is a KGB plant, as I am convinced he is, there can be no doubt that Nosenko's recited story about Oswald in the USSR is a message from the KGB. That message says, in exaggerated and implausible form, that Oswald had nothing whatever to do with the KGB, not questioned for his military intelligence, not even screened as a possible CIA plant. Even Mr. Hart finds it incredible and recommends that you disregard it. But his reasons are flawed, and can you afford to disregard it? By sending out such a message, the KGB exposes the fact that it has something to hide. As Mr. Helms told you, that something may be the fact that Oswald was an agent of the KGB.

The Form and Tone of the CIA Testimony

It is against this grave background that I will comment on the general tenor of the CIA testimony.

The Committee and the public must have been struck dumb by the spectacle of a government agency falling over itself to cast mud on its own performance of duty.

When Mr. Dodd asked Mr. Hart if CIA had "failed in its responsibility miserably," Mr. Hart replied, in a classic of government advocacy, "Congressman, . . . I would go further than that." (3188)

Mr. Hart's testimony—one-sided, intemperate, distorted—was carefully structured to influence rather than inform the Committee.

Mr. Hart went to special pains to force your thinking into a certain framework. He began his testimony defensively, citing all the factors which might have caused this defector to bear false witness: stresses, bad memory, drunkenness, the traumas of defection (shared, by the way, by all defectors), and even the "unreality of his situation." (2634) And then on to the revelations of mistreatment, which you are to accept as dismissing all evidence against Nosenko. "It is with (these mitigating factors) in mind that we have to approach everything that happened from 1962" (2498-9), plus of course the sheer bumbling incompetence of Nosenko's handling.

On the one hand CIA attacked with venom its own past performance, and on the other hand adopted an almost beseeching tone in defending a Soviet KGB person who, by CIA's own admission, had rendered invalid testimony about the assassin of an American president.

"You should believe these statements of Mr. Nosenko," Mr. Hart said. (3252) "Anything that he has said has been said in good faith." (3350) "I am only asking you to believe that he made (his statements) in good faith." (3275) "I am hoping that once these misunderstandings are explained, that many of the problems . . . which the staff has had with the questions and answers from Mr. Nosenko, and also allegations concerning him, will be cleared up and go away." (2124-31)

Confronted by Mr. Dodd with the specific contradictions which made Nosenko's story unacceptable, Mr. Hart fell back on declarations of faith (3426, 3349)

In the heat of his defense of Nosenko and his attack on Nosenko's questioners, Mr. Hart jumbled together the conditions of 1962 (alleged drunkenness) with those of the confinement, leading Mr. Dodd to lay importance on Nosenko's drinking. (3243-4) He got over to Mr. Dodd the idea that hallucinations "probably" (3241) influenced Nosenko's performance under interrogation (by a subtle turn of phrase, lines 2870-73)—while knowing that hallucinations were never a factor in the question-and-answer sessions. Noting that the CIA medical officer concluded that Nosenko had feigned his hallucinations (in periods of isolation) Mr. Hart could not restrain a knee-jerk defense, "but that was simply one medical officer's opinion." (2864) And finally, by spending his testimony on the handling of Nosenko, and the mistreatment, he succeeded in skirting all the *facts* of the case which are, after all, your concern.

Mr. Hart's emotional closing message (4883) with its catchy word "abomination," epitomizes his whole testimony.

That testimony shows none of the detachment of a self-styled "historian" proud of his high standards of scholarship. (4106) It sounds more like a man pleading a flimsy cause, urgently trying to make a point.

He left with the Committee, and the public, a picture of a small group of irresponsible half-wits, carried away by wild fantasies about horrendous plots, failing even to ask questions, much less to check out the answers, while hiding their vile misconduct and illegal thoughts from a duped leadership.

Since these impressions provide the background for Mr. Hart's description of the handling of Nosenko, they may be worth a closer look.

He created at least three impressions about the handling of the Nosenko case:

(1) *That it was the work of an isolated group of irresponsible people*

Specifically, Mr. Hart repeated that it was a "small group of people . . . a very limited group" (2509) handling the case on the basis of a "belief" held closely by "a very small trusted group." (2518) He gets over strongly the impression that Mr. Helms was not properly informed. (4619, 3996-4019, 4632)

Contrary to Mr. Hart's testimony, every step was discussed with all elements concerned; suggestions were solicited, decisions were worked out in consultation. The leadership did not lose control or confidence.

If, indeed, the group concerned with the suspicions of Nosenko remained "very small" it was because if Nosenko was a KGB plant, there was a KGB spy within CIA. This is not the sort of thing one wants to spread widely.

(2) *That it was the work of incompetents*

Mr. Hart succeeded in getting over to the Committee and the public an image of gross incompetence on the part of Nosenko's handlers. He led Mr. Dodd, for example, to ask if any of "these characters" are "still kicking around the agency, or have they been fired?" (4282) and to suggest that even if there had been a KGB conspiracy, we would not have been competent to detect it. (4199)

Mr. Hart got over this impression of incompetence in three ways:

(a) *By repeating general, intemperately derogatory judgments and labels:* He called the handling of "the entire case" (3189)—including the competent parts noted above—"zero," "miserable," "dismal," "counterproductive," and so forth, and hinted that the handlers were prone to wild fancies and illegal conduct.

(b) *By withholding facts:* Certain information Mr. Hart knew and failed to mention might have caused the Committee to wonder whether, after all, there might be more to this than the simplistic picture Mr. Hart drew. For example, he did not tell Mr. Dodd the following about "these characters":

(1) That the people managing this complex case were senior officers with perhaps the most experience within the entire Agency in handling Soviet Bloc counterespionage matters.

(2) That neither C/SB nor DC/SB tended to see shadows where they weren't. In our many dealings with Soviet Bloc intelligence officers as defectors or agents-in-place, we had, before Nosenko, never judged *any* of them to be KGB plants. If anything, I have been reproached for trusting them too far, as more than one defector will probably be willing to testify.

(3) That in our service in positions of responsibility before, during, and after this affair, our performance was rated as superior, as CIA personnel records will confirm. If memory serves, even Mr. Hart judged my performance (and probably C/SB's) after this case as "outstanding." I was decorated for my service.

(c) *By giving you false and misleading information:* Here are at least four examples:

(1) Mr. Hart told the Committee the outright untruth that the work of C/SB and DC/SB "on this case had been discredited and had caused them to be transferred out of Headquarters to foreign assignments." (2529) We can produce witnesses, if necessary, to prove that this is false. Any "discrediting" came later, by Mr. Hart and others. We had asked, long in advance, for our particular assignments and got them when the posts came open in the normal course of events, both of us after long headquarters tours of duty.

(2) Mr. Hart introduced a red herring about my Russian-language competence, which so misled Mr. Fithian that he spoke, without rebuttal by Hart, about an "English speaking person trying to take notes and writing down what this major potential defector was saying and then transcribing them and giving them to the Agency, right down through the interrogation." (3648-52) He led Mr. Dodd, too, to think there were "no verbatim accounts of some of the interrogations but rather notes taken by people who didn't have a very good knowledge of Russian." (3245-7) Hart could have saved a lot of time and confusion by reminding you of the simple truth that a Russian speaker was present at every meeting except the initial contact. In fact, there never was, after that initial contact, any problem of language, Russian or English, I concur with the FBI officer cited in the Committee's Staff Report, page 37: "There was no question about being misunderstood."

(3) Mr. Hart stated falsely that discrepancies in the transcripts were "very important in the history of this case, because (they) gave rise to charges within the Agency that Nosenko was not what he purported to be." (2296-2302) I know of no lasting misunderstandings and none at all that importantly affected our judgment of Nosenko's bona fides. And why would the transcripts be important after January 1964, when Nosenko himself was on hand to be questioned?

(4) By introducing the question of discrepancies in the transcripts Hart misled you in two other ways:

He attributed them to my language deficiency when in fact the transcripts were made by a native Russian speaker who had participated in

the meetings! How could I know there were errors in the transcripts?

He told you that another defector found 150 discrepancies in the transcripts—but did not mention that it was I who brought that defector into the case, and caused him to review the tapes and transcripts! Mr. Hart falsely hinted that I chose to ignore the defector's findings.

By way of footnote to this theme, the Committee might be interested to learn that the "very thorough, very conscientious" defector cited by Hart in connection with the transcripts, who is indeed thorough and of high professional integrity and unique expertise on Soviet intelligence matters, reviewed the whole Nosenko case and *was convinced that Nosenko was a sent KGB provocateur and had not held the positions in the KGB which he claimed.* Mr. Hart seems to have forgotten to mention this.

(3) *That the case against Nosenko is nothing more than a paranoid notion:* This theme runs clearly through Mr. Hart's testimony. I have already discussed certain aspects of it.

Mr. Hart incorrectly attributed the whole "misunderstanding" to grandiose fantasies of Mr. X. In discrediting X he mixes, in the Committee's mind, a theory about the Sino-Soviet split, a "plot" masterminded "by something called the KGB disinformation directorate," and the role in this imaginary plot of "penetrations at high levels within intelligence services" of the West, a plot in the continuing process of "exaggeration and elaboration." (2410-27)

Taken one by one in a somewhat calmer frame of reference, these points may merit the Committee's attention.

The Disinformation Directorate exists. Every defector from the KGB, including Nosenko, has confirmed this, and it has been steadily increased in size and importance within the KGB over the past decades. It offers a framework for the centralization and exploitation of just such compromise and innocuous information as Nosenko has provided to Western intelligence. It is active and CIA knows it. So why does a CIA spokesman try to present it as part of a paranoid fantasy?

Penetration of American Intelligence was suggested by specific leads given by Mr. X, which were deflected by specific leads given shortly thereafter by Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Hart is quite right to say that penetration is part of the problem. He gives false testimony if he denies these leads and says that we are dealing only with a theory or with general allegations.

Mr. Hart implies that all the doubts about Mr. Nosenko can be dispelled by the factors Mr. Hart cited: bad memory, drunkenness, misunderstanding, bad handling, and the rest. In fact, the defense of Mr. Nosenko uses these factors one by one to cover and explain away each of *hundreds* of specific points of doubt such as had *never* arisen in any of the scores of defections of Soviet Bloc intelligence officers before Nosenko. I have tried repeatedly to build a coherent picture of the entirety of Mr. Nosenko's story, and the circumstances surrounding it, using these excuses. Not only do they fail to explain the most important points, but they tend to contradict each other. Perhaps Mr. Hart's people have never gone through this exercise.

Here, in short, is Mr. Hart's message. The whole case against Nosenko is a theory about a "so-called plot" and is "sheer nonsense." (3920-1) The evidence against Nosenko is "supposed evidence."

The CIA's Handling of Nosenko

This leads to the subject of Nosenko's treatment, especially his confinement. For if Mr. Hart succeeds in dismissing and deriding the case against Nosenko and all its implications, he robs the detention of its context and purpose, and truly makes it, as Mr. Dodd put it, "outrageous." (3421)

At the risk of repetition I remind you that:

(1) There is a carefully documented body of evidence, not "supposed evidence", against Nosenko, beyond any explanations of bad memory or misunderstandings. It is not juridical proof, but it was taken very seriously by the Agency's professional leadership, who were neither fools nor paranoids.

(2) Among the implications underlying the very real possibility that Nosenko was planted on CIA by the KGB are these two:

(a) That Lee Harvey Oswald may have been a KGB agent.

(b) That there was KGB penetration of sensitive elements of the United States Government.

Here are certain facts that Mr. Hart has hidden or distorted by the manner of his testimony:

(1) Nosenko's treatment for the first two months after his defection was precisely the same as that given any important defector.

(2) During that period Nosenko had ample opportunity to produce information, or to act in a manner, which might reduce or dissolve doubts about him.

(3) During this period Nosenko, unlike genuine defectors, resisted any serious questioning. It was not that he was "drunk around the clock" as Mr. Hart put it; he was unusually sober when he deflected questions, changed the subject, and invented excuses not to talk, even about isolated points of detail. It became clear that if he were to be questioned at all, some discipline had to be applied.

(4) Reasons to suspect Nosenko (not paranoid notions) were growing and the potential implications to American security were becoming clearer. It was our duty to clarify this matter. Anything less would have been, in truth, the sort of dereliction of duty of which Mr. Hart falsely accuses us today.

Please bear in mind that I find this case (not its handling) just as "abominable" as Mr. Hart does. Its implications are ugly. It imposed immense and unpleasant tasks upon us, and strains upon the Agency which are all too visible today in your Committee's hearings. The case has served me ill, professionally and personally. But it was there; it would not go away. The burden fell upon me and I did my duty.

In doing it I was not let down at any time by the Agency leadership. They understood what had to be done and why, and they took the necessary decisions to make it possible.

And so Nosenko was detained.

—If there were reasonable grounds to suspect that he was a KGB plant, his detention was (1) necessary, (2) effective, and (3) a partial success, for it got Nosenko's story and his ignorance pure and unsullied by outside coaching, and this told us much about what lay behind.

—If the case against Nosenko was "sheer nonsense," then the detention was not justified.

Here is how Mr. Hart described the decision: "The next step, since the interrogations conducted by the CIA, which as I say were designed not to ascertain information so much as they were to pin on Nosenko the label of a KGB agent acting to deceive us, since nothing had been proved in the friendly confinement, the people running the operation determined that the next step would be . . . a much more spartan confinement . . . and a so-called hostile interrogation." (2682-90)

This misstates the case. Those early debriefing sessions were not designed to pin any label on Nosenko. (It is true that they did nothing to assuage our doubts and that during the same period we were learning things outside which tended rather to reinforce them.) If the results had been more promising we might have worked gradually around, in the questioning, to the points of doubt, and might thus have avoided any need of confinement.

The detention of Nosenko was designed initially to give us an opportunity to confront him with certain contradictions in his story. This would alert him to our suspicions and if he were still free he might, we thought, either redefect to the Soviet Union or "go public," either way removing our chances to get the data we needed to assess the truth behind his story of Lee Harvey Oswald and other serious matters.

Our aim was, as Mr. Hart said, to get a confession: either of KGB sponsorship, or of white lies which could, finally, form some believable pattern.

The results of this and subsequent hostile interrogations surprised us. Nosenko was unable to clarify any single point of doubt. Brought up against his own contradictions and our independent information, he admitted that there could be no innocent explanation (not even forgetfulness) or he would remain silent, or he would come up with a new story, only to change that, too, later. He did confess some lies, but they tended to contradict each other, not offer an innocent explanation for the oddities in his story. In fact, the hostile interrogation reinforced and intensified our suspicions.

After this series of confrontations, we had an opportunity, finally, to do something which would normally have been done first, with any cooperative defector: conduct a systematic debriefing, which he had resisted before his detention. We could, as Mr. Hart put it, "ascertain information."

Nosenko was cooperative. He even told his questioners that they were right to have thus removed him from the temptations of drink and women, and to have forced him to work seriously.

And so began months of systematic questioning under neutral, non-hostile, circumstances. Practically the full range of his knowledge was covered. An example is the questioning on the subject of Lee Harvey Oswald in July, 1964, which the Committee's Staff Report called "detailed and specific." As the report states, "an attempt was made to touch all aspects." On each subject Nosenko was given an opportunity, as on the Oswald matter, to review the report and correct or amplify it. He was not drunk, not mistreated, not hallucinating, and there was never the slightest problem of understanding. (We should not confuse, as did Mr. Hart's testimony, the circumstances of one meeting in 1962 (language problem) with the whole operation, nor the conditions of 1962 (alleged drunkenness) with the conditions of confinement, nor hostile with non-hostile questioning.)

Simultaneously we were meticulously checking files and investigating outside, concerning every possible aspect of Nosenko's activities and reports. The results fill many of those file drawers of which Mr. Hart spoke.

What we learned suggested, uniformly, that Nosenko's stories about his career and personal activities in the KGB were not true. To deride these findings, to dismiss them as preconceptions, is to misrepresent facts clear from the files.

We found that the KGB operations Nosenko had reported, for example, were already known or had lost any value they had had to the KGB. This is not true of the reporting of any previous defector. That Mr. Hart, so eager to convince you of Nosenko's good faith, could cite as evidence only cases which had been uncovered by an earlier defector, gives you an idea. Two other KGB spies, an ex-U.S. Army NCO and the well-known case of Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson (the Orly courier-vault penetration), both of which Nosenko truly revealed for the first time, were useless: the NCO had never had access to secrets nor truly cooperated, Johnson had lost his access to the vault and was being publicly exposed by a neurotic wife. Such was the pattern, in addition to Nosenko's deflection of at least six specific leads given earlier by the KGB defector X.

Fact piled upon fact, creating a conviction on the part of every officer working on this operation that Nosenko was a KGB plant. Each had his own viewpoint; none was paranoid.

We conducted two more hostile interrogations, always increasing our knowledge, never relieving any suspicions, getting steadily closer to the truth, perhaps. But we got no confession.

All of this took time, and Nosenko stayed in confinement. As to the conditions of his detention, Mr. Hart has given many details. They do not seem directly relevant to the Committee's mission, for contrary to Mr. Hart's thesis, *they did not materially influence Nosenko's reporting one way or the other, nor the question of Nosenko's bona fides*. They cannot truthfully be adduced to dismiss the case against Nosenko. On the contrary these details, in Hart's testimony, tended to confuse the central problem before you: Nosenko's credibility and what lies behind his message to America concerning the KGB's relations with Lee Harvey Oswald.

However, if the detention could be dealt with as a separate and distinct topic, I am prepared to answer any questions I can on the subject.

The original justification for detaining Nosenko had been that he was in the United States under parole and it was the Agency's duty to prevent his harming the security of the United States. This could not last indefinitely. At the end of the efforts described above, we were still without the "proof" a confession would provide. We had only professional, not juridical, evidence.

Finally our time ran out and a decision had to be made about what to do about Nosenko.

The Question of "Disposal"

Here the extent of CIA's irrational involvement with Nosenko becomes blatant. Mr. Hart read (with relish, according to my friends who watched on TV) selected items from some penciled jottings in my handwriting which left with you the impression that I had contemplated or considered (even "suggested" as more than one newspaperman understood him) such measures as liquidation, drugging, or confinement in mental institutions.

I state unequivocally, and will do so under oath, on behalf of myself and anyone I ever knew in or out of the Central Intelligence Agency, that:

(1) No such measures were ever seriously considered.

(2) No such measures were ever studied.

(What "loony bin"? How "make him nuts"? What drugs to induce forgetfulness? I know of none now and never did, nor did I ever try to find out if such exist. The whole subject of "liquidation" was tabu in the CIA for reasons with which I wholeheartedly agreed then and still do.)

(3) No such measures were ever suggested as a course of action, even in intimate personal conversations.

(4) No such measures were ever proposed at any level of the Agency.

I do not remember making any such notes. However, I can imagine how I might have. Responsible as I was for this "abominable" case, I was called upon to help find the best way to release Nosenko—without a confession but sure that he was an enemy agent. In an effort to find something meriting serious consideration, I suppose that I jotted down, one day, every theoretically conceivable action. Some of them might have been mentioned in one form or another by others; I doubt they all sprang from my mind. (I cannot even guess what "points one through four" might have been, the ones Mr. Hart declined to read because they were "unimportant." I guess that means they weren't damning to me.) But the fact that the notes were penciled reveals that they were intended to be transient; the fact that "liquidation" was included reveals that they were theoretical; and their loose, undignified language reveals that they were entirely personal, for my fleeting use only. In fact, none of these courses of action could have been morally acceptable to me, much less conceivable as a practical suggestion to higher authority.

Mr. Hart admitted, or proudly claimed, that he himself discovered these notes in the files. (4270) Although he recognized their purely personal nature, that they were not addressed nor intended for any other person, nor had any practical intent, he chose to bring them to show-and-tell to the Committee and the American public. Did he feel this a moral duty? Or was it simply part of his evident intent to deride and destroy any opposition to Nosenko? Could he have done it for reasons of personal spite? Whatever the answer, the cost seems too high: he was discrediting his own Agency for a matter without substance.

I cannot remember any concrete proposal for "disposal" being made during my tenure. (You understand, of course, that "disposal" is merely professional jargon for ending a relationship.) The course the Agency eventually adopted seems, in retrospect, the only practical one. I think the Agency did well to rehabilitate Nosenko and, as I thought, put him out to pasture.

However, I cannot understand why they then employed him as an advisor, as a teacher of their staff trainees in counterintelligence. The concrete suspicions of Nosenko have never been resolved, and because they are well founded, they never will "be cleared up and go away." Mr. Hart and Admiral Turner may frivolously dismiss them, as they have done before your Committee, but the doubts are still there and it is irresponsible to expose clandestine personnel to this individual.

Conclusion

Mr. Hart's testimony was a curious performance. One wonders what could drive a government agency into the position of:

- trying to discredit and bury under a pile of irrelevancies the reasons to suspect that the Soviet Union sent to America a provocateur to mislead us about the assassin of President Kennedy;
- pleading irrationally and misleadingly in favor of a KGB man about whom serious doubts persist;
- misrepresenting, invidiously, its own prior actions;
- denigrating publicly the competence and performance of duty of its own officers;
- dredging up unsubstantial personal notes, left carelessly in a highly secret file folder, to falsely suggest in public the planning by its own people of the vilest forms of misconduct.

As the Congress is conspicuously aware, the veil of secrecy can hide irresponsibility and incompetence. But behind that veil the CIA used to maintain unusually high standards of honor and decency and responsibility, and did a pretty competent job, often in the face of impossible demands. The decline of these qualities

is laid bare by Mr. Hart's testimony—to the Agency's discredit, to my own dismay, and to the detriment of future recruitment of good men, who will not want to make careers in an environment without integrity.

The Agency need not have gone so far. After all, Nosenko's bona fides had been officially certified. Those who disagreed were judged at its highest level to have "besmirched the Agency's escutcheon." Not only are they out of the way, but "everything possible" is being done to see that no one challenges Nosenko or his ilk, ever again. (4048) The Agency need only have said this much, and no more.

That Admiral Turner's personal emissary went so much further suggests that the Agency may not, after all, be quite so sure of its position. Perhaps it fears that the Committee, wondering about this defector's strange reporting and unconstrained by CIA's official line, might innocently cry out, "But the emperor has no clothes on!" This might explain the spray of mud, to cloud your view.

The above, I repeat, is but a preliminary statement, and is by no means all I have to say on these subjects.

You can reach me at the address and phone number on the first page.* I presume, if I am permitted to appear before your Committee, that my travel expenses will be covered by the Committee.

Yours truly,

D. C.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. D. C., after you are sworn, you will be recognized to read your statement. I might suggest, after you are sworn, Mr. D. C., and before you read your statement, that you might, for the record, give us your present occupation and your present residence so that we have that basic information.

Will you stand at this time and be sworn.

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. D. C. I do.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. D. C. I recognize you at this time.

TESTIMONY OF D. C., FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF, SOVIET BLOC DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. D. C. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to make a few introductory remarks to introduce myself as the chairman has requested.

I was born in Annapolis, Md., 1925; served in World War II for 3 years in the U.S. Marine Corps; attended Princeton University, University of California, and the University of Geneva, Switzerland, where I received a doctorate of political science. I served in the CIA from 1950 on and specialized there in Soviet and satellite operations. I had worked personally at one time or another with most of the important operations involving these areas over that generation.

In 1962, I became head of the section responsible for counterintelligence against the Soviet intelligence services; and in 1965 or 1966, I was deputy chief of the Soviet Russia Division.

When it was amalgamated with the satellite countries, in 1966—I believe perhaps 1965, I became deputy chief of that amalgamated division.

In 1967, I went to Europe as a station chief in [major city] where I retired in 1972 on the Agency early retirement program, entirely, and

*Deleted for security reasons.

I repeat entirely, on my own volition. I mention that because these matters of performance and separation of service have been raised in this committee.

I also would note for the record that my performance, which I wouldn't otherwise mention, was consistently rated as outstanding, and at the end of it I received an Agency decoration. Since then I have been a private consultant based in Brussels where I represent American and European companies who don't have formal representation in Europe, in the field of avionics and chemicals, principally.

Now I proceed to my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.

I have come before your committee to reply to the testimony of Mr. John L. Hart, who represented the Central Intelligence Agency here on September 15, a testimony which misled you and misused me.

As the former deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of CIA and directly responsible for the case of the KGB defector, Yuri Nosenko, from 1962 to 1967, I can reply more accurately to your questions and can bring you a better understanding of this matter.

For one thing, I won't have to rely as did Mr. Hart on archeological digs into those 40 file drawers of information. Mr. Hart's 6-month expedition obviously failed to understand what they dug up, and their leader was highly selective in what he chose to exhibit here. For another, I will not disqualify myself, as he did, from talking about Lee Harvey Oswald, one of the most important aspects of the Nosenko case, nor about the case of the earlier defector here called "X," which is a critical factor in understanding Nosenko.

CIA's selection of Mr. Hart to study the Nosenko case, and later to present it to you, came to me as a great surprise and mystery. He seemed to bring few qualifications to the study of the most sophisticated Soviet counterintelligence operations of our generation. As far as I know, he never handled a single Soviet intelligence officer, and spent his career, as he told you, remote from Soviet operations, in wars and jungles, as he put it. As a result, he was able to tick off 60 years of Soviet deception as a kind of paranoid fantasy, to make contemptuous remarks about "historical research about a plot against the West," and to use the revealing phrase, "I don't happen to be able to share this type of thing"——

Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt long enough to suggest we turn off [the witness'] microphone. I think we can hear him well enough.

Mr. PREYER. The fidelity of that is a little too high. It tends to muffle your voice. You may continue.

Mr. D. C. But "this type of thing" is what the Nosenko case is all about.

Mr. Hart did not mention, and perhaps never studied, a number of related cases bearing importantly on the question of Nosenko's credibility. From his testimony you would never guess at the existence of cases apart from but related to the Nosenko case. Mr. Hart apparently did not bother to talk with many of the best-qualified officers on these cases during his 6 months of research. When he came to me in 1976 he had not even read the basic papers of the case and instead of talking substance he asked about an irrelevant phrase from an 8-year-old dispatch I had written—a phrase he later brought up with you, the

bit about "devastating consequences," in distorted form and out of context.

His testimony here seems not designed to enlighten your committee, but to subject Nosenko's critics—Mr. Hart's former colleagues—to vilification and ridicule. He left with the committee a picture of a small group of irresponsible half-wits, carried away by wild fantasies about horrendous plots, failing even to ask questions, neglecting to check on what was said, and all the time hiding their vile misconduct and illegal thoughts from a duped leadership.

Mr. Hart told you a lot about Nosenko's mistreatment but very little about Nosenko's credibility as concerns Lee Harvey Oswald. He called on you to make an act of faith, as the CIA seems to have done, in the good will and truth of a Soviet KGB man who had rendered false and incredible testimony about the assassin of an American President. I quote: "You should believe these statements of Mr. Nosenko," Mr. Hart said, "anything he has said has been said in good faith." Then, avoiding the subject of Oswald, he led you into a maze of irrelevant detail about Nosenko's problems and CIA's earlier misunderstanding and mistreatment of this defector. By spattering mud on Nosenko's earlier handling, and particularly on me, Mr. Hart threw up a cloud which threatens to impede your attempts to get at the answer to the true question before you. And I ask you here to focus on that question, instead of the irrelevancies.

That question, of course, is how and why a senior KGB defector, directly responsible for important aspects of Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union, could deliver testimony to this committee which even the CIA's representative called "implausible" and "incredible."

Mr. Hart even said that if he were in your position, he would simply disregard what Mr. Nosenko said about Lee Harvey Oswald. He seems to have done just that, himself. But Mr. Helms rightly labeled that a copout, and it is not clear to me how Mr. Hart thought you could or would just pretend that the question isn't there.

Of course, you can't. For today you are in the same position I was in back in 1964, trying to make sense of Nosenko's reports. You are investigating and evaluating Nosenko's reporting on Lee Harvey Oswald. I did not think, in my time, that I could just shrug off Nosenko's bizarre story of Oswald with some irrelevant and half-hearted explanation, as Mr. Hart did here, and slide off into some other subject.

Mr. Hart did not explain what he thought you should believe, or how this "incredible" testimony is compatible with the claim that Nosenko has, by and large, told nothing but the truth since 1962.

He said Nosenko's testimony to you was a unique aberration; I quote:

I cannot offhand remember any statements which (Nosenko) has been proven to have made which were statements of real substance other than the contradictions which have been adduced today on the Lee Harvey Oswald matter, which have been proven to be incorrect.

But the committee only spoke to Nosenko about this one matter, and even so, the committee detected at least six or seven contradictions from one telling to another. Could this, by coincidence, be the only

such case? (I can tell you the answer is no; on the contrary, this was typical Nosenko whenever he was pinned down on details.)

While extolling Nosenko's truthfulness, Mr. Hart spent a surprising amount of time giving you reasons why Nosenko might have lied or seemed to lie, such as drunken exaggeration, confusion, emotional stresses, hallucinations, and the impact of mistreatment. But that wasn't helpful to you, for none of these things had anything to do with Nosenko's story about Oswald. After all, Nosenko told the CIA and FBI his story about Oswald before any mistreatment, and he told it to your committee after any mistreatment, and no one thought he was drunk at any one of those times.

So I will go back to the question here and see if I can help you find an answer. There has to be some way to explain how this direct participant in the events delivered incredible testimony about them. There must be some explanation for the differences in Nosenko's story at different times he told it, for his excuses and evasions when confronted with these differences, and for his final refusal to talk any more about them with your committee.

As we seek an answer to these questions, I ask you to keep three things in mind:

First, that at the time he reviewed Oswald's file for the KGB, Nosenko was already a willing secret collaborator of the CIA. Therefore, he must have been alert when dealing with this matter of such obvious importance to the United States and to his own country.

Second, that Nosenko told us of some of these events only 10 weeks after they happened, so there wasn't time for them to become dim in his memory.

Third, that no one has suggested that Nosenko is mentally unfit. Mr. Hart brought in the Wechsler test and other psychological details merely to show Nosenko's relative strengths and weaknesses, not to prove him a mental basket case. On the contrary, Nosenko claims to have risen fast in the KGB, and he is regarded by his current employers as "an intelligent human being" who "reasons well." I am quoting Mr. Hart, of course, who also called your attention to Nosenko's powers of "logical thought" and his high score in "power of abstract thinking."

Aside from the irrelevant details about Nosenko's stresses under mistreatment, and drunkenness, I found two things in Mr. Hart's testimony which might bear on the Oswald story. First and foremost, he spoke about compartmentation, bringing his own experience to show how a person in any organization working on the principle of "need to know" might not be aware of everything going on, even in his own operations. Now, I suppose Mr. Hart intended this as a contribution to Mr. Nosenko's defense; certainly Mr. Nosenko had never mentioned it. The trouble is, it doesn't apply to this story. Nosenko had said repeatedly, to CIA and FBI and recently swore under oath to this committee, that he was right there on the inside of any "compartment." He personally reviewed the application of Oswald to stay in the U.S.S.R. in 1959 and he personally participated in the recommendation that the KGB should not let Oswald stay in the country and in the decision not to notify the KGB sections which might normally be interested in debriefing a man like Oswald. Nosenko

knew that the KGB leadership decided that they "didn't want to be involved" with Oswald—not to question him at all, not even to screen him as a possible enemy plant. Nosenko personally participated in the refusal of Oswald's visa request from Mexico not long before the assassination of President Kennedy. And after the assassination, Nosenko himself was told to review Oswald's KGB file; and did so. He has insisted that if anyone in the KGB ever talked to Oswald, he, Nosenko, would know about it. So "compartmentation" explains nothing. Nosenko's story rests essentially on his personal involvement and authority.

The second and last possible explanation which we can find in Mr. Hart's testimony is Nosenko's odd memory, which Mr. Hart took such pains to establish. After all, Nosenko seems to have changed details of seven or eight aspects of the story at one time or another. The trouble with this is, it doesn't touch the heart of the story, the truly incredible part, Nosenko didn't forget whether or not the KGB questioned Oswald; he remembers sharply and consistently—and insists, whatever other changes he makes in his story—that Oswald was never questioned by the KGB. He knows that and remembers it, for he participated directly in the decision not to.

Now that was all Mr. Hart offered. But I think we should try every conceivable explanation. Here are a couple I can think of.

Maybe Nosenko was merely boasting, exaggerating, building things up a bit, especially his personal role. Maybe, for example, he only overheard some KGB officers talking, didn't hear it right, and then passed on an incorrect story to us as his experience, to make himself look important in our eyes. Maybe, under this interpretation, he honestly thinks his story is true.

Another explanation, going a bit further, might be that he invented the whole story. Perhaps, convinced that the U.S.S.R. wouldn't get involved in the assassination of an American President (which is what we all tend to think), he invented this story as a contribution to American peace of mind and to international amity.

Both of these explanations run into trouble. Nosenko, while in detention, had plenty of time and incentive to back off a mere exaggeration, and did, in fact, admit a few minor lies. But about this story he is adamant. Just recently Mr. Hart tried to get Nosenko to come off it, but even in the current climate of good will and trust, Nosenko refused. And remember, too, that Nosenko volunteered to testify to his incredible tale before the Warren Commission, and he swore to it under oath before your committee.

And there are other problems, too. If we begin to play with the idea of fabrication we will have to ask just what parts of the story were invented: Did Nosenko also invent the high KGB job which gave him "knowledge" of the Oswald case?

Anyway, CIA wouldn't accept this line of speculation. They insist that Nosenko always talks in good faith, even if his Oswald story isn't believable. They surely wouldn't want you to think they had hired a fabricator as their adviser and teacher.

And there is yet another obstacle to this line of thought, and not the least important. We must not forget that the Soviet Government itself has confirmed Nosenko's authority to tell the whole story about

Oswald. In Mr. Edward Jay Epstein's book "Legend" he reports that an attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, named Agu, told him that Nosenko is the person who knows most about Oswald in Russia, even more than the people in Minsk whom Epstein applied vainly to go see.

No; I think we can all agree: Mr. Hart, myself, your committee, Mr. Agu, and Mr. Nosenko: Nosenko was neither exaggerating nor inventing nor forgetting nor was he compartmented away from the essential facts of the story.

So what is left to explain this incredible testimony? I can think of only two explanations.

Maybe Nosenko's story is true, after all. Let's overlook for a moment the fact that everyone (except Mr. Nosenko) believes the contrary, including Mr. Hart and today's CIA, including Mr. Helms, Soviet specialists, and ex-KGB veterans in the West. Let's also overlook the way Nosenko contradicted himself on points of detail from one telling to another. Let's focus only on the essential elements of the story, the ones which remain constant. There are two: First, that the KGB never questioned Oswald, and second, that the KGB never found out that Oswald had information to offer them about interesting U.S. military matters.

Here was this young American, Lee Harvey Oswald, just out of the Marine Corps, already inside the U.S.S.R. and going to great lengths to stay there and become a citizen. The KGB never bothered to talk to him, not even once, not even to get an idea whether he might be a CIA plant (and although even Nosenko once said, I think, that the KGB feared he might be).

Can this be true? Could we all be wrong in what we've heard about rigid Soviet security precautions and about their strict procedures and disciplines, and about how dangerous it is in the U.S.S.R. for someone to take a risky decision (like failing to screen an applicant for permanent residence in the U.S.S.R.)?

Of course not. Let me give you one small case history which illustrates how wrong Nosenko's story is. This is an actual event which shows how the real KGB, in the real U.S.S.R., reacts to situations like this. It was told by a former KGB man named Kaarlo Tuomi, and can be found on page 286 of John Barron's book, "KGB." The story concerns (and from here on I quote) "a young Finnish couple who illegally crossed the Soviet border in 1953. The couple walked into a militia station and requested Soviet citizenship, but the KGB jailed them. Continuous questioning during the next 11 months indicated only that the couple believed Communist propaganda and sincerely sought to enjoy the life it promised. Nevertheless the KGB consigned them to an exile camp for suspects in Kirov province. Because Tuomi spoke Finnish, the KGB sent him into the camp as a 'prisoner' with instructions to become friends with the couple. Hardened as he was to privation, he was still aghast at what he saw in the camp. Whole families subsisted in 5 by 8 wooden stalls or cells in communal barracks. Each morning at 6, trucks hauled all the men away to peat bogs where they labored until dark. Small children, Tuomi observed, regularly died of ordinary maladies because of inadequate medical care.

"Worse still, the camp inmates, who had committed no crime, had no idea when, if ever, they might be released. After only 3 days Tuomi

persuaded himself that the forlorn Finns were concealing nothing, and he signaled the camp administrator to remove him. 'That place is just hell,' he later told Serafim, his KGB supervisor. 'Those people are living like slaves.' 'I understand,' Serafim said, 'but don't get so excited. There's nothing you or I can do about it.'" That's the end of the quotation.

So on the one hand we have a young ex-marine, Lee Harvey Oswald, from the United States; on the other hand we have a simple Finnish family. Both say they want to live in Russia. The Finns are questioned for 11 months by the KGB, then consigned indefinitely to a hellish camp for suspects. The American is not even talked to once by the KGB. The Finns' experience fits all we know about the true Soviet Union, from Aleksander Solzhenitsyn and many others, unanimously. Oswald's experience, as Nosenko tells it, cannot have happened.

The second main point of Nosenko's story about Oswald was that the KGB did not find out that Oswald had information to offer about interesting military matters. Nosenko specifically told your committee this. To demonstrate its falsity, I need only quote from page 262 of the Warren Commission report, concerning Oswald's interview with the American Consul Snyder in Moscow on October 31, 1959, when Oswald declared that he wished to renounce his U.S. citizenship. I quote:

Oswald also informed Snyder that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps, intimating that he might know of something of special interest, and that he had informed a Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information concerning the Marine Corps and radar operation which he possessed.

Nosenko didn't mention this. Apparently he didn't know it.

So I think we can safely agree with Mr. Hart that Nosenko's story about Oswald is not credible, not true.

Up to this point we've tried five explanations and still haven't found any acceptable one for Nosenko's story, its contradictions, or his evasive manner when confronted with these contradictions. But because you have to find an explanation, just as I had to in 1964, I will propose here the only other explanation I can think of—one which might explain all the facts before us, including Nosenko's performance before this committee.

This sixth explanation is, of course, that Nosenko's story, in its essence, is a message from the Soviet leadership, carried to the United States by a KGB-controlled agent provocateur who had already established a clandestine relationship of trust with CIA for other purposes a year earlier. The core of the Soviet message is simple: That the KGB, or Soviet Intelligence, had nothing to do with President Kennedy's assassin, nothing at all.

Why they might have sent such a crude message, why they selected this channel to send it, and what truth may lie behind the story given to us, can only be guessed at. If you like, I am prepared to go into such speculation. But even without the answers to these questions, this sixth explanation would make it clear why Nosenko adhered so rigidly to his story. However incredible we might find a message from the Soviet leadership, learned and recited by Nosenko, we would find it difficult to get him to back off it: Discipline is discipline, especially in the KGB.

Now, I'm ready to believe that Nosenko may have genuinely forgotten some details of this learned story. I can also accept that, on his own,

he may have embroidered on it and got caught when he forgot his own embroidery; this seems to fit the facts we have, including Mr. Hart's description of Mr. Nosenko's memory. This could explain Nosenko's differing descriptions of the KGB file, and his accounts of whether there was or wasn't careful surveillance of Oswald which would detect his relations with Marina, and his change of name of the KGB officer who worked with him on the Oswald case—that sort of detail. It would also explain why he told your committee repeatedly that he didn't remember what he'd said previously. This wouldn't have mattered if he'd really lived through the experiences he described; his stories of them at different times should come out straight, all by themselves. When, in fact, they didn't, Nosenko resorted to this strange statement, which made his story appear more memorized than experienced.

Now, I recognize that this is an unpleasant and troubling supposition, a hot potato indeed. But please remember that before coming to it, we had dismissed all the other explanations possible. So we cannot simply slide over this as easily as CIA does. It is a serious possibility, not a sick fantasy. In fact, it is hard to avoid.

What is more, Nosenko's story of Oswald is only one of scores of things that Nosenko said which make him appear to be a KGB plant. If the Oswald story were alone, as Mr. Hart said it was, a strange aberration in an otherwise normal performance, perhaps one could just shrug and forget it. It is not. We got the same evasions, contradictions, excuses, whenever we pinned Nosenko down, the way you did on the Oswald story. Those other matters, while not of direct concern to this committee, included Nosenko's accounts of his career, of his travels, of the way he learned the various items of information he reported, and even accounts of his private life. More important, there were things outside his own reporting and his own performance, which could not be explained away by any part of CIA's litany of excuses for Nosenko (which so strangely resemble Nosenko's own). All of those irregularities point to the same conclusion: That Nosenko was sent by the KGB to deceive us. That is, they point to the same conclusion as our sixth possible explanation of Nosenko's story about Oswald.

The CIA's manner of dealing with those points of doubt about Nosenko's good faith (at least since 1967) has been to take them one by one, each out of context of the others, and dismiss them with a variety of excuses, or rationalizations: confusion, drunkenness, language problems, denial that he ever said it, bad memory, exaggeration, boasting, and coincidence—hundreds and hundreds of coincidences. With any other defector, a small fraction of this number of things would have caused and perpetuated the gravest doubts. For the KGB does send false defectors to the West, and has been doing so for 60 years. And the doubts about this one defector were persuasive to the CIA leadership of an earlier time.

Today, a later CIA leadership chooses to dismiss them. If they only pretended to do so, to justify the release and rehabilitation of Nosenko, that would be understandable. But they must really believe in Nosenko, for they are using him in current counterintelligence work and exposing their clandestine officers to him, and bringing him into their secret premises to help train their counterintelligence personnel.

They go much further to demonstrate the depth of their commitment to Nosenko. They vilify their earlier colleagues who disapproved of him. The intensity of Mr. Hart's attack on me, and the fact that it was done in public, must have surprised you, as it did others with whom I've spoken over the past weeks. As Nosenko's principal opponent, I am made out in public as a miserable incompetent and given credit, falsely, for murderous thoughts, illegal designs, torture, and malfeasance.

The CIA had to go far out to invent these charges, which are not true. Mr. Hart had to bend facts, invent others, and gloss over a lot more, in order to cover me with mud.

In fact, I have detected no less than 30 errors in his testimony, 20 other misleading statements, and 10 major omissions. They seem aimed to destroy the opposition to Nosenko, and they have the effect of misleading your committee on the significance of Nosenko's testimony about Oswald.

I will cite only a few of these points here. Others are to be found in my letter to this committee dated October 11, 1978, which I introduce as an annex to my testimony. I can, of course, go into further detail if you wish. But I discuss below some of the points most relevant to your appraisal of Mr. Nosenko's credibility as concerns Lee Harvey Oswald.

First, Mr. Hart misled you badly on the question of Nosenko's general credibility. It was stunning to hear him say, after reviewing every detail of the case for 6 months with the aid of four assistants (I quote) "I see no reason"—here I repeat, "I see no reason"—"to think that (Nosenko) has ever told an untruth, except because he didn't remember it or didn't know or during those times when he was under the influence of alcohol he exaggerated." Even 10 years away from this case, I can remember at least 20 clear cases of Nosenko's untruths about KGB activity and about the career which gave him authority to tell of it, and a dozen examples of his ignorance of matters within his claimed area of responsibility, for which there is no innocent explanation.

Excuse me just a moment and off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. PREYER. Back on the record.

Mr. D. C. The "influence of alcohol" cannot be much of a factor, for as Mr. Hart reminds us, Nosenko was questioned for 292 days while in detention—when he had no alcohol at all. But Mr. Hart jumbled together the conditions of the 1962 meetings (alleged drunkenness) with those of confinement, leading Congressman Dodd to lay importance on Nosenko's drinking. He even got over to Mr. Dodd, by a subtle turn of phrase, the idea that hallucinations "probably" influenced Nosenko's performance under interrogation. Yet Mr. Hart must have known that hallucinations were never a factor in the question-and-answer sessions.

Then, too, Mr. Hart misstated the early roots of our suspicions of Nosenko. Mr. Hart said that they arose from the paranoid imaginings and jealousy of a previous defector, whom he calls "X." Mr. Hart told you, and I quote, that "Mr. X's views were immediately taken to be the definitive views of Nosenko and from that point on, the treatment

of Mr. Nosenko was never, until 1967, devoted to learning what Mr. Nosenko said." This is not true, as a document in the files, which I wrote in 1962, will make clear. It was not "X's" theories which caused my initial suspicion of Nosenko in 1962. It was the overlap of Nosenko's reports—at first glance entirely convincing and important—with those given 6 months earlier by "X." Alone, Nosenko looked good to me, as Mr. Hart said; seen alongside "X," whose reporting I had not seen before coming to headquarters after the 1962 meetings with Nosenko, Nosenko looked very odd indeed. The matters which overlapped were serious ones, including a specific lead to penetration of CIA—not a general allegation, as Mr. Hart misleadingly suggested. There were at least a dozen such points of overlap, of which I can still remember at least eight. Nosenko's information tended to negate or deflect leads from "X."

And this brings me to Mr. Hart's efforts to make you think that the suspicions of Nosenko were based on foolish fancies about "horrendous plots." Let me try to restore the balance here. A KGB paper of this period described the need for disinformation (deception) in KGB counterintelligence work. It stated that just catching American spies isn't enough, for the enemy can always start again with new ones. Therefore, said this KGB document, disinformation operations are essential. And among their purposes was "to negate and discredit authentic information which the enemy has obtained." There is some reason to believe that Nosenko was on just such a mission in 1962: To cover and protect KGB sources threatened by "X's" defection. Does this sound like a "horrendous plot" conjured up by paranoids? It is known counterespionage technique, perfectly understandable to laymen. But as I have said, Mr. Hart's purpose was not enlightenment, but ridicule.

To prove Mr. Nosenko's credibility, Mr. Hart made a breathtaking misstatement about the defector "X": "Quantitatively and qualitatively," said Mr. Hart, "the information given by Mr. 'X' was much smaller than that given by Nosenko." Could Mr. Hart really have meant that? Mr. "X," paranoid or not, provided in the first months after his defection information which led to the final uncovering of Kim Philby; to the first detection of several important penetrations of Western European governments; proof (not general allegations) of penetration at the heart of . . . [allied service]: and pointers to serious penetrations of the United States Government. Before Nosenko, "X" uncovered the current organization and methods of the KGB, and very large numbers of its personnel active in its foreign operations.

And listen to this: It was Mr. "X" who first revealed both of the two KGB operations which Mr. Hart adduced as of Nosenko's good faith! They concerned microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow and a penetration of one of our NATO allies.

As for the microphones, Mr. Hart stated that "Mr. Nosenko was responsible for the discovery of a system of microphones within the U.S. Embassy in Moscow which had hitherto been suspected but nobody had enough information on it to actually detect it." But Mr. "X" had given approximate locations of some of the microphones 6 months earlier. Like Nosenko, he did not know the precise locations,

but he knew the mikes were there and could indicate some specific offices where they could be found. The actual tearing out of walls, which Mr. Hart mentioned, would have been done, and the microphone "system" found, without Nosenko's information. Contrary to Mr. Hart's statement the KGB would "throw away" already-compromised information to build up a source of theirs. Mr. Hart simply hid from you the fact that this information was already compromised when Nosenko delivered it.

Mr. Hart's other proof of Nosenko's credibility was as follows: Mr. Hart said, "A very high level KGB penetration in a very sensitive position in a Western European government was, on the basis of Mr. Nosenko's lead, arrested, tried, and convicted of espionage. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets would have given this information away." End of quote. Now, Mr. Hart was presumably referring to a man we can here call "Y" although his case is very well known to the public. Did Mr. Hart really not know, or did he choose to hide from you, the fact that "Y's" reports to the KGB were known to Mr. "X," the earlier defector? The KGB, knowing this, cut off contact with "Y" immediately after "X's" defection. "Y's" uncovering was therefore inevitable, even though "X" had not known "Y's" name. Nosenko added one item of information which permitted "Y" to be caught sooner; that is all. How, then, could Mr. Hart have said "there is no reason to believe that the Soviets would have given this information away"? The reason, that "Y" was already compromised, was perfectly clear in the files which Mr. Hart's team studied.

Mr. Hart also told you that Mr. "X" had confirmed Nosenko's claimed positions in the KGB. This is not true. Mr. "X" said, on the contrary, that he had personally visited the American Embassy section of the KGB during the 1960-61 period when Nosenko claims to have been its deputy chief, and knew definitely that Nosenko was not serving there.

So these are some of the matters affecting Nosenko's general credibility, which may be important to you when you assess the meaning of Nosenko's incredible testimony on Oswald.

Now, Mr. Hart also distorted the CIA's performance in getting the facts about Oswald from Nosenko. Your committee staff report had it right, before Mr. Hart came forth. Referring to the Agency's questioning of Nosenko on July 3 and 27, 1964, the report says that the CIA's questions "were detailed and specific about Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. The questions were chronological and an attempt was made to touch all aspects of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union." Close quote. Moreover, the CIA gave Nosenko a transcript of his own remarks so he could add any more he knew, or correct any errors. This is from your staff report, pages 7-9.

But then came Mr. Hart with his sweeping denunciations of CIA's "miserable" and "dismal" and "zero" performance, and stating flatly that "there was no effort being made to get at more information (Nosenko) might have." Mr. Hart thus led Congressman Fithian to suggest that the CIA had not even taken "the logical first step" of getting Nosenko's information and led the chairman to conclude that no investigation of Oswald's activities as known to Nosenko had been made. In this Mr. Hart concurred.

In truth, of course, there was nothing more to be got from Nosenko, unless it would be later changes of earlier details, as happened when your committee questioned Nosenko. If there had been more, we would have gone doggedly after it, of course. We were not the incompetents Mr. Hart made us out to be. Your staff report said that Nosenko "recited" the same story in each of his three sessions with the committee. The word is apt: Nosenko had "recited" that story before, to the CIA and FBI, each of which questioned him systematically about it. So why did Mr. Hart give his own Agency a "zero" on all phases of the handling of Nosenko? Surely he was seeking to fling mud, not to give serious answers to serious questions. His effect was confusion.

Mr. Hart also suggested to you that CIA just didn't investigate the validity of what Nosenko had said about Oswald. That is equally false. What else, for example, was the purpose of our subjecting Nosenko to hostile interrogation and subjecting his information to meticulous investigation whenever we could? Those 40 file drawers are full of the results.

But, of course, we were not able to check inside the U.S.S.R., as the Warren Commission noted. We didn't have other sources in the KGB who were connected with this Oswald case. But think how lucky we were to have even one inside source on Oswald inside the KGB. Of the many thousands of KGB men around the world, CIA had secret relations with only one, and this one turned out to have participated directly in the Oswald case. Not only once, but on three separate occasions: When Oswald came to Russia in 1959; when he applied for a visa from Mexico to return to Russia; and again after the assassination when the Kremlin leadership caused a definitive review of the whole KGB file on Oswald. How many KGB men could say as much? CIA was thus unbelievably lucky to be able to contribute to the Warren report. In view of other suspicions of Nosenko, the keyword in that last sentence is "unbelievably."

Gentlemen, I hesitate before replying publicly to Mr. Hart's false charges, for a number of reasons:

For one thing, I found it hard to imagine myself in the position of defending myself against the CIA before the Congress. My record should have been ample protection against that.

Then, too, I'm comfortable in the knowledge that my honor and integrity, although torn to shreds by the CIA before this committee and the public, remain intact with those who know the truth.

And of course, my embarrassment, my public dishonor, count for little compared with the reputation of a Government agency which must uphold an image of integrity. To call public attention to the way the CIA misinformed you might cause it embarrassment. I do not want to harm the CIA, which has enough real enemies.

For without the CIA, who would remain to oppose the relentless work of subversion and deception and penetration being directed abroad by the KGB against our country? Who would oppose that arrogant and brutal instrument of repression in the secret, dark places where it works?

Finally, it was this thought, of the KGB, which decided me to come before you. Some of the mud the CIA spattered on me might have clouded your view of the KGB's relations with Lee Harvey Oswald, as

given to you by Yuri Nosenko of the KGB. The flying mud may have screened important aspects of the case. By wiping some of it away I thought I might help you to restore what seemed to me a clear presentation of the facts in your committee staff report—written before Mr. Hart's testimony.

What I seek is to let the facts carry the day, to wipe them clean again for your inspection. You need not accept either the beseechings of Mr. Hart, or any counterargument from me. But my hope is that you will not let the facts get obscured by emotional distortions, or irrelevancies.

Mr. Chairman, my prepared statement continues now with a series of remarks on a series of issues of interest to the committee, which is the detention of Mr. Nosenko. I have already mentioned to you that I think it irrelevant to your concerns, but since it was a matter of considerable concern to you and of interest to the public, I have prepared a few pages here which I can either read or use in response to a few questions you may have.

Mr. PREYER. Let me suggest that you read them.

Mr. D. C. Thank you, sir.

The detention of Nosenko has been described in sensationalist terms by Mr. Hart and, as he clearly intended, has caused some outrage on the part of the committee. I want to deal with it because the committee has been led to consider it, not because it is truly pertinent to your concerns. Mr. Hart and Mr. Nosenko use it, falsely, as an excuse for discrepancies in Nosenko's reporting. But this is a distraction, filling Mr. Hart's testimony in place of discussion of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Hart's bias must have been evident to all. He expressed his personal view that the treatment of Nosenko was "absolutely unacceptable" and he introduced terms like "bank vault" to imply inhuman treatment. He led Mr. Sawyer to talk of a "torture vault" and "partial starvation" and gave the idea that Nosenko was subjected to unbearable heat, or left shuddering in the wintry cold. He portrayed the conditions in terms leading committee members to use words like "shocking" and "horrible." Yet at the same time Mr. Hart was describing himself as a "historian" bound by known fact. In fact, he misled you about almost every aspect of the detention.

Had he in fact bothered to collect facts from all concerned, you would have gotten a quite different and more rational point of view, one which deserved at least some respect if for no other reasons than that it prevailed within Mr. Hart's own organization for 3 years.

In fact, one overriding flaw in Mr. Hart's version of these "horrible" matters is that the Agency leadership—serious and responsible people—had approved Nosenko's detention and at least the broad outlines of his treatment. Mr. Hart's way around this was to suggest that Mr. Helms was not aware of what was going on. Mr. Helms has belied that and indeed has called into question some of the impressions conveyed by Hart to the committee concerning Nosenko's treatment.

I participated in most of the discussions about the detention and I remember the circumstances pretty well. Let me propose to you the explanation I would have given you had I been the Agency's representative. What I knew may be more valid than what Hart has selected from Agency records and colored in sensationalist hues.

In the first place, let me remind you of the reasons for the detention. Mr. Helms described a few of them, but Mr. Hart did not give you the picture at all. This is important, for if Mr. Hart succeeds in dismissing and deriding the case against Nosenko and all its implications, he robs the detention of its context and purpose, and truly makes it, as Mr. Dodd put it, "outrageous." Here is why Nosenko was confined:

First, during the initial period of freedom after his defection, when his handling was identical to that of any normal defector, Nosenko resisted any serious questioning. It was not that he was "drunk around the clock" as Mr. Hart put it; he was usually sober when he deflected questions, changed the subject, and invented excuses not to talk.

Second, his conduct and lack of discipline threatened embarrassment to the Agency during his parole in the United States. Remember, he had not been formally admitted to this country.

Third, there was a documented body of evidence, not "supposed evidence"—that's a quote from Mr. Hart—beyond any explanations of bad memory or misunderstandings, which made it likely that Nosenko had been sent by the KGB to mislead us. It was not juridicial proof, but it was taken very seriously by the Agency's professional leadership, who were neither fools nor paranoids.

Fourth, the implications underlying this very real possibility were too serious to ignore. Among them were these two: That Lee Harvey Oswald may have been a KGB agent, and that there was KGB penetration of sensitive elements of the U.S. Government.

Fifth, if we were to confront Nosenko with the contradictions and doubts while he was still free, he would be able to take steps to evade further questioning indefinitely.

Sixth, there was a special urgency to get at the truth of Nosenko's reports about Lee Harvey Oswald because of the time limits imposed on the Warren Commission.

The legal basis for the detention has been explained to you by Mr. Helms. It had, as we understood clearly at the time, the approval of the Department of Justice and other Government agencies. We did not think we were doing anything illegal, at least not until the time had stretched out beyond reasonable limits, at which time we began to prepare for his release. Nosenko himself didn't seem to consider it "illegal" at the time, it doubtless seemed a logical intensification of the severity of the screening process which he knew he had to go through. He did not complain of violation of any constitutional rights nor ask for a lawyer. An innocent man might have protested and resisted, but Nosenko was engaged in a contest, and knew that he was failing to convince us—as indeed he freely admitted (he said he was "looking bad" even to himself, but had no way to explain the many contradictions, ignorances, and errors). He complained about cold and heat, but not, as far as I remember, about the fact of detention and interrogation.

There were two basic requirements for the detention: That it be secure and that Nosenko not be able to communicate with the outside—with the KGB or with unwitting helpers. Therefore, we needed a separate, isolated house in a rural or thinly populated area, as far as possible from other houses, with discreet access for the comings and goings which an interrogation would require. The Office of Secu-

city found a place, but as I remember it was not easy and the rent was high.

The actual conditions of detention within the house were not designed to cause him discomfort—or, for that matter, comfort either. They were to be healthy and clean. He was never touched or threatened and he always knew he wouldn't be; he could always resist a line of questioning by simply clamming up, with a shrug; there was nothing we could do about it.

Nosenko complained about the heat in summer. His window was blocked, not to cause him discomfort but to avoid contact with the outside. A top-floor room was chosen in preference to a basement because it would be dry and healthy, while the basement would be damp. When it became stuffy, Nosenko rightly complained and as I remember, an effort was made to improve the situation; I think a blower was installed to keep the air moving, but perhaps this can be checked in the files.

I don't remember any complaint about cold in the winter. If there had been, I cannot imagine why he would not have been given extra blankets, and I do not believe the complaint is justified.

His diet was planned always in consultation with a medical doctor. To accuse the Agency of trying to subject him to "partial starvation" is unjust: to imply that Nosenko's handlers wanted to, but a medical doctor "intervened" (as Mr. Hart said) is to distort the facts. The doctor was consulted in advance, at every phase of the detention, and checked Nosenko regularly. I can't remember the time period, but I think it was weekly. It might have been every 2 weeks. The diet was made more or less austere depending on the situation at any given phase of the interrogation, but it was always a healthy one.

The time frame has been much distorted here. We did not foresee a long detention—as both Mr. Helms and Mr. Hart have said. The first step, and perhaps the only one which required detention, was to be the confrontation, the hostile interrogation. I do not remember how long we thought it would last; perhaps somewhere between 2 weeks and 2 months. From then on the detention became extended, phase by phase.

First, the hostile interrogation. The results surprised us. Before, we suspected Nosenko might be a plant: afterward, we had come to think moreover that he might never have been a true KGB officer and that he surely had not held certain of the positions in the KGB which he claimed. (This view was reinforced in later questionings.)

At the conclusion of the hostile interrogation, in which Nosenko himself admitted that he "looked bad" even to himself, Nosenko was entirely willing to submit to a systematic debriefing. He said that we had been right to separate him from drink and women and make him work seriously. He did not complain then of the conditions of detention.

So began the second phase, a systematic questioning of the sort which we would have done with any normal defector under conditions of freedom. Nosenko ate quite good food, got books to read, and cooperated without complaint (except when it got too hot).

The third phase was a second hostile interrogation using the new information derived from his questioning and from outside investigations in the meantime. It deepened our suspicions, gave us more insight into what might lie behind him, and produced some confessions of

minor lies—which did not remove the doubts, for the new version contradicted other things he had said. But he did not confess to Soviet control. During this period his diet was made more Spartan, and he was not given reading material.

Nothing was harmful to Nosenko, however. You have only to listen to his complaints (lack of reading material, and other diversions, being about the worse) to realize that this was not “torture” whatever Nosenko’s advantage in making it appear so.

After the second hostile interrogation—I don’t remember the date; I believe it was late 1965—excuse me, late 1964—Nosenko was moved to the second holding area. This we can call the fourth phase.

Much has been made of CIA’s constructing a house to hold Nosenko. But the true explanation is far less lurid than Mr. Hart would make it seem. A new safehouse was needed because time erodes the security of any safe area; it was time to move. There was no thought about how much longer the detention had to last: Nosenko was still in the United States on parole to the CIA; we would not, under any circumstances, have certified to the immigration authorities that we considered him a bona fide immigrant. On the contrary, we had a mass of reasons to believe that he was a KBG agent sent to harm the interests of this country. So what could we do about him? The first thing, in view of the serious implications underlying this suspicion, was to clarify the doubts to the best of our ability. And at that point we still thought there were ways to learn more, enough to justify continuing the effort.

Suitable rural houses near Washington were, of course, hard to find, expensive to rent, and involved leases for minimum period, security hazards, and the threat that breaches of security might make us move again and again. And such holdings areas required a large guard force.

So the Office of Security considered it not only safer and better for our purposes, but also cheaper, to build a place on Government-owned land, than to lease a new house, pay the guards, make the alterations, et cetera, for a period we could not control.

As to the design of that house. Mr. Hart invented the term “bank vault,” which is a catchy phrase but a purposeful misrepresentation, a misrepresentation of his own Agency’s motives. The facts were these. The house was to be separate, but to hold down costs it should be as small as possible. There were certain minimum requirements: an interview room, a room for Nosenko, and a room for the guard or guards. It should require as few guards as possible. It should have an open-air exercise area, but not such as to let him see where he was. And as in the earlier safehouse, he should not be able to communicate with the outside, hence no windows. To prevent tunneling, his room should be of stronger construction. Now, to go from these last two criteria, as Mr. Hart did, and say that “in addition to the vault, which surrounded it,” is to misstate the truth.

The house was designed by the Office of Security, which was responsible for all the physical aspects of holding Nosenko. At no time did any representative of the Office of Security express any dissatisfaction with the manner of Nosenko’s handling, nor disagreement with the suspicions of Nosenko which underlay the detention.

It has been said that Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement and unoccupied, with a special view to influencing him to confess. In fact, there was no alternative to solitary confinement (could we have found him a companion) and it was physically impossible to arrange to question him constantly. One day of interrogation requires at least a day and perhaps more of report writing, and a day or more of investigation, and later sessions take time to prepare. And for almost all the people involved, there were other responsibilities, other tasks; the work went on even outside the Nosenko case. How Mr. Hart could imagine that the Agency leadership (professionals with experience in interrogation) thought Nosenko was under constant questioning is incomprehensible to me. Mr. Hart says we interrogated Nosenko for 292 days out of 1,277. That makes about 1 day in 4, if you let us off for weekends, and that sounds about right and normal. If I once wrote that the time between questionings would make Nosenko ponder, then I was rationalizing inevitable gaps, not planning an unbearable isolation for the man.

The detention had positive results. We got, as we never could have otherwise, the bulk of what Nosenko had to report, pure and free of any outside coaching. We were able to detect just how ignorant he was, and in just what areas. We could probe the limits of his knowledge, and they were rigid, even in connection with things he had claimed to have lived through. (Much like his recited story of Lee Harvey Oswald.) We were able to apply test questions to refine or test our hypotheses, in the absence of a confession. But, limited by morality and the law, we were not able to get a confession. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, I suppose that we would have done just as well to give him better food, more books, music, a big bed, games, and occasional informal conversations. But that was not clear at the time.

But we could hardly, in good conscience under our responsibility under the parole, sponsor him for U.S. immigration. It took a whitewash and pretended belief in his tales to accomplish that.

Now I want to address myself to the question of disposal.

Here the extent of CIA's irrational involvement with Nosenko becomes blatant. Mr. Hart read (with relish, according to my friends who watched on TV) selected items from some penciled jottings in my handwriting which left with you the impression that I had contemplated or considered (even suggested as more than one newspaperman understood him) such measures as liquidation, drugging, or confinement in mental institutions.

I state unequivocally, under oath, that:

First, no such measures were ever seriously considered.

Second, no such measures were ever studied.

(What "loony bin"? How "make him nuts"? What drugs to induce forgetfulness? I know of none now and never did, nor did I ever try to find out if such exist. The whole subject of "liquidation" was taboo in the CIA for reasons with which I wholeheartedly agreed then and still do.)

Third, no such measures were ever suggested as a course of action, even in intimate personal conversations.

Fourth, no such measures were ever proposed at any level of the Agency.

Of course, Mr. Helms, when he testified before you, hadn't heard of those penciled notes; neither had anyone else.

I do not remember making any such notes. And I have had much time to try to remember. However, I can imagine how I might have. Responsible as I was for this "abominable" case, I was called upon to help find the best way to release Nosenko—without a confession but sure that he was an enemy agent. In an effort to find something meriting serious consideration, I suppose that I jotted down, one day, every theoretically conceivable action. Some of them might have been mentioned in one form or another by others; I doubt they all sprang from my mind. (I cannot even guess what "points 1 through 4" might have been, the ones Mr. Hart declined to read because they were "unimportant." I guess that means they weren't damning to me.) But the fact that the notes were penciled reveals that they were intended to be transient; the fact that "liquidation" was included reveals that they were theoretical; and their loose, undignified language reveals that they were entirely personal, for my fleeting use only. In fact, none of these courses of action could have been morally acceptable to me nor conceivable as a practical suggestion to higher authority.

Mr. Hart admitted, or proudly claimed, that he himself discovered these notes in the files. Although he recognized their purely personal nature, that they were not addressed nor intended for any other person, nor had any practical intent, he chose to bring them to show and tell to the committee and to the American public. Did he feel this a moral duty? Or was it simply part of his evident intent to deride and destroy any opposition to Nosenko? Could he have done it for reasons of personal spite? Whatever the answer, the cost seems too high: He was discrediting his own Agency for a matter without substance.

I cannot remember any concrete proposal for "disposal" being made during my tenure. You understand, of course, that "disposal" is merely professional jargon for ending a relationship which began with "acquisition." Those are two words that go together, being "acquisition" and "disposal." The course the Agency eventually adopted seems, in retrospect, the only practical one. I think the Agency did well to rehabilitate Nosenko and, as I thought, put him out to pasture.

However, I cannot understand why they then employed him as an adviser, as a teacher of their staff trainees in counterintelligence. The concrete suspicions of Nosenko have never been resolved, and because they are well founded, they never will "be cleared up and go away." Mr. Hart and Admiral Turner may frivolously dismiss them, as they have done before your committee, but the doubts are still there and it is irresponsible to expose clandestine personnel to this individual.

In conclusion, Mr. Hart's testimony was a curious performance. One wonders what could drive a Government agency into the position of: Trying to discredit and bury under a pile of irrelevancies the reasons to suspect that the Soviet Union sent to America a provocateur to mislead us about the assassin of President Kennedy; pleading irrationally and misleadingly in favor of a KGB man about whom serious

doubts persist; misrepresenting, invidiously, its own prior action; denigrating publicly the competence and performance of duty of its own officers; and dredging up unsubstantial personal notes, left carelessly in a highly secret file folder, to falsely suggest in public the planning by its own people of the vilest forms of misconduct.

As the Congress is conspicuously aware, the veil of secrecy can hide irresponsibility and incompetence. But behind that veil the CIA used to maintain unusually high standards of honor and decency and responsibility, and did a pretty competent job, often in the face of impossible demands. The decline of these qualities is laid bare by Mr. Hart's testimony—to the Agency's discredit, to my own dismay, and to the detriment of future recruitment of good men, who will not want to make careers in an environment without integrity.

The Agency need not have gone so far. After all, Nosenko's bona fides had been officially certified. Those who disagreed were judged at its highest level to have besmirched the Agency's escutcheon. Not only are they out of the way, but everything possible is being done to see that no one challenges Nosenko or his ilk, ever again. The Agency need only have said this much, and no more.

That Admiral Turner's personal emissary went so much further suggests that the Agency may not, after all, be quite so sure of its position. Perhaps it fears that this committee, wondering about this defector's strange reporting and unconstrained by CIA's official line, might innocently cry out, "But the emperor has no clothes!" This might explain the spray of mud, to cloud your view.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee. My only regard is that I have not had the opportunity to answer publicly charges that have been made in public. And I should also like to point out in closing that in making this presentation and in responding to your questions today I may be limited by the fact that the Agency has denied me access to certain documents which I requested be made available. With that in mind, I will be happy to address any questions you may have.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. D. C.

Mr. Fithian, Mr. Klein will be recognized for questioning. Would you prefer to ask questions before Mr. Klein?

Mr. FITHIAN. No.

Mr. PREYER. I recognize Mr. Klein at this time.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. D. C., you referred in your testimony to the memo that was provided to this committee by Mr. Hart. The actual memo was not provided; a typewritten copy of that account was provided, JFK F-427. I will ask the clerk to show you a copy of that document.

Mr. Chairman, that has already been previously marked into evidence in previous hearings.

In looking at that document, do you recognize the words as being your own?

Mr. D. C. No; as I said in my testimony, I can't remember any such document. However, I wish to point out that I also said it is not at all inconceivable to me that such a document existed, and I did write it.

Mr. KLEIN. Some of the questions I will be directing to you refer to the letter; I believe that is also being put into the record. It is JFK exhibit F-136.

You have testified that you were directly responsible for the case of the KGB defector Yuri Nosenko from 1961 to 1962; is that correct?

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Was learning what Nosenko knew of Lee Harvey Oswald a major objective of the CIA during those years?

Mr. D. C. This question has arisen in some of the previous questions I have read. There may be some question about the word "major."

I would like to say the question of Lee Harvey Oswald was major indeed in our thoughts. We had in our custody the only witness to Oswald's life in the Soviet Union. So it was certainly important.

The information which Nosenko gave about Oswald was so circumscribed, so rigid that we took it, we questioned him, as you know, and got to what we thought were the limits of his knowledge. It was not expanded to anything he really lived through. It was there. We thought we had it. We questioned him in Geneva, I think twice. It is in the record. We talked to him here about it. The Bureau had him then afterward. In the conditions of detention it was part of the systematic questioning to which I referred in my testimony. It was dealt with seriously. But I don't believe we had much hope of getting any deeper into it. We thought, Mr. Klein, that we had what Nosenko had to say about Oswald. Now whether that's giving it proper importance, it was—well, of course it was important, but we didn't keep going back day after day for 1,000 days to keep asking him, can you think anything more about it?

The answer is yes, it's important; no, we didn't pound on it incessantly as perhaps a major or important subject might be pounded on. But I say even now, having read excerpts of your talks with him and having seen one or two things change, I would say, perhaps we would have made changes in the story.

Mr. KLEIN. Was determining whether Nosenko was telling the truth about Oswald, was that a major objective?

Mr. D. C. Yes; it was.

Mr. KLEIN. And did you believe at that time that if Nosenko was lying about Oswald, that that could have immense implications?

Mr. D. C. Yes; but the lying about Oswald was, in this sense, parallel to the lying about several other things, a lot of other things.

As you saw, when I took this one case, the case of Lee Harvey Oswald, and took it through our or my thought processes, if you like, I couldn't find any logical or any illogical explanation for why he said what he said about Oswald.

So, of course, finding out why he was saying it or whether he was telling the truth was of immense importance. As you see, independent of all the other aspects of Nosenko's bona fides, we could come to a point of extreme doubt of his bona fides solely on the basis of the Oswald case.

Mr. KLEIN. Now, you quoted from our own report about the detail and specificity of the July 3 and July 27 interrogations of Nosenko, when he was asked about Oswald in the Soviet Union.

Do you know of any other sessions when Nosenko was questioned specifically in detail about Oswald and Oswald's—about Oswald in the Soviet Union?

Mr. D. C. I don't know. I can't remember. I cannot remember. I do know that in our office we spent—now, in my office at this time, Mr.

Chairman, I would like to point out, as I mentioned in my opening remarks about my career, that during the period from 1962 to about 1965 I was in charge of counterintelligence within the Soviet bloc—Soviet Russian Division.

We were the operational element probably most closely involved with the Soviet intelligence aspects of what would come out in the Oswald case, along with the counterintelligence staff, as you know.

We did—because we had sources, defectors and experts at our best—we did dig. We thought, well, what can we supply, how can we shed some light on this thing. This was on everybody's mind, and it was extremely important to us.

I remember, for example, the passing out of questions to certain defectors who were working with us from the KGB predecessor organization, and their information, their questions, their comments, were brought into us and to the best of my knowledge were made available to the Warren Commission.

This is not Nosenko, you remember. This is other sources about Oswald.

There were a number of questions which Mr. Epstein got and published in his book as an appendix, through the Freedom of Information Act, which came from my section. He calls it 44 questions, but the way it is organized in the book it is a lot more than 44 questions because each one is a group of questions.

Now, we passed that to the CI staff, which was our channel and liaison to the Bureau, and it was passed to the Bureau, and there was a big back and forth about whether they would or wouldn't service these questions in their dealings with Nosenko.

They were quite detailed questions, as they had to do with Soviet procedures primarily. Those questions were, I gather, never serviced by the Bureau.

I can only say in retrospect—and here my memory fails me slightly—that by giving them in through channels to be put to Nosenko, somehow we dropped them because I don't believe that in the conditions of detention, I don't think those so-called 44 questions were put to Nosenko.

When I look back on it, that is something that I would have to answer did we do absolutely everything. I think it would have been extremely interesting, and I don't quite understand if we didn't why we didn't.

Mr. KLEIN. I lost one point you were making. You said you gave them to the Bureau, and the Bureau did not ask the questions. Bureau meaning—

Mr. D. C. The FBI.

Mr. KLEIN. Didn't the CIA have custody of Nosenko at all times?

Mr. D. C. No. As has been said, custody is not the word here. Responsibility for the questioning of Nosenko on Lee Harvey Oswald was very firmly in the hands of the FBI. Believe me, we were extremely conscious of this, and if my memory is right, I believe we were enjoined at the time not to question him.

Certainly there was no doubt that by giving him the body, the man, Nosenko, into the hands of the FBI for as long as they wanted—I am talking now about conditions of liberty, of course, in this period, immediately after his defection—that the United States—the appropriate

U.S. organization for the inquiry into Nosenko's knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald, our duty was accomplished.

We had given him, and it was the Bureau's job. They did their questioning.

You know, I don't know to this day exactly what they asked him. I learned more from your staff report than I had known before.

Mr. KLEIN. Is it your testimony that the Agency was constrained from asking Nosenko questions about Oswald's activities in Russia because the FBI had primary jurisdiction in this?

Mr. D. C. Yes; I think so.

Mr. KLEIN. Even Oswald's activities abroad?

Mr. D. C. Oh, yes. That was the only thing that Nosenko could bring to the FBI. That was all Nosenko had, is Oswald in Russia.

Mr. KLEIN. That was the full extent of Nosenko's testimony?

Mr. D. C. Yes; he was allegedly a KGB officer who had dealt with the case within the KGB. Of course, this was all he had to offer. The fact that this was handed—the Bureau had this authority, or this responsibility, it was perfectly clear to us at the time.

Mr. KLEIN. How was this matter made known to you, that the FBI would do all questioning—would be responsible for questioning Nosenko about Oswald's activities in Russia? How was that made known to you?

Mr. D. C. I don't remember. It must have been a result of normal interagency liaison, although nothing was really very normal about anything having to do with the President's assassination.

I would suggest that the best person to answer that question would be someone on the counterintelligence staff which controlled directly our liaison with the FBI.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask at this time to have—

Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Klein, may I interrupt just a minute here.

I would like to ask a question on this, and if I ask it later it will be as disjointed as can be.

If the FBI had responsibility for the questioning of Oswald, which I believe you just said—

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. FITHIAN [continuing]. How then could you testify earlier, as I believe I understood you to testify, that the questions you asked and the answers you received from Oswald—from Nosenko about Oswald. I think you said the Oswald case alone disproved Nosenko's bona fides.

Mr. D. C. I didn't say disproved. I said it was a factor in testing of bona fides. I don't think I said disproved because the word "prove" is a tricky one in this case.

Mr. FITHIAN. That is not the burden of my question. The burden of my question is if there was this clear jurisdictional division, are you saying, or aren't you saying, that the CIA did or did not question Oswald—question Nosenko intensely or otherwise about Oswald.

Mr. D. C. Oh, yes; I would be glad to review what I said about that.

During the period when we were dealing with Mr. Nosenko in Geneva, we—this was an active hot operational matter, there was no question of FBI at all—we were face to face with a man who was in the jargon of the Agency, was an agent in place—Nosenko before his

defection, who was meeting us under clandestine circumstances in Geneva. He was telling us about Lee Harvey Oswald.

We, of course, took that and got it as straight and as thoroughly as we could under those circumstances.

After he defected and came to the United States, it was, through the channels that Mr. Klein is interested in—it was made clear that the FBI, as the primary investigative agency on the President's assassination, would manage the further and detailed questioning of Mr. Nosenko in the United States on his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Later, after the detention—as I mentioned, we tried to get some sort of admissions from Nosenko by the act of hostile interrogation. Those, as far as I remember—there were no questions involved in there because there were no contradictions about Oswald, and I don't think that was part of our hostile interrogation.

But subsequent to the hostile interrogation, as I say, we were able for the first time because this man had resisted it earlier, we were able to ask him the kinds of questions we would have asked him had he been free, any normal defector.

We got to the questions and back to the questions of Lee Harvey Oswald in the course of that systematic debriefing. That, I think, will explain the dates, Mr. Klein, that are in your report, which I didn't know, I don't remember. They were July 3 and 27.

Again, I learned from the report or I was reminded by the report that the detention and the hostile interrogation began in early April. As I remember it, the systematic questioning continued through the summer, and as a part of the questioning, not with any expectation that there was more to come, that we would have to contribute about Oswald, but because we wanted to do everything we could to get his full story before the Warren Commission closed its doors, we did ask him about these matters.

The result was——

Mr. FITHIAN. Even though at that time you did not have—the FBI still had jurisdiction?

Mr. D. C. The question wasn't—in fact, Mr. Fithian, the question was no longer, I think—we didn't feel any constraint during this period of detention. There was nothing preventing us from talking to Nosenko about Oswald.

The only thing that may have inhibited us was the conviction that he had no more to say about it. Certainly I think the comparison of what we got in Geneva, and the rather systematic questioning in July, there wasn't any more substance to it.

He was making certain statements, and those statements were either true or not true. But, they were certainly very limited. I think we could list the number of facts he gave us about the Oswald case, and they would not be a very long list. They have to do with how he heard about it and what he heard about Oswald's attempt at suicide, about Oswald's psychological assessment they did or did not do in the KGB, or in a Soviet hospital, on Oswald. These facts lined up have not changed and they have not increased by subsequent questionings. And I think by the time we were talking about, while Nosenko was in detention and we could have asked him as many questions as we

wanted to, I think our feeling was that we had his story. And I think subsequent events have borne that out.

The only thing I regret, as I say, is that those 44 questions which we had passed to the FBI, I don't think we should have felt any inhibition about asking Nosenko those at that time. I don't think anybody should have any inhibitions about asking Mr. Nosenko those questions today.

So I hope that answers your question.

Mr. FITHIAN. I was just unclear—

Mr. D. C. While he was in detention, we didn't feel strongly constrained. There was not much thought—the Bureau was always—the FBI was always aware that if they wanted to talk to Mr. Nosenko again, that they could have him at any time they wanted. There was no question of keeping him away from the FBI. With the FBI's knowledge of this case, the FBI's interest in this case, he was always there. If they wanted to come to the CIA and say, "Look, you are custodians of Mr. Nosenko. We would like to talk to him," they would have talked to him again.

Mr. FITHIAN. The reason I raised the question was I inferred from your response to Mr. Klein you somehow felt ruled out jurisdictionally, because that was the FBI's province.

Mr. D. C. I would say prior to the detention, yes.

Mr. FITHIAN. Only for one time frame.

Mr. D. C. Yes. I think from the time of his defection, or the time of his arrival in the United States until the detention. And as I say, the detention was designed to do a hostile interrogation, not to question him systematically. In fact, the hostile interrogation was a confused and confusing operation which didn't succeed, but it was strictly focused on contradictions in his story. And as I state, there were few enough, if any, contradictions visible within his story of Oswald that there was nothing there we could hook onto and use with any impact.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you.

Mr. KLEIN. Is it your testimony that whether it be very early or later on that the CIA did make every effort to get all the information from Mr. Nosenko that it could get and to find the truth—all the information from Nosenko about Oswald that it could get, and to determine whether that information was true or not?

Mr. D. C. There are two questions, I think. I separated them in my letter. The question did we get all the information. And then you said—

Mr. KLEIN. You attempted to get all the information from Nosenko about Oswald. You can take that one first.

Mr. D. C. OK. It would be very easy, and I would in good conscience say yes. But over these past weeks I have had a lot of time to think about it, what did we know, what could we have done. And the only thing that sticks in my mind right now that would have been perhaps useful for the record was to ask him those questions which our experts, knowing internal Soviet procedures, had dredged up about—which were not all to do with Oswald, and they had nothing to do with his knowledge of Oswald. They had to do with Oswald's own story, which has to do with his meeting with Marina, his permission to marry Marina, his exit of Marina from the Soviet Union, all of these things

that have to do with Soviet internal procedures, where we consider ourselves particularly well informed, because we had access to some former KGB people who knew these procedures.

By the way, they have said, they said at that time—well, their reaction to the story was quite violent. I understand that you have talked to some defectors on this subject.

But the reaction of the KGB men to the Oswald and Marina story, and most particularly to Nosenko's story about the failure to talk to him, and the ease with which he married this lady and so forth, they believed that this is not possible as given. Strongly they believe that.

Mr. KLEIN. I think my question sort of got lost. But is it your testimony that at some point the CIA did try to get all the information that they could from Nosenko that he knew about Oswald?

Mr. D. C. About Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald, yes.

Mr. KLEIN. And at some point did the CIA try to do its best, do whatever was possible to determine whether the information Nosenko gave about Oswald was true?

Mr. D. C. I would say our efforts in this respect would be on two planes. One is to check out the facts, and those facts, as I think Mr. Helms told you here, can only be found within the files of the KGB. And second, to find out whether Nosenko as such is telling a true story. In other words, is his story—is all of his story true, and therefore is his story of Oswald potentially true. And in that latter respect, I would say we made a heroic but unsuccessful effort. I say unsuccessful, because we didn't prove it.

As I told you today—I hope I got over to you the fact that I am convinced that the story cannot be true.

But that was the result of a long and strenuous effort.

So my answer to your second question is yes, indeed.

Mr. KLEIN. It is also your testimony that prior to the hostile interrogations, the CIA did not concentrate on the Oswald question because the FBI had primary responsibility for that issue, even though it dealt with Oswald's activities in Russia.

Mr. D. C. Correct.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that at this time I read into the record page 7 from a document received from the FBI which is responses to questions that this committee posed to the FBI. I cannot put the entire document into evidence because portions of it are secret. But the portion I propose to read is unclassified.

The question posed to the FBI by this committee was:

Did either the FBI or the CIA have primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald. If neither had primary responsibility, was there any division of responsibility?

The answer, and I am quoting:

The FBI had primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald that pertained to his, Oswald's, activities in the United States, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The CIA had primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald's activities abroad.

Mr. D. C. I find that absolutely incomprehensible, because Nosenko could not conceivably have known anything about Oswald's activities in the United States. The FBI would have had nothing to talk to him about.

Mr. KLEIN. In effect, what this document would seem to say is that for everything that Nosenko knew about Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA had primary responsibility of finding it out and investigating it.

Mr. D. C. Absolutely, that is what that document says to me; yes. Because it couldn't possibly have been the agreement between the FBI and CIA at that time because, as I say, there is no use talking to a Moscow-based internal security officer of the KGB about a man, a former Marine of the United States, who came to the United States—who had lived in the United States before he came to Russia, came back to the United States after he lived in Russia, and at some point along the way killed the President of the United States. How in the world would this man have had anything to say on the subject? In fact, he would have shrugged and said, "No, I don't know anything about it."

Mr. KLEIN. So we draw the conclusion from this that the CIA was of the opinion that the FBI had responsibility in this area and at the same time the FBI was of the opinion that the CIA had the primary responsibility in this area?

Mr. D. C. Certainly not. The FBI talked to this man for days. They could have terminated their so-called responsibility in 5 minutes had they thought that we were responsible, the CIA was responsible for talking to him about everything to do with Oswald in Russia.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, you are disputing that statement; is that right?

Mr. D. C. Oh, yes. And I have a feeling that there is some misunderstanding there. I can't believe that anybody said that seriously.

I have no memory of any such thing being said at the time because—perhaps they meant, you know—it couldn't mean that they felt that the FBI had—no, they were talking about Oswald, not about Nosenko. No, I cannot understand it.

Mr. KLEIN. So, you dispute that.

Mr. D. C. Oh, of course.

Mr. KLEIN. Well——

Mr. D. C. But I suspect it is a misunderstanding, rather than a misstatement.

Mr. KLEIN. You testified earlier that you did not recall any other sessions where Nosenko was asked detailed specific questions about Oswald in Russia, other than the July 3 and July 27 statements, which were mentioned in our report; is that correct?

Mr. D. C. That is correct. One reason I think perhaps you have the whole picture is that there were pretty careful records kept. In response to your questions to the agency, or—I am sure you had got all of the pertinent files, and had there been anything else, it would have been clearly indicated.

Mr. KLEIN. I should state for the record we have read those files, and we know of no others.

Do you have any recollection of how long these two sessions were in time?

Mr. D. C. You mean the July session?

Mr. KLEIN. July 3 and July 27.

Mr. D. C. No. I take it that information came from a document. Did it give any indication of the time? Because——

Mr. KLEIN. I should state for the record the sessions are on tape.

Mr. D. C. Well, then, there must be a way to know.

Mr. KLEIN. How many hours, as an experienced security officer, considering what you have told us was of importance to this question of Oswald—how many hours do you think that the agency should have devoted to questioning Nosenko about Oswald?

Mr. D. C. I would give you a practical answer to that question. When you are faced with a man who is telling you a limited number of facts, which have a very clear limit, you can ask him the questions, and you can write down the answers, and you can ask him the same questions or related questions all day long.

But I think that we felt that we had touched his limits, and we didn't just feel it, we experienced it, and that had we talked more and more and more we wouldn't have gotten anywhere. Therefore, I cannot guess how many hours one should spend asking the same questions.

I would add, by way of comment to your question, that had he lived through the experience as he said, we could have talked with him for days. Because you have a situation where a case officer named Rostrusin, or Krupnov, if this man walks up, and they talk about it, and then they go out and have a drink, or they live through these experiences, that Oswald had been in a hotel, and that there was this Soviet Intourist woman who was in touch with him, what exactly is her relationships with both KGB and what did she think about this guy, and did you talk to her and when—these are things which would go on and on and on had there been a genuine contact?

But the one thing I have noticed is that your complete information about Oswald and ourselves or the FBI's run to a few pages, never more. You can't expand it. You reached the limit. Therefore, my answer to your question is I can't guess how long you can spend on this man, but I don't think it is any longer than we did spend.

Mr. KLEIN. Is it your testimony that 5 or 6 hours would be adequate for this issue?

Mr. D.C. I am sorry. That is a very difficult question to answer.

Mr. KLEIN. I should state for the record that the committee has heard the tapes of these two sessions and they lasted, combined, approximately 5 or 6 hours. That is where the figure comes from.

Mr. D. C. I don't know. You are talking about a matter of hours—was it 6 hours or 12 hours or even 30 hours. Perhaps there could have been more.

Mr. KLEIN. Now, are you familiar with the person who questioned Oswald on July 3 or July 27?

Mr. D. C. No, I can't remember who it was. If you tell me his name, I am sure I would remember. But—it was presumably a member of my division, or my section, I would say—at that time the counter-intelligence section of the Soviet division.

Mr. KLEIN. My only hesitation is——

Mr. D.C. It doesn't matter.

Mr. KLEIN [continuing]. Is the security aspect.

Mr. D. C. Unless you want to ask me about some document. Excuse me for my question.

Mr. KLEIN. What I do want to ask you is do you think if you have Nosenko, as he is speaking about Oswald, and you said it was an

important issue, that the person who questioned Nosenko about Oswald should be somebody who is experienced in KGB—questioning KGB defectors.

Mr. D. C. I don't know. You have people available for questioning, and their manner of questioning is more or less detailed, and more or less competent, depending on their training, and depending on their personal inclinations or capacities.

Everybody has to get his experience somewhere. I think many officers I have known have done brilliant and complete interrogations without any prior experience.

No; I don't think it is necessarily relevant to be systematic about this. There was an implication in one of the reports I read that this man had not carefully studied the matter of Oswald before asking the questions of Nosenko. I think probably more could have been done there.

Mr. KLEIN. When you say that everyone has to get their experience somewhere, do you think this situation would have been a proper place to give somebody experience in questioning a KGB defector, talking about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. D. C. Yes; I think it would—in other words, it is not grotesque, it is not unheard of to have a competent person—I am sure that the man who was sent—as I say, I don't remember who it was—I am sure he was not an incompetent.

When we are talking about questioning anybody about anything, we are talking about a personal capability, personal professional competence, rather than experience, let's say, with a Soviet defector, or with anybody else. He could go down and question a businessman about his business.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, to question a businessman, say, about his business, do you think that he would have been very familiar in the facets of the business—and my question is, would the person who questioned Nosenko about Oswald, would you expect that that person should be very familiar with the facts of Oswald's life and especially everything we knew about Oswald in Russia?

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. And this committee, as is stated in the report, questioned, took a deposition from the particular agent who was assigned to question Nosenko about Oswald, and was the only agent who performed that questioning on July 3 and July 27, and he stated that his knowledge of Oswald came from the media, what he had read as all of us look at the newspapers and hear on television.

Do you think that is a satisfactory way to investigate what Nosenko knew about Oswald?

Mr. D. C. The word "satisfactory" is a difficult one.

Mr. KLEIN. Adequate.

Mr. D. C. Certainly not maximum. Certainly not desirable. No; I would be inclined to think that it was not—it was certainly not maximum.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you think that had the person who questioned Nosenko been very familiar with all aspects of Oswald, and experienced in KGB, and spent more than 5 or 6 hours questioning Nosenko about Oswald, and perhaps the CIA would have come up with more

relevant information in determining whether Nosenko was telling the truth about Oswald?

Mr. D. C. No.

Mr. KLEIN. You state in your report that the chairman of this committee, due to Mr. Hart's confusing testimony—

Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Klein, are you departing that particular line of questioning now?

Mr. KLEIN. I am going to come back to it. But you certainly can ask a question now.

Mr. FITHIAN. I have had the feeling, subjective, today that perhaps, hearing your testimony and what else we have found out, that it would be fair to characterize your major interest in Nosenko as not being Oswald—either because you touched the limits of his knowledge, information, or for whatever reason—and that it would be fair to say that your real interest in Nosenko, as an individual, was the potential penetration of American Government, potential penetration of your own agency, determining whether he was sent here to mislead your agency, sent here to undermine Mr. X, whatever.

In other words, the intelligence operations that he might be able to lead you to were of a great deal more interest to you than Oswald. Isn't that fair to say?

Mr. D. C. No, no, it isn't, Mr. Fithian.

I would like to correct some of the impressions given in this field by Mr. Hart, among others.

During the period of Nosenko's clandestine meetings with us before his defection, and during the period of his questioning under conditions of freedom in the United States, he was treated—and his information was gone at—precisely as would any other defector.

The most important information he had to offer was got at, priorities were established, he was questioned on everything he knew including Oswald. During the period of confinement, he was also questioned on everything he knew including Oswald.

Now, if the case as a whole seems to bear this counterintelligence flavor, I would like to say that is probably determined by the fact that Mr. Nosenko was an internal security officer of the KGB. He was questioned early on, both in Geneva and here, on his knowledge of anything to do with Soviet politics, Soviet personalities, on the economic or internal relationships with the leadership, any type of policy information that he could give from his knowledge, as a KGB officer.

These are things which some KGB officers have had knowledge of. In other words, we don't write them off. They are not nearly as valuable as sources of intelligence are; for example, officers of the Soviet Army or * * * [others].

But nonetheless, they are not necessarily zero, especially having to do with political information. I would say we made every effort to get what this man had on other things, that we were not just slanting our questions in order to determine whether he was a plant.

However, during that questioning we continually found reason to suspect that he was a plant, but that was not our purpose as it has been stated to this committee.

Our purpose was to get what he knew. He didn't know much. That is a fact. That isn't our preconception, as Mr. Hart—

Mr. FITHIAN. You mean he didn't know much about any area?

Mr. D. C. No, sir. Well, what do you mean by any area?

Mr. FITHIAN. The areas you questioned him on.

Mr. D. C. The areas I mentioned, on Soviet politics, economics and so on, he knew effectively nothing. He had nothing that was of any intelligence value.

Mr. FITHIAN. Well, I had some other questions, but that would kind of lead us far astray.

Mr. KLEIN. I don't have a whole lot more.

You stated in your letter that the chairman of the committee, due to the confusing testimony of Mr. Hart, was led to state that no investigation of Oswald's activities as known to Nosenko have been made.

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. And that that was incorrect?

Mr. D. C. Oh, yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Would you tell us specifically what the CIA did to investigate what Nosenko said about Oswald in Russia?

Mr. D. C. The context of that statement, by the way, as is put in my letter, has to do with the getting—it is in the paragraph of that letter which talks about getting the information from, even though we are talking about investigation.

This is as I read the transcript. It may not be correct. It may have meant indeed the investigation of the information which had been gotten.

Mr. KLEIN. Right. Distinguishing taking a statement from investigation, using investigation in that way, would you tell us what specifically was done to investigate this case.

Mr. D. C. Yes, with pleasure.

First of all, the best way to investigate it is to check parallel sources of information. In this case, the only parallel source of information which could tell us, confirm or deny whether Lee Harvey Oswald had or had not been questioned by the KGB, or had or had not had any relations with the KGB, or some of the other things Nosenko said, could only come from the KGB, or Inturist, or from some of the personalities in contact with Nosenko in Russia. We had no such sources.

Second, we would probably go into—I am not sure what the technical term here is—we would consult experts. We would take Nosenko's information and see whether it made sense in terms of the knowledge, our knowledge of the Soviet Union.

That would not be a reference merely to files. That would be the questioning of all available sources on this subject. That is the point I made, that we did go back to every one of our defectors, not only on Nosenko's story, but on Oswald's story, directly.

That would be about all—except finally the attempt to determine how valid that information was in terms of the man's total credibility, which means investigation under interrogation.

Mr. KLEIN. Now, consulting of experts—you told us that although you spoke to some defectors, that they never used the questions, is that right?

Mr. D. C. No, no, no. They made reports. They made comments and reports about internal Soviet procedures which bore on the Oswald story. Oh, yes, they did that. They made reports.

Mr. KLEIN. So, since, as you say, you could not go to the KGB, the only investigation that the CIA did in this matter was to consult other defectors about procedures in the KGB?

Mr. D. C. Other defectors, other knowledge available to the American intelligence community.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, what specifically?

Mr. D. C. Excuse me?

Mr. KLEIN. I say other than defectors, who else did you specifically talk to, to investigate.

Mr. D. C. Talk to? Oh, let me think. Talk to. May I ask you to be very precise in your question as to what aspects of the story you might be talking about? Is it Nosenko's story of Oswald? Because if it is, it has to do with the procedures of admission to the Soviet Union, the series of events that occurred to Oswald in the Soviet Union, the suicide, and things of that sort.

Mr. KLEIN. And you are saying that you investigated this—these statements by Nosenko how, by speaking to—

Mr. D. C. Well, who would know about, let's say, procedures for the admission of people into the Soviet Union. Who would know about—the main source, the most valued source we have ever had on things from this very closed society, where these regulations and these procedures are in no sense open to the public, the best source we have had, of course, is defectors and that is over a large number of years—many years.

The result has been we have accumulated this information, and have turned out general reports and kept them up-to-date on what certain Soviet procedures are.

Those would be consulted. In other words, written reports, background information. Surely we checked that.

Mr. KLEIN. So in general you checked the reports that had been accumulated over the years, but not specifically written for this case.

Mr. D. C. And then questioned people specifically about this case, those sources we had.

Mr. KLEIN. Who did you question, without saying a name—if you questioned defectors, how many?

Mr. D. C. Defectors.

Mr. KLEIN. How many did you question?

Mr. D. C. Certainly a minimum of three, and as many perhaps as, I would guess—my memory really isn't sure because I wasn't as closely aware of some of these other things—I would imagine that we sought or got reports from more than those three, the three that I know of. How many more, I don't remember.

Mr. KLEIN. And were their records and files of what these—all the people that you questioned, are those records all made, of what they said when asked specifically to comment on this case?

Mr. D. C. I don't know that, Mr. Klein. I don't know.

Mr. KLEIN. And other than the number of defectors, at least three, anybody else that you questioned, or did you do anything else to investigate what Nosenko said about Oswald?

Mr. D. C. The word investigation is bothering me a little. I don't know what you mean. If you mean to look into it, to verify it by whatever information we had about Russia, what other sources are avail-

able? You have overt information, and you have information which has come from covert sources.

Mr. KLEIN. What I am saying is—I am not stating at this time that there are other possibilities. I am just asking what—is that the extent of what you did to investigate it?

Mr. D. C. We are talking about Nosenko's story, which is Oswald in Russia.

Mr. KLEIN. Yes.

Mr. D. C. What you do to investigate that in the United States is go down to the neighborhood and you go talk to people. But we had no such access to people inside the Soviet Union. There was a tremendous limit to our ability to investigate this information.

Therefore, if these outsiders, talking about procedures, or what would or wouldn't be done normally, sounds like a somewhat inadequate means of investigation, it was the only one at our disposal.

Mr. KLEIN. As I say, your statement is that there was investigation. I am just trying to ascertain—

Mr. D. C. I mentioned investigation on those three grounds, the third of those grounds being the attempt by interrogation to get at the veracity of Nosenko in general, and Nosenko as a source on Oswald.

Mr. KLEIN. And we have already discussed the extent of the questioning of Nosenko on the Oswald matter. That was those two sessions.

Mr. D. C. The questioning of Nosenko on the Oswald matter was limited to those two sessions, I believe, because you have told me so—plus the session is in Geneva.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recollect in Geneva that you spoke in detail with Nosenko about Oswald?

Mr. D. C. The words "in detail" are hard to say because the conditions of a clandestine meeting are never satisfactory. You cannot sit down and be systematic because you don't have that much time. There are other things we talked about.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever question Marina Oswald about what happened in Russia when she was with Oswald, and compare that to what Nosenko was giving you?

Mr. D. C. To my knowledge the CIA had no access whatsoever to Marina Oswald, and I have no knowledge of any CIA contact with her at any time.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you ever ask the FBI to question her specifically about the issues you were interested in?

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Is there a written request for that?

Mr. D. C. I would suspect so; yes.

Mr. KLEIN. And did you get any answer back?

Mr. D. C. No.

Mr. KLEIN. The FBI—

Mr. D. C. No; I don't believe that we would have asked them to ask her something to tell us because this would have been a violation of what the FBI considered its charter in this case.

Mr. KLEIN. So you didn't ask them.

Mr. D. C. We would give them questions to ask her. We would request them or suggest to them that they ask Marina certain questions. That, yes, but not with the idea of reporting back to us because we wouldn't have any right to do that.

MR. KLEIN. You wouldn't have any right to have the FBI give you their reports on Marina Oswald?

MR. D. C. Oh, yes; we would have a right to ask them to give the reports. But we didn't say why don't you ask this. This is essentially why we are doing it. We gave them a request for information and said will you go ask these questions.

That is the history of the famous 44 questions I spoke about a moment ago.

MR. KLEIN. Weren't you interested in the answers to compare it to what Nosenko was telling you?

MR. D. C. Yes, indeed. But—the answers to—

MR. KLEIN. That Marina gave the FBI, to compare it to what Nosenko told you what happened?

MR. D. C. We would have been very happy to have answers from Marina, and asked these questions. But we could not operate through the FBI to do this. I think this is a thing that has come up in previous testimony. I think we were constrained, that the Bureau felt very strongly it was their responsibility.

MR. KLEIN. Did you ever make any attempt to study files you had on other people who had defected, Americans who had defected to the Soviet Union, and check what happened to them, and compare them to Oswald's?

MR. D. C. Oh, yes; and the people who were doing that—by the way, I want to stress here that the agency component primarily responsible—I told you about our wholehearted effort and tremendous interest in this. But the agency component handling the agency's requirements on Lee Harvey Oswald were in fact the counterintelligence staff. They indeed did look into the experience of other defectors.

MR. KLEIN. Were their reports made on this?

MR. D. C. I don't know.

MR. KLEIN. I should say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that our committee has seen these files, but has never seen any reports indicating that any kind of study was made to compare these people to Oswald.

Were the results of these studies put in the final report that you people—that the Soviet Russia division published in I believe February of 1977?

MR. D. C. No. The Soviet Russia—may I speak about that report? The report, the so-called final Soviet Russia division report has also been misrepresented here. What was being done in the so-called 1,000-page report, or whatever one chooses to call it, was to make sense out of an incredible mass of material.

It had gotten to the point, there were so many interrelated cases, so much detail connected with Nosenko, that somebody new coming into the case could probably no longer master it. What I sought to do was to get each and every aspect of the case written up, what Nosenko had said, what investigations had been made of it, perhaps even comments on it, or further things to be done on it.

That I don't remember—the exact format. But I do know the first two things were there, what Nosenko had said and what our investigation, independent knowledge showed.

This was put together with the idea of being a reference of easy access, not as a final report.

Now, exactly what was finally said in it when it got into its eventual form, the so-called 400-page report, I don't know because I wasn't there, and I had certainly not originally intended that compilation had to be a final report.

It has certainly been treated as such, and has been described as such here. Perhaps there were passages in it which had the kind of conclusions which I saw quoted—Nosenko was not this, and was not that, and was trying to deceive, and things of that sort.

Perhaps they appeared even in that 1,000-page report. But frankly, that wasn't its original intent, and I don't remember their being in there.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you specifically remember a report where there was a study of all American defectors to the Soviet Union and a comparison?

Mr. D. C. No; but I can assure you that the person to ask on that would be the counterintelligence staff. That was their responsibility.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall any kind of effort to get hold of documents, letters, diary written by Oswald, and compare that to what Nosenko was telling you about Oswald?

Mr. D. C. No, no.

Mr. KLEIN. When I asked you earlier about whether if you thought that a more experienced person questioned Nosenko, somebody who knew more about Oswald did the questioning, and whether there were longer sessions, whether that might have helped to get more information and get to the truth in this matter, you said that you didn't think it would help. And in your letter to us, you told us that you felt the Agency did an adequate job, and you compared what the Agency learned about Nosenko and what this committee learned and said that since we and the FBI didn't learn any more than the CIA, that that shows that the Agency did a good job.

Mr. D. C. Did an adequate job. I didn't say did a good job.

Mr. KLEIN. An adequate job.

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Did the FBI have the same access to Nosenko that the CIA had?

Mr. D. C. Yes. As I remember, I think he was delivered to them. I think they probably questioned him—I am not 100 percent sure of this, but I seem to remember that they questioned him on their own premises. In other words, I think he was out of our custody in the period he was being talked to by the FBI. It is conceivable that I am wrong and that the FBI people came to the house in which Nosenko was living and talked to him there. But I have some—

Mr. KLEIN. I believe the record will reflect that was the case.

Mr. D. C. I'm sorry. I don't remember.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall the FBI having any access to Nosenko after April 4, 1964?

Mr. D. C. No. Nor do I remember their asking for such access.

Mr. KLEIN. So they only were able to question Nosenko for approximately 2 months in 1964; is that right?

Mr. D. C. Correct.

Mr. KLEIN. And you stated in your letter that they questioned him—

Mr. D. C. Wait a minute. Excuse me. You said were able to interrogate him only during 2 months?

Mr. KLEIN. They had 2 months——

Mr. D. C. You used the words "were able." They were able to talk to him more if they asked for it. I said that earlier today.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, you are saying they could have spoken to him after April 4, 1964.

Mr. D. C. Of course. We would never have denied them access to him.

Mr. KLEIN. And your testimony is that they had questioned him all they wanted, and that is why they didn't question him any more after April 4, 1964.

Mr. D. C. Yes. It is certainly my understanding.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, again I would like to read from the report given to us by the FBI, from page 5. This particular section was read into the record at our earlier hearings. I would like to read it again.

The FBI had no direct access to Nosenko from April 3, 1964, until April 3 of 1969, and therefore was not in a position to make an objective assessment of his bona fides nor of the veracity of information furnished by him. Thus information provided by him in early 1964 was accepted at face value and qualified in terms of the source and the conditions under which it was received.

Does that indicate to you that the FBI felt that they could have interviewed him any time they wanted after April 4, 1964?

Mr. D. C. Yes. The phrase in there was they had, as I understood it—they had no access to him during that period. They didn't suggest, I think, by that phraseology that they were denied it. I know of no case in which the FBI asked for access to Nosenko or that anything was said to the Bureau that suggested to them that they could not have access to him during his period of detention.

Mr. KLEIN. And you also compared the findings of the CIA with the findings of this committee. Do you think the fact that this committee spoke to Nosenko 14 years later might have put the committee at a disadvantage versus the position the CIA was in in 1964?

Mr. D. C. Normally I would say of course. In this case, I see no sign of it.

Mr. KLEIN. You don't think that the committee had any disadvantage——

Mr. D. C. No. I say I don't see any sign of it in the result. On the contrary, I think you got everything and perhaps a bit more. As to whether the 14 years make a disadvantage in this case or not, I would say normally of course it would. Everybody's memory fades, especially of experienced events.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you think that the absence of the investigative and intelligence resources that the CIA had available in 1964, the absence of that for this committee might have also made it more difficult for this committee to conduct its investigation?

Mr. D. C. The absence of what—excuse me?

Mr. KLEIN. The investigative and intelligence resources that the CIA has available, and had available in 1964, that that might have——

Mr. D. C. As I pointed out to you, there were no investigative resources that you would consider serious ones inside the Soviet Union.

Mr. KLEIN. You don't think that the CIA had any advantage over this committee as far as sources available to them?

Mr. D. C. I don't know what your limitations were, Mr. Klein. I would think that the type of sources that I have described would have been made available to your committee had you asked them. In other words, defectors, available background information on the Soviet Union and so forth. I don't think that—well, I don't know what other assets you are talking about or what other capabilities.

Mr. KLEIN. You state in your letter that the committee came up with only one fact.

Mr. D. C. Well, I was talking there about the——

Mr. KLEIN. Surveillance.

Mr. D. C. The surveillance.

Mr. KLEIN. You are aware that the committee came up with numerous inconsistencies in Nosenko's statements?

Mr. D. C. I certainly am. And I found them extremely well presented.

Mr. KLEIN. In the time the CIA had to question Nosenko, can you specifically tell us inconsistencies or untruths that the CIA pinned him to?

Mr. D. C. In the details of the case?

Mr. KLEIN. Yes.

Mr. D. C. The answer is probably no. I don't—and the answer is certainly no, I do not remember any. But as to whether there were or not, I don't remember.

Mr. KLEIN. In the files that I have read I can state that I have not found any. And my question to you is if the Agency did an adequate job, then how is it that 14 years later this committee found inconsistencies, when the Agency never found any at the time?

Mr. D. C. Well, some of those were changes in the story in the interim, aren't they?

Mr. KLEIN. That is correct. But they came about from questioning, from checking prior statements, questioning a number of times about the facts, 25, 30 hours.

Mr. D. C. Yes, prior statements.

Mr. KLEIN. My question basically is did the Agency put the time and resources into this so that if there were inconsistencies that could have been found in 1964 they would have been found.

Mr. D. C. I am not sure that these inconsistencies did exist at that time. And certainly I am not sure that a questioning of him at that time would have produced these inconsistencies. I have no way of knowing that.

Mr. KLEIN. I am not necessarily referring to these particular inconsistencies. What I am suggesting is that if inconsistencies develop in questioning of somebody now, would it be a fair statement that adequate questioning in 1964, although maybe not developing these same inconsistencies, would have probably developed other inconsistencies which could have been investigated and could have been the basis for even further questioning.

Mr. D. C. I think that is unknowable. I don't know.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. On that point, if I may add, Mr. Klein—your own professional judgment is that Nosenko is lying about his knowledge

of Oswald in Russia, or that he is intentionally misrepresenting what he knows to be factual about the KGB treatment of Oswald.

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. FITZMAN. I mean those are the only two possibilities.

Mr. D. C. Yes, sir.

Mr. FITZMAN. And that was your conclusion at that time.

Mr. D. C. The conclusion—

Mr. FITZMAN. Let me just ask you. You never would have put your stamp of approval on Nosenko's bona fides, is that correct?

Mr. D. C. No one would put a stamp of approval on somebody's bona fides except as the result of a careful and considerable period of investigation; that is any defector.

Mr. FITZMAN. I understand that.

Mr. D. C. And in his case it is suggested and has been suggested to this committee that conclusions were drawn prior to his—first of all prior to his reappearance in 1964, in other words, after the 1962 meetings, and subsequently during that period, before he was incarcerated, if that is the word. The fact is that at all times in our discussion, regardless of what might—well, let me start again. That at all times we left the door open to him, for him to prove his bona fides. The key period in this, in my opinion, was in that period of freedom, after his defection, where he was treated like anyone else, and we tried to go down and talk to him and so forth. And there were points or questions in our minds which we tried to approach with him during that period.

I would say that we went to the meetings in 1964 with a doubt in the back of our minds. But in no way planning to handle the meetings in a different way than would have been.

Quite a lot was made by Mr. Hart about the duplicity with which we talked about the settlement arrangements that would be made with Mr. Nosenko when he came to the United States. This has been the subject of some controversy since.

My memory tells me that we were not and could not have been authorized to exercise duplicity as such. We were offering him the type of settlement which we would have offered to that man had he established his bona fides. It was not duplicity as such.

Now, if you say at the same time that fellow who is promising these things is also the author of this paper over here which says that we don't trust him, or that there are some odd things here which suggest he was a KGB plant, I would say absolutely yes. But is that duplicity? Because the door was always open for the establishment of his bona fides.

And as for the first hostile interrogation, when we confronted him with these contradictions, I would say to you that we probably suspected that he would not be able to clear up these things. But we didn't do it. And there might conceivably have been some innocent explanation of both contradictions in his own story or oddities, all the things that Mr. Hart or others have mentioned, that there was some—he was perhaps a pathological liar or that he was boasting or he had a very strange memory, a whole lot of things could have come up.

But what we had done in the meantime is to do a lot of investigation on the side, not only about Oswald, and that we presented this

outside information to him, asked him questions about it, and found that he was inexplicably unable to answer the questions.

At what point has one concluded that this man—in other words, dismissed him as a source? I don't think we ever did. I don't think we talked to him about Oswald until much later, during the period we are talking about here. I don't think any less effort was made than would have been made with a serious defector. There were certainly more troubles in getting details from him than from other defectors, but I think our posture, face-to-face to him, probably was not much different than it would have been had we not had the suspicions in the background. It's the word "conclusions" that bothers me. It's the conclusion what he might have said had we not had these preconceptions, as Mr. Hart put it.

Mr. FITHIAN. I was trying to get at a followup to Mr. Klein's questions. Mainly inconsistencies occurred because stories didn't match and so on, but I was trying to ascertain whether or not in your judgment, since you did not believe him, you had reason at that time either because of inconsistencies or lies or whatever you judged them to be, to disbelieve his rendition of the Oswald story in Russia.

Mr. D. C. To the degree we had a suspicion of him at all, the answer is yes; we had that much reason to disbelieve what he said about Oswald in Russia. Plus the fact the story he was telling about Oswald in Russia was absolutely unacceptable to us alone as a story, for all the reasons we have already discussed. It was an incredible story and Mr. Hart and others have stressed that and every Soviet defector has stressed this.

Mr. PREYER. I have to be at a meeting over at the Capitol at 12:45 p.m. If you want to continue some questioning, could you come back? I suggest if it's agreeable with everyone that we recess until 2 o'clock today in this room and we can post a notice on the door if we have to go to another room.

The committee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to resume at 2 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. PREYER. The committee will resume its sitting.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Klein to complete his questions.

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be exceedingly brief, with only one question.

Mr. D. C., to your knowledge is there any documentation, reports, memos, that fully describe the efforts made by the CIA in 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, to investigate what Nosenko had to say about Oswald?

Mr. D. C. No; and I would say as of 1966 or 1967, when I cut off, my best guess is that such a document doesn't exist. I don't remember marking one and I am not quite certain what the reason for making one would be.

Mr. KLEIN. Is it normal procedure that during the course of the investigation you wouldn't document the course of the investigation?

Mr. D. C. You would document everything you do, but you certainly need not go back and describe everything you did or everything you propose to do. I don't know who such a document would be directed to,

for example. If one were reporting progress of an investigation there would be reports of what was done and what not. But this was one aspect of one larger investigation and I can't remember any document being made up on the subject.

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you. I have no further questions.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Fithian.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Judge.

My first question is less specific. We'll have more specific ones later. But I have always been puzzled since Mr. Hart appeared before us as to why the Director would accept a man who would testify in such a way as to create smashing anti-CIA headlines out of that testimony and that goes beyond what you said this morning as to his own personal knowledge or credentials for making such testimony. Can you shed any light on that at all?

Mr. D. C. It goes without saying, I have thought about this a lot. I think the dates of the Director's takeover of the agency may have something to do with it. He came in from outside, very much outside, and he was faced with what to him was probably repulsive or abominable state of affairs and he turns to what was then the recognized expert, the man who had just before his takeover of the agency conducted this study. I have not seen it; I understand it's bulky and have no doubt as to its conclusion. But I would say from the Director's point of view, this man might appear to be the expert even though he was already retired at the time he did the 1976 study.

Mr. FITHIAN. Going back to Mr. Hart's testimony on page 114 of our record, he says to this committee explaining how he would proceed, he says:

Therefore, what I have before me are a series of notes which were finished about 8 o'clock last night based on guidance which I got at that time from Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA.

Mr. D. C. I am mystified and have been asked the question and have asked others the question and no one I know in the Agency during my time or since has come up with any sensible explanation.

Mr. FITHIAN. Your assessment or judgment as to why Mr. Hart was selected then stems from and concurs with what Mr. Hart is saying a little later in his testimony when he says since Admiral Turner has become Director of Central Intelligence he has been quite concerned about this case and he specifically requested I come back to the Agency from which I retired in 1972 and give presentations to agents on the nature of the case.

Now my question is this, since the Nosenko case became a celebrated one long before this committee became interested or long before we even knew he existed, was Mr. Hart's operation such that he would be the logical person within the Agency or immediately retired from the Agency to make the kind of presentations to "senior officials or agents in the case" that we might have expected?

Mr. D. C. No, sir, he was not.

Mr. FITHIAN. May I reiterate in the record at this point what Mr. Dodd so ably did during the questioning that day, and that is to say that kind of testimony didn't in any way square with what this committee had requested of the Agency. We had submitted to the Agency a very detailed list of questions or concerns we had, Mr. Klein can

amplify that, of all our concerns. Then they were sent over to the Agency for a representative to discuss these matters. I might state, in no way did the Department comply with the request. It's worse than I thought in this sense. We were very surprised that day that the subject of Oswald was not discussed after some 30 or 40 minutes of testimony and then all the questions and even the statement that he was not qualified to comment on Oswald, which happens to be the only thing this committee was primarily interested in. So I make that comment at this point in the record.

Now, let me turn to your specific testimony, Mr. D. C., and ask you to refer to page 10 of your testimony.

Prior to asking a question as to this particular page, let me ask a couple of background questions: As a professional in this field, I believe I read into your statement here that it is highly unlikely, perhaps totally improbable, that someone with Oswald's particular background would have been able to move in, do the things he did in the Soviet Union, and move out without being questioned by the KGB.

Mr. D. C. That is absolutely my thought. I would say it's absolutely unthinkable and it's unthinkable for the Soviet defectors I know, it's unthinkable for anyone who knows the automatic procedures of the Soviet Union, there is no way he could have evaded this action.

One described to me that the KGB, as it would face an American swimming into their sea, it would be like a pool of piranhas, insofar as one could make a statement as dogmatic and final as that. I would say it can't have happened as described.

Mr. FITHIAN. Well, then, when Mr. Nosenko told you, told the Agency that story, that would have been as early as Geneva?

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. FITHIAN. Just prima facie, doesn't this raise questions on the part of the Agency as to credibility of this man at all? I mean, even at the very outset, the first or second contact you had with him in Geneva?

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. FITHIAN. Now, staying with the Geneva scene for just a minute, this is a digression, but I was appalled at statements made to us somewhere along the way, Mr. Chairman, as to the techniques of questioning Nosenko in Geneva, that the CIA non-Russian-language person doing the recording and—I have forgotten all the details. I would like some amplification, because I occasionally vote on budgets around here.

Mr. D. C. Yes, sir. A slight correction of dates and the manner in which I entered into this case.

I was in fact stationed in . . . [West Europe], not in headquarters in the Soviet Division at the time this case broke. Therefore, I came into it, if you like, as the Soviet operations expert in that area.

While I had given myself in the course of my career a lot of home learning of Russian to the point where I occasionally served as a low-level translator for the Ambassador or interpreter in some of his contacts with the Soviet Embassy, I was most definitely never fluent or competent in the language. But on the other hand, this shouldn't keep one from operating against the Soviet Union.

The contact made by a member of a Soviet delegation to that area, in this instance a disarmament conference in Geneva, he says "I want a contact with American intelligence," so somebody had to do that. It was quite clear I was the person to contact and I did.

In the course of the first meeting with him, both English and Russian were spoken. I told the man from the outset that I would appreciate his speaking clearly and relatively slowly and I would like to break into English whenever possible, and we tried to reach a language of understanding. At times either from excitement, impatience or whatever, he expressed himself over a considerable number of sentences, fast, in Russian, where my understanding of it was imperfect.

Now, I think at this late date, I told you this at a much earlier date, but very early along our questioning of the man and of our writing reports on him, we were aware of those points where he had said something and I had failed to understand simply because there were taped recordings of these meetings.

During the second meeting—it possibly could have been the third but I think it was the second—there was present in the room a native-speaking Russian officer to accompany me in my dealings with this man.

Although I came into it as a member of the * * * [an overseas] component of the Agency, I was already known as particularly competent and experienced in this field, so it was considered as I think Mr. Helms said in 1964, it was considered a good face for the Agency, a competent qualified face for this extremely valuable source.

But from the second meeting on—even in the first meeting, there were a few misunderstandings which consisted, I believe, of my taking notes on certain things he said about his background. The military school which he attended was cited in your testimony and there were one or two other minor things having to do with the manner of his father's death. I made a mistake. I heard it wrong. So, in my initial report to headquarters there were mistakes. But at least for most of that first meeting I had no doubt there was good understanding and for all subsequent meetings, there was a total understanding.

To take misunderstandings which may have appeared in the first cable and first meeting on insignificant matters and extend them into a judgment as to the manner in which this source was handled from beginning to end is confusing, it misleads you and is unnecessary and has no relevancy at all.

I want to say the so-called drunkenness, the heartfelt statement of Mr. Nosenko to Mr. Hart, "John, I was snookered," he wasn't snookered, he probably had a lot of booze, but he was entirely lucid at all times. There was never a time when communications were broken because of the influence of alcohol.

Therefore, I suggest that element of language misunderstanding that you are speaking of and the element of drinking was artificially introduced as an explanation and excuse for other irregularities in Mr. Nosenko's reporting.

Mr. FITZIAN. Are you then saying that Nosenko used his drinking to make up or cover up or disguise the fact he did not know answers to certain questions or the account of that is erroneous?

Mr. D. C. Yes; later when confronted with that in Geneva in 1962, he simply said, "I was drunk" or "I did not say that," or "There was a misunderstanding."

In one case, Mr. Fithian, a very important case, he described in 1962, his participation in an operation involving an American of which we had a record. In 1964, he denied any knowledge of that operation at all. It wasn't a question of a transcript being ineptly made by some process I don't understand, was not the transcript at all which entered into this confrontation, we brought back a tape. This tape was loud and clear. We said, "You don't remember this operation? Here is your voice." And he hears his voice loud and clear, giving details of the operation. And his explanation was that he was drunk; he had no knowledge of having spoken to it a year and a half earlier. It's my premise that drunkenness doesn't give you second sight.

Mr. FITHIAN. I think Nosenko used the term as to Oswald being an uninteresting target. Mr. Epstein in his book perhaps makes a little too much of Oswald's potential knowledge of the U-2. Am I off base on that?

Mr. D. C. I think not. It makes a good story. It's logical, but after all this is something which escaped American attention. I have had an American friend who has come to me since then and said, "You can't expect me to believe the security review of Oswald failed to pick up the fact he knew about the U-2." I don't think it's even been proven he knew about the U-2, and I think it's the sort of thing that would have slipped by in any instance. He was at a Marine radar base 500 meters from where the U-2 took off, and his radar unit tracked it. Possibly certain things as to speed and altitude might have come to Oswald's attention.

For example, Mr. Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union would have been a part of naval intelligence to see what he knew or didn't know; and I have a hunch the most conscientious investigation you could make about that man might not bring up the fact that his service in that radar shack was in any way related to a highly secret operation which was documented in totally different ways.

I do agree with you that it's unlikely that the U-2 was the special information that Nosenko—excuse me, that Oswald told Snyder. There has been a lot of speculation as to the information of special interest he had. It may be he realized there was a special operation and this was the special thing he had to offer to the Soviets, but it's certainly not provable.

Mr. FITHIAN. One of the central questions which may go unanswered, but I would appreciate your best guess, I am not sure from your testimony whether you believe that Nosenko came to the United States, became available as a defector—I conclude you believe him to be a plant. I am not sure as to what your real belief is as to why he might have become the plant. Some very wrapped up in the assassination would have us believe this was of such tremendous potential disturbing nature for Soviet-American relations that even if Oswald didn't have that much of a role to play with the KGB, they would defuse anything that had to do with Oswald before they sent him over here. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to send someone of Nosenko's caliber.

The other possibility is the one I think you alluded to, that is, they believed the kind of information agent X was giving was of such a potential damaging nature, that they should muddy the water and send a plant calling attention to what he was testifying to.

You call it on page 14, a "crude message." I take it from that you have no definitive information. But I would like to know what your guess is.

Mr. D. C. It would be a pleasure to say.

It seems to be difficult for Mr. Hart or for anybody coming into this case to make distinctions, and one of the big distinctions is between his contact in Geneva in 1962 and his recontacts in coming out in 1964 saying he was going to defect.

In 1962, he made it absolutely clear to us that he would never defect, under no circumstances. He had his family, he liked living in the Soviet Union, but he had certain undefined objections to the Soviet regime. I was reminded in Mr. Hart's testimony, I think that he needed some money urgently and therefore he was coming to us. He not only said he wouldn't defect but he wouldn't accept contact with us inside the Soviet Union. However, he would see us whenever he came out on official duty on Soviet delegations abroad.

In January of 1964 he came out and stupefied us with this statement that now he wants to defect. I can assure you my first question was, "Why? Didn't you tell us you never would?"

His answers were extremely vague. "Well, I think they may suspect me. I have decided to make a new life."

I asked, "How about your family?" He said well, he had decided to start anew and they would be all right.

Now, I detect in that a tremendous change of course. Therefore, I would like to answer your question as to what he might have been about in 1962 and 1964.

In 1962 I say in my letter and testimony he was deflecting information given 6 months before by defector X. This was clear.

There were such connections; there was an astonishing overlap. I have dealt with many Soviet-bloc intelligence officers and, of course, many would know two or three doing the same thing. But the degree his information coincided to certain information given to us by X was simply not unacceptable, but it was noteworthy.

I would guess on that basis, Mr. Fithian, that the purpose in 1962 was that this man was sent out to do a perfectly understandable counterespionage technique. The question has been asked why the tremendous change between 1962 and 1964. His reasons make no sense. They are not convincing. So what is it in the Soviet mind that would cause a man to physically send a man out when they said they never would?

By way of footnote, I would like to say I mentioned in my testimony the insight we got into this man is that he hadn't in fact held the positions he said he had held. Not only was he not a plant but he was not a real KGB officer. The reason we have what we have in this tremendous volume of information is that we have that detention and we were able to take it. We had him sitting—he tried to avoid him sitting down but once we had him sitting down, we could see he did not know about the operations of his colleagues, he did not know about his main target, he did not know those things.

But still in 1962, had he come out to see us in Copenhagen, New York, or Buenos Aires, he could have seen us only for an hour here or there under tense circumstances where there would be no chance to get into details under the controlled conditions I am speaking of.

Therefore I think the Soviets had a good thing going had they left the man where he was. But as a defector they were running a big risk. This is not going away from your question, because it involves the decision to do this, to change the course. This is all assuming under your category we are speculating that he is a KGB plant.

Something made them want us to have him in hand as a defector. One of the possibilities could be the event which happened in the interim, the assassination of President Kennedy, and therefore he was as you say, used for this message because he may have been the only valid, controlled, and trusted secret contact to CIA.

The Soviets have shown a proclivity to use tricky methods like this to give us messages through clandestine means going directly to the President, escaping suspicious desk officers. But it's possible they looked for a way to get a message of their innocence as to President Kennedy's assassination. If it was the best available channel, I can see the non-KGB or let us say a member of the Soviet leadership, like Mr. Khrushchev himself, may have said do it, and the professional might have said, yes, but the fellow might run into trouble, and the reply would be yes, but do it.

This is again in the realm of speculation.

I only know of one other—by way of background—I only know of one potential explanation of this man coming out to see us in short stretches or the man putting himself into our hands as a defector.

That has to do with an unrelated matter. It is very difficult—it is even more speculative than is related to the Kennedy assassination.

In other words, I am not at all sure that the other speculation is any more valid than what I have just said.

So, I would say that in groping for an explanation on the basis of the hypothesis that he is a sent KGB agent, one of the two things, one of the only two that I can think of, is that he was sent to give a message to the Warren Commission.

Mr. PITHMAN. In that 1962 interview, is there any reference made to Nosenko's alleged role in recruiting American tourists?

Mr. D. C. Yes. He said that at that time he had made his career from 1955 until 19—until the end of 1959 in the tourist department, and he spoke about it at that time. In 1962 he had just gone back, after a 2-year period in the section working against the American Embassy in Moscow, he had gone back to that section, working against tourists, with a promotion.

So, needless to say he did talk about operations against tourists.

Mr. PITHMAN. Was there in that interview, in 1962, anything which tends to support his later claims of his position within the KGB?

Mr. D. C. Prior to his contact with us in 1962, he claims to have made a brilliant career as an English-speaking case officer, an operations officer, a man who gets out in the field, a tough guy, as he used to call himself.

He told of certain things he had done. We checked them out. It goes without saying we were fairly meticulous about that. We found only

two operations in which he physically appeared at all prior to 1962, that we could confirm.

In other words, we were getting from him the statement of where he was, and then we were going back to what we knew about those operations, or else going out and interviewing the people involved.

One was as a member of a team of about three, three people in the compromise of a tourist on homosexual grounds in 1956.

The other was a junior officer, a companion of an identified officer, senior officer, of the tourist department of the KGB in meeting with an agent of theirs whom the bureau had interviewed. That agent's testimony—I will say he was a person—this person's testimony showed that Nosenko appeared exclusively as a junior member of the team. He had never appeared alone.

The other man, who was an identified officer of the section, of the tourist directed section, did all the questioning and all the control of the meetings as testified by the agent.

Now, one of the interesting things about that particular case is the meetings with Nosenko playing a junior role continued well into 1960, at a time when Mr. Nosenko said later that he had shifted into the section working against the American Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. FITHIAN. And held an important position in it.

Mr. D. C. The deputy chief of it.

Mr. FITHIAN. And you are saying that according to Soviet structure, that would be highly improbable?

Mr. D. C. Very. I can't imagine why the deputy chief of a section busy working against the American Embassy should accompany a senior tourist department officer in meeting an agent who, while admittedly American, a resident—from time to time a resident in Moscow—but primarily directed to tourist-oriented operations, why he should continue in that capacity.

If we were the senior case officer and had a special relationship with the man he would be acceptable, quite, no reason why not.

They might feel no one else could do it as well, and maybe this man had some potential to talk about members of the American Embassy. I believe by the way that that is the way that Nosenko explained it when we asked him about this.

He knew people in the Embassy, but that doesn't really check with the story as given by the man himself when interviewed by the FBI.

Mr. FITHIAN. Do you have any information on the treatment of Nosenko's family in Russia after his defection?

Mr. D. C. There was a story, as unlikely as the story I mentioned in my testimony, of Mr. Epstein's being told by an official member of the Soviet Embassy in Washington that Nosenko is the best qualified man in the United States, the best qualified man in the world really to talk about Oswald in Russia.

That other story has to do—let me see—with the approach by a Soviet official to a large circulation magazine in this case *Paris Match*, offering a story to them, illustrated by pictures, a story of the pathos of the family of Yuri Nosenko, Colonel Nosenko, I believe is one of the many people who referred to Nosenko as a colonel, having left his family behind, and how this would turn into—there would be a divorce, and these children were left behind.

He offered, by way of illustration of this heartrending article, a picture of two daughters, I think, as I remember—I think we got hold of them—on a boat in a lake somewhere, I suppose in Moscow.

In other words, here was a Soviet official coming and saying here is the family. In other words, they were talking about the family. For the first time in our experience, after a defection, the wife and mother of the defector came to the American Embassy to plead with the Embassy to, I don't know, give their son back or something, I don't know. There had been at that time no precedent. I believe since then there have been one or two similar cases where the family has done this, but I can assure you that no family of any defector is going to be free to go to the American Embassy in Moscow, unless the KGB wants it that way.

So, I find the whole family business, from what we know about the family after the defection, very strange.

As to their faith, I don't think we do know. At least not at the time I left the operation, I don't think we had any really firm information about whether they had suffered or whether they just had gone ahead with a divorce. I am told, by the way, by some sources, that if a man defects, he becomes automatically an enemy of the state and a divorce is granted automatically.

I was told unofficially somewhere in between, after I had left the case, that, if memory serves me, that a divorce had gone through in the Soviet Union.

Now, how that is known, I have no idea. Perhaps through Nosenko; perhaps he was notified in some way.

Mr. FRITHIAN. I wanted to turn to what seems to me to be kind of a curious situation. I refer to the questions that you say you submitted to the FBI.

Just glancing over them, there seems to be several questions in which the CIA would have just been vitally interested in—how the KGB works against American tourists, for example, any techniques, any process, any procedure or whatever.

I don't know, Mr. Klein, I have not reviewed the interviews of the 23d and the 27th—I have not had them available to me, so I may just be covering ground that you have already covered.

If that is so, Judge, we could save this time.

But in the second question listed, the second set of questions that you gave to the FBI, among others in that section was, "Describe the routine handling procedure of U.S. tourists to the Soviet Union. Was Oswald's trip handled any differently?"

You alluded earlier this morning to the fact that you were always trying to update your files on procedures. It seems to me that you had a potential, at least, a superb opportunity, a person who had worked in this sensitive area, right in the area of one of the important procedures as far as we would be concerned, and that is safeguarding American tourists from being somehow enticed away to become defectors and so on.

Am I to believe that you submitted these to the FBI, the FBI did or did not use them, you are not sure, and then subsequently you never really returned to this?

Mr. D. C. No. I don't know how it got included in the questions for the FBI for Nosenko because it involves the handling of tourists.

We did a very, very systematic debriefing of Mr. Nosenko on the subject of the KGB's handling of American and other tourists in the Soviet Union. I must say that if I had to list the information which is valuable, that would be at the top of the list.

He had that. He gave it well. We got it out, and we put it into forms which would serve the purposes that you just mentioned, Mr. Fithian.

We circulated widely not only to those elements of the U.S. Government, and even to the American public—I think a version was put out into the public domain. But to foreign liaison services, to our allies who themselves could draw value from knowing the techniques of the KGB control and actions against foreign tourists in the U.S.S.R.

Yes, indeed, we did that. Why it appears there, I don't know.

Mr. FITHIAN. Another is a question which seems logical enough. If you worked so hard at trying to establish Nosenko's authenticity, it would be likely that they would work equally hard on establishing whether Oswald was bona fide or not.

Mr. D. C. Much, much harder.

Mr. FITHIAN. Did you ever ask Nosenko?

Mr. D. C. Of course.

Mr. FITHIAN. Those questions?

Mr. D. C. I can only say the answer is of course. I don't know what the record shows, but there is no doubt that we at some point showed some—perhaps it was in the house—but we must have indicated to Mr. Nosenko our disbelief in this disinterest on the part of the KGB.

I don't know what the record shows on that, but it was blatant. We were aware of it at the time. It seems almost unthinkable to me that we didn't confront Nosenko with it and ask for an explanation.

By the way, I would think that this is one of the many times when he, I won't say clams up, but when he stubbornly opposes the line of questioning by simply repeating what he said before; that is, that it is uninteresting, uninteresting—at which a standard—I am not sure this happened, I am saying this is the way it would have gone—we would have said, "Well, that doesn't answer the question."

This was an American young exmarine coming into your country. He would say, he is unstable. I am sure this was his line of defense against this type of question—that this man was considered personally unstable, and uninteresting—those words are used over and over again, I believe, in the reports.

I think Mr. Klein knows the reports better than I do at this point. But he emphasized that the act of suicide, or attempted suicide, in the first place, showed that the man was unstable, and after that the psychiatric examinations which either were or were not done more or less confirmed this. To believe Mr. Nosenko, this suspended all their procedures.

But that the question was asked to him, how is this possible I have no doubt. It must have been.

Mr. FITHIAN. Do you happen to know, just from your own knowledge of Russian operations, whether a person judged unstable, an American who wanted to defect and so on, would have been permitted under Russian law or procedures to marry a Russian citizen?

Mr. D. C. I don't know the answer to that question. I don't know.

Mr. FITHIAN. Do you have any information at all on Marina and any relationship that she had to the KGB in any way, shape or form?

Mr. D. C. None whatsoever. On the contrary, he said she was an uninteresting girl with no character, nothing. I remember this response about Marina.

Mr. FITHIAN. You mean that is Nosenko's?

Mr. D. C. Nosenko's response, as I remember. I am surely not having a failure of memory here, but I know that he must have addressed himself, and that we must have asked him about Marina.

His reaction, I know, I remember his statement that she was of no interest. I think it may have been in connection with why did they let her go. Well, she was of no value, no interest, it didn't matter, dumb girl, something of that sort.

Mr. FITHIAN. Let me suspend at the moment. I may not have any more questions. I thought I had one or two more as I walked back over, Judge.

Mr. PREYER. Well, I will ask a few, and maybe it will refresh your recollection.

When you first brought Nosenko to this country, there was a free period, as you described it, in which he was treated like any other defector.

Some of the recent news stories, some of the treatment is quite free indeed, I notice.

But you indicated that he resisted normal questioning during the free period. That resistance was more in terms of simply evading your questions? He was not physically trying to evade you?

Mr. D. C. No, no, no, no. It was in terms of evading the questions.

Mr. PREYER. But you felt he wasn't responding the way a normal defector during that free period might respond, in the openness with which he would answer questions?

Mr. D. C. Absolutely.

Mr. PREYER. Then you went into a period of controlled questioning. He was first confined to a safe house, I gather, somewhere in the general area here.

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. PREYER. When was he no longer allowed to use alcohol? Or was there ever any period in which he was never allowed to use alcohol?

Mr. D. C. I would say the entire period of detention. There was never any question of his having any alcohol from April 4 onward.

Mr. PREYER. So as soon as he went from the free period of questioning to the safe house, controlled period, all alcohol was barred from that time on?

Mr. D. C. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREYER. On the question of hallucinations, I think you indicated that he did not suffer from any hallucinations from alcohol. Did he ever have any periods in which he hallucinated, to your knowledge?

Mr. D. C. This is a debated question. You may remember—in the periods when he was alone, not being questioned, he sometimes spoke to himself, and he would tell his guards that, "I see something." That is as I remember the form the hallucinations took.

We were both concerned and interested in it. The doctor went to him. He maintained he was hallucinating. This was, I believe, a very

limited period. It has been made out as if this took place during periods when he was in face-to-face contact with someone in answering questions.

It isn't true. It was strictly noted by the guards and Nosenko himself saying this to them. The doctor, who is a trained psychiatrist, his opinion was that these hallucinations were feigned. I am certainly not qualified to say whether they were or not.

So, the answer to your question is I don't know whether he was actually hallucinating or not. I do know that it had nothing whatsoever at any time to do with the question sessions. It had no impact on his answers to any questions that he was ever asked.

MR. PREYER. Well, once controlled questioning began, you have described it as somewhat spartan conditions. I think you have helped restore some balance to this nature of that question and confinement.

Now, you mentioned on the diet, your comments on that I gather was that there was a deliberate effort to put him on a lean diet, but that that was checked with a doctor.

MR. D. C. Yes, sir.

MR. PREYER. At regular intervals?

MR. D. C. Yes, sir.

MR. PREYER. How often did you see Nosenko yourself once he got into a controlled period of questioning?

MR. D. C. Frequently, during the first period of hostile interrogation. I believe that is all. I participated from the wings in subsequent questioning, but not directly face-to-face with Nosenko.

MR. PREYER. During the first period, the safe house period, would you see him once a week or once a month?

MR. D. C. Oh, no. I spoke about the hostile interrogation. That was daily. That was for the period it lasted. I actually can't remember whether that was a matter of 1 or 2 weeks. It wasn't long. It was a very short period.

Then I saw him very frequently indeed at the other side of the table.

MR. PREYER. Well, when he went into what has been described as the bank vault period of questioning, was that the period when you did not see him very often?

MR. D. C. Well, yes: I did not see him during the bank vault period at all. I did not see him after the first hostile interrogation. I did not see him face-to-face even in the first holding area.

In other words, during this summer questioning, the questioning that followed the hostile interrogation, and during the second hostile interrogation, I did not see him. I saw him no more after the month of April 1964.

MR. PREYER. Well, under whose direct control was he at that time, after you no longer saw him face-to-face?

MR. D. C. Mine. Your question was whether I saw him face-to-face.

MR. PREYER. Yes.

MR. D. C. But direct control. I would say, in the sense of responsibility for the interrogation and for the handling of the case——

MR. PREYER. These are all people in your division who were seeing him and questioning him daily.

MR. D. C. Yes, sir.

MR. PREYER. What relation is Mr. Angleton to your division?

Mr. D. C. They are entirely separate. Mr. Angleton's counterintelligence staff has a staff role as against an operational or executive role. The Soviet division was the organization within the Agency specifically operating against the U.S.S.R. and the satellites.

We would run the cases, handle the defectors, plan and carry out, sometimes through people who were not members of the Soviet division, of course, in the stations abroad.

Mr. PREYER. Did Mr. Angleton ever see him face-to-face during this period?

Mr. D. C. No, sir. Mr. Angleton's role was as the overall agency, the seat of Agency expertise in counterintelligence in general. He kept an eye on these things, and he would have an advisory role.

In this particular case, his role was conditioned by the fact that his staff was managing the earlier defector, X.

Mr. PREYER. Were you aware of the two lie detector tests that were given to him?

Mr. D. C. Yes, sir.

Mr. PREYER. Was it two or three?

Mr. D. C. I think three.

Mr. PREYER. Three?

Mr. D. C. Yes, sir. Indeed, I was aware of them.

Mr. PREYER. Is it accurate that they were given to him with the understanding that he would be told he failed the test whether he did or not?

Mr. D. C. After the test, yes. That is true. The first test given, at the time of his confinement, but before he was told he was going to be confined, he was simply taken and given the test.

Now, Mr. Hart has said that there was already an extraneous element added, that somebody, instead of putting on the normal three controls of palm moisture and blood pressure and heart beat, that an additional thing, something to increase his tension, was put on him to allegedly be capable of measuring brain waves.

I don't remember that. It is possible. If he has the record that it was done, fine, but I thought that the first lie detector test was given straight, and there was indeed, sir, the intent to tell him that he had failed it, as the means of opening the hostile interrogation, which would confront him with all the collected contradictions in his story and the data from outside his story which indicated that he wasn't what he said he was.

Mr. PREYER. You mentioned somewhere in your testimony about the word "disposal" being political jargon, CIA jargon. Disposal does not necessarily mean liquidation in jargon, or does it?

Mr. D. C. No, sir. I have never heard of the word being used for liquidation. I would like to just add one—as long as the subject comes up once more—I would really like to say one more thing about liquidation.

I remember some years ago, Mr. Helms saying that not only would there be no assassination, murder, liquidation, any kind of this action which has been in the jargon called executive action, not only would there not be any, but there would not be any discussions or proposals, it would not be a subject fit for human ears within the agency.

I have lived my time in the agency under that belief. Like many other officers of the agency were surprised when the publicity came out

about someone had contemplated, one or two or three of these political assassinations, they were counter to what I thought was the very specific, explicit policy of the agency.

It was unthinkable that anyone could therefore have thought of disposal in those terms.

Mr. PREYER. Well, the question of disposal in the sense of resolving this issue in some ways must have certainly occurred from—at increasingly frequent intervals, I would think—where you have a man in this controlled custody for some 5 years and where it became, was beginning to become clear that you were not going to get much one way or the other from him.

Which gets back to the question of what you referred to as the duped leadership, and the idea that a small handful of you were aware of this, were aware of his treatment, but that no one else was really very aware of what was going on.

Would you make periodic reports to somebody from time to time of the progress or lack of progress that was being made?

Mr. D. C. Oh, yes, yes; indeed.

First of all, who knew about it is the first thing—the small group we are talking about consisted of everyone on that particular case, that operation, everyone responsible. In other words, for the interrogation of Nosenko and the investigation of his leads, and the use of his information for whatever purpose within our agency, which meant primarily certain elements of the Soviet division, Soviet bloc division.

It involved the counterintelligence staff, as I mentioned, because of their advisory function in counterintelligence matters. In that case it meant the chief of staff and those members that he delegated to be aware of this, and there were several.

It meant the Office of the Chief of the Clandestine Services, known then as the Deputy Director for Plans, and since changed to the Deputy Director for Operations, I believe, the DDO, his office and the assistant DDO office, DDP at that time—the assistant DDP's office, and those members of that office who needed to cope with the paper.

On upward to the office of the, I guess—my dates may be a little fuzzy—but I think the then-Deputy Director of the agency, then-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Helms.

It goes without saying if we are sending the doctor out to check him next week, or if we are planning to interrogate him on a certain subject, or if we are talking about making—giving him or not giving him books to read, or things like that, that we would never go to Mr. Helms about that.

But if we were planning an interrogation session on a certain subject, or planning something that was substantive or if a certain amount of time had passed, and it was just time to check in, Mr. Helms was always available, as I think he has testified.

He was always available. Surely, as I read what he said, I think what he said was a very accurate reflection of what was really going on. In other words, he got some of it, but by no means all of it.

He wouldn't have known that the man was hot or cold. If the man had been—if that had been a matter of policy, to make the man hot or cold, he most surely would have known about it. But the various little

aspects of this holding certainly would not have been brought to his attention routinely. They would have been brought to the attention of whoever was concerned.

There was a lot of consultation in advance. There was a lot of periodic consultation—staff meetings, I suppose you would call it—on the subject. As you say, sir, there was increasing concern as time went on because I felt that Mr. Helms was always aware, (a) that what we were doing was legal but (b) that it became more and more sensitive as time went on and this couldn't go on indefinitely.

He was as interested as he could be because he understood the implications behind this operation, which were immense, and they went way beyond Mr. Nosenko. They went to several other operations, several other * * * people who were in touch with us in one way or another.

The implications underlying it clearly pointed at serious matters. Not only that Mr. Oswald may have been a Soviet agent, but also that there would be penetration in the U.S. Government.

It followed logically as an implication of the fact that Nosenko could have been sent—and by the way, could have told us a false story about his career. I think that is a very menacing little piece of information because if he can lie to us about a key job during a key period, it would suggest to me that the KGB knows that we are unable to check on this, which I find disturbing.

Mr. PREYER. Well, you categorically deny, then, any implication that this was the treatment that Nosenko, and was known to only a handful, five or six people in the agency, and that they were deliberately—I think this is at least an implication from the testimony—deliberately hiding it from the upper echelon of the CIA for fear that the planted agent might get wind of it.

Mr. D. C. I certainly do categorically deny that. There was—it is fiction. Within the agency, it always works on the need to know, and some operations are kept tighter than others. But a defector in our hand, unfortunately by the very nature of things, can't be very tightly held.

The number of people who knew about the case and generally about what was going on were—was appropriate. I would say there were in our division alone, there must have been five or six people directly talking to Nosenko. Plus those that were supporting them at the desk, plus the leadership of the division, plus all these elements of the counterintelligence staff.

We are talking about a multiple of the five or six you are speaking of. It was done as any such operation would be done in the agency.

In other words, all who had any responsibility would know about it. All who had any responsibility for that particular line of work.

Mr. PREYER. This question might be an invasion of privacy. If you don't want to answer it, don't answer it. I am just curious as to your general political views—whether you are a liberal or conservative. I ask that because knowing some of your relatives, and knowing their views, they are hardly what would be known as hard line conservatives.

There has been some implication that this group controlling Nosenko was a very hard line group. I don't know whether you want to comment on what your political views are.

Mr. D. C. Oh, yes, I would welcome that. Insofar as the tradition, family and otherwise, it certainly has been liberal indeed.

My line of work has kept me apart from active political life in the United States, so I haven't identified myself in any way. But, I would certainly consider myself very strongly middle of the road.

Then we came to the whole question of being anti-Soviet or not. To say that I am hard line anti-Soviet, anti-KGB, anti—well, that is enough—Soviet and KGB I most assuredly am. I think—I make remarks here which I think even looking at them now seem fairly firm about what the KGB is up to in terms of deception and subversion.

I have been exposed to the people who are doing it for a very long time, and none of them has ever given any other view of what the KGB is up to. That is just as much 1978 as 1962 or 1958 or 1952, before the death of Stalin. Nothing has changed the basic thrust of the KGB's work against this country.

I found it tremendously rewarding as a career to be able to focus on what was very clearly the enemy of our country—outside enemy of our country—rather than some of these Third World things which have caused such, well, really confusion in the motivation of some of the men that have had to work with them.

I consider not that I would have been—I might have shared some of these feelings, and I might have taken—might have fallen on either side of the fence in those operations where we were supporting a government or a political party in certain Third World areas.

I don't know how I would have felt about it because I didn't have to. So, I consider myself more lucky than anything else to have avoided that. But certainly the group who were exposed to KGB officers day in and day out, whether as adversaries or as defectors, are extremely anti-Soviet.

I believe, by the way, that that permits me to be in American political terms a liberal.

Mr. PREYER. Yes, I think Mr. Moynihan and Ben Wattenberg and a number of people of that sort would agree with you on that.

Did you ever talk to Mr. Epstein?

Mr. D. C. Yes.

Mr. PREYER. About his book?

Mr. D. C. Yes. Mr. Epstein has made that clear publicly and I think there are certain things in the book which make that clear, too.

Mr. Epstein got from others the basic outlines of the Nosenko story, and then made an approach to me, and I of course refused to talk to him.

Later he came back, a few months later, and with a long letter telling me some of the things he knew, which were things which I would never have thought could have gotten into the public domain. At which point I did accept to see him and he, without my saying a word, exposed exactly what he had and what he was doing and showed me what he was going to write, which was in its broad lines the general story of the Nosenko case and in its details full of confusion and inaccuracies.

So, the primary help that I gave to Mr. Epstein on that book was to insure that at least the errors were not in there, and that this book,

which was going to be the first time that the Nosenko story was going to become public, that at least there would not be egregious errors. There are some errors of emphasis which Mr. Fithian has pointed out, which I happen to agree with. But that is entirely Mr. Epstein's business, how he chooses to interpret what he hears.

Several of the things are wrong, and I gather they have even been accepted by the CIA. For example, Mr. Epstein insisted that there was some sort of a cleansing, of purposeful cleansing of the Soviet operations of the CIA, and people like myself and the chief of the Soviet division were got rid of.

I explained to him at the time, I said I didn't think that should get into his book because that was incorrect. I told him how I had gotten my assignment abroad, and how I justified my leaving my headquarters position.

I happen to know the way in which the chief of the division got his overseas assignment. It had nothing to do with any such plot.

I think in retrospect that we would have both done better to stay here and be purged, if purging was in the mill. In fact, it did, our assignments abroad did occur in the normal course of events. Mr. Epstein put it different.

There are two or three things like that, interpretations which I most assuredly don't share. But the facts that Mr. Epstein has in the book are generally accurate.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you.

Mr. Fithian?

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. D. C., do you think that the CIA did all it could to cooperate with the Warren Commission?

Mr. D. C. Yes, I do, because—my exposure to it was by the way a minor one. I think—I know—on one of these occasions—it hasn't emerged in the record, and perhaps it will, but I thought I had actually gone over once with Mr. Helms to the Commission.

It was at a time when Mr. Helms was making a statement—when Mr. Helms was telling—I think it is one of these things that has come out in all this testimony. My exposure to it was practically nil. I don't know, but the impression I get is that every effort within the agency, in every corner of the agency was to dig out everything we could that could possibly help the Warren Commission in its job.

I am absolutely convinced of that. But I do stress that I am not in a position to judge because it was the counterintelligence staff that centralized the activity and all. But I know that our people dug, and dug, and dug.

For example, in my section at the time, an officer went—we thought what can we do, how can we use the files of the CIA to contribute in any way. We decided to have a look at the photograph file of the agency, which is a rather extensive thing, and see just what Minsk looked like, and what we could see, the places that were in Oswald's life, in Oswald's background.

It was a member of my section who dredged up, out of files of the CIA, a tourist picture which showed Oswald in front of I believe the opera house. It was one of those columned buildings. There was a tourist group, and there was Oswald.

This fellow came up to me and said, look, I have been looking through pictures of Minsk and doesn't this look funny to you, and showed me this picture, and that was him.

That document, of course, is a part of the Warren Commission report. In other words, we were doing everything we could think of to do to help the Warren Commission. Absolutely good faith.

Mr. FITHIAN. I am curious. At the very outset Nosenko appears to be a fraud—that is pretty harsh, but I will let it stand. Assuming that was your interpretation, assuming you didn't get anything to persuade you that you were wrong, isn't 5 years¹ a long investment in somebody that you thought was a fraud?

Mr. D. C. What do you mean by investment, Mr. Fithian?

Mr. FITHIAN. Time, money, resources, commitment.

Mr. D. C. No, sir, for what that meant, that case is potentially the most important and the most interesting operation possible, because as I say the implications underlying it—had we been able to prove, which we never were—we were certainly able to give operational indications and enough to draw—operational conclusions at least as a basis for further activity or investigations. But we were not able to prove that this man was a sent KGB agent.

Had we proved it, all of those implications would have come to the surface and would have been investigated, and I think the security of the United States would have been the better for it. So, I don't think this investment was too great.

By 5 years, you are presumably—

Mr. FITHIAN. Is that longer than you worked with any other defector?

Mr. D. C. Well, it is absolutely unique in the sense that there was no other defector that we gave either that much attention to or that type of attention to.

Mr. FITHIAN. But you concluded, didn't you, that he really wasn't a very important person in the KGB?

Mr. D. C. I conclude that he may never have served properly within the KGB. That he was sent by the KGB to pose as a KGB agent there is no doubt. He is not a fabricator; he is not somebody who pretends to be just on his own. He had detailed knowledge of KGB operations, which he claimed to have been part of his knowledge as an officer.

Mr. FITHIAN. Is he the only person in your whole span that falls in that category?

Mr. D. C. No, sir.

Mr. FITHIAN. That is, he was sent by the KGB?

Mr. D. C. No, sir, he is not.

Mr. FITHIAN. Well, then I kind of repeat, if that is your conclusion, and if you thought him designed to mislead you to start with, you still don't think that much investment of time and resources and so forth is—

Mr. D. C. No, very much not so.

If you know the man or you can make the operational assumption that the man is being sent against you, as we just have for purposes

¹ 1962-67.

of this discussion, you can read it in reverse and find out what really lies behind this mission of the KGB.

Those indications are very, very interesting. They are as good as a look inside the KGB files.

By the way, I won't digress here for very long, but I do want to give you an example to illustrate my answer.

Mr. D. C. In the invasion of Normandy, 1944, there was a large, tremendous investment in deception by which the Germans were led to believe the main thrust of the invasion would fall on the Pas de Calais region instead of Normandy. Under General Patton an invasion unit was set up. All the radio communications which would accompany an army group was set up in trying to fool the Germans in making them think there was a group there. There were landing craft much too far away to participate in the Normandy invasion. The result was the Germans were fooled and when the invasion struck in Normandy, I believe it was the 17 German army groups were held at Pas de Calais because the Germans believed the Normandy invasion was a diversion. They held the force there and as you know, the landing was nip and tuck for 4 days. Had that German force in the north been able to be present at the landing beaches, it's possible the invasion would have failed.

The problem is, had the deception been known to the Germans as a deception, it would have told them that first of all, the 1st U.S. Army group doesn't exist, and second, that the diversion was toward the Pas de Calais to the north, and there was only one other place for the invasion, and that was Normandy.

In other words, the perception of the allied deception would have been a spectacular piece of intelligence for the Germans. I don't necessarily want to put this thing on the same scale as Normandy, but it has all the same effect. If a perception is perceived it can be turned against the deceiver, and that is, in my opinion, what we did so long as we made the operating assumption Nosenko was sent. In other words, I do believe it was a valuable expenditure of time.

Mr. FITHIAN. You think the mistake to depart from that interpretation was a serious one?

Mr. D. C. Very. More important in terms of lost opportunities than the things I speak about in my prepared testimony about the exposure of personnel to him. I think it's bad enough to bring him onto the premises and let him talk to counterintelligence trainees. I think it a very bad mistake to let him talk to our foreign liaison officials without informing them there is a body of evidence suggesting he is no good. I don't know exactly what they are doing, but in Mr. Helms' testimony I found an indication, a statement that he was of value to current counterintelligence investigations. It suggests to me that current information, current activities are being exposed to him. I think that is a mistake.

Mr. FITHIAN. You say in your letter to the committee, in a paragraph you say if Nosenko is a KGB plant there can be no doubt that Nosenko's recited story about Oswald and the U.S.S.R. is a message from the KGB. Then you say by sending out such a message, the KGB exposes the fact it has something to hide.

As Mr. Helms told you, that something may be the fact that Oswald may be an agent of the KGB.

Do you have an opinion, and if so will you provide the basis for your opinion on two things: (1) The likelihood of that; and (2) I am struck by the use of the word "fact"—that conveys to me a very strong impression.

Mr. D. C. That was probably not the very best word I could have chosen. It was meant to be softened by the verb, which was "may"—one of these messages "may" have been the fact that. It was not meant it was a statement of fact. It just follows—perhaps I can put that more felicitously by saying it would hide the possibility—instead of saying the operation would hide the fact, say the message hides the possibility that this man is or could have been a Soviet agent. By a "Soviet agent" I don't mean a Soviet assassination agent. I mean something quite different.

Mr. FITHIAN. I was just asked by Congressman Dodd's staff to follow up on this whether or not you would rule out the possibility that even though the KGB had nothing to do with the assassination that they would spend this kind of energy or effort personally to convince us they had nothing to do with it.

Mr. D. C. I think it entirely conceivable. If you accept the hypothesis, the supposition, the speculation that in fact they had something to hide and that something might have been perhaps he had a code name, perhaps he was a sleeper agent, they obviously couldn't expect as much from him coming back to the United States with a Soviet wife, they couldn't expect him to be elected President, but at the same time, they may have said, "We will get in touch with you in time of war," or they may have recruited him by saying, "We will get in touch with you by the following procedures." This is pure speculation.

But then if he is on their rolls as a sleeper agent or for wartime sabotage or something of that sort, they would be absolutely shocked to hear their man had taken it upon himself to kill the American President. I would think their reaction could very well be of the sort you suggest. They might indeed change the mission of another man of another operation in order to get this message over to us that they really had nothing to do with it.

The only thing I am quite sure of, I don't want to tell you what I think is behind us, because I really don't know, but I am quite sure of one thing, and that is that it's not true. That's all, it's not true; they didn't speak to him, that the KGB didn't speak to Oswald in the Soviet Union, that is not true, by all logic, by everything we know. I can't prove that, and I am not making that as a statement of hard fact, but certainly within the framework of my knowledge of the Soviet Union and the KGB it is not true.

Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, you will be happy to know I only have two more questions.

Mr. Hart says rather flat out that there was a direct conflict between the two agencies as to interpretation of whether or not Nosenko was bona fide. He indicates the FBI thought Nosenko was bona fide when he arrived and that the CIA assumed he was a plant when he arrived. Is that accurate?

Mr. D. C. Again, I don't like the word "assumed," but changing that word "assumed" to "suspected" I would certainly say yes.

Now I don't know the FBI part of it, either. They had no basis to make such a judgment and they had no stake in it, as far as I can tell. They had a source coming here who had told them about a few Americans who had been recruited as tourists in the Soviet Union. He had a good knowledge as to how the Soviet Union recruited tourists who have been useful to the FBI. But they didn't get into as many fields as we did because Nosenko was a Moscow-based officer.

Mr. FITHIAN. One other question. Is it totally unreasonable to speculate that the Agency might be in the process of leading Nosenko on at this point, using him even now to pass false information along to the Soviets?

Mr. D. C. May I ask your third word there, I think you said "totally"—

Mr. FITHIAN. "Totally unreasonable."

Mr. D. C. Totally excluded, no, it's not totally excluded because I don't know. I have not been in the Agency and such people within the Agency who have talked with him make me believe it's not so.

Mr. FITHIAN. I was trying to look for other alternatives for the Agency to bristle so intensely as to send over Mr. Hart and sort of throw up the smokescreen and get the Agency in the worst possible light as far as the newspapers are concerned. The whole scenario is so totally unthinkable that I am puzzled.

Mr. D. C. The only thing I can say is if they were working on the basis of a hypothesis or knowledge which is most concretely and specifically represented by myself, it would seem to me not terribly unreasonable to let me know that instead of doing what they did to me here.

Therefore, all my instincts tell me that isn't it at all.

Mr. FITHIAN. You might be expendable?

Mr. D. C. Yes, but they must get some use out of me before they dispose of me.

Mr. FITHIAN. On page 39 of your testimony I would like for you to look at that again. This is my last point, Mr. Chairman.

Down at the last full paragraph, which starts with "However," skipping the first part and dropping down to "Mr. Hart and Admiral Turner may frivolously dismiss them as they have done before your committee but the doubts are still there and it's irresponsible to expose clandestine personnel to this individual."

The doubts you refer to are the doubts about Nosenko's authenticity.

I guess my question is, do you want to close out the record standing by that statement?

Mr. D. C. Well, I must admit your calling attention to that—is it the word "frivolously"?

Mr. FITHIAN. Both the words "frivolously dismiss them" and the subordinate charge that they are acting frivolously.

Mr. D. C. I would be happy because of the emotions involved in the word to retract the word "frivolously." Quite happy. But I suppose it has come through my testimony and what I have said in answer to your questions that I find the use of this man, the positive use of this man vis-a-vis innocents, such as trainees, terribly bothersome.

I know—I don't think—I know that the people who are exposed to Nosenko in counterintelligence training are not told—they know there was doubt, but they are being specifically told, as Admiral Turner pointed out in a memo and as Mr. Hart has indicated here, was the work of halfwits. If this man is a Soviet agent and has a mission for the KGB in this country, it's a poor way to have some young man begin his career, to be exposed to him.

Mr. FITHIAN. In an irresponsible way? I am getting to the tremendous charge involved in this paragraph.

Mr. D. C. I appreciate your concern about that and of course to the contrary I think you are being—Mr. Fithian, and may I ask you for a word, because I think you have offered me an opportunity to withdraw my word from the testimony and I'm certainly not going to say no. Knowing now exactly what I meant by that, can you think of—perhaps “I think it wrong to expose”—perhaps that should be the phraseology there.

Mr. FITHIAN. I hate to put words in your mouth, but Mr. Hart and Admiral Turner may dismiss them. To say “frivolously dismiss them” might do the admiral injustice here. Maybe Mr. Hart's statement before the committee may well constitute, you know, frivolous treatment or something; I was pretty provoked by it myself.

Then the second, that it's irresponsible—it's an error to expose.

Mr. D. C. I very definitely will withdraw the word “irresponsible.”

Mr. FITHIAN. That is in my reading such a terribly serious charge against the director—

Mr. D. C. I accept your comment with appreciation.

Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, I have no further comments. I would like to say this: I enormously appreciate your witness' time and patience with us in this matter. I think it has been just to me, as an individual Member of the House, just tremendously helpful, perhaps one of the better days I have had on the committee.

Mr. D. C. Thank you.

Mr. PREYER. I might just ask one more question which might be more a comment.

You raise the question of what the explanation of Mr. Hart's testimony was, Mr. Fithian, that where we seem to get a minimum amount of information about Lee Harvey Oswald, which is what we were after, and a maximum amount as to Mr. Nosenko's bona fide in a wide intelligence sense, would one explanation be, could it be it was simply the CIA's answer to Mr. Epstein's book, which was current at the time, very much in the news, and in that book, you are left with the thought there is a mole in the CIA?

If you accept Mr. Epstein's thinking, they may have thought it worth a little bad publicity temporarily if it would kill the idea there was a possible mole in the CIA?

Mr. D. C. I would say no one I have talked to has had that reaction to what Mr. Hart did. But on the contrary they are aghast and confused by it. I don't think it laid anything to rest. Now, it could very well have been the motive. I have even looked at the motive of their, in a sense, punishing me for having helped Mr. Epstein. I have used the analogy of somebody using a blow on the head, shoots himself in the foot. I don't believe they have helped their cause very much by this sort of reaction.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Klein, do you have any further questions?

Mr. KLEIN. No; I don't, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. D. C., when a witness has concluded his testimony, under our rules, he is entitled to make a statement for 5 minutes on any subject that may have come up that he wishes to clarify or anything further he wishes to say. If there is anything further you wish to add at this point, we will recognize you for 5 minutes for that purpose.

Mr. D. C. Well, Mr. Fithian has made a kind remark and I would like to reciprocate, not as a reciprocation but from the beginning of your work, I got hold of both Mr. Hart's testimony and the staff's work and was deeply impressed with the quality of the work of the committee. I have today been treated with immense courtesy and interest and knowing full well at your regular schedule, at a time when you are pressed with some other things, not the least being the King matter, I am awed, impressed, and deeply appreciative that you should have given me the time.

As you know, I wanted to come and answer those charges, but I also wanted to make some points which I felt important which I do think are pertinent to your mission.

Nevertheless, whether they are or not, you have received me with great courtesy and I appreciate it enormously.

Mr. PREYER. Your testimony has been helpful and your testimony can add to our knowledge in this area. We appreciate your being here.

If there is nothing further, the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Annabelle Short, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me in shorthand to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Annabelle Short
Notary Public in and for
the District of Columbia

My Commission expires
November 14, 1980



THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Congressional Research Service

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY:
AN ALPHABETICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Suzanne Cavanagh
Analyst in American National Government
Government Division
and
Sherry Shapiro
Bibliographer in Government and American Law
Library Services Division
March 28, 1979

FOREWORD

This comprehensive bibliography consists of every relevant book citation that could be found in the Library's card catalog and Books in Print. Periodical literature was identified (and selectively included) from the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature; Public Affairs Information Service (P.A.I.S.); International Social Science and Humanities Index; America: History and Life; Social Science Citation Index; Magazine Index; Psychology Abstracts; Sociological Abstracts; Comprehensive Dissertation Abstracts; and the CRS's Bibliographic Citation File. Some of the noted periodical sources are from computerized, on-line data bases external to the Library of Congress.

Other sources referred to in compiling the bibliography were: The Kennedy Assassination and the Warren Report; Selected References, by Richard Malow which is a CRS multilith report, GGR-119, published Sept. 23, 1966 (6 p.); American Political Assassinations; A Bibliography of Works Published 1963-1970 related to the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Robert F. Kennedy, [in pamphlet form] compiled by the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, with a forward by Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., 927 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C.; 1973, 28 p. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1917-1963; A Chronological List of References, [in pamphlet form] by the Bibliography and Reference Correspondence Section of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1964, 68 p. and also, under the same title, a supplement [in monograph form] of, principally, monographs, by William J. Studer which was published by the Library of Congress in 1964 (25 p.); and the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Moves to Reopen the Investigation, by Donald A. Baskerville which appears in the Library of Congress Information Bulletin of December 3, 1976. (6 p., 752-757).

Credit is due the following people who assisted in the compilation of this bibliography: Sarah Collins, Nancy Fitch, Karen Keesling, Steve Langone, and Daniel Strickland. Jeffrey C. Griffith in CRS's Information Systems Section was instrumental in the retrieval of citations from on-line data bases external to the Library of Congress.

Credit is due Robert Amorosi, Linda Bailey, Martha Schweitzer, Cheryl Scott, Lillie Thompson, and Sandra Wallace for the secretarial production of the bibliography.



The Library of Congress

Congressional Research Service

Washington, D.C. 20540

THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY: AN ALPHABETICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Accused. *Time*, v. 82, Nov. 29, 1963: 27-28.
AP2.T37, v. 82
2. Acoca, Miguel, and Robert Brown. The Bayo-Pawley affair--a plot to destroy JFK and invade Cuba. Soldier of fortune, spring 1976: 12-22, 60-61. [Not in L.C. collection]
3. The Actual voices and events of four days that shocked the world, Nov. 22, 23, 24, 25, 1963; the complete story. (Phonodisc.) Colpix Records, CP 2500, 1964. R65-1928
4. Adams, Perry, and Fred T. Newcomb. Murder from within. Santa Barbara, Cal., Probe, 1974. 423 p. E842.9.N44
5. Adler, Bill, comp. The weight of the evidence, the Warren report and its critics, edited by Jay David. New York, Meredith Press, 1968. 303 p. E842.9.A68
6. After the tragedy. *Tablet*, v. 217, Nov. 30, 1963: 1181-1182. [Not in L.C. collection]
7. Aftermath of the Warren report. *Broadcasting*, v. 67, Oct. 5, 1964: 50. TK6540.B85, v. 67
8. Again the assassination. *Newsweek*, v. 68, Aug. 15, 1966: 30-33. AP2.N6772, v. 68
9. Agee, Phillip. Inside the company--CIA diary. New York, Stonehill Publishing Co., 1975. 639 p. JK468.I6.A75 1975b
10. Agony relived; second installment of the death of a President. *Time*, v. 89, Jan. 27, 1967: 58. AP2.T37, v. 89
11. Ahler, James G., and Joseph B. Tamney. Some functions of religious ritual in catastrophe: Kennedy assassination. *Sociological analysis*, v. 25, winter 1964: 212-230. HN51.A7, v. 25
12. All the elements. *Newsweek*, v. 73, Mar. 10, 1969: 364. AP2.N6772, v. 73

13. An almanac of Jim Garrison's investigation into the assassination of John F. Kennedy; the crime of silence. Austin, Tex., Research Publications, 1968. 22 p. E842.9.A7
14. Alsop, Stewart. Johnson takes over. Saturday evening post, v. 237, Feb. 15, 1964: 17-23. AP2.S2, v. 237
15. American Broadcasting Company. November 22, 1963. (Phonodisc.) New York, 1963. Matrix no. ABC-JFK A-D. R64-106
16. American condition. Nation, v. 197, Dec. 21, 1963: 425. AP2.N2, v. 197
17. Amrine, Michael. This awesome challenge. New York, Putnam, 1964. 283 p. E846.A6
18. Andronov, Iona. On the trail of a President's killer. New times (Moscow), v. 1, Jan. 1977: 27-30; v. 2, Jan. 1977: 26-30; v. 3 Jan. 1977: 27-30. D839.N483 1977
19. Another assassination attempt by Lee Oswald? U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 16, 1963: 8. JK1.U65, v. 55
20. Anniversary of an assassination. Reconstructionist, v. 30, Nov. 27, 1964: 6. DS133.R4, v. 30
21. Ansbacher, Heinz, Rowena R. Ansbacher, David Shiverick, and Kathleen Shiverick. Lee Harvey Oswald: an Adlerian interpretation. Psychoanalytic review, v. 53, fall 1966: 55-68. BF1.P5, v. 53
22. Anson, Robert Sam. The greatest cover-up of all. New times (New York), v. 4, Apr. 18, 1975: 16-29. E169.12.N45, v. 4
23. ----- Jack, Judy, Sam and Johnny...and Frank, Fidel, Edgar... New times (New York), v. 6, Jan. 23, 1976: 21-23, 27-30, 32-33. E169.12.N45, v. 6
24. Anson, Robert Sam. The man who never was. New times (New York), v. 5, Sept. 19, 1975: 14-16, 21-25. E169.12.N45, v. 5
25. ----- They've killed the President: the search for the murderers of John F. Kennedy. New York, Bantam Books, 1975. 408 p. E842.9.A74

26. Any number can play: question of whether the assassination was the work of one man. *Newsweek*, v. 68, Nov. 7, 1966: 37-38.
AP2.N6772, v. 68
27. Appelbaum, Stephen A. The Kennedy assassination. *Psychoanalytic review*, v. 53, fall 1966: 69-80. *BF1.P5*, v. 53
28. Are there new leads? *Newsweek*, v. 89, Apr. 11, 1977: 32-33.
AP2.N6772, v. 89
29. Arnoni, M. S. Garrison and Warren, anything in common? *Minority of one*, v. 9, Oct. 1967: 11-12. *AP2.M55985*, v. 9
30. As the book appears: a close look at the facts; concerning The death of a President by W. Manchester. *U.S. news and world report*, v. 62, Jan. 23, 1967: 50-52. *JK1.U65*, v. 62
31. As Warren inquiry starts; latest on the assassination. *U.S. news and world report*, v. 55, Dec. 30, 1963: 28-30.
JK1.U65, v. 55
32. Asbell, B. 10 years later: a legacy of torment haunts those closest to the JFK assassination. *Today's health*, v. 51, Oct. 1973: 56-60, 62-63, 65. *RA421.T6*, v. 51
33. Ascoli, M. Interim reflections. *Reporter*, v. 31, Oct. 22, 1964: 12.
D839.R385, v. 31
34. Ashman, Charles. The CIA-mafia link. New York, Manor Books, Inc., 1975. *Registration no. A679827*
Copyright Office
35. Assassination. *Newsweek*, v. 64, Oct. 5, 1964: 32-40, 45-52, 57-60, 62-64. *AP2.N6772*, v. 64
36. The Assassination: a nonentity for history. *Time*, v. 89, Jan. 13, 1967: 16-17. *AP2.T37*, v. 89
37. Assassination, as the plot unfolds: case against Oswald: how the President was shot. *U.S. news and world report*, v. 55, Dec. 9, 1963: 68-71. *JK1.U65*, v. 55
38. Assassination-behind moves to reopen JFK case. *U.S. news and world report*, v. 78, Jan. 2, 1975: 30-33.
JK1.U65, v. 78

39. Assassination gives impetus to Dodd's gun bill. Advertising age, v. 34, Dec. 2, 1963: 1-2. HF5801.A276, v. 34
40. Assassination: now a suicide talks. Time, v. 109, Apr. 11, 1977: 20. AP2.T37, v. 109
41. Assassination of John F. Kennedy. (Motion Picture) Thorne Films, 1971. E842.9
42. The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. [Coverage of Soviet newspapers, Nov. 22-28, 1963] Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 15, Dec. 11, 1963: 3-15. D839.C87, v. 15
43. The Assassination of President Kennedy. East Europe, v. 13, Jan. 1964: 25-26. DR1.N363, v. 13
44. Assassination of President Kennedy; with report by T. H. White. Life, v. 55, Nov. 29, 1963: 22-32. AP2.L547, v. 55
45. Assassination syndrome fits Lee Oswald. Science, v. 90, Sept. 24, 1966: 229. Q1.S35, v. 90
46. The Assassination: the reporter's story; what was seen and read; television, newspapers, magazines; journalism's role: unresolved issues. Columbia journalism review, v. 11, winter 1964: 5-31. PN4700.C64, v. 11
47. Assassination: the trail to a verdict; with report by G. R. Ford. Life, v. 57, Oct. 2, 1964: 40-50B. AP2.L547, v. 57
48. The Assassination: the Warren report. Newsweek, v. 64, Oct. 5, 1964: 32-40, 45-52, 57-60, 63-64. AP2.N6772, v. 64
49. Associated Press. The torch is passed; the Associated Press story of the death of a President. [New York] 1963. 99 p. E842.9.A85
50. Attorney for Oswald. Time, v. 83, Mar. 6, 1964: 47. AP2.T37, v. 83
51. Autopsy. Time, v. 82, Dec. 27, 1963: 18. AP2.T37, v. 82

52. Autry, James A. The Garrison investigation: how and why it began. New Orleans, v. 1, Apr. 1967: 8, 50-51.
F399.N5, v. 1
53. Awful interval. Newsweek, v. 63, Jan. 6, 1964: 19-20.
AP2.N6772, v. 63
54. Aynesworth, Hugh. JFK conspiracy: J. Garrison's investigation of a plot to kill J. F. Kennedy. Newsweek, v. 69, May 15, 1967: 36, 38, 40.
AP2.N6772, v. 69
55. Back, Kurt, and Judith Saravay. From bright ideas to social research: the studies of the Kennedy assassination. Public opinion quarterly, v. 31, summer 1967: 253-264.
HM261.A1.P8, v. 31
56. Back of the secrecy in the assassination probe. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Feb. 24, 1964: 52.
JK1.U65, v. 56
57. Back to Dallas; theories of J. Thompson and J. Connally. Time, v. 90, Nov. 24, 1967: 54-55.
AP2.T37, v. 90
58. Bagdikian, B. H. Assassin. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 22-27.
AP2.S2, v. 236
59. Baker, Dean C. The assassination of President Kennedy; a study of the press coverage. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Dept. of Journalism [1965] 45 p.
E842.9.B3
60. Banned in Moscow: Warren Commission report. Newsweek, v. 68, Sept. 12, 1966: 40.
AP2.N6772, v. 68
61. Banta, Thomas J. The Kennedy assassination: early thoughts and emotions. Public opinion quarterly, v. 28, summer 1964: 216-224.
HM261.A1.P8, v. 28
62. Baskerville, Donald A., comp. The assassination of President John F. Kennedy: moves to reopen the investigation; a selected list of references. Library of Congress information bulletin, v. 35, Dec. 3, 1976: 752-757.
Z733.V57.I6, v. 35
63. Bedford, Subille. Verdict on Jack Ruby. Life, v. 53, Mar. 27, 1963: 32-34, 34B, 70A-71, 79.
AP2.L547, v. 53

64. Behind the move to reopen JFK case. U.S. news and world report, v. 79, Sept. 15, 1975: 21. JK1.U65, v. 79
65. Belin, David W. Truth was my only goal. Texas observer, v. 63, Aug. 13, 1971: 13-15. F381.T368, v. 63
66. Belin, David W. Nov. 22, 1963; you are the jury. New York, Quadrangle, 1973. 521 p. E842.9.B44
67. ----- They've killed the President. National review, v. 28, Feb. 6, 1976: 81-85, 88-90. AP2.N3545, v. 28
68. Belli, Melvin M., and M. C. Carroll. Dallas justice; the real story of Jack Ruby and his trial. New York, McKay [1964] 298 p. KF224.R8.B44
69. Berendt, John. If they've found another assassin, let them name names and produce their evidence. Esquire, v. 68, Aug. 1967: 80-82. AP2.E845, v. 68
70. Berkeley, Edmund C. The assassination of President Kennedy: the pattern of coup d'etat and public deception. Computers and automation, v. 20, Nov. 1971: 24-26, 29-30, 48. TJ212.C58, v. 20
71. Berkeley, Edmund C., and Richard E. Sprague. The attempted framing of Jim Garrison. Computers and automation, v. 22, Dec. 1973: 23-29. TJ212.C58, v. 22
72. Bernert, Phillippe, and Camille Gilles. The Frenchman who was to kill Kennedy. Computers and automation, v. 22, Jan. 1973: 37-40. TJ212.C58, v. 22
73. Bethell, Tom. Earl Warren: on the mob's payroll? Washington monthly, v. 8, Mar. 1976: 35-46. E838.W37, v. 8
74. ----- Was Sirhan Sirhan on the grassy knoll. Washington monthly, v. 7, Mar. 1975: 31-39. E838.W37, v. 7
75. Between two fires: Mrs. Oswald's testimony to Warren Commission. Time, v. 83, Feb. 14, 1964: 16-20. AP2.T37, v. 83
76. Bickel, Alexander M. CBS on the Warren report. New republic, v. 157, July 15, 1967: 29-30. AP2.N624, v. 157

77. Bickel, Alexander M. Failure of the Warren report. Commentary, v. 43, Apr. 1967: 23-26. DS101.C63, v. 43
78. ----- Leo Sauvage and the Warren Commission. New leader, v. 49, Nov. 21, 1966: 19-21. HX1.N37, v. 49
79. ----- Reexamining the Warren report. New republic, v. 156, Jan. 7, 1967: 25-28. AP2.N624, v. 156
80. ----- Return to Dallas. New republic, v. 157, Dec. 23, 1967: 34. AP2.N624, v. 157
81. Big sale; exclusive photos for Life. Newsweek, v. 63, Mar. 2, 1964: 80. AP2.N6772, v. 63
82. Biller, Owen A. Suicide related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Suicide and life threatening behavior, v. 7, spring 1977: 40-44. RC574.L54, v. 7
83. Bishop, James Alonzo. The day Kennedy was shot. New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1968. 713 p. E842.9.B5
84. ----- Day in the life of President Kennedy. New York, Random House [1964] 108 p. E842.B5
85. ----- The end of Camelot. Ladies home journal, v. 90, Nov. 1973: 77. AP2.L135, v. 90
86. Biskind, Peter. The FBI's secret soldiers. New times (New York), v. 6, Jan. 9, 1976: 18, 21-25. E169.12.N45, v. 6
87. Bloom tells his public relations role in Ruby case. Editor and publisher, v. 96, Feb. 1, 1964: 58. PN4700.E4, v. 96
88. Bloomgarden Henry S. The gun: a biography of the gun that killed John F. Kennedy. New York, Grossman Publishers, 1975. 152 p. HV8059.B55 1975
89. Blumberg, Rae Lesser, Samuel A. Mueller, Suzanne E. Rocheleau, and Joyce A. Sween [Northwestern Assassination Research Group] Reactions to the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; a preliminary report. [Evanston, Ill.] Northwestern University, c1969. 1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.N67

90. Blumenthal, Sid, and R. D. Rosen. The politics of conspiracy, the conspiracy of politics. Computers and people, v. 24, Apr. 1975: 24-26, 31. TJ212.C58, v. 24
91. Blumenthal, Sid, and Harvey Yazijian, eds. Government by gunplay: assassination conspiracy theories from Dallas to today. New York, New American Library, 1976. 266 p. E842.9.G65
92. Boeth, R., and others. JFK: what the FBI found. Newsweek, v. 90, Dec. 19, 1977: 28. AP2.N6772, v. 90
93. Bonjean, Charles M., Richard J. Hill, and Harry W. Martin. Reactions to the assassination by sex and social class. Southwest Sociology Association, v. 15, 1965: 21-37. [Not in L.C. collection]
94. Bonner, Judy Whitson. Investigation of a homicide; the murder of John F. Kennedy. Anderson, S.C., Droke House, 1969. 367 p. E842.9.B6
95. Bonsal, Philip. Cuba, Castro, and the United States. Foreign affairs, v. 45, Jan. 1967: 260-276. D410.F6, v. 45
96. Bonventre, P., and others. Opening the JFK file: FBI file. Newsweek, v. 90, Dec. 12, 1977: 34-35. AP2.N6772, v. 90
97. Bourbon street rococo; J. Garrison's investigation. Time, v. 89, Mar. 3, 1967: 26. AP2.T37, v. 89
98. Bowser, Hallowell. The perils of hasty history. Saturday review, v. 49, Dec. 31, 1966: 14. AP2.S273, v. 49
99. Braden, Tom. What's wrong with the CIA. Saturday review, v. 2, Apr. 5, 1975: 14-18. AP2.S273, v. 2
100. Branch, Taylor, and George Crile, III. Kennedy vendetta. Harper's, v. 251, Aug. 1975: 49-63. AP2.H3, v. 251
101. Brave little woman, M. Oswald before Warren's investigating commission. Newsweek, v. 63, Feb. 17, 1964: 17. AP2.N6772, v. 63
102. Breig, Joe. Assassination of a people. Ave Maria, v. 98, Dec. 14, 1963: 10. AP2.A9, v. 98

103. ----- President Kennedy's death: why? Ave Maria, v. 99,
Jan. 11, 1964: 9. AP2.A9, v. 99
104. Brenner, Milton E. The Garrison case; a study in the abuse of
power. 1st ed. New York, C. N. Potter [1969] 278 p.
E842.9.B7 1969
105. Breslin, J. Death in emergency no. one: Parkland Memorial
Hospital. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963:
30-31. AP2.S2, v. 236
106. Bringuier, Carlos. Red Friday, Nov. 22nd, 1963. Chicago, C.
Hallberg [1969] 174 p. E842.9.B74
107. Brienberg, Mordecai. Riddle of Dallas. Spectator, v. 212,
Mar. 6, 1964: 305-306. AP4.S7, v. 212
108. Brigham, Robert. Russia: no, no, this cannot be true. Life,
v. 55, Dec. 6, 1963: 129-130. AP2.L547, v. 55
109. Brogan, Denis W. Death in Dallas. Myths after Kennedy.
Encounter (Great Britain), v. 23, no. 135, 1964: 20-26.
[Not in L.C. collection]
110. Brooks, Steward M. Our murdered Presidents: the medical story.
New York, Fredrick Fell, Inc., 1966. 234 p.
RD96.3.B7
111. Broyles, William. The man who saw too much. Texas monthly,
v. 4, Mar. 1976: 86, 88-89, 114-122. F381.T84, v. 4
112. Buchanan, Thomas G. Who killed Kennedy? New York, Putnam
[1964] 207 p. E842.9.B9 1964
113. Buckley, W. F., Jr. Do they really hate to hate? National
review, v. 15, Dec. 31, 1963: 559. AP2.N3545, v. 15
114. Butler, Ed. The great assassin puzzle. The Westwood village
square, v. 1, no. 2, 1968: 21-28; no. 1, 1969: 26-27, 37-41.
[Not in L.C. collection]
115. Butterfield, Roger. Assassination: some serious exceptions
to the Warren report. Harper's, v. 233, Oct. 1966: 122,
124-126. AP2.H3, v. 233

116. Cadden, Vivian, and Gerald Caplan. Lessons in bravery. McCalls, v. 95, Sept. 1968: 12, 85, 115. TT500.M2, v. 95
117. Callahan, Dr. John W. Did Jack Ruby kill the wrong man? Argosy, v. 365, Sept. 1967: 29, 96-101. AP2.A7, v. 365
118. Cameron, J. Humane and sane. Commonwealth, v. 79, Dec. 13, 1963: 338-339. AP2.C6897, v. 79
119. Campbell, A. What happened in Dallas? Concerning H. Weisberg and E. J. Epstein's theories on the Warren report. New republic, v. 154, June 25, 1966: 23-25. AP2.N624, v. 154
120. Campbell, Earl Vendryes. Kennedy's thoughts after he was shot. Bigfork, Minn., Northwoods, c1975. 44 p. E842.l.C35
121. Canfield, Michael, and Allan Weberman. Coup d'etat in America: the CIA and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. New York, The Third Press, Joseph Okpaky Publishing Co., Inc., 1975. 314 p. E842.9.C36
122. Caplan, Gerald, and Vivian Cadden. Lessons in bravery. McCall's, v. 95, Sept. 1968: 12, 85, 115. TT500.M2, v. 95
123. Carney, Frederick S. Crisis of conscience in Dallas: Soul-searching vs. new faith in Dallas. Thoughts on the day of the funeral by Tom F. Driver. Christianity and crisis, v. 23, Dec. 23, 1963: 235-241. BR1.C6417, v. 23
124. Carnival in New Orleans: Jim Garrison's investigation. Newsweek, v. 69, Mar. 6, 1967: 32. AP2.N6772, v. 69
125. Carr, Attorney General (Texas) Waggoner. Texas supplemental report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the serious wounding of Governor John B. Connally, November 22, 1963. Austin, Tx., Attorney General's Office, 1964. 20-1. E842.9.T45
126. Cartwright, Gary. Who was Jack Ruby? Texas monthly, v. 3, Nov. 1975: 82-86, 129-130, 132-134. F381T84, v. 3
127. Cartwright, H. L. Justice and Oswald. Nation, v. 197, Dec. 21, 1963: inside cover. AP2.N2, v. 197

128. Chambliss, Sanford. Who killed Jack Ruby? Real magazine, Apr. 1967: 40-42. TL789.F57
[Not in L.C. collection]
129. Chapman, Gil. Was Oswald alone? San Diego, Ca., Publishers Export Co., 1967. 160 p. E842.9.C47
130. Charge of conspiracy. Newsweek, v. 69, Apr. 3, 1967: 36-37. AP2.N6772, v. 69
131. Charged: a cover-up in Kennedy killing. U.S. news and world report, v. 81, July 5, 1976: 21. JK1.U65, v. 81
132. A Child's eye: November 22, 1963 (motion picture). Group VI Productions (released by Pathe Contemporary Films), 1968. 8 min. FIA68-671
133. And a Child's yellow flowers. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 36-37. AP2.N6772, v. 62
134. Chriss, Nicholas C., and Jerry Cohen. New Orleans: act one. Reporter, v. 36, Apr. 6, 1967: 17-20. D839.R385, v. 36
135. A Chronology of tragedy. Time and tide, v. 44, Nov. 28, 1963: 7-9. AP4.T445, v. 44
136. The CIA and the man who was not Oswald. New York review of books, v. 22, Apr. 3, 1975: 24-25. AP2.N655, v. 22
137. Ciardi, John. November 22, 1963. Saturday review, v. 46, Dec. 7, 1963: 16, 18. Z1219.S25, v. 46
138. ----- Of chaos and courage. Saturday review, Dec. 28, 1963: 25. Z1219.S25, v. 46
139. Clifford, G. Warren Report: a new boost for the Kennedy memorabilia industry. Maclean's magazine, v. 77, Nov. 2, 1964: 3. AP5.M2, v. 77
140. Clinch, Nancy Gager. The Kennedy neurosis - a psychological portrait of an American dynasty. New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1973. 433 p. E843.C54 1963
141. Cline, R. A. Postscript to Warren. Spectator, Jan. 27, 1967: 99. AP4.S7, v. 218
142. ----- Warren in the dock. Who killed Kennedy? Spectator, v. 217, Sept. 23, 1966: 371-372. AP4.S7, v. 217

143. The Cloak comes off. Newsweek, v. 85, June 23, 1975: 16-27.
AP2.N6772, v. 85
144. Closing in; Garrison's unofficial chief investigator quits.
Time, v. 90, July 7, 1967: 17. AP2.T37, v. 90
145. Cohen, Jacob. Conspiracy fever. Commentary, v. 60, Oct. 1975:
33-42. DS101.C63, v. 60
146. ----- The Warren Commission report and its critics. Frontier,
Nov. 1966: 5-20. F595.2.F7, v. 18
147. ----- What the Warren report omits: vital documents. Nation,
v. 203, July 11, 1966: 43-49. AP2.N2, v. 203
148. Cohen, Jeff. The Oswald tapes. Crawdaddy, Aug. 1975:
40-43. ML1.C926
149. Cohen, Jerry, and Nicholas C. Chriss. New Orleans: Act One.
Reporter, v. 36, Apr. 6, 1967: 17-20. D839.R385, v. 36
150. Cole, Alwyn. Assassin forger. Journal of forensic sciences,
v. 11, July 1966, 272-288. RA1001.A57, v. 11
151. Collective guilt in the U.S.? Take a look at the world: with
excerpts from address by Thruston B. Morton. U.S.
news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 1963: 72-74.
JK1.U65, v. 55
152. Collective or individual guilt. U.S. news and world report,
v. 55, Dec. 1963: 10. JK1.U65, v. 55
153. Committee to Investigate Assassinations. American political
assassinations: a bibliography of works published 1963-
1970 related to the assassination of John F. Kennedy,
Martin Luther King [and] Robert F. Kennedy. Washington,
1973. 26 p. Z8462.8.C65 1973
154. Compendium of curious coincidences; parallels in the lives
and deaths of A. Lincoln and J. F. Kennedy. Time,
v. 84, Aug. 21, 1964: 19. AP2.T37, v. 84
155. Condon, R. Manchurian candidate in Dallas. Nation, v. 197,
Dec. 28, 1963: 449-451. AP2.N2, v. 197
156. Confusion compounded. National review, v. 18, Oct. 18, 1966:
1032-1033. AP2.N3545, v. 18

157. Cook, Fred J. Irregulars take the field. Nation, v. 213,
July 19, 1971: 40-46. AP2.N2, v. 213
158. ----- Warren Commission report; some unanswered questions.
Nation, v. 202, June 13, 1966: 705-715. AP2.N2, v. 202
159. ----- Warren Commission report: testimony of the eyewitnesses.
Nation, v. 202, June 20, 1966: 737-746. AP2.N2, v. 202
160. ----- Warren report and the irreconcilables: theories of
Josiah Thompson and Sylvia Meagher. Nation, v. 206,
Feb. 26, 1968: 227-281. AP2.N2, v. 206
161. Cooke, Alistair. After the President's assassination.
Listener, v. 70, Dec. 5, 1963: 907-908. AP4.L4165, v. 70
162. ----- Death of the young warrior. Listener, v. 70, Nov. 28,
1963: 863-864. AP4.L4165, v. 70
163. Condon, Richard. Winter kills. New York, Dail Press, 1974.
304 p. PZ4.C746Wi
164. Cottrell, John. Assassination. The world stood still.
London, New English Library, 1964. 124 p.
E176.1.C795
165. Counsel for Oswald. U.S. news and world report, v. 48, Mar. 9,
1964: 16. JK1.U65, v. 48
166. Covering big Jim. Newsweek, v. 73, Mar. 17, 1969: 105.
AP2.N6772, v. 73
167. Covering the tragedy: news tragedy. Time, v. 82,
Nov. 29, 1963: 84. AP2.T37, v. 82
168. Crawford, K. Warren impeachers. Newsweek, v. 64
Oct. 19, 1964: 40. AP2.N6772, v. 64
169. Crawford, Kenneth. The enemies he made. Newsweek, v. 62,
Dec. 2, 1963: 35. AP2.N6672, v. 62
170. Crown, James T. The Kennedy literature: a bibliographical
essay on John F. Kennedy. New York, New York University
Press, 1968. 181 p. Z8462.8.C7

171. Curry, Jesse E. Retired Dallas police chief, Jesse Curry reveals his personal JFK assassination file. [Dallas, 1969] 133 p. E842.9.C78
172. Curtains for the DA; physicians examine photographs and X-rays. Newsweek, v. 73, Jan. 27, 1969: 27. AP2.N6772, v. 73
173. Cushman, Robert F. Why the Warren Commission? New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 477-503. Law
174. Cutler, Robert Bradley. Crossfire: evidence of conspiracy. Danvers, Mass. Betts's and Mirror Press, 1975. 99 p. E842.9.C74
175. ----- The flight of CE399: evidence of conspiracy by R. B. Cutler. Beverly, Mass., printed by Omni-Print, 1969. E842.9.C8
176. D.A. wins a round; Jim Garrison's investigation. Time, v. 89, Mar. 24, 1967: 17-18. AP2.T37, v. 89
177. Dahlin, Robert. Fresh wave of JFK assassination titles suggest a host of new theories. Publisher's weekly, v. 208, Dec. 1975: 50, 52. Z1219.P98, v. 208
178. Dallas: late casualty. Newsweek, v. 67, Feb. 28, 1966: 31-32. AP2.N6772, v. 67
179. Dallas: new questions and answers. Newsweek, v. 85, Apr. 28, 1975: 36-38. AP2.N6772, v. 85
180. Dallas rejoinder. Nation, v. 198, May 25, 1964: 519. AP2.N2, v. 198
181. Dallas revisited. Time, v. 93, Feb. 21, 1969: 18-19. AP2.T37, v. 93
182. Daniel, J. When Castro heard the news. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 7, 1963: 7-9. AP2.N624, v. 149
183. Daniel, P. Assessing the blame in the President's death: excerpts from addresses. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 14, 1963: 73. JK1.U65, v. 55
184. David, Jay, ed. The weight of the evidence; the Warren report and its critics, comp. by Bill Adler. New York, Meredith Press, 1968. 303 p. E842.9.A68

185. Day JFK died; excerpts from The day Kennedy was shot, by Jim Bishop. Ladies home journal, v. 85, Nov. 1968: 151-157.
AP2.L135, v. 85
186. The Day Kennedy died. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 20-26.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
187. Deadly iteration. Time, v. 93, Mar. 7, 1969: 22-23.
AP2.T37, v. 93
188. Death in Dallas. Reader's digest, v. 84, Jan. 1964: 39-44.
AP2.R255, v. 84
189. Death of a modern. Spectator, v. 211, Nov. 29, 1963: 681.
AP4.S7, v. 211
190. Death of a President. Commonweal, v. 79, Dec. 6, 1963: 299-301.
AP2.C6897, v. 79
191. Death of a President; excerpt from the introduction to annual report of the Librarian of Congress for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1964. Library journal, v. 90, Aug. 1965: 3173-3176.
Z671.L7, v. 90
192. Death of a President: the established facts. Atlantic monthly v. 215, Mar. 1965: 112-118.
AP2.A8, v. 215
193. Death of a President: told in direct testimony; excerpts. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, Dec. 7, 1964: 68-70.
JK1.U65, v. 57
194. Death of President Kennedy: statements by Sir Robert Menzies and Sir Garfield Barwick on 23rd November. Current notes on international affairs, Nov. 1963: 38-39.
[Not in L.C. collection]
195. Decade of unanswered questions. Ramparts, v. 12, Dec. 1973: 42-44.
AP2.R19, v. 12
196. Dee, Jay. Lee Oswald did not kill President Kennedy alone. 1st ed. Canoga Park, Calif., N.P., c1967. 49 p.
E842.9.D34
197. Deep and growing doubts questioning the verdict of the Warren Commission. Newsweek, v. 68, Oct. 10, 1966: 36, 41.
AP2.N6772, v. 68
198. Defiant defendant. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 24, 1969: 33.
AP2.N6772, v. 73

199. Deighton, Len, Michael Rand, and Howard Loxton, comps. The Assassination of President Kennedy. London, Cape [1967] 1 v.
E842.R32
200. Dellinger, David. Editorial: the Warren report...? Liberation,
v. 10, Mar. 1965: 3-5. E838.L5, v. 10
201. ----- The Warren report: the death of a President. Liberation,
v. 9, Jan. 1965: 11-12. E838.L5, v. 9
202. Demaris, Ovid, and Gary Willis. Disposal of Jack Ruby. Esquire,
v. 67, June 1967: 131-135, 172-174, 176-178, 180-184.
AP2.E845, v. 67
203. ----- Jack Ruby. New York, New American Library, 1968. 266 p.
E842.9.W47
204. Dempsey, David. Warren report in mass production. Saturday review,
v. 47, Nov. 7, 1964: 25, 38. Z1219.S25, v. 47
205. Denson, R. B. Destiny in Dallas: on the scene story in pictures.
Dallas, the author, 1964. 64 p. E842.9.D4
206. Did Church panel cover up for JFK? Human events, 7,
1975: 6. D410.H8, v. 35
207. Diehl, William F., Jr. The press: its actions and reactions.
New Orleans, v. 1, Apr. 7, 1967: 12-13, 52-53.
F379.N5, v. 1
208. Dies, Martin. Assassination and the aftermath. American opinion,
v. 7, Mar. 1964: 1-10; Apr. 1964: 33-40.
AP2.O4732, v. 7
209. Different look at Dallas. U.S. news and world report, v. 56,
Feb. 3, 1964: 42-46. JK1.U65, v. 56
210. Dimona, Joseph. Last man at Arlington. New York, Arthur Fields
Books [1973] 315 p. PZ4.D5835
211. Dirix, B. Why was JFK shot? Atlas, v. 13, May 1967: 10-13.

- AP1.A83, v. 13
 212. Disclose the evidence: call for new investigation. Nation, v. 221,
 Dec. 13, 1975: 611-612. AP2.N2, v. 221
213. The Documents. New republic, v. 173, Sept. 27, 1975: 12-48.
 AP2.N624, v. 173
214. Donovan, Robert J. The assassins. New York, Popular Library,
 1964. 254 p. HV6278.D6 1964
215. Dreifus, Claudia. Who stole John Kennedy's brains and other
 questions on the assassination of the President; an inter-
 view with Mark Lane. Playgirl, v. 3, Aug. 1975: 50-51, 58-59,
 80-81, 92, 100-101, 140-141. AP2.P695, v. 3
216. Drury, Michael, ed. Since that day in Dallas. McCall's,
 v. 91, Aug. 1964: 78-79, 141-142. TT500.M2, v. 91
217. Dryer, Ivan. The framing of Jim Garrison, Pt. 3. Computers
 and people, v. 23, Jan. 1974: 33-38. TJ212.C58, v. 23
218. DuBois, Larry, and Laurence Gonzales. The puppet...uncovering the
 secret world of Nixon, Hughes, and the CIA. Playboy, v. 23,
 Sept. 1976: 74-77, 82, 112, 180-190. AP2.P69, v. 23
219. Dudman, R. Commentary of an eyewitness. New republic, v. 149,
 Dec. 21, 1963: 18. AP2.N624, v. 149
220. Dugger, Ronnie. The last madness of Jack Ruby. New republic,
 v. 156, Feb. 11, 1967: 19-25. AP2.N624, v. 156
221. Dulles, Allen. Allen Dulles answers Warren report critics; excerpts
 from statements, Dec. 4, 1966. U.S. news and world report,
 v. 61, Dec. 19, 1966: 20. JK1.U65, v. 61
222. ----- The craft of intelligence. New York, Harper and Row,
 Publishers, 1963. 277 p. UB270.D8
223. Dunning, John L. The Kennedy assassination as viewed by communist
 media. Journalism quarterly, v. 41, spring 1964: 163-69.
 PN4700.J7, v. 41

224. Durkin, Henry P. The climate of hate. New guard, v. 6, Nov. 1966: 13-15, 20-21. AP2.N6154, v. 6
225. Dymond, F. Irving. The New Orleans portion of the conspiracy to assassinate President John F. Kennedy-II. Computers and automation, v. 22, May 1973: 30-32. TJ212.C58, v. 22
226. Economics: a shock, then recovery. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 92-93. HF5001.B89
227. Eddowes, Michael. November 22: how they killed Kennedy. St. Helier, Jersey, N. Spearman (Jersey) Ltd., London, distributed by N. Spearman, 1976. 352 p. E842.9.E32
228. ----- The Oswald file. New York, C. N. Potter, distributed by Crown Publishers, c1977. 240 p. E842.9.E32 1977
229. Eisenhower, D. D. When the highest office changes hands. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 15. AP2.S2, v. 236
230. Ellis, William Scott. The Warren report. Jubilee, v. 12, Dec. 1964: 24-27. BX801.J8, v. 12
231. End and a beginning. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 9, 1963: 19-20. AP2.N6772, v. 62
232. The End of Camelot. Playboy, v. 23, Apr. 1976: 125, 127-130, 142, 193, 196, 198-200, 202-204, 206, 208. AP2.P69, v. 23
233. Ephron, N. Twelve years on the assassination beat. Esquire, v. 85, Feb. 1976: 58. AP2.E844, v. 85
234. Epstein, Edward Jay. Counterplot. New York, Viking Press, 1969. 182 p. E842.9.E59
235. ----- Final chapter in the assassination controversy. New York times magazine, Apr. 20, 1969: 30-31, 115-120. AP2.N6573 1969
236. ----- Garrison. New Yorker, v. 44, July 13, 1968: 35-40, 42, 49-52, 54-56, 58-60, 62-76, 79-81. AP2.W6772, v. 44
237. ----- Inquest: the Warren Commission and the establishment of truth. New York, Viking Press, 1966. 224 p. E842.9.E6

238. Epstein, Edward Jay. Legend: the secret world of Lee Harvey Oswald.
[New York] Reader's Digest Press, c1978. 382 p.
E842.9.E63
239. ----- Manchester unexpurgated. Commentary, v. 44, 1967:
25-31. DS101.C63, v. 44
240. ----- Who's afraid of the Warren report? Esquire, v. 66, Dec.
1966: 204, 330-332, 334. AP2.E845, v. 66
241. Evans, M. Stanton. Coverup proved in JFK murder probe. Human
events, v. 36, July 24, 1976: 13, 15. D410.H8, v. 36
242. Evans, Medford. Fit to kill; the Presidency and political assass-
ination. American opinion, v. 17, May 1974: 35-37, 39, 41,
43, 45, 47-48. AP2.O4732, v. 17
243. ----- The usurpers. Boston, Western Islands, 1968.
249 p. E846.E9
244. Eye on that window. Newsweek, v. 63, June 22, 1964: 32.
AP2.N6772, v. 63

245. Fairlie, H. No conspiracy but perhaps two assassins. New York times magazine, Sept. 11, 1966: 52-55.
AP2.N6573
246. Farrell, Barry. Running with Dick Gregory. Ramparts, v. 13, Aug.-Sept. 1975: 26-28, 56-58. AP2.R19, v. 13
247. The Fateful trip to Texas: the assassination of a President, 1963 (motion picture) ed. by Fred Israel. Chelsea House Educational Communications, 1969.
248. Fateful two hours without a President: excerpts from testimonies. U.S. news and world report, v. 61, Nov. 14, 1966: 68-78.
JK1.U65.U61
249. FBI story on JFK's death: with report by H. Gorey. Time, v. 110, Dec. 19, 1977: 18. AP2.T37, v. 110
250. Fein, Arnold L. JFK in Dallas: the Warren report and its critics. Saturday review, v. 49, Jan. 21, 1967: 36.
AP2.S273, v. 49
251. Feldman, Harold. The Johnson murder charge. Minority of one, v. 8, Dec. 1966: 21-22. AP2.M55985, v. 8
252. ----- Oswald and the FBI. Nation, v. 198, Jan. 27, 1964: 86-89. AP2.N2, v. 198
253. Feldman, Jacob J., and Paul B. Sheatsley. The assassination of President Kennedy: a preliminary report on public reactions and behavior. Public opinion quarterly, v. 28, summer 1964: 189-215. HM261.A1.P8, v. 28
254. Fensterwald, Bernard, Jr. Jim Garrison, District Attorney, Orleans Parish vs. the Federal Government. Computers and automation, v. 20, Aug. 1971: 37-42. TJ212.C58, v. 20
255. ----- A legacy of suspicion. Esquire, v. 80, Nov. 1973: 141, 143, 265. AP2.E845, v. 80
256. Fensterwald, Bernard, and George O'Toole. The CIA and the man who was not Oswald. New York review of books, v. 22, Apr. 3, 1975: 24-25. AP2.N655, v. 22
257. Ferrari, Alfred John. Kennedy assassinations and political detours. Minority of one, v. 10, Nov. 1968: 7-9. AP2.M55985, v. 10

258. 50,000 word leak: testimony of Jack Ruby to the Warren Commission. Time, v. 84, Aug. 28, 1964: 40. AP2.T37, v. 84
259. Files of evidence connected with the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; 21 vols. in 2 reels micro-film. Washington, Microcard Editions, 1963-64. E842.9F47
260. Fine, William M., ed. That day with God. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965. 213 p. E842.9.F5
261. Five publishers issue Warren panel's report. Publisher's weekly, v. 186, Oct. 5, 1964: 43-44. Z1219.P98, v. 186
262. Fixx, J. F. As others see us: concerning Warren Commission report. Saturday review, v. 47, Nov. 1964: 35-37. AP2.S273, v. 47
263. Flammonde, Paris. The Kennedy conspiracy; an uncommissioned report on the Jim Garrison investigation. New York, Meredith Press, 1969. 348 p. E842.9.F54
264. Fleming, D. F. Foreword: postscript. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, v. 351, Jan. 1964: x. H1.A4, v. 351
265. Fonzi, Gaetano. Loose ends. Greater Philadelphia magazine, v. 58, Jan. 1967: 66-69, 88, 90, 106-108. HC108.P5G7, v. 58
266. Ford, Gerald R., and John Stiles. Portrait of an assassin. New York, Simon and Shuster, 1965. 508 p. E842.9.F58
267. Foreign countries, too, mourn first citizen of the world. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 48-49. JK1.U65, v. 55
268. Foreign power: same goals, sterner style. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 31-32. HF5001.B89
269. Forkosch, Morris D. Presidential murder: constitutionality of a statute making it a Federal crime. Southwest law journal, v. 19, June 1965: 229-238. K23.08, v. 19

270. Four days. Television, v. 21, Jan. 1964: 27-33.
HE869.OT4, v. 21
271. Four days in November (Motion Picture). Wolper Productions,
released by United Artist, 1964.
272. Four days; the historical record of the death of President Kennedy.
Compiled by United Press International and American Heritage
Magazine. New York, American Heritage Publishing Co., 1964.
143 p. E842.9.U55
273. Fox, Sylvan. The hidden evidence about President Kennedy's
assassination. Saga magazine, v. 33, Nov. 1966: 12-15,
78-84, 86. AP2.S127, v. 33
274. ----- The unanswered questions about President Kennedy's
assassination. New York, Award Books, 1965. 221 p.
E842.9.F64
275. ----- Unanswered questions about President Kennedy's
assassination. National review, v. 18, Jan. 11, 1966: 34-37.
AP2.N3545, v. 18
276. Fraker, S., and S. Leshner. Back to square one. Newsweek, v. 88,
Dec. 6, 1976: 32, 35. AP2.N6772, v. 88
277. Freed, Donald, and Mark Lane. Executive action. New York, Dell
Publishing Co., inc., 1973. 251 p. No. 2348
Rare book collection
278. Freeman, Lucy, and Renatus Hartogs. The two assassins. New York,
Crowell, 1965. 265 p. E842.9.H3
279. Freese, Paul L. The Warren Commission and the fourth shot: a
reflection on the fundamentals of forensic fact finding.
New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 424-465.
K14.E974, v. 40
280. Fresh doubts on JFK assassination: forensic experts call for
a new investigation of all the evidence. Medical world news,
v. 16, June 2, 1975: 25-28. R11.M864, v. 16
281. Friends of Lee Oswald. National review, v. 16, Mar. 10, 1964:
183-185. AP2.N3545, v. 16

282. From Dallas to Watergate: the longest cover-up. Ramparts,
v. 12, Nov. 1973: 12-17, 20, 53-54. AP2.R19, v. 12
283. From friend and foe in America: sense of shock and dismay at
the despicable act, statements. U.S. new and world report,
v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 49. JK1.U65, v. 55
284. From Washington straight. National review, v. 16, Apr. 21,
1964: 311. AP2.N3545, v. 16
285. Frontek, T. An American view. Tablet, Apr. 8, 1967: 382-383.
BX801.T3
[Not in L.C. collection]

286. Gales, Robert Robinson. The assassination of the President: jurisdictional problems. Syracuse law review, v. 16, fall 1964: 69-81. K23.Y7, v. 16
287. Gallup [Poll] Inc. (American Institute of Public Opinion). Were Kennedy, King conspiracy victims? Gallup opinion index, report no. 139, Feb. 1977: 1-4. HM261.A1G34
288. Gans, Herbert J. Why was Kennedy killed. Trans-action, v. 5, July-Aug. 1978: 5-6. H1.T72, v. 5
289. Gareth, Jenkins. Who shot President Kennedy--or fact and fable in history. Computers and automation, v. 21, Feb. 1972: 43-46. TJ212.C58, v. 21
290. Garrison, Jim. A heritage of stone. New York, Putnam, [1970] 253 p. E842.9.G34
291. ----- New Orleans evidence; excerpts from statements. Reporter, v. 38, Feb. 8, 1968: 10. D839.R385, v. 38
292. Garrison under fire. The economist, v. 22, Feb. 25, 1967: 730. HG11.E2, v. 22
293. Garrison under pressure. Newsweek, v. 74, Oct. 27, 1969: 42. AP2.N6772, v. 74
294. Garrison vs. the people. Time, v. 93, Mar. 14, 1969: 29. AP2.T37, v. 93
295. Garrison's last gasp. Time, v. 93, Mar. 7, 1969: 23. AP2.T37, v. 93
296. Garson, Barbara. MacBird. New York, Grove Press, 1967. 109 p. PS3557.A78.M3
[Not in L.C. collection]
297. Gatti, Arthur. The Kennedy curse. Chicago, Regnery, c1976. 264 p. BF1728.K46.G37

298. Gellner, John. Who killed John Kennedy? Saturday night, v. 79,
July 1964: 11-14. AP5.S27, v. 79
299. Gershenson, Alvin. Kennedy and big business. Beverly Hills,
Calif., Book Company of America, 1964. 256 p.
E841.G43
300. Gertz, Elmer. Moments of madness: people vs. Jack Ruby. Chicago,
Follett Pub. Co., 1968. 564 p. KF224.R8.G4
301. Gertz, Elmer, and Wayne B. Giampietro. The trial of 'State cases':
a postscript on the Ruby trial. DePaul law review, v. 16,
spring-summer 1967: 285-308. Law
302. The Ghost will not rest. New republic, v. 173, Sept. 27, 1975:
7. AP2.N624, v. 173
303. Giampietro, Wayne B., and Elmer Gertz. The trial of 'State cases':
a postscript on the Ruby trial. DePaul law review, v. 16,
spring-summer 1967: 285-308. Law
304. Gibbons, Russell W. The Warren Commission. Ave Maria, v. 104,
Sept. 17, 1966: 16-17. AP2.A9, v. 104
305. Gillers, Stephen, and Pat Watters, eds. Investigating the FBI.
New York, Doubleday, 1973. 518 p. HV8138.I58
306. Gilman, R. Facts of mortality. Commonweal, v. 79, Dec. 17, 1963:
337-338. AP2.C6897, v. 79
307. Ginsparg, Sylvia L., and Alice E. Moriarty. Reactions of young
people to the Kennedy assassination: the significance of
characteristic patterns of individual responses. Menninger
Clinic bulletin, v. 33, no. 5, 1969: 295-309.
RC321.M4
308. Goldberg, Arthur. Conspiracy interpretations of the assassination
of President Kennedy: international and domestic. Los
Angeles, University of California, 1968. 30 p.
E842.9.G58

309. Goldman, P., and J. J. Lindsay. Dallas: new questions and answers. Newsweek, v. 85, Apr. 28, 1975: 36-38.
AP2.N6772, v. 85
310. Gonzales, Laurence, and Larry DuBois. The puppet...uncovering the secret world of Nixon, Hughes, and the CIA. Playboy, v. 23, Sept. 1976: 74-77, 82, 112, 180-190.
AP2.P69, v. 23
311. Goodall, Kenneth. Warren Commission: the critics and the law; beyond reasonable doubt? Reporter, v. 35, Dec. 15, 1966: 44-46.
D839.R385
312. Goodhart, Arthur L. The mysteries of the Kennedy assassination and the English press. Law quarterly review, v. 83, Jan. 1967: 23-63.
Law
313. ----- The Warren Commission from a procedural standpoint. New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 404-423.
K14.E974, v. 40
314. ----- Warren Commission: the critics and the law; legal ignorance and false logic. Reporter, v. 35, Dec. 15, 1966: 47-48, 50.
D839.R385
315. Goranoff, Kyrill. Why did you kill your President? Berlin, N.P., 1970. 1544 p.
D24.G75
316. Gordon, Bruce. One and one make two sometimes: the Kennedy assassination. Fullerton, Calif., N.P., 1968. 28 p.
E842.9.G6
317. Gordon, William E. The assassination of President Kennedy. Contemporary review, v. 205, Jan. 1964: 8-13.
AP4.C7, v. 205
318. Goulden, Joseph C. Gun barrel politics. Washingtonian, v. 10, Feb. 1975: 46-52.
F191.W37, v. 10
319. The Government still lives. Time, v. 82, Nov. 29, 1963: 21-32.
AP2.T37, v. 82

320. Graham, J. J. Acquittal for Oswald: concerning the movie Rush to judgment. *Commonweal*, v. 86, Apr. 21, 1967: 149-151.
AP2.C6897, v. 86
321. Greenberg, Bradley S. The diffusion of news of the Kennedy assassination. *Public opinion quarterly*, v. 28, summer 1964: 225-232.
HM261.A1.P8, v. 28
322. Greenberg, Bradley S., and Edwin B. Parker, eds. The Kennedy assassination and the American public; social communication in crisis. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, 1965.
392 p. E842.9.G7
323. Greenstein, Fred I. Popular images of the President. *American journal of psychiatry*, v. 122, Aug. 1965: 523-529.
RC321.A52, v. 122
324. Groden, Robert. A new look at the Zapruder film. *Rolling stone*, no. 185, Apr. 24, 1975: 35-36. ML1.R65
325. Gross, A. A. Shadows of doubt. *Christian century*, v. 83, Sept. 28, 1966: 1178. BR1.C45, v. 83
326. Grosvenor, Melville Bell. The last full measure. *National geographic*, v. 125, Mar. 1964: 307-355. G1.N27, v. 125
327. Grove, L. Did press pressure kill Oswald? *U.S. news and world report*, v. 56, Apr. 6, 1964: 78-79. JK1.U65, v. 56
328. Guidry, Vernon A., Jr. Coverup in slaying of JFK. *Washington post*, June 24, 1976: A-3. Newsp
329. Gun, Nerin E. Red roses from Texas. London, Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1964. 208 p. E842.9.G8

330. Habe, Hans. The wounded land: journey through a divided America.
New York, Coward-McCann, 1964. 310 p.
E169.O2.H293
331. Hager, Barry. House move reflects questions on cost of assassination
probe. CQ weekly report, v. 35, Jan. 8, 1977: 46-48.
JK1.C15,v. 35
332. Hale, Hazel, and Thomas Henry Irwin. A bibliography of books, news-
paper and magazine articles, published in English outside
the United States of America, related to the assassination
of John F. Kennedy. Belfast, the authors, 1975. 19 p.
Z8462.8.I79
333. Haley, J. Evetts. A Texan looks at Lyndon: a study in illegitimate
power. Cayon, Tex., Palo Duro Press, 1964. 256 p.
E847.H3
334. Hammer, Richard. Organized crime: part I: the American dream.
Playboy, v. 20, Aug. 1973: 89-94, 166-174.
AP2.P69, v. 20
335. ----- Playboy's history of organized crime, part XI: attack on
a hoodlum empire. Playboy, v. 21, June 1974: 133-136, 173-
175, 178-185.
AP2.P69, v. 21
336. ----- Playboy's history of organized crime presents part XII:
the American nightmare. Playboy, v. 21, July 1974: 123-126,
148, 204-215.
AP2.P69, v. 21
337. Handlin, O. Warren Commission. Atlantic monthly, v. 218, Aug.
1966: 117-118.
AP2.A8, v. 218
338. Hanson, William H. The shooting of John F. Kennedy; one assassin,
three shots, three hits, no misses. San Antonio, Tx., The
Naylor Company, 1969. 203 p.
E842.9.H28
339. Harris, Irving. Little brother. Psychology today, v. 10, Oct.
1976: 48-51, 103.
BF1.P855, v. 10

340. Harris Larry R., and J. Gary Shaw. Cover-up: the governmental conspiracy to conceal the facts about the public execution of John Kennedy. Cleburne, Tex., Shaw, 1976. 227 p.
E842.9.S44
341. Harris, T. George. Memo about a Dallas citizen. Look, v. 28, Aug. 11, 1964: 64, 67-68, 70.
AP2.L79, v. 28
342. Hart, Luke E. The death of President Kennedy. Columbia, v. 43, Dec. 1963: 3.
AP2.C67, v. 43
343. ----- A year of progress with a sorrowful close. Columbia, v. 44, Jan. 1964: 16.
AP2.C67, v. 44
344. Hartogs, Renatus, and Lucy Freeman. The two assassins. New York, Crowell, 1965. 264 p.
E842.9.H3
345. Hastings, Michael. Lee Harvey Oswald: a far mean streak of indepenence [sic] brought on by neglect [sic]. Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1966. 112 p.
PR6058.A8.L4
346. Hatred knows no logic. Saturday evening post, v. 237, Jan. 4, 1964: 80.
AP2.S2, v. 237
347. The Hatred that consumes...address by Chief Justice E. G. Warren on the assassination of the President. Hadassah magazine, Dec. 1963: 32.
DS141.A2.H3
[Not in L.C. collection]
348. Have we learned our lessons? Christian century, v. 80, Dec. 18, 1963: 1567-1568.
BR1.C45, v. 80
349. Havemann, Ernest. Defendant Ruby will meet the ghost of a long dead Scott. Life, v. 56, Feb. 21, 1964: 30-31.
AP2.L547, v. 56
350. He gave his life; a newspaper's account of the assassination of a President and the two weeks that followed. Nashville Tennessean, [1963?] Unpaged.
E842.9.N3

351. He was my brother: excerpts from Lee (R. L. Oswald and others).
Look, v. 31, Oct. 17, 1967: 62-66, 71-74.
AP2.L79, v. 31
352. Heaps, Willard Allison. Assassination; a special kind of murder.
New York, Meredith Press, 1969. 218 p.
HV6278.H38
353. Henderson, Bruce E. 1:33. 1st ed. New York, Cowles, 1968.
243 p.
E842.9.H4
354. Hepburn, James. Farewell America. Vaduz, Frontiers, 1968. 418 p.
E842.H46
355. Hercher, W. W. Thousand well-wishers, and one assassin. U.S.
news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 34-35.
JK1.U65, v. 55
356. Here's what the Warren report will show. U.S. news and world
report, v. 57, Sept. 14, 1964: 42-43. JK1.U65, v. 57
357. Herman, M. and Flora Reta Schreiber. November, 22, 1963, a psych-
iatric evaluation. Science digest, v. 58, July 1965: 39-41.
Q1.S35, v. 58
358. Hessel, D. To heal the wounds. Christian century, v. 81, Jan. 1,
1964: 15. BR1.C45, v. 81
359. Hill, Richard J., Harry W. Martin, and Charles M. Bonjean. Reactions
to the assassination by sex and social class. Southwest
Sociology Association, v. 15, 1965: 21-37.
[Not in L.C. collection]
360. Hinckle, Warren, III. If you have a lemon, make lemonade. New York,
Putnam Son, 1974. 370 p.
PN4874.H49.A34
361. ----- The mystery of the black books. Esquire, v. 79, Apr. 1973:
128-131, 170, 172, 174. AP2.E845, v. 79

362. History or headlines? New Orleans investigation. *Newsweek*, v. 69, Mar. 13, 1967: 44, 47. AP2.N6772, v. 69
363. History or hysteria? Trevor-Roper article in London's Sunday Times. *Newsweek*, v. 64, Dec. 28, 1964: 35-36. AP2.N6772, v. 64
364. History's jury. *Newsweek*, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 25-27. AP2.N6772, v. 62
365. Hoch, Paul, and George O'Toole. Dallas: the Cuban connection. Saturday evening post, v. 248, Mar. 1976: 44-45, 96. AP2.S2, v. 248
366. Hoch, Paul L., Peter Dale Scott, and Russell Stetler, eds. The assassinations: Dallas and beyond: a guide to cover-ups and investigations. 1st ed. New York, Random House, c1976. 552 p. E842.9.A8
367. Holmes, John Clellon. The silence of Oswald. *Playboy*, v. 12, Nov. 1965: 101-102, 222, 224. AP2.P69, v. 12
368. Hopkins, Robert S. The killer elite. New York, Delacorte Press, 1973. 234 p. P24.H7955 Ki
369. Horowitz, Irving L. Kennedy's death, myths, and realities. *Trans-action*, v. 5, July-Aug. 1968: 3-5. H1.T72, v. 5
370. Hougan, Jim. Surfeit of spies. *Harper's*, v. 249, Dec. 1974: 51-54, 58, 63-64, 66-67. AP2.H3, v. 249
371. House Assassination Committee: internecine bitterness seen. *New times* (New York), v. 10, Feb. 20, 1978: 18. E169.12.N45, v. 10
372. Houts, Marshall. President Kennedy's autopsy was bungled. *Medical economics*, v. 45, Mar. 4, 1968: 248-249, 252-253, 257, 260-261, 264-266, 272-275, 278-279, 282-283, 286-287. R723.5.M4, v. 45

373. Houts, Marshall. Warren Commission one-bullet theory exploded. Argosy, v. 365, July 1967: 108-116. AP2.A7, v. 365
374. ----- Where death delights; the story of Dr. Milton Helpert and forensic medicine. New York, Coward-McCann [1967] 317 p. RA1025.H4.H6
375. How America felt. Newsweek, v. 63, Mar. 16, 1964: 33. AP2.N6772, v. 63
376. How could it happen? New republic, v. 149, Dec. 7, 1963: 6. AP2.N624, v. 149
377. How JFK died. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 30, 1963: 55. AP2.N6772, v. 62
378. How sorrowful bad: world reactions. Time, v. 82, Nov. 29, 1963: 38-39. AP2.T37, v. 82
379. How to read the Warren report. National review, v. 16, Oct. 16, 1964: 858. AP2.N3545, v. 16
380. Howard, Anthony. Logistics of the funeral. Esquire, v. 70, Nov. 1968: 119-122. AP2.E845, v. 70
381. Howe, Irving. On the death of John F. Kennedy. In his steady work: essays in the politics of democratic radicalism, 1953-1966. New York, Harcourt Brace and World, 1966. 364 p. E743.H69
382. Hughes, Emmet John. Echo in the silence. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 52. AP2.N6772, v. 62
383. Hyannisport revisited. Look, v. 28, Nov. 1964: 37-45. AP2.L79, v. 28

384. I just heard some shots: three shots. Editor and publisher,
v. 96, Nov. 30, 1963: 14-15, 67. PN4700.E4, v. 96
385. If it all happened again. Editor and publisher, v. 97,
Nov. 21, 1964: 9-10. PN4700.E4, v. 97
386. Imitators: post-Kennedy assassination threats of magnicide.
Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 23, 1963: 27. AP2.N6772, v. 62
387. In the nation's interest; commission to investigate the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy. America,
v. 109, Dec. 21, 1963: 789. BX801.A5, v. 109
388. Inconceivable connivance. Time, v. 91, Jan. 12, 1968: 14.
AP2.T37, v. 91
389. Inquest on Dallas: the right to bear arms. Tablet, v. 218,
Oct. 3, 1964: 1101-1102. BX801.T3
[Not in LC collection]
390. International outlook. Business week, no. 1787,
Nov. 30, 1963: 83-84. HF5001.B89
391. Into the archives, X-rays and photographs of body of JFK.
Time, v. 88, Nov. 11, 1966: 33. AP2.T37, v. 88
392. Irwin, Thomas Henry, and Hazel Hale. A bibliography of books,
newspaper and magazine articles, published in English
outside the United States of America, related to the
assassination of John F. Kennedy. Belfast, the authors,
1975. 19 p. Z8462.8.I79
393. Itek Corporation. Life-Itek Kennedy assassination film
analysis. Lexington, Ms., Itek Corporation [1967] 24 p.
E842.9.I8
394. Izakow, Boria. The Dallas investigation. New times (Moscow),
no. 49, Dec. 11, 1963: 10-12. D839.N483
395. ----- Echo of Dallas. New times (Moscow), no. 51,
Dec. 21, 1966: 29-31. D839.N483

396. JFK assassination; Justice Department publishes a report by doctors. New republic, v. 160, Feb. 1, 1969: 9-10.
AP2.N624, v. 160
397. JFK censored? Newsweek, v. 68, Oct. 3, 1966: 65-66.
AP2.N6772, v. 68
398. JFK: clean bill for CIA. Newsweek, v. 87, June 23, 1976: 21.
AP2.N6772, v. 87
399. JFK could lose. Look, v. 27, Dec. 17, 1963: 94, 96, 99,
101-102. AP2.679, v. 27
400. JFK death: a new investigation but... U.S. news and world
report, v. 62, Mar. 13, 1967: 16. JK1.U65, v. 62
401. JFK killing: FBI files raise questions, give no answers.
U.S. news and world report, v. 83, Dec. 19, 1977: 15.
JK1.U65, v. 83
402. JFK killing: new findings. U.S. news and world report, v. 66,
Jan. 27, 1969: 4. JK1.U65, v. 66
403. JFK memorial issue. Look, v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: 122.
AP2.L79, v. 28
404. JFK: the death and the doubt. Newsweek, v. 68, Dec. 5, 1966:
25-26. AP2.N6772, v. 68
405. JFK: the murder and the myths. Time, v. 83, June 12, 1964:
44, 47. AP2.T37, v. 83
406. JFK: what the FBI found. Newsweek, v. 90, Dec. 19, 1977:
28-29. AP2.N6772, v. 90
407. JFK's murder: sowers of doubt. Newsweek, v. 63, Apr. 6, 1964:
22-24. AP2.N6772, v. 63
408. Jackson, Donald. The evolution of an assassination. Life,
v. 58, Feb. 21, 1964: 68A-80. AP2.L547, v. 58

409. Jacobsen, Dan. Mean street. New statesman, v. 69, Jan. 15, 1965: 76-77. AP4.N64, v. 69
410. Jaffe, Louis L. Trial by newspaper. New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 504-524. Law
411. James, Rosemary, and Jack Wardlaw. Plot or politics. The Garrison case and its cast. New Orleans, Pelican Publishing House [1967] 167 p. E842.9.J3
412. Joesten, Joachim. The biggest lie ever told. The Kennedy murder fraud, and how I helped expose it. [Munich, Dreschstr. 5, Selbstverlag] 1968-69. 4 v. E.842.0.J57
413. ----- The case against Lyndon B. Johnson in the assassination of President Kennedy. Munich, Dreschstr [1967] 2 v. E842.9.J573
414. ----- Cuba, Vietnam, oil; three reasons why President John F. Kennedy had to die. Gutenberg uber Waldshut, Joesten [1972, c1971] 1 p. E842.9.J575
415. ----- The dark side of Lyndon B. Johnson. London, Peter Dawnay [1968] 272 p. E847.J56
416. ----- The Garrison enquiry: truth and consequences. London, Dawnay [1967] 158 p. E842.0.J58
417. ----- Gerald Ford: coverup artist par excellence: how he misused his power and prestige to shield the assassins of President John F. Kennedy and cover up the Dallas coup d'etat: a public indictment before the high court of world opinion. Bobins uber weilheim, Joesten [1974] 18 p. E842.9.J583
418. ----- How Kennedy was killed: the full appalling story. London, Dawnay; London, Tandem [1968] 192 p. E842.9.J583
419. ----- Marina Oswald. London, Dawnay [1967] 165 p. E842.9.J59

420. Joesten, Joachim. Oswald: assassin or fall guy? New York, Morzani [1964] 158 p. E842.9.J6
421. ----- Oswald: the truth. London, Dawney [1967] 372 p. E812.9.J62
422. ----- They call it intelligence: spies and spy techniques since World War II. London, Abelard-Schuman [1963] 314 p. UB270.J6
423. ----- Trilogy of murder. Munich [1968-70?] N.P. 5 v. E842.9.J63
Rare book collection
424. John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Look, v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: the JFK memorial issue, 33-36. AP2.L79, v. 28
425. Johnson, Priscilla. Oswald in Moscow. Harper's magazine, v. 228, Apr. 1964: 46-50. AP2.H3, v. 228
426. Johnson names commission to probe assassination. CQ weekly report, v. 21, Dec. 6, 1963: 2212-2213. JK1.5.C665, v. 21
427. Johnston, Edmund. The key to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, plus the Seiberling letters. Akron, Ohio, Hamilton Publishing House [c1977] 30 p. E842.9.J643
428. Joling, R. J. JFK assassination still an unsolved murder mystery. Saturday evening post, v. 247, Dec. 1975: 44-46. AP2.S2, v. 247
429. Jones, K. Unlikely assassin; question of F. Castro's involvement. New republic, v. 175, July 3, 1976: 5-6. AP2.N624, v. 175
430. Jones, Penn. Forgive my grief. Midlothian, Texas, Midlothian mirror [1966] 188 p. E842.9.J65, v. 1
431. ----- Forgive my grief. Midlothian, Texas, Midlothian mirror [1967] 193 p. E842.9.J65, v. 2

432. Jones, Penn. Forgive my grief vol. 3. Midlothian, Texas,
the Midlothian mirror [1967] 88 p. E842.9.J65, v. 3
433. ----- Forgive my grief vol. 4. Midlothian, Texas: the
Midlothian mirror. [1974] E842.9.J65, v. 4
434. Jones, W. November in Dallas. Library journal, v. 89, Jan. 1,
1964: 72. Z671.L7, v. 89
435. Jumping the gun; premature disclosures. Newsweek, v. 64,
July 13, 1964: 50. AP2.N6772, v. 64

436. Kaiser, Robert Blair. The JFK assassination: why Congress should reopen the investigation. Rolling stone, no. 185, Apr. 24, 1975: 27-28, 30-31, 33, 37-38. ML1.R65
437. Kaplan, John. Controversy: the assassins. American scholar, v. 36, spring 1967: 271-308. AP2.A4572, v. 36
438. Kaplan, John, and Jon R. Waltz. The trial of Jack Ruby. New York, MacMillan, 1965. 392 p. KF224.R8.K36
439. Karmin, Jacob. Myth, fantasy, or fact? New York, Vantage Press, c1977. 159 p. E842.9.K33
440. Karp, Irwin. Debate over Dallas: theories of John Sparrow and Sylvia Meagher. Saturday review, v. 51, Mar. 9, 1968: 113-114. AP2.S273, v. 51
441. Kavanaugh, J. A visit to the grave. Catholic digest, v. 28, July 1964: 8-11. BX801.C34, v. 28
442. Kempton, Murray. Boy, don't you know I'm a camera? New republic, v. 150, Feb. 29, 1964: 7. AP2.N624, v. 150
443. ----- The disposable Jack Ruby. Spectator, v. 218, Jan. 13, 1967: 35. AP4.S7, v. 218
444. ----- Looking back on the anniversary. Spectator, v. 213, Dec. 4, 1964: 778-779. AP4.S7, v. 213
445. ----- Oswald, may we have some facts, please. New republic, v. 150, June 13, 1964: 13-15. AP2.N624, v. 150
446. ----- Rage greater than grief. Atlantic monthly, v. 219, May 1967: 98-100. AP2.A8, v. 219
447. ----- Ruby, Oswald, and the State. Spectator, v. 217, Oct. 21, 1966: 506-507. AP4.S7, v. 217
448. ----- Warren report: a case for the prosecution. New republic, v. 151, Oct. 10, 1964: 13-17. AP2.N624, v. 151

449. Kennedy alive in hospital. Science news letter, v. 86, Oct. 10, 1964: 229. Q1.S76, v. 86
450. Kennedy assassination--communist version. Communist affairs, v. 1, Nov.-Dec. 1963: 3-6. HK1.C717, v.1
451. Kennedy assassination; question of a second investigation. New republic, v. 155, Nov. 12, 1966: 8. AP2.N624, v. 155
452. Kennedy assassination: something rotten... Saturday evening post, v. 240, Dec. 2, 1967: 88. AP2.S2, v. 240
453. Kerby, Phil. The assassination: a new inquiry appears warranted. Frontier, v. 18, Dec. 18, 1966: 3-4. F595.F7, v. 18
454. Kilgallen, Dorothy. Murder one. New York, Random House, 1967. 304 p. HV6529.K5
455. Killing still mystery. Science news letter, v. 86, Oct. 10, 1964: 230. Q1.S76, v. 86
456. Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr. The real CIA. New York, MacMillan, 1968. 312 p. JK468.I6.K5
457. ----- The U.S. intelligence community: foreign policy and domestic activities. New York, Hill & Wang, 1973. 212 p. JK468.I6.K53
458. Kirkwood, James. American grotesque; an account of the Clay Shaw-Jim Garrison affair in the city of New Orleans. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1970. 669 p. KF224.S45.K5
459. Kliman, Gilbert W., and Martha Wolfenstein. Children and the death of a President; multidisciplinary studies. New York, Doubleday, 1966. 256 p. BF723.D3.W6
460. Knebel, Fletcher. After the shots: the ordeal of Lyndon Johnson. Look, v. 28, Mar. 10, 1964: 26-28, 30, 33. AP2.L79, v. 28
461. ----- New wave of doubt; concerning Inquest by E.J. Epstein. Look, v. 30, July 12, 1966: 60-72. AP2.L79, v. 30

462. Knight, Janet M., ed. Three assassinations: the deaths of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King. New York, Facts on File, 1971. 266 p. E842.9.K55
463. Kohn, Howard. Execution for the witnesses: the deadly Kennedy probe. Rolling stone, no. 240, June 2, 1977: 42-44. ML1.R65
464. Kopkind, Andrew. Kennedy mystery reopened. New statesman, v. 72, July 29, 1966: 153. AP4.N64, v. 72
465. Krassner, Paul. The mind of Mae Brussell. Oui, v. 7, May 1978: 106-112. AP2.O63, v. 7
466. Krupp, G. R. Day the President died; its meaning and impact. Redbook, v. 122, Mar. 1964: 49, 98-104. AP2.R28, v. 122
467. Kubicek, Earl C. Bibliography of books, brochures and magazines dealing with events prior and subsequent to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. American book collector, v. 22, no. 1, 2 and 3, 1971: 26-27, 23-26, and 23-25; and v. 22, no. 4, 1972: 21-29. Z990.A5, v. 22
468. ----- The legend of John F. Kennedy. American book collector, v. 22, no. 1, 1971: 25. Z990.A5, v. 22
469. Kurland, Gerald. The assassination of John F. Kennedy. Charlottesville, N.Y., SamHar Press, 1973. 31 p. E842.9.K87

470. LBJ on the assassination. *Newsweek*, v. 75, May 11, 1970:
41. AP2.N6772, v. 75
471. Labor: union rally to Johnson. *Business week*, no. 1787,
Nov. 30, 1963: 46, 48. HF5001.B828
472. Lane, Mark. A citizen's dissent: Mark Lane replies. New
York, Holt, Reinhart, and Winston [1968] 290 p.
E842.9.L29
473. ----- The man in the doorway. Film comment, v. 4, fall/
winter 1967: 20-21. PN1993.F438, v. 4
474. -----, ed. The Oswald case; Mark Lane's testimony to the
Warren Commission. Phonodisc. Brookside BR501, 1964.
R64-1333
475. ----- Oswald innocent? A lawyer's brief. *National guardian*
weekly, Dec. 19, 1963. Microfilm
05144AP
476. ----- Playboy interview: Mark Lane. *Playboy*, v. 14, Feb.
1967: 41-42, 44-64, 66-68. AP2.P69, v. 14
477. ----- Rush to judgment. New York, Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston [1966] 478 p. E842.9.L3
478. ----- The Warren report: a first glance. *Minority of one*,
v. 6, Nov. 1964: 6-8. AP2.M55985, v. 6
479. ----- Who killed Kennedy? CBS is wrong. *True magazine*,
v. 48, Dec. 1967: 34-36. AP2.T76127, v. 48
480. Lane, Mark, and Donald Freed. Executive action. New York,
Dell Publishing Co., Inc. [1973] 251 p.
No. 2348
Rare book collection
481. Lane says JFK death is still unsolved murder. *Publishers*
weekly, v. 190, Aug. 22, 1966: 58. Z1219.P98, v. 190
482. Langer, E. Kennedy's assassination: study organized by social
scientists. *Science*, v. 142, Dec. 13, 1963: 1446-1447.
Q1535, v. 142

483. Lardner, George Jr. Congress and the assassinations: the curious politics of the House inquiry into the murders of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. Saturday review, v. 4, Feb. 19, 1977: 14-18.
AP2.S273, v. 4
484. Lasky, Victor. JFK, the man and the myth. New York, MacMillan Co. [1963] 653 p. E842.L3
485. Latest on murder of Kennedy: a preview of the Warren Report. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, June 1, 1964: 43-44.
JK1.U65, v. 56
486. Latin letter: Haiti. Latin America political report (London), v. 11, May 1977: 131. HC121.L27, v. 11
487. Lattimer, John K. Factors in the death of President Kennedy. Journal of the American Medical Association, v. 198, Oct. 24, 1966: 327, 332-333. R15.A48, v. 198
488. Lattimer, John K. Similarities in fatal wounds of John Wilkes Booth and Lee Harvey Oswald. Journal of medicine, v. 66, July 3, 1966: 1782-1794. R11.J73, v. 66
489. Law unto himself. Newsweek, v. 71, Jan. 8, 1968: 25-26.
AP2.N6772, v. 71
490. Lawrence, D. Incredible tragedy. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 104. JK1.U65, v. 55
491. Lawrence, Lincoln [pseud.] Were we controlled. New Hyde Park, N.Y., University Books [1967] 173 p.
E842.9.L36
492. Leaf, Jesse James. The war inside the CIA. Genesis, Dec. 5, 1975: 22-24, 40, 44. AP2.G33
493. Lee Oswald's widow tells her story; summary of testimony by Marina Oswald. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Feb. 17, 1964: 19. JK1.U65, v. 56
494. Leshner, S. and S. Fraker. Back to square one. Newsweek, v. 88, Dec. 6, 1976: 32, 35. AP2.N6772, v. 88

495. Leslie, Warren. Dallas, public and private: aspects of an American city. New York, Grossman Publishers [1964] 238 p. F394.02L4
496. Levin, Bernard. The bell tolls in Dallas. Listener, v. 70, Dec. 5, 1963: 914. AP4.L4165, v. 70
497. Levy, Sheldon G. How population subgroups differed in knowledge of six assassinations. Journalism quarterly, v. 46, winter, 1969: 685-698. K10.U27, v. 46
498. Lewis, Richard Warren. Flashy lawyer for Oswald's killer. Saturday evening post, v. 237, Feb. 8, 1964: 28-30. AP2.S2, v. 237
499. ----- The scavengers and critics of the Warren report; the endless paradox. New York, Delacorte Press [1967] 188 p.
500. Life. John F. Kennedy memorial edition: all of Life's pictures and text on the most shocking event of our time, including his biography and his most enduring words. Chicago, Time, Inc. [1963] AP2.L547
501. Lillard, Richard G. Confrontation and innovation on the campus: and eventful decade for western universities. American west, v. 11, no. 1, 1974: 10-17, 62-64. F591.A4, v. 11
502. Lincoln, Evelyn. Kennedy and Johnson. New York, Rinehart and Winston [1968] 207 p. E842.1.L47
503. Lindsay, J. J., and P. Goldman. Dallas: new questions and answers. Newsweek, v. 85, Apr. 28, 1975: 36-38. AP2.N6772, v. 85
504. Lineberry, William. The lingering plot. Foreign opinion and the assassination. New leader, v. 47, Apr. 27, 1964: 21-22. HX1.N37, v. 47
505. Lingering doubts; survey of public opinion. Newsweek, v. 63, Jan. 6, 1964: 19. AP2.N6772, v. 63

506. Linn, Edward. The untold story of Jack Ruby. Saturday evening post, v. 237, July 25, 1964: 24-26, 28, 33, 36-37, 40, 48-49. AP2.S2, v. 237
507. Logan, Andy. JFK: the stained-glass image. American heritage, v. 18, Oct. 1967: 4-7, 75-78. E171.E43, v. 18
508. Love, Ruth Leeds. Television and the Kennedy assassination. New society, v. 8, Oct. 13, 1966: 567-571. H1.N47, v. 8
509. Lowenstein, Allard. The Kennedy killings. Argosy, v. 383, Feb. 1976: 28-33, 86. AP2.A7, v. 383
510. Lowther, William. The evidence be damned. (Who killed JFK?) Macleans, v. 90, Dec. 26, 1977: 35-36. AP5.M2, v. 90
511. Loxton, Howard, Len Deighton, and Michael Rand, comp. The assassination of President Kennedy. London, Cape [1967] 1 v. E842.R32
Rare book collection
512. Lynd, S., and J. Minnis. Seeds of doubt: some questions about the assassination. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 21, 1963: 14-17. AP2.N624, v. 149

513. McBernie, William S. What was behind Lee Harvey Oswald? Norfolk, Va., McBernie Publications Association [N.D.]
[Not in L.C. collection]
514. McCarry, Charles. The tears of autumn. New York, Saturday Review Press, 1974. 276 p. PZ4.M12265Te
515. MacCloskey, Monro. The American intelligence community. New York, Rosen Press, Inc., 1967. 190 p. JK468.I6.M28
516. McDade, Thomas M. The assassination industry: a tentative check-list of publications on the murder of John F. Kennedy. American book collector, v. 18, no. 10, 1968: 8-14.
Z990.A5, v. 18
517. Macdonald, D. Our baby. New republic, v. 150, Jan. 25, 1964: 30. AP2.N624, v. 150
518. ----- A critique of the Warren report. Esquire, v. 63, Mar. 1965: 59-63, 127-138. AP2.E845, v. 63
519. McDonald, Hugh C. Appointment in Dallas: the final solution to the assassination of JFK. New York, The Hugh McDonald Publishing Corporation, 1975. 211 p. E842.9.M23
520. MacDonald, Neil. The assassination of President Kennedy. The 'Oswald window'. People and the pursuit of truth, May 1975: 7.
[Not in L.C. collection]
521. ----- Confidential and secret documents of the Warren Commission deposited in the U.S. Archives. Computers and automation, v. 19, Nov. 1970: 44-47. TJ212.C58, v. 19
522. McGill, Ralph E. Speaking out: hate knows no direction. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 8, 10. AP2.S2, v. 236
523. McGrory, Mary. After great pain; a formal feeling. America, v. 109, Dec. 14, 1963: 764. BX801.A5, v. 109

524. McKinley, James. Cries of conspiracy. Playboy, v. 23, May 1976: 122-127, 130, 132, 200-208. AP2.P69, v. 23
525. ----- The end of Camelot. Playboy, v. 23, Apr. 1976: 125, 127-130, 142, 193, 196, 198-200, 202-204, 206, 208. AP2.P69, v. 23
526. McMillan, Priscilla Johnson. Marina and Lee. New York, Harper and Row, c1977. 527 p. CT275.0737.M32 1977
527. ----- Why Oswald really killed Kennedy: part 2. Ladies home journal, v. 94, Nov. 1977: 122-143. AP2.L135, v. 94
528. MacParlane, Ian Colin A. The assassination of John F. Kennedy: a new review. Koogons, Vic., I. C. A. MacParlane, 1974. 60 p. E842.9.M25
Rare book collection
529. ----- Proof of conspiracy in the assassination of President Kennedy. Melbourne, Book Distributors, 1975. 160 p. E842.9.M26
Rare book collection
530. Mader, Julius. Who's who in the CIA. Berlin, West Germany, Mader, 1968. 604 p. JK468.I6.M323
531. Maddox, Henry. The plot according to Garrison. New Orleans, v. 1, July 1967: 18-19, 52-53. F379.N5, v. 1
532. Mallowe, Mike. Who killed Kennedy? The Philadelphia connection. Philadelphia magazine, v. 68, Sept. 1977: 135-142, 230-239. AP2.A2.P45, v. 68
533. Malone, William Scott. The secret life of Jack Ruby. New times (New York), v. 10, Jan. 23, 1978: 46-51. E169.12.N45, v. 10
534. Man who killed Oswald. Time, v. 82, Dec. 6, 1963: 34-35. AP2.T37, v. 82

535. The Man who loved Kennedy. Time, v. 93, Feb. 21, 1969: 18.
AP2.T37, v. 93
536. Man who wanted to kill Nixon. Time, v. 83, June 19, 1964: 21.
AP2.T37, v. 83
537. Manchester, William. Then. New York times magazine, Nov. 4,
1973: 36-37, 123-124, 126-130, 132-136. AP2.N6573
538. Manchester, William R. The death of a President, November 20-
November 25, 1963. New York, Harper's, 1967. 710 p.
E842.9.M28
539. Mandel, P. End to nagging rumors: the six critical seconds.
Life, v. 55, Dec. 6, 1963: 527. AP2.L547, v. 55
540. Mannes, M. Long vigil. Reporter, v. 29, Dec. 19, 1963: 15-17.
D839.R385, v. 29
541. Marchetti, Victor, and John D. Marks. The CIA and the cult of
intelligence. New York, Knopf, 1974. 398 p.
JK468.I6.M37
542. Marcus, Raymond. The bastard bullet; a search for legitimacy
of Commission exhibit 399. Los Angeles, Rendell Publications,
1966. 77 p. E842.9.M34
543. Mardi Gras season. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 73, 1969: 34.
AP2.N6772, v. 73
544. Marketing shoppers flock back to resume buying. Business week,
no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 80-90. HR5001.B89
545. Marks, John. A Kafka story, but its true. Playboy, v. 22, Aug.
1975: 59. AP2.P69, v. 22
546. Marks, John D., and Victor Marchetti. The CIA and the cult of
intelligence. New York, Knopf, 1974. 398 p.
JK468.I6.M37

547. Marks, Stanley J. American dream; American nightmare. Los Angeles Bureau of International Affairs, 1971. [Not in L.C. collection]
548. ----- Coup d'etat: November 22, 1963; the conspiracies that murdered President John F. Kennedy, the Rev. Martin Luther King, and Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Los Angeles, Bureau of International Affairs, 1970. 201 p. E842.9.M348
549. ----- Murder most foul. The conspiracy that murdered President Kennedy: 975 questions and answers. Los Angeles, Bureau of International Affairs, 1967. 149 p. E842.9.M35
550. ----- Two days of infamy: November 22, 1963 and September 28, 1964. [1st U.S. ed. Los Angeles, Bureau of International Affairs] 1969. 178 p. E842.9.M353 1969
551. ----- Watch what we do, not what we say. Los Angeles, Bureau of International Affairs, 1971. [Not in L.C. collection]
552. Marshall, Eliot. Aftermath; how the survivors feel now. New republic, v. 173, Sept. 27, 1975: 48-51. AP2.N624, v. 173
553. Martin, Harry W., Charles M. Bonjean, and Richard J. Hill. Reactions to the assassination by sex and social class. Southwest Sociology Association, v. 15, 1965: 21-37. [Not in L.C. collection]
554. Martin, William C. Welcome to the Lee Harvey Oswald Memorial Library and Research Institute, Marguerite C. Oswald, director. Esquire, v. 79, Jan. 1973: 142-143, 160. AP2.E845, v. 79
555. Martyred President and nation's journey. Reconstructionist, v. 29, Dec. 13, 1963: 3. DS133.R4, v. 29
556. Marxist marine. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 27. AP2.N6772, v. 62

557. Matter of reasonable doubt. Life, v. 61, Nov. 25, 1966: 38-48B,
53. AP2.L547, v. 61
558. Matthews, James P. Four dark days in history: Nov. 22-25, 1963.
Los Angeles, the author, c1963. 68 p. E842.9.F6
Rare book collection
559. Maxfield, Marietta, and Dan Wise. The day Kennedy died. San
Antonio, Naylor Co., 1964. 137 p. E842.9.W5
560. Mayer, Milton. November 22, 1963. Progressive magazine, v. 28,
Dec. 1964: 21-25. AP2.P8655, v. 28
561. Mayes, Stanley. What they are saying. Listener, v. 70, Nov. 28,
1963: 868. AP4.L4165, v. 70
562. Mayo, John B. Bulletin from Dallas: the President is dead; the
story of John F. Kennedy's assassination as covered by radio
and TV. [1st ed.] New York, Exposition Press [1967] 157 p.
E842.9.M37
563. Meagher, Sylvia. Accessories after the fact; the Warren Commission,
the authorities, and the report. New York, Vintage Books
[1976, c1967] 477 p. E842.9.M36 1976
[Not in L.C. collection]
564. ----- After the battle, the book. Minority of one, v. 9,
June 1967: 25-27. AP2.M55985, v. 9
565. ----- The curious testimony of Mr. Given. Texas observer, v. 63,
August 1971: 11-12. F381.T368, v. 63
566. ----- How well did the 'non-driver' Oswald drive? Minority
of one, v. 8, Sept. 1966: 19-21. AP2.M55985, v. 8
567. ----- Johnnies-come-lately to Dealey Plaza. Texas observer,
v. 62, July 24, 1970: 11-13. F381.T368, v. 62
568. ----- Notes for a new investigation. Esquire, v. 66, Dec. 1966:
211, 335. AP2.E845, v. 66

569. Meagher, Sylvia. On closing the doors, not opening them; or the limit of the Warren investigation. Minority of one, v. 8, July-Aug. 1966: 29-32. AP2.M55985, v. 8
570. ----- Oswald and the State Department. Minority of one, v. 8, Oct. 1966: 22-27. AP2.M55985, v. 8
571. ----- Post-assassination credibility chasm. Minority of one, v. 9, Mar. 1967: 21-22. AP2.M55985, v. 9
572. ----- A psychiatrist's retroactive 'clairvoyance'. Minority of one, v. 8, June 1966: 25-27. AP2.M55985, v. 8
573. ----- Subject index to the Warren report and hearings and exhibits. New York, Scarecrow Press, 1966. 150 p. E842.9.M4
574. ----- Three assassinations. Minority of one, v. 10, Sept. 1968: 13-16. AP2.55985, v. 10
575. ----- Two assassinations. Minority of one, v. 10, June 1968: 9-10. AP2.M55985, v. 10
576. ----- Wheels with deals: how the Kennedy investigation was organized. Minority of one, v. 10, July-Aug. 1968: 23-27. AP2.M55985, v. 10
577. Mendelson, Harold. Broadcast vs. personal sources of information in emergent public crises: the Presidential assassination. Journal of broadcasting, v. 8, spring 1964: 147-156. PN1991.J6, v. 8
578. Meunier, Robert F. Shadows of doubt: the Warren Commission cover-up. Hicksville, N.Y., Exposition Press, c1976. 165 p. E842.9.M45
579. Meyer, Karl E. The triumph of Caliban. New leader, v. 47, Oct. 12, 1964: 4-6. HX1.N37, v. 47

580. Miller, Tom. The assassination please almanac. Chicago, Regnery, Co., c1977. 284 p. E842.9.M53 1977
581. Mills, Andrew. Who killed Kennedy? The Warren report is right. True magazine, v. 48, Dec. 1967: 32, 72, 75-77. AP2.T76127, v. 48
582. Minnis, J., and S. Lynd. Seeds of doubt: some questions about the assassination. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 21, 1963: 14-17. AP2.N624, v. 149
583. Missing link: photos and X-rays of autopsy. Newsweek, v. 72, Nov. 14, 1968: 30-31. AP2.N6772, v. 72
584. Mitgang, Herbert. New inquiry is needed: questions concerning the assassination. New York times magazine, Dec. 25, 1966: 14. AP2.N6573
585. Model, F. Peter. The assassinationist business--an investigation of the investigators. Oui, v. 5, Feb. 1976: 17-18, 123-124. AP2.O63, v. 5
586. ----- Killing the Kennedy's: the case for conspiracy. Argosy, v. 382, July 1975: 34-41, 64-66. AP2.A7, v. 382
587. Moment of tragedy. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 6. JK1.U65, v. 55
588. Montgomery, R. Crystal ball: condensation from gift of prophecy. Reader's digest, v. 86, July 1965: 235-242. AP2.R255, v. 86
589. More on the Kennedy assassination charges, concerning Jim Garrison's TV broadcast. U.S. news and world report, v. 62, June 12, 1967: 55-56. JK1.U65, v. 62
590. More than a man in the dock. Time, v. 93, Feb. 14, 1969: 26-29. AP2.T37, v. 93

591. More than one man. America, v. 109, Dec. 7, 1963: 722.
BX801.A5, v. 109
592. Moriarty, Alice E., and Sylvia Ginsparg. Reactions of young people to the Kennedy assassination: the significance of characteristic patterns of individual responses. Menninger Clinic bulletin, v. 33, no. 5, 1969: 295-309.
RC321.M4, v. 33
593. Morin, Relman. Assassination: the death of President John F. Kennedy. New York, New American Library, 1968. 191 p.
E842.9.M6
594. Morris, Wright. One day. 1st ed. New York, Atheneum, 1965.
PZ3.M8346 On
595. Morrow, Robert. Betrayal: a reconstruction of certain clandestine events from the Bay of Pigs to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1976. 229 p.
E842.9.N44
596. Mosk, Richard M. The Warren Commission and the legal process. Case and comment magazine, v. 72, May-June 1967: 13-20.
Law
597. Mueller, Samuel A., Suzanne E. Rocheleau, Joyce A. Sween, and Rae Lesser Blumberg [Northwestern Assassination Research Group] Reactions to the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; a preliminary report. [Evanston, Ill.] Northwestern University, c1969. 1 v. (various pagings)
E842.9.N67
598. Muggeridge, Malcolm. New Kennedy theory. New statesman, v. 72, Nov. 18, 1966: 735.
AP4.N64, v. 72
599. Murphy, Charles J. V. Assassination plot that failed. Time, v. 105, June 30, 1975: 28.
AP2.T37, v. 105
600. Murray, Norbert. Legacy of an assassination. New York, Pro Peoples Press, 1964. 479 p.
E841.M8
601. Mystery makers; J. Sparrow's evaluation of the Warren Commission report and its critics. Time, v. 90, Dec. 22, 1967: 21.
AP2.T37, v. 90
602. Mythmakers; mysterious deaths of people involved in case. Time, v. 88, Nov. 11, 1966: 33-34.
AP2.T37, v. 88

603. Nash, George, and Patricia Nash. The other witnesses. New leader, v. 47, Oct. 12, 1964: 6-9. HX1.N37, v. 47
604. A Nation grieves. Interracial review, v. 36, Dec. 1963: 232. E185.5.I6, v. 36
605. National Broadcasting Company. Seven hours and thirty minutes, as broadcast on the NBC television network by NBC news. New York, Random House, 1966. 152 p. E842.9.N35
606. New assassination theory: theory of J. Thompson. Newsweek, v. 70, Nov. 27, 1967: 29-30, 35. AP2.N6772, v. 70
607. New clue in attempt to shoot General Walker. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Jan. 13, 1964: 10. JK1.U65, v. 56
608. New conflict over assassination. U.S. news and world report, v. 61, Dec. 5, 1966: 6, 8. JK1.U65, v. 61
609. New JFK evidence unearthed. Guardian, v. 28, Nov. 26, 1975: 7. AP8.G78, v. 28
610. New light on the assassination: a secret agent's story. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, June 1964: 38-39. JK1.U65, v. 56
611. New light on second assassin theory. U.S. news and world report, v. 62, May 29, 1967: 14. JK1.U65, v. 62
612. New York times runs 48 pages of report. Editor and publisher, v. 97, Oct. 3, 1964: 61. PN4700.E4, v. 97
613. Newcomb, Fred T., and Perry Adams. Murder from within. Santa Barbara, Calif., Probe, c1974. 423 p. E842.9.N44
614. Newman, Albert H. The assassination of John F. Kennedy: the reasons why. New York, C. N. Potter, 1970. 622 p. E842.9.N46 1970

615. Nichols, John. President Kennedy's adrenals. Journal of the American Medical Association, v. 201, July 10, 1967: 129-130.
R15.A48, v. 201
616. Nierenberg, Harry H. Ego disturbance following a national trauma. Psychoanalytic review, v. 55, no. 1, 1968: 128-134.
BF1.P5, v. 55
617. Nightmare revisited; reenactment for Warren Commission. Newsweek, v. 63, June 8, 1964: 48.
AP2.N6772, v. 63
618. Nobile, Phillip and Ron Rosenbaum. The curious aftermath of JFK's best and brightest affair. New times (New York), v. 8, July 9, 1976: 22-34.
E169.12.N45, v. 8
619. Norden, Eric. Jim Garrison: a candid conversation with the embattled district attorney of New Orleans. Playboy, v. 14, Oct. 1967: 59-60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 156-163, 165-168, 170-172, 174-176, 178.
AP2.P69, v. 14
620. Notes and comment. New Yorker, v. 39, Dec. 7, 1963: 45.
AP2.N6763, v. 39
621. November 22, 1963, Dallas: photos by nine bystanders. Life, v. 63, Nov. 25, 1967: 87-97.
AP2.L547, v. 63
622. Now the trumpet summons again... Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 21-23.
HF5001.B89
623. Now the U.S. gets JFK autopsy photos. U.S. news and world report, v. 61, Nov. 14, 1966: 81.
JK1.U65, v. 61
624. Noyes, Peter. Legacy of doubt. New York, Pinnacle Books, 1973. 249 p.
E842.9.N69

625. O'Brien, Conor Cruise. The life and death of Kennedy. New statesman, v. 71, Jan. 14, 1966: 50-51. AP4.N64, v. 71
626. ----- No one else but him. New statesman, v. 73, Sept. 30, 1966: 479-481. AP4.N64, v. 73
627. ----- Veto by assassination? Minority of one, v. 9, Dec. 1967: 16-18. AP2.M55985, v. 9
628. Odd company. Time, v. 89, Mar. 10, 1967: 24. AP2.T37, v. 89
629. Oglesby, Carl. The yankee and cowboy war: conspiracies from Dallas to Watergate. Mission, Kan., Sheed Andrews and McMeel, c1976. 355 p. E842.9.034
630. Olds, Greg. In my opinion: the Zapruder film. Texas observer, v. 61, Nov. 21, 1969: 16. F381.T368, v. 61
631. ----- The official doubters. Texas observer, v. 62, Feb. 6, 1970: 9-11. F381.T368, v. 62
632. Olson, Don, and Ralph Turner. Photographic evidence and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 16, Oct. 1971: 399-419. RA1001.A57, v. 16
633. Oltmans, Willem. New mysteries in Kennedy assassination? Atlas world press review, v. 24, May 1977: 13-15. AP1.A83, v. 24
634. On the far right: the assassination. Commonweal, v. 79, Dec. 27, 1963: 384-385. AP2.C6897, v. 79
635. On the trail of the rogue. Saturday evening post, v. 248, Dec. 1976: 74. AP2.S2, v. 248
636. Opening the JFK file. Newsweek, v. 90, Dec. 12, 1977: 34-35. AP2.N6772, v. 90

637. Orren, Karen, and Paul Peterson. Kennedy assassination: case study in dynamics of political socialization. Journal of politics, v. 29, May 1967: 388-404. JAl.J6, v. 29
638. Orth, Maureen. Memoirs of a CIA psychologist. New York times magazine, June 25, 1976: 18-24. AP2.N6575
639. Osborn, Kenneth. The CIA scalpel cut deep. Playboy, v. 22, Aug. 1975: 58. AP2.P69, v. 22
640. Osterburg, James W. The Warren Commission: report and hearing. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 11, July 1966: 261-271. RA1001.A57, v. 11
641. Oswald, Lee Harvey. Lee Oswald's letters to his mother. Esquire, v. 61, May 1964: 67-73, 75. AP2.E845, v. 61
642. Oswald, Robert L. Lee: a portrait of Lee Harvey Oswald. New York, Coward-McCann, 1967. 246 p. E842.9.08
643. Oswald and the weight of evidence. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 9, 1963: 36, 41-42. AP2.N6772, v. 62
644. Oswald cover-up: accusing the FBI of concealing Oswald's visit to Dallas headquarters. Time, v. 106, Sept. 15, 1975: 19. AP2.T37, v. 106
645. Oswald diary publication stirs furor. Editor and publisher, v. 97, July 4, 1964: 14. PN4700.E4, v. 97
646. Oswald killing discussed. Science news letter, v. 84, Dec. 7, 1963: 355. Q1.S76, v. 84
647. Oswald mystery grows deeper and deeper. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Mar. 30, 1964: 45. JK1.U65, v. 56
648. Oswald's historic diary. Life, v. 57, July 10, 1964: 26-31. AP2.L547, v. 57

649. Other guns. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 30, 1963: 15.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
650. O'Toole, George. The assassination probe. Saturday evening post, v. 247, Nov. 1975: 45-48, 112. AP2.S2, v. 247
651. ----- Assassination tapes. Penthouse, v. 4, July 1973: 44-47, 112-114, 124-126. AP2.P413, v. 4
652. ----- The assassination tapes: an electronic probe into the murder of John F. Kennedy and the Dallas cover-up. New York, Penthouse Press, 1975. 265 p. E842.9.082
653. ----- Lee Harvey Oswald was innocent. Penthouse, v. 6, Apr. 1975: 45-46, 124-129, 132. AP2.P413, v. 6
654. ----- The Oswald-FBI coverup. Penthouse, v. 6, Aug. 1975: 48-51, 62, 89-90, 123. AP2.P413, v. 6
655. O'Toole, George, and Bernard Fensterwald. The CIA and the man who was not Oswald. New York review of books, v. 22, Apr. 3, 1975: 24-25. AP2.N655, v. 22
656. O'Toole, George, and Paul Hoch. Dallas: the Cuban connection. Saturday evening post, v. 248, Mar. 1976: 44-45, 96. AP2.S2, v. 248
657. O'Toole, George, and others. Unsolved JFK murder mystery: special issue. Saturday evening post, v. 247, Sept. 1975: 44-53. AP2.S2, v. 247
658. O'Toole, James K., Dr. Mourning a President. Psychiatric quarterly, v. 40, Oct. 1966: 737-755. RC321.N52, v. 40
659. Overstreet, Harry. The strange tactics of extremism. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1964. 315 p. E743.09

660. Pabst, Ralph M. Plodding toward terror: a personal look at the Jack Ruby case. New York, Vantage Press, c1974. 174 p.
E842.9.P32
661. Packer, Herbert L. The Warren report: a measure of achievement. Nation, v. 199, Nov. 2, 1964: 295-299. AP2.N2, v. 199
662. Pacis, Vicente A. Hate campaign did it. Weekly graphic, v. 30, Dec. 25, 1963: 2, 3, 98. AP8.G7, v. 30
663. Panter-Downee, Mollie. Letter from London. New Yorker, v. 39, Dec. 7, 1963: 196-198. AP2.N6763, v. 39
664. Paris: le coup de Dallas. New statesman, v. 66, Dec. 6, 1963: 817. AP4.N64, v. 66
665. Parker, Edwin B., and Bradley S. Greenberg, eds. The Kennedy assassination and the American public; social communication in crisis. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1965. 392 p.
E842.9.G7
666. Pathologist sleuth reopens Kennedy controversy; suggest JFK suffered from Addison's disease. Science news, v. 92, July 22, 1967: 79-80. Q1.S76, v. 92
667. Payne, Darwin. The press corps and the Kennedy assassination. Lexington, Ky., Association for Education in Journalism, 1970, c1969. 53 p.
PN4722.J6 no. 15/E842.9
668. Penthouse interview: Victor Marchetti. Penthouse, v. 6, Jan. 1975: 60-62, 91-98. AP2.P413, v. 6
669. Peterson, Paul, and Karen Orren. Presidential assassination: case study in dynamics of political socialization. Journal of politics, v. 29, May 1967: 388-404. JAL.J6, v. 29
670. Phantasmagoria; who murdered Kennedy? Time, v. 88, Nov. 25, 1966: 34-35. AP2.T37, v. 88

671. Phelan, James. The assassination that will not die. New York times magazine, Nov. 23, 1975: 27-28, 109-111, 119-123, 126, 132-133. AP2.N6575
672. ----- Plot to kill Kennedy? Rush to judgment in New Orleans. Saturday evening post, v. 240, May 6, 1967: 21-25. AP2.S2, v. 240
673. ----- The vice man cometh. Saturday evening post, v. 236, June 8, 1963: 67-71. AP2.S2, v. 236
674. Pity of it. Jewish frontier, v. 30, Dec. 1963: 3. DS149.A324, v. 30
675. Plastrik, Stanley. The Oswald case should be reopened. Dissent, v. 13, Sept.-Oct. 1966: 469-470. HX1.D58, v. 13
676. Plot to clear Lee Oswald. National review, v. 16, Apr. 7, 1964: 265. AP2.N3545, v. 16
677. Police in Dallas. New republic, v. 150, Jan. 18, 1964: 8. AP2.N624, v. 150
678. Policoff, Jerry. The media and the murder of John Kennedy. New times (New York), v. 5, Aug. 8, 1975: 29-32, 34-36. E169.12.N45, v. 5
679. Pomerance, Jo. Some questions to be answered. Nation, v. 220, Feb. 22, 1975: 204-205. AP2.N2, v. 220
680. Popkin, Richard H. Garrison's case. New York review of books, v. 9, Sept. 14, 1967: 19-29. AP2.N655, v. 9
681. ----- The second Oswald. New York, Avon Books, 1966. 174 p. E842.9.P6
682. ----- The second Oswald: the case for conspiracy theory. New York review of books, v. 7, July 28, 1966: 11-22. AP2.N655, v. 7

683. Portrait of a psychopath. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 83-84.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
684. Possony, S. T. Clearing the air. National review, v. 17, Feb. 9,
1965: 113-114. AP2.N3545, v. 17
685. Powledge, Fred. Is Garrison faking? New republic, v. 156, June 17,
1967: 13-18. AP2.N624, v. 156
686. President assassinated by a gunman in Dallas. Illustrated London
news, v. 243, Nov. 30, 1963: 887-889. AP4.I3, v. 243
687. Priceless role. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 56.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
688. Primer of assassination theories. Esquire, v. 66, Dec. 1966:
205-210. AP2.E845, v. 66
689. Prouty, L. Fletcher. Dallas Watergate connection. Genesis,
Aug. 1974: 27-29. AP2.G33
[Not in L.C. collection]
690. ----- The greatest coverup. Genesis, Oct. 1974: 25-28.
AP2.G33
[Not in L.C. collection]
691. ----- The guns of Dallas: update. Gallery, May 1976: 19-22.
[Not in L.C. collection]
692. ----- An introduction to the assassination business. Gallery,
Sept. 1975: 73-74, 86-87. [Not in L.C. collection]
693. ----- The secret team: the CIA and its allies in control of
the United States and the world. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
Prentice Hall, 1973. 496 p. JK468.I6.P76
694. ----- The shadow of Dallas. Genesis, Jan. 1974: 25-27.
AP2.G33
[Not in L.C. collection]
695. Public relations firm sets press rules for Ruby's trial. Editor
and publisher, v. 96, Dec. 28, 1963: 9. PN4700.E4, v. 96
696. Questions that won't go away. Saturday evening post, v. 247,
Dec. 1975: 38-39. AP2.S2, v. 247
697. A Quiet and sad day. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 30, 1963: 34.
AP2.N6772, v. 62

698. Rabasseire, Henri. Let's talk sense about Oswald. Dissent, v. 14, Mar.-Apr. 1967: 205-210. HX1.D58, v. 14
699. Radio-TV barred from Ruby trial. Broadcasting, v. 65, Dec. 23, 1963: 56. TK6540.B85, v. 65
700. Radio-TV newsmen testify in Ruby trial. Broadcasting, v. 66, Mar. 16, 1964: 74. TK6540.B85, v. 66
701. Rajski, Raymond B., comp. A nation grieved: the Kennedy assassination in editorial cartoon. Rutland, Vt., C. E. Tuttle Co., 1967. 134 p. E842.9.R28
702. Ralston, Ross F. History's verdict: the acquittal of Lee Harvey Oswald. N.P., Ralston, c1975. 269 p. E842.9.R286
703. Rand, Michael, Howard Loxton, and Len Deighton, comps. The assassination of President Kennedy. London, Cape [1967] 1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.R32
704. Ransom, Harry H. The intelligence establishment. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970. 309 p. JK468.I6.R3 1970
705. Raskin, Marcus. Rush to judgement. Yale law journal, v. 75, Jan. 1967: 581-597. KF29.A4, v. 75
706. Reaction in the South. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 27. AP2.N6772, v. 62
707. Reaction to killings. Science news letter, v. 84, Dec. 7, 1963: 358. Q1.S76, v. 84
708. Reaction to the assassination; excerpts from reports to Christian century's news correspondents. Christian century, v. 80, Dec. 25, 1963: 1618-1619. BR1.C45, v. 80
709. Recommendation no. 9. Journal of the American Medical Association, v. 191, Jan. 11, 1965: 143. R15.A48, v. 191

710. Report from the FBI. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 23, 1963: 19-20.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
711. Reporting the report. Newsweek, v. 64, Oct. 12, 1964: 100-101.
AP2.N6772, v. 64
712. Revere, Guy. Jack Ruby: the Mafia's man in Dallas. Saga, v. 33,
Mar. 1967: 28-31, 86-88, 90. AP2.S127, v. 33
713. Reynolds, Ruth. The Oswald riddle. Coronet, v. 5, Mar. 1967:
122-127. AP2.C768, v. 5
714. Rice, John. What was back of Kennedy's murder. Murfreesboro,
Tenn., Sword of the Land, 1964. 22 p. [Not in L.C. collection]
715. Rice, William R., comp. John F. Kennedy-Robert F. Kennedy: assassin-
ation bibliography. Orangevale, Calif., Rice, 1975. 62 p.
Z8462.8.R53.E842.9
716. Richler, Mordecai. It's a plot. Playboy, v. 22, May 1975: 132-133,
179-185, 188-190. AP2.P69, v. 22
717. Rifkin, S. Reply to M. Kempton. Warren report: a case for the
prosecution. New republic, v. 151, Oct. 24, 1964: 29.
AP2.N624, v. 151
718. Rifles: target for control? Newsweek, v. 64, Dec. 28, 1964:
21-23. AP2.N6772, v. 64
719. Rivers, Caryl. Warren report slaps press and calls for ethics
code: news media share in blame for killing of JFK's assassin.
Editor and publisher, v. 97, Oct. 3, 1964: 13.
PN4700.E4, v. 97
720. Roberts, Charles. Eyewitness in Dallas. Newsweek, v. 68, Dec. 5,
1966: 26-29. AP2.N6772, v. 68
721. ----- The truth about the assassination. New York, Grosset
and Dunlap, 1967. 128 p.
E842.9.R57
[Not in L.C. collection]

722. Roberts, Gene. The case of Jim Garrison and Lee Oswald. New York times magazine, May 21, 1967: 32-35. AP2.N6575
723. Robertson, A. Murder most foul. American heritage, v. 15, Aug. 1964: 90-104. E171.A43, v. 15
724. Rouchelleau, Suzanne E., Joyce A. Sween, Samuel A. Mueller, and Rae Lesser Blumberg [Northwestern Assassination Research Group] Reactions to the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; a preliminary report. [Evanston, Ill.] Northwestern University, c1969. 1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.N67
725. Roddy, Joseph. Ireland: the Kennedy cult. Look, v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: 66-72, 75-76, 79. AP2.L79, v. 28
726. Roffman, Howard. Presumed guilty: Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. South Brunswick, N.J. A.S. Barnes, 1976. 299 p. E842.9.R58 1976
727. Rogers, Warren. Persecution of Clay Shaw. Look, v. 33, Aug. 26, 1969: 53-56, 58-60. AP2.L79, v. 33
728. Rosen, R. D. and Sid Blumenthal. The politics of conspiracy, the conspiracy of politics. Computers and people, v. 24, Apr. 1975: 24-26, 31. TJ212.C58, v. 24
729. Rosenbaum, Ron. The assassination labyrinth. The Village voice, v. 72, Mar. 8, 1973: 5, 5, 8, 10, 24. microfilm
730. ----- Turning point for the assassination buffs. The Village voice, v. 20, May 5, 1975: 46, 50, 52. microfilm
731. Rosenbaum, Ron, and Phillip Nobile. The curious aftermath of JFK's best and brightest affair. New times (New York), v. 8, July 9, 1976: 22-34. E169.12.W45, v. 8

732. Rosenberg, M. Warren Commission. Nation, v. 199, Sept. 14, 1964: 110-112. AP2.N2, v. 199
733. Ross, Thomas, and David Wise. The espionage establishment. New York, Random House, 1967. 308 p. JK468.I6.W5
734. Rothstein, David A. Reflections on a contagion of assassination. Life-threatening behavior, v. 3, summer 1973: 105-130. RC574.L54, v. 3
735. Round one. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 3, 1969: 33. AP2.N6772, v. 73
736. Royster, V. No time for collective guilt. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 9, 1963: 72. JK1.U65, v. 55
737. Ruby and the king of torts. Times literary supplement, no. 3,342, Mar. 17, 1966: 221. AP4.T45
738. Ruby death verdict: a TV spectacular. Editor and publisher, v. 97, Mar. 21, 1964: 11, 55. PN4700.E4, v. 97
739. Ruddy, Jon. Did this man happen upon John Kennedy's assassins? Maclean's magazine, v. 80, Nov. 1967: 2-3. AP5.M2, v. 80
740. Rush to buy the report on Kennedy assassination. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, Oct. 12, 1964: 20. JK1.U65, v. 57
741. Rush to judgment: a conversation with Mark Lane and Emile de Antonio. Film comment, v. 4, fall/winter 1967: 2-18. PN1993.F438, v. 4
742. Russell, Bertrand. Sixteen questions on the assassination. Minority of one, v. 6, Sept. 1964: 6-8. AP2.M55985, v. 6
743. Russell, Francis. Doubts about Dallas. National review, v. 18, Sept. 6, 1966: 887-888, 890-893. AP2.N3545, v. 18

744. Russell, Richard. CBS leaves a skeptic skeptical. The Village voice, v. 20, Dec. 8, 1975: 156-157. microfilm
745. ----- The finger points to Fidel, but should it? The Village voice, v. 20, Dec. 15, 1975: 29-37. microfilm
746. ----- Interview with Gerry Hemming: An ex-CIA man's stunning revelations on 'the company,' JFK's murder and the plot to kill Richard Nixon. Argosy, v. 383, Apr. 1976: 25-28, 52-54. AP2.A7, v. 383
747. ----- Three witnesses. New times (New York), v. 8, June 24, 1977: 31-35. E169.N45, v. 8
748. ----- What was in the CIA's declassified JFK file? The Village voice, v. 21, Apr. 26, 1976: 17-20. microfilm

749. Sad and solemn duty; commission to investigate the assassination of J. Kennedy. Time, v. 87, Dec. 13, 1963: 26-27.
AP2.T37, v. 87
750. Safeguarding the President so it can't occur again. Business week, no. 1831, Oct. 3, 1964: 34-36.
HF5001.889
751. Sagatelyan, Mikhail. Dallas: who, how, why?--Part I. Computers and automation, v. 21, Mar. 1972: 28-32, 34-36.
TJ212.C58, v. 21
752. ----- Dallas: who, how, why?--Part II. Computers and automation, v. 21, Apr. 1972: 37-43.
TJ212.C58, v. 21
753. ----- Dallas: who, how, why?--Part III. Computers and automation, v. 21, May 1972: 34-40.
TJ212.C58, v. 21
754. ----- Dallas: who, how, why?--Part IV: conclusion. Computers and automation, v. 21, June 1972: 34-43.
TJ212.C58, v. 21
755. Salandria, Vincent J. The impossible tasks of one assassination bullet. Minority of one, v. 8, Mar. 1966: 12-18.
AP2.M55985, v. 8
756. ----- The separate Connally shot. Minority of one, v. 8, Apr. 1966: 9-13.
AP2.M55985, v. 8
757. ----- The Warren report? Liberation, v. 10, Mar. 1965: 14-32.
E838.L5, v. 10
758. Salinger, Pierre, and Sander Vanocur, eds. A tribute to John F. Kennedy. Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica Press, 1964. 162 p.
E842.S28
759. Salisbury, Harrison. The gentlemen killers of the CIA. Penthouse, v. 6, May 1975: 46-48, 51, 144-156.
AP2.P413, v. 6
760. ----- Who killed President Kennedy? Progressive magazine, v. 30, Nov. 1966: 36-39.
AP2.P8655, v. 30

761. Saltz, Eli, and John Wickey. Resolutions of the liberal dilemma in the assassination of President Kennedy. Journal of personality, v. 33, Dec. 1965: 636-648. BFl.J66, v. 33
762. Sanford, David. The death of Trujillo: Kennedy complicity? New republic, v. 172, June 28, 1975: 7-8. AP2.N624, v. 172
763. Saravay, Judith, and Kurt Back. From bright ideas to social research: The studies of the Kennedy assassination. Public opinion quarterly, v. 31, summer 1967: 253-264. HM261.A1P8, v. 31
764. Sassa, Atsuyuki. New light on the assassination: a secret agent's story. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, June 8, 1964: 38-39. JK1.U65, v. 56
765. Sauvage, Leo. As I was saying. New leader, v. 47, Nov. 9, 1964: 8-13. HX1.N37, v. 47
766. ----- As I was saying. New leader, v. 49, Nov. 21, 1966: 21-22. HX1.N37, v. 49
767. ----- The case against Mr. X. New leader, v. 49, Jan. 3, 1966: 13-18. HX1.N37, v. 49
768. ----- A few questions for the Warren Commission. Dissent, v. 14, Mar.-Apr. 1967: 200-205. HX1.D58, v. 14
769. ----- The Oswald affair. Commentary, v. 37, Mar. 1964: 55-56. DS101.C63, v. 37
770. ----- The Oswald affair: an examination of the contradictions and omissions of the Warren report. Cleveland, World Publishing Co., 1966. 418 p. E842.9.S243
771. ----- Oswald in Dallas: a few loose ends. Reporter, v. 30, Jan. 2, 1964: 24-26. D839.R385, v. 30

772. Sauvage, Leo. Oswald's case against the Warren Commission. New leader, v. 48, Dec. 20, 1965: 5-10. HX1.N37, v. 48
773. ----- Prof. Bickel and the Warren Commission. New leader, v. 49, Nov. 7, 1966: 16-19. HX1.N37, v. 49
774. ----- The Warren Commission's case against Oswald. New leader, v. 48, Nov. 22, 1965: 16-21. HX1.N37, v. 48
775. Scaduto, Tony. Blood money scandal: President Ford's assassination coverup. Genesis, Oct. 1975: 24-27, 33. AP2.G33
[Not in L.C. collection]
776. Scene of the crime. Newsweek, v. 70, Dec. 4, 1967: 31B-32. AP2.N6772, v. 70
777. Schiller, Lawrence. The controversy. [Phonodisc] Capitol KAO2677 [1967] R67-300
778. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A eulogy: John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 32-32A. AP2.S2, v. 236
779. ----- On writing of contemporary history. Atlantic, v. 219, Mar. 1967: 69-74. AP2.A8, v. 219
780. Schonfeld, Maurice W. The shadow of a gunman. Columbia journalism review, v. 14, July-Aug. 1975: 46-50. PN4700.C64, v. 14
781. Schorr, Daniel. The assassins. New York review of books, v. 24, Oct. 3, 1977: 14-22. AP2.N655, v. 24
782. Schreiber, Flor Reta, and M. Herman. November 22, 1963, a psychiatric evaluation. Science digest, v. 58, July 1965: 39-41. Q1.S35, v. 58
783. Schulz, Donald E. Kennedy and the Cuban connection. Newsweek, v. 88, Sept. 6, 1976: 9. AP2.N6772, v. 88
784. ----- Kennedy and the Cuban connection. Foreign policy, no. 26, spring 1977: 57-64, 121-139. E744.F75

785. Schwartz, Jay. A legal demurrer to the report of the Warren Commission. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 11, July 1966: 318-329. RA1001.A57, v. 11
786. Scobey, Alfreda. A lawyer's notes on the Warren Commission report... American Bar Association journal, v. 51, Jan. 1965: 39-43. Law
787. Scott, Peter Dale. Crime and cover-up: the CIA, the Mafia, and the Dallas-Watergate connection. Berkeley, Calif., Westworks, 1977. 80 p. E842.9.S34
788. ----- From Dallas to Watergate: the longest cover-up. Ram-parts, v. 12, Nov. 1973: 12-17, 20, 53-54. AP2.R19, v. 12
789. Scott, Peter Dale, Paul L. Hoch, and Russell Stetler, eds. The assassinations: Dallas and beyond: a guide to cover-ups and investigations. 1st ed. New York, Random House, c1976. 552 p. E842.9.A8 1976
790. Screen test. Newsweek, v. 63, Feb. 10, 1964: 48. AP2.N6772, v. 63
791. The Second Oswald: an exchange of letters. New York review of books, v. 7, Oct. 6, 1966: 29-34. AP2.N655, v. 7
792. Second primer of assassination theories. Esquire, v. 67, May 1967: 104-107. AP2.E845, v. 67
793. Senseless tragedy. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 19. AP2.S2, v. 236
794. Seth, Ronald. The executioners: the story of SMERSH. New York, Hawthorn Books, [1968, c1967] 199 p. DK266.3.S44 1968
795. Seventy-two hours and what they can teach us. Life, v. 55, Dec. 6, 1963: 4. AP2.L547, v. 55
796. Shadow on a grassy knoll: photographic-analysis shows no new evidence. Time, v. 89, May 26, 1967: 21. AP2.T37, v 89

797. Shales, Tom. When good assassinationists get together...they seldom get together. *Oui*, v. 5, Feb. 1976: 78-79, 121-122.
AP2.063, v. 5
798. Shame of Dallas. *Saturday review*, v. 46, Dec. 28, 1963: 26.
AP2.S273, v. 46
799. Shannon, W. V. Enough is enough. *Commonweal*, v. 85, Nov. 18, 1966: 191-192.
AP2.C6897, v. 85
800. Shaw, J. Gary, and Larry R. Harris. Cover-up: the governmental conspiracy to conceal the facts about the public execution of John Kennedy. 1st ed. Cleburne, Tex., Shaw, 1976. 227 p.
E842.9.S44
801. Shayon, Robert Lewis. Persistent devils; CBS news inquiry: the Warren report. *Saturday review*, v. 50, July 22, 1967: 46.
AP2.S273, v. 50
802. ----- The relevant question. *Saturday review*, v. 46, Dec. 14, 1963: 23.
Z1219.S25, v. 46
803. Shea, J. M., Jr. Memo from a Dallas citizen. *Look*, v. 28, Mar. 24, 1964: 88, 91-92, 94, 96.
AP2.L79, v. 28
804. Sheatsley, Paul B., and Norman Bradburn. Assassination. How the American public responded. [Washington] American Psychological Association, 1964. [Not in L.C. collection]
Paper presented at the American Psychological Association 72d Annual Convention held in Los Angeles, Sept. 4-9, 1964.
805. Sheatsley, Paul B., and Jacob J. Feldman. The assassination of President Kennedy: a preliminary report on public reactions and behavior. *Public opinion quarterly*, v. 28, summer 1964: 189-215.
HM261.A1.P8, v. 28
806. Shiverick, David, Kathleen Shiverick, Henry Ansbacher, and Rowena Ansbacher. Lee Harvey Oswald: an Adlerian interpretation. *Psychoanalytic review*, v. 53, fall 1966: 55-68.
BF1.P5, v. 53
807. Shock, then recovery: impact of the assassination of Pres. Kennedy, opinions of U.S. economists. *Business week*, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 92-93.
HF5001.B89

808. The Shot that changed our future. Time and tide, Nov. 28, 1963: 4.
[Not in L.C. collection]
809. Shutting up big mouth. Time, v. 90, Aug. 25, 1967: 48-51.
AP2.T37, v. 90
810. Sicinski, A. Dallas and Warsaw: impact of a major national
political event on public opinion abroad. Public opinion
quarterly, v. 33, summer 1969: 190-196. HM261.A1.P8, v. 33
811. Sideshow in New Orleans. Time, v. 93, Jan. 31, 1969: 40.
AP2.T37, v. 93
812. Sidey, Hugh. Jackie Onassis' memory fragments on tape. Time,
vol. 111, Apr. 24, 1978: 30. AP2.T37, v. 111
813. Sifting fact from fantasy: use of truth drugs in Jim Garrison's
investigation. Time, v. 89, Mar. 31, 1967: 41.
AP2.T37, v. 89
814. Sites, Paul. Lee Harvey Oswald and the American dream. [1st ed.]
New York, Pageant Press, 1967. 261 p. E842.9.S5
815. Sleight of hand: Jim Garrison's assassination investigation
extends to FBI and CIA. Newsweek, v. 69, May 22, 1967: 40, 42
AP2.N6772, v. 69
816. Smiling through. Newsweek, v. 73, Jan. 27, 1969: 27-28.
AP2.N6772, v. 73
817. Smirnova, L. I was hired to assassinate him. New times (Moscow),
no. 46, Nov. 1972: 27. E169.12.N45
818. Smith, Eliot Fremont. Who killed Kennedy? Oswald did. The
Village voice, v. 20, Dec. 8, 1975: 57-58.
microfilm
819. Smith, L. Dealey plaza. Holiday, v. 46, Nov. 1969: 78-79.
AP2.H592, v. 46
820. Smith, R. H. Thinking the unthinkable: the Warren Commission
books. Publishers weekly, v. 190, Oct. 10, 1966: 55.
Z1219.P98, v. 190

821. Smith, R. P., and Cyril Wecht. The medical evidence in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Forensic science, v. 3, Apr. 1974: 105-128. RA1001.F65, v. 3
822. Smith, Sandy. From a governor and a D.A. an offer of resignation. Life, v. 63, Sept. 29, 1967: 34-36. AP2.L547, v. 63
823. Smith, William Rochelle. Assassination by consensus: the story behind the Kennedy assassination. Washington, L'Avant Garde Publications [1966] 240 p. E842.9.S6
824. ----- A hog story from the aftermire of the Kennedy assassination. Washington, L'Avant Garde Publications, [1968] 55 l. E842.9.S62
825. Snider, Arthur J. Assassination, a new medical opinion. Science digest, v. 61, Feb. 1967: 35-36. Q1.S383, v. 61
826. Snyder, Dr. LeMoyne. Lee Oswald's guilt: how science nailed Kennedy's killer. Popular science, v. 186, Apr. 1965: 68-73. AP2.P8, v. 186
827. Solved: mystery of the missing frames. Newsweek, v. 69, Feb. 6, 1967: 17. AP2.N6772, v. 69
828. Something of a shambles. Time, v. 89, June 30, 1967: 42. AP2.T37, v. 89
829. Soviet press comment following Kennedy's death. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 15, Dec. 18, 1963: 3-7. D839.C87, v. 15
830. Sparrow, John Hanbury Anges. After the assassination: a positive appraisal of the Warren report. New York, Chilmark Press, 1967. 77 p. E842.9.S65
831. ----- Making mysteries about Oswald. Atlas, v. 9, Mar. 1965: 173-174. AP1.A83, v. 9

832. Spitzer, Stephen P. Mass media vs. personal sources of information about the presidential assassination: a comparison of six investigations. *Journal of broadcasting*, v. 9, winter 1964-65: 45-50. PN1991.J6, v. 9
833. Spitzer, Stephen P., and Norman K. Denzin. Levels of knowledge in an emergent crisis. *Social forces*, v. 44, Dec. 1965: 234-237. HN51.S5, v. 44
834. Sprague, Richard E. The American news media and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy: accessories after the fact--conclusion. *Computers and automation*, v. 22, July 1973: 31-38. TJ212.C58, v. 22
835. ----- The assassination of President John F. Kennedy: in the plans and the coverup. *People and the pursuit of truth*, May 1975: 3-5, 7. [Not in L.C. collection]
836. ----- The assassination of President John F. Kennedy: the application of computers to the photographic evidence. *Computers and automation*, v. 19, May 1970: 29-60. TJ212.C58, v. 19
837. ----- The assassination of President Kennedy--declassification of relevant documents from the National Archives. *Computers and automation*, v. 20, Oct. 1971: 41-45. TJ212.C58, v. 20
838. ----- The framing of Lee Harvey Oswald. *Computers and automation*, v. 22, Oct. 1973: 21-24, 34-36. TJ212.C58, v. 22
839. ----- Nixon, Ford, and the political assassinations in the United States. *Computers and people*, v. 24, Jan. 1975: 27-31. TJ212.C58, v. 24
840. Stafford, Jean. The strange world of Marguerite Oswald. *McCall's*, v. 93, Oct. 1965: 112-113, 192-194, 196-200, 202-205. TT500, M 2, v. 93
841. Stang, Alan. They killed the President. *American opinion*, v. 19, Feb. 1976: 1-8, 59-61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71-72. AP2.O4732, v. 19
842. Stephens, Eve. The assassin. [1st Amer. ed.] New York, Coward-McCann [1970] 253 p. PZ4.S832.A53

843. Stetler, Russel, Peter Dale Scott, and Paul L. Hoch. The assassinations: Dallas and beyond: a guide to cover-ups and investigations. 1st ed. New York, Random House, c1976. 552 p. E842.9.A8
844. Stewart, Charles J. Catholic and Jewish pulpit reaction to the Kennedy assassination. Western speech, v. 32, spring 1967: 131-139. PN4071.W45, v. 32
845. ----- The pulpit in time of crisis: 1865 and 1963. Speech monographs, v. 32, Nov. 1965: 427-434. PN4077.S6, v. 32
846. Stiles, John, and Gerald R. Ford. Portrait of an assassin. New York, Simon and Shuster, 1965. 508 p. E842.9.F28
847. Stolley, Richard B. What happened next; film of John Kennedy's assassination. Esquire, v. 80, Nov. 1973: 134-135, 262-263. AP2.E845, v. 80
848. Stop the press. Front page coverage of the Kennedy assassinations (Filmstrip). Visual Education Consultants, 1969.
849. Strange world of Lee Oswald: more light on the assassination. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 16, 1963: 60-62. JKL.U65, v. 55
850. Summers, Anthony. The Kennedy assassination: why doubts persist. Atlas world review, v. 25, July 1978: 20-22. AP1.A83, v. 25
851. Sween, Joyce A., Rae Lesser Blumberg, Samuel A. Mueller, and Suzanne E. Rocheleau [Northwestern Assassination Research Group] Reactions to the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; a preliminary report. [Evanston, Ill.] Northwestern University, c1969. 1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.N67
852. Syme, Anthony V. The assassins. London, Melbourne [etc.] Horwitz, [1967] 162 p. HV6278.S95
853. Symposium on the Warren Commission report. New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 404-524. K14.E974, v. 40

854. Szulc, Ted. Death of JFK; CIA and FBI failure to report anti-Castro conspiracies. New republic, v. 174, June 5, 1976: 6-8. AP2.N624, v. 174
855. ----- Murder by proxy. Penthouse, v. 6, Aug. 1975: 44-46, 124-132. AP2.P413, v. 6
856. ----- The spy among us. Penthouse, v. 6, July 1975: 44-46, 92-93, 123-125, 132-135. AP2.P413, v. 6
857. ----- The Warren Commission in its own words. New republic, v. 173, Sept. 27, 1975: 9-48. AP2.N624, v. 173

858. Tackwood, Louis E. The glass house tapes. New York, Avon Books, 1973 284 p. HV8148.L552C65 1973
859. Tales of Garrison. The economist, v. 222, Mar. 25, 1967: 1145. HG11.E2, v. 222
860. Tamney, Joseph B., and James Ahler. Some functions of religious ritual in catastrophe: Kennedy assassination. Sociological analysis, v. 25, winter 1964: 212-230. HN51.A7, v. 25
861. Task of the Warren Commission. Nation, v. 198, Jan. 27, 1964: 81. AP2.N2, v. 198
862. Taste of conspiracy: European newsmen are leery of Garrison's investigation. Newsweek, v. 69, Mar. 20, 1967: 76. AP2.N6772, v. 69
863. Tastmona, Thothnu [pseud]. It is as if: a solution of the President Kennedy death mystery. New York, Exposition Press, 1966. [Not in L.C. collection]
864. Taylor, Henry J. Facts belie 'plot' charges in JFK assassination. Human events, v. 35, Apr. 12, 1975: 9. D410.H8, v. 35
865. Teamsters: limit of devotion. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 75-76. AP2.N6772, v. 62
866. Tebbel, John. JFK: the magazines and peace. Saturday review, v. 46, Dec. 14, 1963: 56-57. AP2.S273, v. 46
867. Temple, Wayne C. Two martyrs. Lincoln herald, v. 65, winter 1963: 165. E457.M887, v. 65
868. Teutsch, Joel M., and Champion K. Teutsch. Victimology: an effect of consciousness, interpersonal dynamics and human physics. International journal of criminology and penology, v. 2, Aug. 1974: 249-274. [Not in L.C. collection]
869. Texas. Attorney General's Office. Texas supplemental report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the serious wounding of Governor John B. Connally, November 22, 1963 [by Attorney General Waggoner Carr. Austin, 1964] 20 l. E842.9.T45
Rare book collection

870. Text of summary of Warren Commission report. CQ weekly,
v. 22, Oct. 2, 1964: 2332-2340. JK1.C15, v. 22
871. And Then it was November 22 again. Newsweek, v. 64, Nov. 30,
1964: 25-28. AP2.N6772, v. 64
872. Theory of an Oswald conspiracy. Life, v. 62, Mar. 3, 1967: 33.
AP2.L547, v. 62
873. They've killed the President. National review, v. 28, Feb. 6,
1976: 81-85, 88-90. AP2.N3545, v.28
874. Thickening the plot: judges support Jim Garrison's plot theory.
Newsweek, v. 69, Mar. 27, 1967: 37. A2.N6772, v. 69
875. Thompson, Josiah. The cross fire that killed President Kennedy:
excerpts from six seconds in Dallas. Saturday evening post,
v. 240, Dec. 2, 1967: 27-31. AP2.S2, v. 240
876. ----- Six seconds in Dallas; a micro-study of the Kennedy ass-
assination. [New York] B. Geis Associates, distributed by
Random House, [1968, c1967] 323 p. E842.9.T49
877. Thompson, T. Assassin: the man held and killed for murder. Life,
v. 55, Nov. 29, 1963: 37-39. AP2.L547, v. 55
878. ----- In Texas a policeman and an assassin are laid to rest too.
Life, v. 55, Dec. 6, 1969: 52B-52E. AP2.L547, v. 55
879. Thompson, William Clifton. A bibliography of literature relating
to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Revised
ed. San Antonio, Tx., [c1968] 40 p. Z8462.8.T45 1968b
880. ----- A bibliography of literature relating to the assassination
of President John F. Kennedy; 1971 Suppl. San Antonio Tex.,
distributed by W. C. Thompson & Son, 1971. Z8462.8.T45 1968b Suppl.
881. Thomson, George C. The quest for truth: a quizzical look at the
Warren report; or, how President Kennedy was really assassinated.
Glendale, Calif., G. C. Thomson Engineering Co., c1964. 50 p.
E842.9.T5
882. Thornley, Kerry W. Oswald. Chicago, New Classics House, 1965.
126 p. E842.9.T54
883. Those missing exhibits; photographs and X-rays turned over to
National Archives. Nation, v. 203, Nov. 14, 1966: 500.
AP2.N2, v. 203

884. Tinder, Glenn. Death of a President and the problem of meaning.
Review of politics, v. 29, July 1967: 407-415.
JAL.R4, v. 29
885. Tobin, R. L. If you can keep your head when all about you:
television and news magazine coverage of the Kennedy assassin-
ation story. Saturday review, v. 46, Dec. 14, 1963: 53-54.
AP2.S273, v. 46
886. Tonahill, Joe H. Why Lee Harvey Oswald would have been acquitted
for the murder of President John F. Kennedy. [n.p., 1967]
1 v. (various pagings) KF224.O8.T6
887. Towne, Anthony. The assassination, the Warren Commission and the
public interest. Notice, v. 27, Feb. 1967: 6-14.
BV4531.A1.M76, v. 27
888. Tragic end of John F. Kennedy. U.S. news and world report, v. 55,
Dec. 2, 1963: 31-33.
JK1.U65, v. 55
889. Trevor-Roper, Hugh R. Slovenly Warren report. Atlas, v. 9, Feb.
1965: 115-118.
AP1.A83, v. 9
890. Trillin, Calvin. Reporter at large; the buffs. New Yorker, v. 43,
June 10, 1967: 41-46, 48, 50, 53-54, 56, 59-60, 62, 65-66,
68, 71.
AP2.N6763, v. 43
891. Truth about Kennedy assassination: questions raised and answered.
U.S. news and world report, v. 61, Oct. 10, 1966: 44-50.
JK1.U65, v. 61
892. Truth vs. death; views of C. Roberts. Time, v. 89, Mar. 17, 1967:
26.
AP2.T37, v. 89
893. Tuchler, Maier. Psychiatric observation on the Warren Com-
mission report. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 11, July 1966:
289-299.
RA1001.A57, v. 11
894. Turnbull, J. W. Note from Texas. Commonweal, v. 79, Dec. 13, 1963:
337.
AP2.C6897.v. 79

895. Turner, Ralph F., and Don Olson. Photographic evidence and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 16, Oct. 1971: 399-419.
RA1001.A57, v. 16
896. Turner, W., and D. Welsh. In the shadow of Dallas. Ramparts, v. 7, Jan. 25, 1969: 61-71.
AP2.R19, v. 7
897. Turner, William W. Garrison commission on the assassination of President Kennedy. Ramparts, v. 6, Jan. 1968: 43-68.
AP2.R19, v. 6
898. ----- The inquest. Ramparts, v. 5, June 1967: 17-29.
AP2.R19, v. 5
899. ----- Press vs. Garrison. Ramparts, v. 6, Sept. 1967: 8, 10, 12.
AP2.R19, v. 6
900. ----- Some disturbing parallels: assassinations of M. L. King and J. F. Kennedy. Ramparts, v. 6, June 29, 1968: 33-46.
AP2.R19, v. 6
901. Tuteur, Werner. Dialogue in Dallas: psychiatric examination of Jack Ruby. Mental health, v. 58, spring 1974: 6-10.
[Not in L.C. collection]
902. TV sees it now, for seventy hours. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 34.
HF5001.B89
903. Two for the seesaw. Newsweek, v. 70, July 3, 1967: 82.
AP2.N6772, v. 70

904. Ultimate assassination book: a story to make your eyes roll. New times (New York), v. 10, Feb. 6, 1978: 16.
E169.I2.N45, v. 10
905. Ungar, Sanford J. A new man on two old cases. Atlantic, v. 239, Feb. 1977: 8, 12, 14.
AP2.A8, v. 239
906. U.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States. Allegations concerning the assassination of President Kennedy. In its Report to the President [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1975: 251, 269.
JK458.I6.U54 1975
907. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights. National Archives--security classification problems involving Warren Commission files and other records. Hearing, 94th Congress., 1st session. Nov. 11, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 98 p.
KF27.G6628 1975d
908. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. Providing funds for the expenses of the investigations and studies to be conducted by the Select Committee on Assassinations; report to accompany H. Res. 1557. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1976. 3 p. (94th Congress., 2d session. House. Report no. 94-1685)
909. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Authorizing the Select Committee on Assassinations or any subcommittee thereof to make applications to courts; and to bring and defend lawsuits arising out of subpoenas, orders immunizing witnesses and compelling them to testify, testimony or the production of evidence, and the failure to testify or produce evidence; report to accompany H. Res. 760. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 3 p. (95th Congress., 1st session. House. Report no. 95-606)
910. ----- Creating a Select Committee on Assassinations; report to accompany H. Res. 222. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1977. 3 p. (95th Congress., 1st session. House. Report no. 95-3)
911. ----- Creating a select committee to conduct an investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the death of John F. Kennedy and the death of Martin Luther King, Junior, and of any others the select committee shall determine; report to accompany H. Res. 1540. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1976. 2 p. (94th Congress., 2d session. House. Report no. 94-1566)

912. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Preserving evidence pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy; report to accompany H.R. 9545. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965] 6 p. (89th Congress., 1st session. House. Report No. 813) E842.9.A52
913. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. FBI oversight. Hearings, 94th Congress., 1st and 2d sessions. Parts 1-3. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975-1976. 628 p. KF27.J847 1975
914. U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Assassinations. Committee meetings. Hearings, 95th Congress., 1st session. March 9...23, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 60 p. KF27.5.A8 1977
915. ----- Report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 14 p. (95th Congress., 1st session. House. Report no. 95-119)
916. ----- Report together with additional and supplemental views, of the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 18 p. 94th Congress., 2d session. House. Report no. 94-1781)
917. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Preserving evidence pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy; report to accompany H.R. 9545. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 4 p. (89th Cong., 1st sess. Senate. Report no. 851) E842.9.A525
918. U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy: performance of the intelligence agencies. Final report; Book V. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 106 p. (94th Congress., 2d session. Senate. Report no. 94-755)
919. U.S. Library of Congress. General Reference and Bibliography Division John Fitzgerald Kennedy 1917-1963: a chronological list of references. Comp. by the Bibliographic and Reference Correspondence Section. Washington, [1964] 68 p. Z8462.8.U5
920. ----- John Fitzgerald Kennedy 1917-1963: a chronological list of references supplement. Comp. by William J. Studes. Washington [1964] 25 p. Z8462.8.U5

921. U.S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. The Kennedy assassination and the Warren report, selected references [by] Richard Malow. Washington [1966] 6 p.
922. U.S. National Archives. Inventory of the records of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Comp. by Marion Johnson, Record Group 272. Washington, [1973]
923. U.S. President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. A concise compendium of the Warren Commission report on the assassination of John F. Kennedy. New York, Popular Library, [c1964] 637 p. E842.9.A55
924. ----- Investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. [1964] E842.9.A54
925. ----- The official Warren Commission report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. [Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday] 1964. 888 p. E842.9.A55
926. ----- Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. [1964] 888 p. E842.9.A55
927. ----- Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. [1st ed.] New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co. [1964] 726 p. E842.9.A55 1964b
928. ----- The Warren report; report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. [New York, Associated Press, 1964?] 366 p. E842.9.A55 1964d
929. ----- The witnesses; the highlights of hearings before the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. [1st ed.] New York, McGraw-Hill [1965] 634 p. E842.9.A562
930. Unraveling the mystery of the assassination of John F. Kennedy: the official story. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, Oct. 5, 1964: 35-42, 70-71, 96-97. JK1.U65, v. 57
931. Untold stories: aftermath of the assassination. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, Oct. 12, 1964: 58-62. JK1.U65, v. 57
932. Ushakov, G. Dallas merry go round. New Times (Moscow), no. 11, Mar. 18, 1964: 27-29.. D839.N483

933. Van Bremmelen, J. M. Did Lee Harvey Oswald act without help? New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 466-477.
K14.E974, v. 40
934. Van Der Karr, Richard K. How Dallas TV stations covered Kennedy shooting. Journalism quarterly, v. 42, winter 1965: 646-649.
PN4700.J7, v. 42
935. Vanocur, Sander, and Pierre Salinger. A tribute to John F. Kennedy. Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica Press, 1964. 162 p.
E842.S28
936. Verdict in New Orleans. Nation, v. 208, Mar. 17, 1969: 324.
AP2.N2, v. 208
937. Viorst, Milton. The Mafia, the CIA, and the Kennedy assassination. Washingtonian, v. 11, Nov. 1975: 113-118. F1191.W3, v. 11

938. Wainwright, L. Book for all to read: Warren report. Life, v. 57, Oct. 16, 1964: 35. AP2.L547, v. 57
939. ----- Warren report is not enough; voices speaking in contradiction of report; call for investigation. Life, v. 61, Oct. 7, 1966: 38. AP2.L547, v. 61
940. Wardlaw, Jack, and Rosemary James. Plot or politics? The Garrison case and its cast. New Orleans, Pelican Pub. House, 1967. 167 p. E842.9.J3
941. Warner, Dale G. Who killed the President? [1st ed.] New York, American Press [1964] 24 p. E842.9.W3
942. Warner, Ken. Big bargain in rifles. Mechanix illustrated, v. 60, Oct. 1964: 89-91, 152, 153. TL.M46, v. 60
943. Warren Commission. Nation, v. 197, Dec. 28, 1963: 445. AP2.N2, v. 197
944. Warren Commission. New Republic, v. 150, Feb. 29, 1964: 4-5. AP2.N624, v. 150
945. Warren Commission report. Time, v. 84, Oct. 2, 1964: 45-50. AP2.T37, v. 84
946. The Warren Commission report (Motion picture). National Broadcasting Co., 1964. Fi67-2029
947. Warren Commission report; paraffin test unreliable; killing still mystery. Science news letter, v. 86, Oct. 10, 1964: 227, 229, 230. Q1.S76, v. 86
948. Warren Commission; testimony and evidence. Time, v. 84, Dec. 4, 1964: 25-27. AP2.T37, v. 84
949. Warren findings: some new facts. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, July 6, 1964: 44. JK1.U65, v. 57
950. The Warren report: how to murder the medical evidence. Current medicine for attorneys, v. 12, Nov. 1965: 1-28.
[Not in L.C. collection]

951. Warren report; paperback editions were produced at record-breaking pace. Publishers weekly, v. 186, Oct. 5, 1964: 80-82.
Z1219.P98, v. 186
952. Warren report wrong. College teacher says. Los Angeles times, Nov. 17, 1967: 18.
Newsp
953. Warren's secrets. National review, v. 16, Apr. 7, 1964: 265-266.
AP2.N3545, v. 16
954. Was Jack Ruby insane? Life, v. 58, Feb. 21, 1964: 26-29.
AP2.L547, v. 58
955. Watters, Pat, and Stephen Gillers, eds. Investigating the FBI. New York, Doubleday and Co., 1973. 518 p.
HV8138.I58
956. Weaver, John Downing. Warren: the man, the court, the era. Boston, Little Brown, 1967. 406 p.
KF8745.W3W4
957. ----- Warren: the man, the court, the era. London, Gollancz, 1968. 406 p.
KF8745.W3W4 1968
958. Weberman, Alan, and Michael Canfield. Coup d'etat in America: the CIA and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. New York, Third Press, 1975. 314 p.
E842.9.C36
959. Wecht, Cyril H. A critique of the medical aspects of the investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 11, July 1966: 300-317.
RA1001.A57, v. 11
960. ----- New evidence rekindles old doubts--JFK assassination: 'a prolonged and willful cover-up.' Modern medicine, v. 42, Oct. 28, 1974: 40X-40Z.
R11.M85, v. 42
961. ----- Pathologist's view of JFK autopsy: an unsolved case. Modern medicine, v. 40, Nov. 27, 1972: 28-32.
R11.M85, v. 40
962. Wecht, Cyril, and R. P. Smith. The medical evidence in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Forensic science, v. 3, Apr. 1974: 105-128.
RA1001.F65, v. 3

963. Weisberg, Harold. Kennedy murder: buried proof of a conspiracy. Saga, v. 34, Apr. 1967: 28-31, 89-90, 92, 94-96.
AP2.S127, v. 34
964. ----- Oswald in New Orleans; case of conspiracy with the CIA. New York, Canyon Books [1967] 404 p. E842.9.W38 1968
965. ----- Post mortem: JFK assassination cover-up smashed. Frederick, Md., Weisberg, c1975. 650 p. E842.9.W393
966. ----- Post-mortem; suppressed Kennedy autopsy. Frederick, Md., n.p., 1969. 650 p. E842.9.W393
967. ----- Post-mortem; suppressed Kennedy autopsy. [Frederick, Md., 1969] 144 l. E842.9.W39
968. ----- Post-mortem III; secrets of the Kennedy autopsy. Frederick, Md., n.p., [1969] 1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.W396 1969a
969. ----- The report on the Warren report; or, the six wise men of Industan. n.p. [1965] 188 p. E842.9.W4 1965a
970. ----- Whitewash: the report on the Warren report. [Hyattstown, Md., 1966, c1965] 224 p. E842.9.W4 1966ab
971. Weisberg, Harold, and Jim Lesser. Whitewash IV: top secret JFK assassination transcript. Frederick, Md., Weisberg [1974] 224 p. E842.9.W415
972. Welsh, D., and W. Turner. In the shadow of Dallas. Ramparts, v. 7, Jan. 25, 1969: 61-71. AP2.R19, v. 7
973. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Inc. November 22, dialogue in Dallas. (Phonodisc). New York, [1964]. Matrix no. N-WBC 2692-2693. R64-2438
974. Whalen, R. J. Kennedy assassination. Saturday evening post, v. 240, Jan. 14, 1967: 19-25. AP2.S2, v. 240
975. What conspiracy? Testimony of Perry Russo. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 24, 1969: 33. AP2.N6772, v. 73.
976. What Garrison proved. New republic, v. 160, Mar. 15, 1969: 9. AP2.N624, v. 160

977. What they saw that dreadful day in Dallas; testimony and evidence published. Newsweek, v. 64, Dec. 7, 1964: 28-30, 35-36, 38, 40, 42. AP2.N6772, v. 64
978. What's your source?; premature publication of Journal-American of Ruby's testimony before Warren. Newsweek, v. 64, Aug. 31, 1964: 68-69. AP2.N6772, v. 64
979. Wheeler, Keith. Cursed gun, the track of C2766. Life, v. 59, Aug. 27, 1965: 62-65. AP2.L547, v. 59
980. When Kennedy died. Newsweek, v. 64, Sept. 14, 1964: 61. AP2.N6772, v. 64
981. Where the shots came from. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 28, 1963: 7. AP2.N624, v. 149
982. White, Stephen. Should we believe the Warren report? New York, MacMillan, [1968] 309 p. E842.9.W46
983. White, Theodore H. Assassination inquiry: slow, careful. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Jan. 27, 1964: 49. JK1.U65, v. 56
984. ----- For President Kennedy: an epilogue. Look, v. 55, Dec. 6, 1963: 158-159. AP2.L79, v. 55
985. Who killed JFK? Skeptic, no. 9, Sept.-Oct. 1975: whole issue. D1.S485, 1975
986. Who killed JFK? Just one assassin. Time, v. 106, Nov. 24, 1975: 32-34, 37-38. AP2.T37, v. 106
987. Who killed Kennedy? Fact, v. 3, Nov.-Dec. 1966: 3-17. AP2.F142, v. 3
988. Who killed Kennedy? National review, v. 20, July 2, 1968: 642. AP2.N3545, v. 20
989. Who killed President Kennedy: soviet condolences. New times (Moscow), no. 48, Dec. 4, 1963: 5-7. D839.N483

990. Who was to blame? Economist, v. 209, Dec. 7, 1963: 1022.
HG11.E2, v. 209
991. Why a plot was feared when Kennedy was shot. U.S. news and world
report, v. 56, Jan. 6, 1964: 7. JK1.U65, v. 56
992. Why has file no. 3106 not be publicized? Human events, v. 26,
Dec. 17, 1966: 805. D410.H8, v. 26
993. Why is the Assassinations Committee killing itself?; anatomy of a
murder inquest. Rolling stone, no. 184, Apr. 7, 1977: 42-45.
ML1.R65
994. Why the JFK case is coming back to life. U.S. news and world report,
v. 82, Jan. 17, 1977: 28-30. JK1.U65, v. 82
995. Wickey, John, and Eli Saltz. Resolutions of the liberal dilemma
in the assassination of President Kennedy. Journal of per-
sonality, v. 33, Dec. 1965: 636-648. BF1.J66, v. 33
996. Willis, Gary. Ten years after. Playboy, v. 20, Nov. 1973: 169, 212.
AP2.P69, v. 20
997. Willis, Gary, and Ovid Demaris. Disposal of Jack Ruby. Esquire,
v. 67, June 1967: 131-135, 172-174, 176-178, 180-182, 184.
AP2.E845, v. 67
998. ----- Jack Ruby. [New York] New American Library, [1968] 266 p.
E842.9.W47
999. Wilson, Richard. What happened to the Kennedy program. Look,
v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: 117-118, 120, 122. AP2.L79, v. 28
1000. Wire services appeal FBI denial of refund. Editor and publisher,
v. 111, Feb. 25, 1978: 17. FN4700.E4, v. 111
1001. Wise, Dan, and Marietta Maxfield. The day Kennedy died. San Antonio,
Tx., Naylor Co. [1964] 137 p. E842.9.W5
1002. Wise, David. It will be many years... Good housekeeping, v. 158,
Feb. 1964: 90-91, 150. TX1.G7, v. 158
1003. ----- Secret evidence on the Kennedy assassination. Saturday
evening post, v. 241, Apr. 6, 1968: 70-73.
AP2.S2, v. 241

1004. Wise, David, and Thomas Ross. The espionage establishment. New York, Random House [1967] 308 p. UB270.W56
1005. ----- The espionage establishment. London, Cape, 1968. 308 p. UB270.W56 1969
1006. ----- The invisible government. New York, Random House, 1964. 375 p. JK468.I6.W5
1007. Wolfenstein, Martha, and Gilbert W. Kliman, eds. Children and the death of a President; multidisciplinary studies. New York, Doubleday, 1966. 256 p. BF723.D3.W6
1008. ----- Children and the death of a President; multidisciplinary studies. Gloucester, Mass., P. Smith, 1969 [c1965] 288 p. BF723.D3.W6
1009. The World and the White House. New statesman, v. 66, Nov. 29, 1963: 765. AP4.N64, v. 66
1010. World listened and watched: radio-TV meet greatest challenge in wake of JFK tragedy... Broadcasting, v. 65, Dec. 2, 1963: 36-61. TK6540.B85, v. 65
1011. World mourns in doubt, fear, hope. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 9, 1963: 56-58. AP2.N6772, v. 62
1012. World weeps and waits. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 30-31. HF5001.B89
1013. Worthington, Peter. The limelight: why Jack Ruby's first trial couldn't happen here. Maclean's, v. 77, Apr. 18, 1964: 3-4. AP5.M2, v. 77
1014. Wrone, David R. The assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy: an annotated bibliography. Wisconsin magazine of history, v. 56, no. 1, 1972: 21-36. F576.W7, v. 56
1015. WQMR (Radio station). Four dark days in November [Phonodisc. Washington, Connie B. Gay Broadcasting Corp., 1964] Matrix no. PB1495-1496. R64-927

1016. X marks the spot. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 27-28,
AP2.N6772, v. 62
1017. Yarborough, Ralph. Sensory perception. Newsweek, v. 69, Jan. 16,
1967: 6. AP2.N6772, v. 69
1018. Yazijian, Harvey, and Sid Blumenthal, eds. Government by gunplay:
assassination conspiracy theories from Dallas to today. New
York, New American Library, 1976. 266 p. E842.9.G65
1019. You all know me. I'm Jack Ruby. Esquire, v. 67, May 1967: 79-87,
153-164. AP2.E845, v. 67
1020. Young, Roger. The investigation: where it stands today. New Orleans,
v. 1, July 1967: 16-17, 54-59. F379.N5, v. 1
1021. Zwart, Jacques. Invitation to hairsplitting; a hypercritical invest-
igation into the true function of the Warren Commission and the
true nature of the Warren report. Amsterdam, Paris. [1970]
40 p. E842.9.Z9

I N D E X

- Assassinations 11, 27, 35, 36, 41-44, 46, 55, 58-59, 82, 102,
137-138, 153, 164, 205, 214, 219, 242, 283, 307, 322, 352, 366,
392, 459, 462, 497, 516, 571, 574-575, 577, 580, 582, 584-585,
600, 606, 608, 621, 627, 630, 634, 650-652, 669, 671, 688, 692,
701, 721, 729-730, 734, 752-754, 763-764, 781, 789, 792, 797,
808, 817, 823-825, 832, 839, 841, 843, 846, 852, 871, 890, 900,
931, 973, 977, 1015
- Castro, Fidel 95, 182, 429, 745
- CIA 9, 34, 99, 121, 136, 218, 256, 310, 398, 456, 492, 530,
541, 546, 638-639, 655, 693, 746, 748, 759, 787, 854, 937, 958,
964
- Connally, John 57, 125
- Conspiracy 12, 18, 22, 24-26, 28, 54, 57, 69-72, 90-91, 107,
112, 114, 119, 130-131, 145, 174, 177, 196, 212, 215, 225, 234,
235, 237, 245, 255, 263, 273-275, 278, 280, 282, 287, 289, 308,
309, 324-325, 338, 340, 344, 366, 414, 437, 440, 455, 462, 472,
477, 481, 504, 512, 524-525, 527, 529, 548-551, 586, 591, 599,
610-611, 613, 629, 649, 681-682, 690, 696, 705, 716, 728, 739,
741, 743, 756, 762, 775, 780, 791, 796, 800, 842, 855, 864, 872,
875, 904, 941, 960, 963-965, 975, 981, 985-991, 1018
- Cuba 95, 365, 414, 595, 656, 783-784, 788
- Cuban Exiles 2
- FBI 86, 92, 96, 249, 252, 305, 401, 406, 710, 854, 913, 937,
955, 1000
- Garrison Investigation 13, 29, 52, 54, 97, 104, 124, 134, 144,
149, 166, 176, 207, 217, 236, 254, 263, 290-295, 362, 411, 416,
458, 531, 589, 619, 680, 685, 722, 727, 811, 813, 815, 859, 862,
874, 897, 899, 936, 940, 976, 1020
- Grassy Knoll 74
- House Select Committee on Assassinations 331, 371, 483, 908-911,
914-916, 993
- Johnson, Lyndon B. 14, 248, 257, 268, 333, 413, 415, 426, 460,
470-471, 502

Kennedy, John F. (Pres.) 37-38, 41, 49, 51, 54, 59, 62, 64, 83-85, 92, 94, 96, 103, 105-106, 108-109, 120, 125, 161-162, 169-172, 185-186, 188-194, 199, 206, 211, 223, 227, 231-232, 241, 247, 257, 259, 271-272, 286, 288-289, 297-299, 302, 315, 316-317, 324, 328, 332, 338, 342, 350, 353, 369, 372, 381, 391, 393-397, 399-400, 402-407, 412, 418, 424, 427-428, 434, 436, 440, 449-453, 462-464, 467-469, 482, 484, 487, 500, 502, 507, 510-511, 516, 519-520, 527-529, 532, 535, 538-539, 548, 555, 559, 562, 576, 593, 595, 598, 614-615, 618, 623, 625, 632, 633, 636-637, 657-658, 666-667, 670, 672, 678, 686, 714, 715, 725, 731, 758, 760-761, 778, 793, 807, 821, 834-837, 847-848, 850-851, 860, 863, 866, 869, 873, 876, 879-880, 884-885, 888, 891, 895, 906, 912, 917-922, 935, 959, 961-962, 966-968, 971, 974, 980, 984, 994-995, 999, 1001, 1003, 1014

Kennedy, Robert 257, 297, 462, 548, 715

Miscellaneous 4, 8, 10, 20, 30, 33, 40, 80-81, 98, 100, 110, 111, 116, 118, 122, 133, 140, 143, 150, 154-157, 163, 167, 178-181, 183, 187, 195, 198, 209-210, 213, 216, 222, 224, 226, 229, 233, 239, 243, 246, 260, 264-265, 269, 276-277, 284-285, 296, 306, 312, 318-319, 321, 323, 326, 329, 331, 339, 341, 346, 348, 354-355, 357, 360-361, 363-364, 368, 370, 374, 377, 380, 383, 384-386, 388-389, 409-410, 422-423, 430-433, 439, 441-442, 444, 446, 454, 457-458, 465, 476, 479-480, 486, 489-491, 494-496, 501, 503, 508-509, 514-515, 517, 522-523, 536-537, 540, 543-545, 547, 552, 557-558, 560-561, 564-565, 567-568, 572, 579, 583, 587, 588, 590, 594, 602-603, 605, 607, 609, 620, 622, 624, 626, 628, 631, 635, 659, 662-664, 666, 668, 673-674, 677, 679, 683-684, 687, 689, 691, 694, 697, 704, 709, 718, 720, 723, 733, 735-736, 742, 744, 747, 750-751, 765-767, 776-777, 779, 782, 790, 794, 795, 798-799, 802-803, 809, 812, 816, 819, 822, 827-828, 833, 840, 856, 858, 865, 867-868, 878, 883, 892, 894, 896, 898, 902, 903, 905, 932, 934, 942, 972, 992, 996, 1002, 1004-1006, 1009, 1010, 1016-1017

Organized Crime 23, 34, 73, 334-336, 787, 937

Oswald, Lee Harvey 1, 19, 21, 37, 45, 50, 88, 127, 129, 148, 165, 196, 228, 238, 252, 256, 266, 281, 320, 327, 345, 351, 367, 408, 419-421, 425, 445, 447, 474-475, 488, 493, 513, 526, 527, 554, 566, 570, 641-648, 653-654, 675-676, 698, 702-703, 713, 722, 726, 769-772, 806, 814, 818, 826, 831, 838, 849, 877, 882, 886, 933, 964

Public Reaction to Kennedy Assassination 3, 6, 15-17, 32, 39,
49, 53, 61, 82, 89, 93, 113, 123, 132, 135, 151-152, 208, 253,
267, 270, 283, 307, 321-322, 330, 343, 350, 358-359, 375-376,
378, 382, 390, 459, 466, 505, 553, 556, 592, 597, 604, 616, 665,
706-708, 724, 804-805, 810, 829, 844-845, 1007-1008, 1011-1012

Ruby, Jack 63, 68, 87, 117, 126, 128, 202-203, 220, 258, 300,
301, 303, 349, 438, 443, 447, 498, 506, 533-534, 660, 695, 699,
700, 712, 737-738, 901, 954, 978, 997-998, 1013, 1019

Single Bullet Theory 175, 373, 755, 979

Texas School Book Depository 244, 473

Warren Commission 31, 56, 65-66, 73, 75, 101, 142, 173, 258,
279, 304, 311, 313-314, 337, 347, 356, 373, 387, 426, 477, 493,
521, 542, 563, 569, 578, 596, 601, 617, 640, 732, 749, 768, 773,
774, 785-786, 820, 857, 861, 887, 893, 907, 923-924, 929, 943,
944, 948-949, 953, 956-957, 983, 1021

Warren Report 5, 7, 29, 47-48, 60, 65-66, 76-79, 115, 139, 141,
146-147, 158-160, 168, 184, 197, 200-201, 204, 221, 230, 240,
250, 261-262, 379, 417, 435, 448, 478, 485, 499, 518, 573, 581,
612, 661, 711, 717, 719, 740, 757, 801, 830, 853, 870, 881, 889,
921, 925-928, 930, 938-939, 945-947, 950-952, 969-970, 982



THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Congressional Research Service

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY:
A CHRONOLOGICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Suzanne Cavanagh
Analyst in American National Government
Government Division
and
Sherry Shapiro
Bibliographer in Government and American Law
Library Services Division
March 28, 1979

FOREWORD

This comprehensive bibliography consists of every relevant book citation that could be found in the Library's card catalog and Books in Print. Periodical literature was identified (and selectively included) from the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature; Public Affairs Information Service (P.A.I.S.); International Social Science and Humanities Index; America: History and Life; Social Science Citation Index; Magazine Index; Psychology Abstracts; Sociological Abstracts; Comprehensive Dissertation Abstracts; and the CRS's Bibliographic Citation File. Some of the noted periodical sources are from computerized, on-line data bases external to the Library of Congress.

Other sources referred to in compiling the bibliography were: The Kennedy Assassination and the Warren Report; Selected References, by Richard Malow which is a CRS multilith report, GGR-119, published Sept. 23, 1966 (6 p.); American Political Assassinations; A Bibliography of Works Published 1963-1970 related to the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Robert F. Kennedy, [in pamphlet form] compiled by the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, with a forward by Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., 927 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C.; 1973, 28 p. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 1917-1963; A Chronological List of References, [in pamphlet form] by the Bibliography and Reference Correspondence Section of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1964, 68 p. and also, under the same title, a supplement [in monograph form] of, principally, monographs, by William J. Studer which was published by the Library of Congress in 1964 (25 p.); and the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Moves to Reopen the Investigation, by Donald A. Baskerville which appears in the Library of Congress Information Bulletin of December 3, 1976. (6 p., 752-757).

Credit is due the following people who assisted in the compilation of this bibliography: Sarah Collins, Nancy Fitch, Karen Keesling, Steve Langone, and Daniel Strickland. Jeffrey C. Griffith in CRS's Information Systems Section was instrumental in the retrieval of citations from on-line data bases external to the Library of Congress.

Credit is due Robert Amorosi, Linda Bailey, Martha Schweitzer, Cheryl Scott, Lillie Thompson, and Sandra Wallace for the secretarial production of the bibliography.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
Foreword.....	1
1963.....	1
1964.....	7
1965.....	16
1966.....	19
1967.....	24
1968.....	31
1969.....	34
1970.....	36
1971.....	37
1972.....	38
1973.....	39
1974.....	40
1975.....	42
1976.....	46
1977.....	50
1978.....	52

CRS - 1

- 1963
- Accused. Time, v. 82, Nov. 29, 1963: 27-28. AP2.T37, v. 82
- After the tragedy. Tablet, v. 217, Nov. 30, 1963: 1181-1182. [Not in L.C. collection]
- American Broadcasting Company. November 22, 1963. (Phonodisc.) New York, 1963. Matrix no. ABC-JFK A-D. R64-106
- American condition. Nation, v. 197, Dec. 21, 1963: 425. AP2.N2, v. 197
- Another assassination attempt by Lee Oswald? U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 16, 1963: 8. JK1.U65, v. 55
- As Warren inquiry starts; latest on the assassination. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 30, 1963: 28-30. JK1.U65, v. 55
- Assassination, as the plot unfolds: case against Oswald: how the President was shot. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 9, 1963: 68-71. JK1.U65, v. 55
- Assassination gives impetus to Dodd's gun bill. Advertising age, v. 34, Dec. 2, 1963: 1-2. HF5801.A276, v. 34
- The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. [Coverage of Soviet newspapers, Nov. 22-28, 1963] Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 15, Dec. 11, 1963: 3-15. D839.C87, v. 15
- Assassination of President Kennedy; with report by T. H. White. Life, v. 55, Nov. 29, 1963: 22-32. AP2.L547, v. 55
- Associated Press. The torch is passed; the Associated Press story of the death of a President. [New York] 1963. 99 p. E842.9.A85
- Autopsy. Time, v. 82, Dec. 27, 1963: 18. AP2.T37, v. 82
- Bagdiklan, B. H. Assassin. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 22-27. AP2.S2, v. 236
- Bedford, Subille. Verdict on Jack Ruby. Life, v. 53, Mar. 27, 1963: 32-34, 34B, 70A-71, 79. AP2.L547, v. 53
- Breig, Joe. Assassination of a people. Ave Maria, v. 98, Dec. 14, 1963: 10. AP2.A9, v. 98
- Breslin, J. Death in emergency no. one: Parkland Memorial Hospital. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 30-31. AP2.S2, v. 236
- Brigham, Robert. Russia: no, no, this cannot be true. Life, v. 55, Dec. 6, 1963: 129-130. AP2.L547, v. 55
- Buckley, W. F., Jr. Do they really hate to hate? National review, v. 15, Dec. 31, 1963: 559. AP2.N3545, v. 15
- Cameron, J. Humane and sane. Commonwealth, v. 79, Dec. 13, 1963: 338-339. AP2.C6897, v. 79
- Carney, Frederick S. Crisis of conscience in Dallas: Soul-searching vs. new faith in Dallas. Thoughts on the day of the funeral by Tom F. Driver. Christianity and crisis, v. 23, Dec. 23, 1963: 235-241. BR1.C6417, v. 23
- Cartwright, H. L. Justice and Oswald. Nation, v. 197, Dec. 21, 1963: inside cover. AP2.N2, v. 197

- And a Child's yellow flowers. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 36-37. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- A Chronology of tragedy. Time and tide, v. 44, Nov. 28, 1963: 7-9. AP4.T445, v. 44
- Ciardi, John. November 22, 1963. Saturday review, v. 46, Dec. 7, 1963: 16, 18. Z1219.S25, v. 46
- Of chaos and courage. Saturday review, Dec. 28, 1963: 25. Z1219.S25, v. 46
- Collective guilt in the U.S.? Take a look at the world: with excerpts from address by Thruston B. Morton. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 1963: 72-74. JK1.U65, v. 55
- Collective or individual guilt. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 1963: 10. JK1.U65, v. 55
- Condon, R. Manchurian candidate in Dallas. Nation, v. 197, Dec. 28, 1963: 449-451. AP2.N2, v. 197
- Cooke, Alistair. After the President's assassination. Listener, v. 70, Dec. 5, 1963: 907-908. AP4.L4165, v. 70
- Death of the young warrior. Listener, v. 70, Nov. 28, 1963: 863-864. AP4.L4165, v. 70
- Covering the tragedy: news tragedy. Time, v. 82, Nov. 29, 1963: 84. AP2.T37, v. 82
- Crawford, Kenneth. The enemies he made. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 35. AP2.N6672, v. 62
- Daniel, J. When Castro heard the news. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 7, 1963: 7-9. AP2.N624, v. 149
- Daniel, P. Assessing the blame in the President's death: excerpts from addresses. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 14, 1963: 73. JK1.U65, v. 55
- The Day Kennedy died. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 20-26. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- Death of a modern. Spectator, v. 211, Nov. 29, 1963: 681. AP4.S7, v. 211
- Death of a President. Commonweal, v. 79, Dec. 6, 1963: 299-301. AP2.C6897, v. 79
- Death of President Kennedy: statements by Sir Robert Menzies and Sir Garfield Barwick on 23rd November. Current notes on international affairs, Nov. 1963: 38-39. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Dudman, R. Commentary of an eyewitness. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 21, 1963: 18. AP2.N624, v. 149
- Dulles, Allen. The craft of intelligence. New York, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963. 277 p. UB270.D8
- Economics: a shock, then recovery. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 92-93. HF5001.B89
- Eisenhower, D. D. When the highest office changes hands. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 15. AP2.S2, v. 236
- End and a beginning. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 9, 1963: 19-20. AP2.N6772, v. 62

CRS - 3

Files of evidence connected with the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; 21 vols. in 2 reels micro-film. Washington, Microcard Editions, 1963-64.
E842.9F47

Foreign countries, too, mourn first citizen of the world. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 48-49.
JK1.U65, v. 55

Foreign power: same goals, sterner style. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 31-32.
HF5001.B89

From friend and foe in America: sense of shock and dismay at the despicable act, statements. U.S. new and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 49.
JK1.U65, v. 55

Gilman, R. Facts of mortality. Commonweal, v. 79, Dec. 17, 1963: 337-338.
AP2.C6897, v. 79

The Government still lives. Time, v. 82, Nov. 29, 1963: 21-32.
AP2.T37, v. 82

Hart, Luke E. The death of President Kennedy. Columbia, v. 43, Dec. 1963: 3.
AP2.C67, v. 43

The Hatred that consumes...address by Chief Justice E. G. Warren on the assassination of the President. Hadassah magazine, Dec. 1963: 32.
DS141.A2.H3
[Not in L.C. collection]

Have we learned our lessons? Christian century, v. 80, Dec. 18, 1963: 1567-1568.
BRL.C45, v. 80

He gave his life; a newspaper's account of the assassination of a President and the two weeks that followed. Nashville Tennessean, [1963?] Unpaged.
E842.9.N3

Hercher, W. W. Thousand well-wishers, and one assassin. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 34-35.
JK1.U65, v. 55

History's jury. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 25-27.
AP2.N6772, v. 62

How could it happen? New republic, v. 149, Dec. 7, 1963: 6.
AP2.N624, v. 149

How JFK died. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 30, 1963: 55.
AP2.N6772, v. 62

How sorrowful bad: world reactions. Time, v. 82, Nov. 29, 1963: 38-39.
AP2.T37, v. 82

Hughes, Emmet John. Echo in the silence. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 52.
AP2.N6772, v. 62

I just heard some shots: three shots. Editor and publisher, v. 96, Nov. 30, 1963: 14-15, 67.
PN4790.E4, v. 96

Imitators: post-Kennedy assassination threats of magnicide. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 23, 1963: 27.
AP2.N6772, v. 62

In the nation's interest; commission to investigate the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. America, v. 109, Dec. 21, 1963: 789.
BX801.A5, v. 109

International outlook. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 83-84.
HF5001.B89

Izakow, Boria. The Dallas investigation. New times (Moscow), no. 49, Dec. 11, 1963: 10-12.
D839.N483

CRS - 4

- JFK could lose. Look, v. 27, Dec. 17, 1963: 94, 96, 99, 101-102. AP2.679, v. 27
- Joesten, Joachim. They call it intelligence: spies and spy techniques since World War II. London, Abelard-Schuman [1963] 314 p. UB270.J6
- Johnson names commission to probe assassination. QJ weekly report, v. 21, Dec. 6, 1963: 2212-2213. JK1.5.C655, v. 21
- Kennedy assassination--communist version. Communist affairs, v. 1, Nov.-Dec. 1963: 3-6. HX1.C717, v.1
- Labor: union rally to Johnson. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 46, 48. HF5001.B828
- Lane, Mark. Oswald innocent? A lawyer's brief. National guardian weekly, Dec. 19, 1963. Microfilm 05144AP
- Langer, E. Kennedy's assassination: study organized by social scientists. Science, v. 142, Dec. 13, 1963: 1446-1447. Q1535, v. 142
- Lasky, Victor. JFK, the man and the myth. New York, MacMillan Co. [1963] 653 p. E842.L3
- Lawrence, D. Incredible tragedy. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 104. JK1.U65, v. 55
- Levin, Bernard. The bell tolls in Dallas. Listener, v. 70, Dec. 5, 1963: 914. AP4.L4165, v. 70
- Life. John F. Kennedy memorial edition: all of Life's pictures and text on the most shocking event of our time, including his biography and his most enduring words. Chicago, Time, Inc. [1963] AP2.L547
- Lynd, S., and J. Minnis. Seeds of doubt: some questions about the assassination. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 21, 1963: 14-17. AP2.N624, v. 149
- McGill, Ralph E. Speaking out: hate knows no direction. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 8, 10. AP2.S2, v. 236
- McGrory, Mary. After great pain; a formal feeling. America, v. 109, Dec. 14, 1963: 764. BX801.A5, v. 109
- Man who killed Oswald. Time, v. 32, Dec. 6, 1963: 34-35. AP2.T37, v. 82
- Mandel, P. End to nagging rumors: the six critical seconds. Life, v. 55, Dec. 6, 1963: 527. AP2.L547, v. 55
- Mannes, M. Long vigil. Reporter, v. 29, Dec. 19, 1963: 15-17. D839.R385, v. 29
- Marketing shoppers flock back to resume buying. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 80-90. HR5001.B89
- Martyred President and nation's journey. Reconstructionist, v. 29, Dec. 13, 1963: 3. DS133.R4, v. 29
- Marxist marine. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 2, 1963: 27. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- Matthews, James P. Four dark days in history: Nov. 22-25, 1963. Los Angeles, the author, c1963. 63 p. E842.9.F6
- Rare book collection

CRS - 5

- Mayes, Stanley. What they are saying. Listener, v. 70, Nov. 28, 1963: 868. AP4.L4165, v. 70
- Minnis, J., and S. Lynd. Seeds of doubt: some questions about the assassination. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 21, 1963: 14-17. AP2.N624, v. 149
- Moment of tragedy. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 6. JK1.U65, v. 55
- More than one man. America, v. 109, Dec. 7, 1963: 722. BX801.A5, v. 109
- A Nation grieves. Interracial review, v. 36, Dec. 1963: 232. E185.5.I6, v. 36
- Notes and comment. New Yorker, v. 39, Dec. 7, 1963: 45. AP2.N6763, v. 39
- Now the trumpet summons again... Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 21-23. HF5001.B89
- On the far right: the assassination. Commonweal, v. 79, Dec. 27, 1963: 384-385. AP2.C6897, v. 79
- Oswald and the weight of evidence. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 9, 1963: 36, 41-42. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- Oswald killing discussed. Science news letter, v. 84, Dec. 7, 1963: 355. Q1.S76, v. 84
- Other guns. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 30, 1963: 15. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- Pacis, Vicente A. Hate campaign did it. Weekly graphic, v. 30, Dec. 25, 1963: 2, 3, 98. AP8.G7, v. 30
- Panter-Downee, Mollie. Letter from London. New Yorker, v. 39, Dec. 7, 1963: 196-198. AP2.N6763, v. 39
- Paris: le coup de Dallas. New statesman, v. 66, Dec. 6, 1963: 817. AP4.N64, v. 66
- Phelan, James. The vice man cometh. Saturday evening post, v. 236, June 8, 1963: 67-71. AP2.S2, v. 236
- Pity of it. Jewish frontier, v. 30, Dec. 1963: 3. DS149.A324, v. 30
- Portrait of a psychopath. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 83-84. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- President assassinated by a gunman in Dallas. Illustrated London news, v. 243, Nov. 30, 1963: 887-889. AP4.I3, v. 243
- Priceless role. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 56. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- Public relations firm sets press rules for Ruby's trial. Editor and publisher, v. 96, Dec. 28, 1963: 9. PN4700.E4, v. 96
- A Quiet and sad day. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 30, 1963: 34. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- Radio-TV barred from Ruby trial. Broadcasting, v. 55, Dec. 23, 1963: 56. TK6540.B85, v. 65
- Reaction in the South. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 27. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- Reaction to killings. Science news letter, v. 84, Dec. 7, 1963: 358. Q1.S76, v. 84
- Reaction to the assassination; excerpts from reports to Christian century's news correspondents. Christian century, v. 80, Dec. 25, 1963: 1618-1619. BR1.C45, v. 80

CRS - 6

- Report from the FBI. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 23, 1963: 19-20.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
- Royster, V. No time for collective guilt. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 9, 1963: 72. JK1.U65, v. 55
- Sad and solemn duty; commission to investigate the assassination of J. Kennedy. Time, v. 87, Dec. 13, 1963: 26-27.
AP2.T37, v. 87
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A eulogy: John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 32-32A.
AP2.S2, v. 236
- Senseless tragedy. Saturday evening post, v. 236, Dec. 14, 1963: 19. AP2.S2, v. 236
- Seventy-two hours and what they can teach us. Life, v. 55, Dec. 6, 1963: 4. AP2.L547, v. 55
- Shame of Dallas. Saturday review, v. 46, Dec. 28, 1963: 26. AP2.S273, v. 46
- Shayon, Robert Lewis. The relevant question. Saturday review, v. 46, Dec. 14, 1963: 23. Z1219.S25, v. 46
- Shock, then recovery: impact of the assassination of Pres. Kennedy, opinions of U.S. economists. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 92-93. HF5001.B89
- The Shot that changed our future. Time and tide, Nov. 28, 1963: 4. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Soviet press comment following Kennedy's death. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 15, Dec. 18, 1963: 3-7. D839.C87, v. 15
- Strange world of Lee Oswald: more light on the assassination. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 16, 1963: 60-62.
- Teamsters: limit of devotion. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 75-76. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- Tebbel, John. JFK: the magazines and peace. Saturday review, v. 46, Dec. 14, 1963: 56-57. AP2.S273, v. 46
- Temple, Wayne C. Two martyrs. Lincoln herald, v. 65, winter 1963: 165. E457.M887, v. 65
- Thompson, T. Assassin: the man held and killed for murder. Life, v. 55, Nov. 29, 1963: 37-39. AP2.L547, v. 55
- Tobin, R. L. If you can keep your head when all about you: television and news magazine coverage of the Kennedy assassination story. Saturday review, v. 46, Dec. 14, 1963: 53-54. AP2.S273, v. 46
- Tragic end of John F. Kennedy. U.S. news and world report, v. 55, Dec. 2, 1963: 31-33. JK1.U65, v. 55
- Turnbull, J. W. Note from Texas. Commonweal, v. 79, Dec. 13, 1963: 337. AP2.C6897.v. 79
- TV sees it now, for seventy hours. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963: 34. HF5001.B89
- The Actual voices and events of four days that shocked the world, Nov. 22, 23, 24, 25, 1963; the complete story. (Phonodisc.) Colpix Records, CP 2500, 1964. R65-1928
- Warren Commission. Nation, v. 197, Dec. 28, 1963: 445. AP2.N2, v. 197

- Where the shots came from. New republic, v. 149, Dec. 28, 1963: 7.
AP2.N624, v. 149
- For President Kennedy: an epilogue. Look, v. 55, Dec. 6,
1963: 158-159. AP2.L79, v. 55
- Who killed President Kennedy: soviet condolences. New times
(Moscow), no. 48, Dec. 4, 1963: 5-7. D839.N483
- Who was to blame? Economist, v. 209, Dec. 7, 1963: 1022.
HG11.E2, v. 209
- The World and the White House. New statesman, v. 66, Nov. 29, 1963:
765. AP4.N64, v. 66
- World listened and watched: radio-TV meet greatest challenge in
wake of JFK tragedy... Broadcasting, v. 65, Dec. 2, 1963:
36-61. TK6540.B85, v. 65
- World mourns in doubt, fear, hope. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 9, 1963:
56-58. AP2.N6772, v. 62
- World weeps and waits. Business week, no. 1787, Nov. 30, 1963:
30-31. HF5001.B89
- X marks the spot. Newsweek, v. 62, Dec. 16, 1963: 27-28.
AP2.N6772, v. 62
-
- 1964 Aftermath of the Warren report. Broadcasting, v. 67, Oct. 5, 1964:
50. TK6540.B85, v. 67
- Ahler, James G., and Joseph B. Tamney. Some functions of religious
ritual in catastrophe: Kennedy assassination. Sociological
analysis, v. 25, winter 1964: 212-230. HN51.A7, v. 25
- Alsop, Stewart. Johnson takes over. Saturday evening post,
v. 237, Feb. 15, 1964: 17-23. AP2.S2, v. 237
- Amrine, Michael. This awesome challenge. New York, Putnam, 1964.
283 p. E846.A6
- Anniversary of an assassination. Reconstructionist, v. 30,
Nov. 27, 1964: 6. DS133.R4, v. 30
- Ascoli, M. Interim reflections. Reporter, v. 31, Oct. 22, 1964:
12. D839.R385, v. 31
- Assassination. Newsweek, v. 64, Oct. 5, 1964: 32-40,
45-52, 57-60, 62-64. AP2.N6772, v. 64
- The Assassination of President Kennedy. East Europe, v. 13, Jan.
1964: 25-26. DRI.N363, v. 13
- The Assassination: the reporter's story; what was seen and read;
television, newspapers, magazines; journalism's role: unre-
solved issues. Columbia journalism review, v. 11, winter
1964: 5-31. PN4700.C64, v. 11
- Assassination: the trail to a verdict; with report by G. R. Ford.
Life, v. 57, Oct. 2, 1964: 40-50B. AP2.L547, v. 57
- The Assassination: the Warren report. Newsweek, v. 64, Oct. 5,
1964: 32-40, 45-52, 57-60, 63-64. AP2.N6772, v. 64
- Attorney for Oswald. Time, v. 83, Mar. 6, 1964: 47.
AP2.T37, v. 83
- Awful interval. Newsweek, v. 63, Jan. 6, 1964: 19-20.
AP2.N6772, v. 63
- Back of the secrecy in the assassination probe. U.S. news and
world report, v. 56, Feb. 24, 1964: 52. JK1.U65, v. 56

- Banta, Thomas J. The Kennedy assassination: early thoughts and emotions. *Public opinion quarterly*, v. 28, summer 1964: 216-224. H2261.A1.P8, v. 28
- Belli, Melvin M., and M. C. Carroll. Dallas justice; the real story of Jack Ruby and his trial. New York, McKay [1964] 298 p. KF224.R8.B44
- Between two fires: Mrs. Oswald's testimony to Warren Commission. *Time*, v. 83, Feb. 14, 1964: 16-29. AP2.T37, v. 83
- Big sale; exclusive photos for Life. *Newsweek*, v. 63, Mar. 2, 1964: 80. AP2.N6772, v. 63
- Bisnop, James Alonzo. Day in the life of President Kennedy. New York, Random House [1964] 108 p. E842.B5
- Bloom tells his public relations role in Ruby case. Editor and publisher, v. 96, Feb. 1, 1964: 58. PN4700.E4, v. 96
- Brave little woman, M. Oswald before Warren's investigating commission. *Newsweek*, v. 63, Feb. 17, 1964: 17. AP2.N6772, v. 63
- Breig, Joe. President Kennedy's death: why? *Ave Maria*, v. 99, Jan. 11, 1964: 9. AP2.A9, v. 99
- Brienberg, Mordecai. Riddle of Dallas. *Spectator*, v. 212, Mar. 6, 1964: 305-306. AP4.S7, v. 212
- Brogan, Denis W. Death in Dallas. Myths after Kennedy. *Encounter* (Great Britain), v. 23, no. 135, 1964: 20-26. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Buchanan, Thomas G. Who killed Kennedy? New York, Putnam [1964] 207 p. E842.9.B9 1964
- Carr, Attorney General (Texas) Waggoner. Texas supplemental report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the serious wounding of Governor John B. Connally, November 22, 1963. Austin, Tx., Attorney General's Office, 1964. 20-1. E842.9.T45
- Clifford, G. Warren Report: a new boost for the Kennedy memorabilia industry. *Maclean's magazine*, v. 77, Nov. 2, 1964: 3. AP5.M2, v. 77
- Compendium of curious coincidences; parallels in the lives and deaths of A. Lincoln and J. F. Kennedy. *Time*, v. 84, Aug. 21, 1964: 17. AP2.T37, v. 84
- Cottrell, John. Assassination. The world stood still. London, New English Library, 1964. 124 p. E176.1.C795
- Counsel for Oswald. U.S. news and world report, v. 48, Mar. 9, 1964: 16. JK1.U65, v. 48
- Crawford, K. Warren impeachers. *Newsweek*, v. 64 Oct. 19, 1964: 40. AP2.N6772, v. 64
- Dallas rejoinder. *Nation*, v. 123, May 25, 1964: 510. AP2.N2, v. 123
- Death in Dallas. Reader's digest, v. 84, Jan. 1964: 39-44. AP2.R255, v. 84
- Death of a President: told in direct testimony; excerpts. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, Dec. 7, 1964: 68-70. JK1.U65, v. 57

CRS - 9

- Dempsey, David. Warren report in mass production. Saturday review, v. 47, Nov. 7, 1964: 25, 38. Z1219.S25, v. 47
- Denson, R. B. Destiny in Dallas: on the scene story in pictures. Dallas, the author, 1964. 64 p. E842.9.D4
- Dies, Martin. Assassination and the aftermath. American opinion, v. 7, Mar. 1964: 1-10; Apr. 1964: 33-40. AP2.04732, v. 7
- Different look at Dallas. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Feb. 3, 1964: 42-46. JK1.U65, v. 56
- Donovan, Robert J. The assassins. New York, Popular Library, 1964. 254 p. HV6278.D6 1964
- Drury, Michael, ed. Since that day in Dallas. McCallis, v. 91, Aug. 1964: 78-79, 141-142. TT500.M2, v. 91
- Dunning, John L. The Kennedy assassination as viewed by communist media. Journalism quarterly, v. 41, spring 1964: 163-69. PN4700.J7, v. 41
- Ellis, William Scott. The Warren report. Jubilee, v. 12, Dec. 1964: 24-27. BX801.J8, v. 12
- Eye on that window. Newsweek, v. 63, June 22, 1964: 32.
- Feldman, Harold. Oswald and the FBI. Nation, v. 198, Jan. 27, 1964: 86-89. AP2.N2, v. 198
- Feldman, Jacob J., and Paul B. Sheatsley. The assassination of President Kennedy: a preliminary report on public reactions and behavior. Public opinion quarterly, v. 28, summer 1964: 189-215. HM261.A1.P8, v. 23
- 50,000 word leak: testimony of Jack Ruby to the Warren Commission. Time, v. 84, Aug. 28, 1964: 40. AP2.T37, v. 84
- Five publishers issue Warren panel's report. Publisher's weekly, v. 186, Oct. 5, 1964: 43-44. Z1219.P98, v. 186
- Fixx, J. F. As others see us: concerning Warren Commission report. Saturday review, v. 47, Nov. 1964: 35-37. AP2.S273, v. 47
- Fleming, D. F. Foreword: postscript. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, v. 351, Jan. 1964: x. H1.A4, v. 351
- Four days. Television, v. 21, Jan. 1964: 27-33. HE869.OT4, v. 21
- Four days in November (Motion Picture). Wolper Productions, released by United Artist, 1964.
- Four days; the historical record of the death of President Kennedy. Compiled by United Press International and American Heritage Magazine. New York, American Heritage Publishing Co., 1964. 143 p. E842.9.U55
- Friends of Lee Oswald. National review, v. 16, Mar. 10, 1964: 183-185. AP2.N3545, v. 16
- From Washington straight. National review, v. 16, Apr. 21, 1964: 311. AP2.N3545, v. 16
- Gales, Robert Robinson. The assassination of the President: jurisdictional problems. Syracuse law review, v. 16, fall 1964: 69-81. K23.Y7, v. 16

- Gellner, John. Who killed John Kennedy? Saturday night, v. 79, July 1964: 11-14. AP5.S27, v. 79
- Gershenson, Alvin. Kennedy and big business. Beverly Hills, Calif., Book Company of America, 1964. 256 p. E841.G43
- Gordon, William E. The assassination of President Kennedy. Contemporary review, v. 205, Jan. 1964: 8-13. AP4.C7, v. 205
- Greenberg, Bradley S. The diffusion of news of the Kennedy assassination. Public opinion quarterly, v. 28, summer 1964: 225-232. HM261.A1.P8, v. 28
- Grosvenor, Melville Bell. The last full measure. National geographic, v. 125, Mar. 1964: 307-355. G1.N27, v. 125
- Grove, L. Did press pressure kill Oswald? U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Apr. 6, 1964: 78-79. JK1.U65, v. 56
- Gun, Merin E. Red roses from Texas. London, Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1964. 208 p. E842.9.G8
- Habe, Hans. The wounded land: journey through a divided America. New York, Coward-McCann, 1964. 310 p. E169.O2.H293
- Haley, J. Evetts. A Texan looks at Lyndon: a study in illegitimate power. Canyon, Tex., Palo Duro Press, 1964. 256 p. E847.H3
- Harris, T. George. Memo about a Dallas citizen. Look, v. 28, Aug. 11, 1964: 64, 67-68, 70. AP2.L79, v. 28
- Hart, Luke E. A year of progress with a sorrowful close. Columbia, v. 44, Jan. 1964: 16. AP2.C67, v. 44
- Hatred knows no logic. Saturday evening post, v. 237, Jan. 4, 1964: 80. AP2.S2, v. 237
- Havemann, Ernest. Defendant Ruby will meet the ghost of a long dead Scott. Life, v. 56, Feb. 21, 1964: 30-31. AP2.L547, v. 56
- Here's what the Warren report will show. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, Sept. 14, 1964: 42-43. JK1.U65, v. 57
- Hessel, D. To heal the wounds. Christian century, v. 81, Jan. 1, 1964: 15. BR1.C45, v. 81
- History or hysteria? Trevor-Roper article in London's Sunday Times. Newsweek, v. 64, Dec. 28, 1964: 35-36. AP2.N6772, v. 64
- How America felt. Newsweek, v. 63, Mar. 16, 1964: 33. AP2.N6772, v. 63
- How to read the Warren report. National review, v. 16, Oct. 16, 1964: 858. AP2.N3545, v. 16
- Hyannisport revisited. Look, v. 28, Nov. 1964: 37-45. AP2.L79, v. 28
- If it all happened again. Editor and publisher, v. 97, Nov. 21, 1964: 9-10. PN4700.E4, v. 97
- Inquest on Dallas: the right to bear arms. Tablet, v. 213, Oct. 3, 1964: 1101-1102. BX801.T3
- [Not in L.C. collection]

CRS - 11

- JFK memorial issue. Look, v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: 122.
AP2.L79, v. 28
- JFK: the murder and the myths. Time, v. 83, June 12, 1964: 44, 47.
AP2.T37, v. 83
- JFK's murder: sowers of doubt. Newsweek, v. 63, Apr. 6, 1964: 22-24.
AP2.N6772, v. 63
- Jackson, Donald. The evolution of an assassination. Life, v. 58, Feb. 21, 1964: 68A-80.
AP2.L547, v. 58
- Joesten, Joachim. Oswald: assassin or fall guy? New York, Morzani [1964] 158 p.
E842.9.J6
- John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Look, v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: the JFK memorial issue, 33-36.
AP2.L79, v. 28
- Johnson, Priscilla. Oswald in Moscow. Harper's magazine, v. 228, Apr. 1964: 46-50.
AP2.H3, v. 223
- Jones, W. November in Dallas. Library journal, v. 89, Jan. 1, 1964: 72.
Z671.L7, v. 89
- Jumping the gun; premature disclosures. Newsweek, v. 64, July 13, 1964: 50.
AP2.N6772, v. 64
- Kavanaugh, J. A visit to the grave. Catholic digest, v. 28, July 1964: 8-11.
BX801.C34, v. 23
- Kempton, Murray. Boy, don't you know I'm a camera? New republic, v. 150, Feb. 29, 1964: 7.
AP2.N624, v. 150
- Looking back on the anniversary. Spectator, v. 213, Dec. 4, 1964: 778-779.
AP4.S7, v. 213
- Oswald, may we have some facts, please. New republic, ----- Warren report: a case for the prosecution. New republic, v. 151, Oct. 10, 1964: 13-17.
AP2.N624, v. 151
- Kennedy alive in hospital. Science news letter, v. 86, Oct. 10, 1964: 229.
Q1.S76, v. 86
- Killing still mystery. Science news letter, v. 86, Oct. 10, 1964: 230.
Q1.S76, v. 86
- Knebel, Fletcher. After the shots: the ordeal of Lyndon Johnson. Look, v. 28, Mar. 10, 1964: 26-28, 30, 33.
AP2.L79, v. 28
- Krupp, G. R. Day the President died; its meaning and impact. Redbook, v. 122, Mar. 1964: 49, 98-104.
AP2.R28, v. 122
- Lane, Mark, ed. The Oswald case; Mark Lane's testimony to the Warren Commission. Phonodisc. Brookside BF501, 1964.
R64-1333
- The Warren report: a first glance. Minority of one, v. 6, Nov. 1964: 6-8.
AP2.M55985, v. 6
- Latest on murder of Kennedy: a preview of the Warren report. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, June 1, 1964: 43-44.
JK1.U65, v. 56
- Lee Oswald's widow tells her story; summary of testimony by Marina Oswald. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Feb. 17, 1964: 19.
JK1.U65, v. 56
- Leslie, Warren. Dallas, public and private: aspects of an American city. New York, Grossman Publishers [1964] 238 p.
F394.O2L4

CRS - 12

- Lewis, Richard Warren. Flashy lawyer for Oswald's killer. Saturday evening post, v. 237, Feb. 8, 1964: 28-30.
AP2.S2, v. 237
- Lineberry, William. The lingering plot. Foreign opinion and the assassination. New leader, v. 47, Apr. 27, 1964: 21-22.
HX1.N37, v. 47
- Lingering doubts; survey of public opinion. Newsweek, v. 63, Jan. 6, 1964: 19.
AP2.N6772, v. 63
- Linn, Edward. The untold story of Jack Ruby. Saturday evening post, v. 237, July 25, 1964: 24-26, 28, 33, 36-37, 40, 48-49.
AP2.S2, v. 237
- Macdonald, D. Our baby. New republic, v. 150, Jan. 25, 1964: 30.
AP2.N624, v. 150
- Man who wanted to kill Nixon. Time, v. 83, June 19, 1964: 21.
AP2.T37, v. 83
- Maxfield, Marietta, and Dan Wise. The day Kennedy died. San Antonio, Naylor Co., 1964. 137 p.
E842.9.W5
- Mayer, Milton. November 22, 1963. Progressive magazine, v. 28, Dec. 1964: 21-25.
AP2.P8655, v. 28
- Mendelson, Harold. Broadcast vs. personal sources of information in emergent public crises: the Presidential assassination. Journal of broadcasting, v. 8, spring 1964: 147-156.
PN1991.J6, v. 8
- Meyer, Karl E. The triumph of Caliban. New leader, v. 47, Oct. 12, 1964: 4-6.
HX1.N37, v. 47
- Murray, Norbert. Legacy of an assassination. New York, Pro Peoples Press, 1964. 479 p.
E841.M8
- Nash, George, and Patricia Nash. The other witnesses. New leader, v. 47, Oct. 12, 1964: 6-9.
HX1.N37, v. 47
- New clue in attempt to shoot General Walker. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Jan. 13, 1964: 10.
JK1.U65, v. 56
- New light on the assassination: a secret agent's story. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, June 1964: 33-39.
JK1.U65, v. 56
- New York times runs 48 pages of report. Editor and publisher, v. 97, Oct. 3, 1964: 61.
PN4700.E4, v. 97
- Nightmare revisited; reenactment for Warren Commission. Newsweek, v. 63, June 8, 1964: 48.
AP2.N6772, v. 63
- Oswald, Lee Harvey. Lee Oswald's letters to his mother. Esquire, v. 61, May 1964: 67-73, 75.
AP2.E845, v. 61
- Oswald diary publication stirs furor. Editor and publisher, v. 97, July 4, 1964: 14.
PN4700.E4, v. 97
- Oswald mystery grows deeper and deeper. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Mar. 30, 1964: 45.
JK1.U65, v. 56
- Oswald's historic diary. Life, v. 57, July 10, 1964: 26-31.
AP2.L547, v. 57
- Overstreet, Harry. The strange tactics of extremism. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1964. 315 p.
E743.O9
- Packer, Herbert L. The Warren report: a measure of achievement. Nation, v. 199, Nov. 2, 1964: 295-299.
AP2.N2, v. 199

- Plot to clear Lee Oswald. National review, v. 16, Apr. 7, 1964: 265. AP2.N3545, v. 16
- Police in Dallas. New republic, v. 150, Jan. 18, 1964: 8. AP2.N624, v. 150
- Radio-TV newsmen testify in Ruby trial. Broadcasting, v. 66, Mar. 16, 1964: 74. TK6540.B85, v. 66
- Reporting the report. Newsweek, v. 64, Oct. 12, 1964: 100-101. AP2.N6772, v. 64
- Rice, John. What was back of Kennedy's murder. Murfreesboro, Tenn., Sword of the Land, 1964. 22 p. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Rifkin, S. Reply to M. Kempton. Warren report: a case for the prosecution. New republic, v. 151, Oct. 24, 1964: 29. AP2.N624, v. 151
- Rifles: target for control? Newsweek, v. 64, Dec. 28, 1964: 21-23. AP2.N6772, v. 64
- Rivers, Caryl. Warren report slaps press and calls for ethics code: news media share in blame for killing of JFK's assassin. Editor and publisher, v. 97, Oct. 3, 1964: 13. PN4700.E4, v. 97
- Robertson, A. Murder most foul. American heritage, v. 15, Aug. 1964: 90-104. E171.A43, v. 15
- Roddy, Joseph. Ireland: the Kennedy cult. Look, v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: 66-72, 75-76, 79. AP2.L79, v. 28
- Rosenberg, M. Warren Commission. Nation, v. 199, Sept. 14, 1964: 110-112. AP2.N2, v. 199
- Ruby death verdict: a TV spectacular. Editor and publisher, v. 97, Mar. 21, 1964: 11, 55. PN4700.E4, v. 97
- Rush to buy the report on Kennedy assassination. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, Oct. 12, 1964: 20. JK1.U65, v. 57
- Russell, Bertrand. Sixteen questions on the assassination. Minority of one, v. 6, Sept. 1964: 6-8. AP2.M55985, v. 6
- Safeguarding the President so it can't occur again. Business week, no. 1831, Oct. 3, 1964: 34-36. HF5001.B89
- Salinger, Pierre, and Sander Vanocur, eds. A tribute to John F. Kennedy. Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica Press, 1964. 162 p. E842.S28
- Sassa, Atsuyuki. New light on the assassination: a secret agent's story. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, June 8, 1964: 38-39. JK1.U65, v. 56
- Sauvage, Leo. As I was saying. New leader, v. 47, Nov. 9, 1964: 8-13. HX1.N37, v. 47
- The Oswald affair. Commentary, v. 37, Mar. 1964: 55-56. DS101.C63, v. 37
- Oswald in Dallas: a few loose ends. Reporter, v. 30, Jan. 2, 1964: 24-26. D839.R385, v. 30
- Screen test. Newsweek, v. 63, Feb. 10, 1964: 48. AP2.N6772, v. 63
- Shea, J. M., Jr. Memo from a Dallas citizen. Look, v. 28, Mar. 24, 1964: 88, 91-92, 94, 96. AP2.L79, v. 28

CRS - 14

- Sheatsley, Paul B., and Norman Bradburn. Assassination. How the American public responded. [Washington] American Psychological Association, 1964. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Paper presented at the American Psychological Association 72d Annual Convention held in Los Angeles, Sept. 4-9, 1964.
- Sheatsley, Paul B., and Jacob J. Feldman. The assassination of President Kennedy: a preliminary report on public reactions and behavior. Public opinion quarterly, v. 28, summer 1964: 189-215. HM261.A1.P8, v. 28
- Spitzer, Stephen P. Mass media vs. personal sources of information about the presidential assassination: a comparison of six investigations. Journal of broadcasting, v. 9, winter 1964-65: 45-50. PN1991.J6, v. 9
- Tamney, Joseph B., and James Ahler. Some functions of religious ritual in catastrophe: Kennedy assassination. Sociological analysis, v. 25, winter 1964: 212-230. HN51.A7, v. 25
- Task of the Warren Commission. Nation, v. 198, Jan. 27, 1964: 81. AP2.N2, v. 198
- Texas. Attorney General's Office. Texas supplemental report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the serious wounding of Governor John B. Connally, November 22, 1963 [by Attorney General Waggoner Carr. Austin, 1964] 20 l. E842.9.T45
Rare book collection
- Text of summary of Warren Commission report. QQ weekly, v. 22, Oct. 2, 1964: 2332-2340. JK1.C15, v. 22
- And Then it was November 22 again. Newsweek, v. 64, Nov. 30, 1964: 25-28. AP2.N6772, v. 64
- Thomson, George C. The quest for truth: a quizzical look at the Warren report; or, how President Kennedy was really assassinated. Glendale, Calif., G. C. Thomson Engineering Co., c1964. 50 p. E842.9.T5
- U.S. Library of Congress. General Reference and Bibliography Division John Fitzgerald Kennedy 1917-1963: a chronological list of references. Comp. by the Bibliographic and Reference Correspondence Section. Washington, [1964] 68 p. Z8462.8.U5
- John Fitzgerald Kennedy 1917-1963: a chronological list of references supplement. Comp. by William J. Studes. Washington [1964] 25 p. Z8462.8U5
- U.S. President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. A concise compendium of the Warren Commission report on the assassination of John F. Kennedy. New York, Popular Library, [c1964] 637 p. E842.9.A55
- Investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. [1964] E842.9.A54
- The official Warren Commission report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. [Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday] 1964. 888 p. E842.9.A55

- Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. [1964] 888 p. E842.9.A55
- Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. [1st ed.] New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co. [1964] 726 p. E842.9.A55 1964b
- The Warren report; report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. [New York, Associated Press, 1964?] 366 p. E842.9.A55 1964d
- Unraveling the mystery of the assassination of John F. Kennedy: the official story. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, Oct. 5, 1964: 35-42, 70-71, 96-97. JK1.U65, v. 57
- Untold stories: aftermath of the assassination. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, Oct. 12, 1964: 58-62. JK1.U65, v. 57
- Ushakov, G. Dallas merry go round. New Times (Moscow), no. 11, Mar. 18, 1964: 27-29.
- Vanocur, Sander, and Pierre Salinger. A tribute to John F. Kennedy. Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica Press, 1964. 162 p. E842.S28
- Wainright, L. Book for all to read: Warren report. Life, v. 57, Oct. 16, 1964: 35. AP2.L547, v. 57
- Warner, Dale G. Who killed the President? [1st ed.] New York, American Press [1964] 24 p. E842.9.W3
- Warner, Ken. Big bargain in rifles. Mechanix illustrated, v. 60, Oct. 1964: 89-91, 152, 153. T1.M46, v. 60
- Warren Commission. New Republic, v. 150, Feb. 29, 1964: 4-5. AP2.N624, v. 150
- Warren Commission report. Time, v. 84, Oct. 2, 1964: 45-50. AP2.T37, v. 84
- The Warren Commission report (Motion picture). National Broadcasting Co., 1964. F167-2029
- Warren Commission report; paraffin test unreliable; killing still mystery. Science news letter, v. 86, Oct. 10, 1964: 227, 229, 230. Q1.S76, v. 86
- Warren Commission; testimony and evidence. Time, v. 84, Dec. 4, 1964: 25-27. AP2.T37, v. 84
- Warren findings: some new facts. U.S. news and world report, v. 57, July 6, 1964: 44. JK1.U65, v. 57
- Warren report; paperback editions were produced at record-breaking pace. Publishers weekly, v. 186, Oct. 5, 1964: 80-82. Z1219.P98, v. 186
- Warren's secrets. National review, v. 16, Apr. 7, 1964: 265-266. AP2.N3545, v. 16
- Was Jack Ruby insane? Life, v. 58, Feb. 21, 1964: 26-29. AP2.L547, v. 58
- Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Inc. November 22, dialogue in Dallas. (Phonodisc). New York, [1964]. Matrix no. N-WBC 2692-2693. R64-2438
- What they saw that dreadful day in Dallas; testimony and evidence published. Newsweek, v. 64, Dec. 7, 1964: 28-30, 35-36, 38, 40, 42. AP2.N6772, v. 64

- What's your source?; premature publication of Journal-American of Ruby's testimony before Warren. *Newsweek*, v. 64, Aug. 31, 1964: 68-69. AP2.N6772, v. 64
- When Kennedy died. *Newsweek*, v. 64, Sept. 14, 1964: 61. AP2.N6772, v. 64
- White, Theodore H. Assassination inquiry: slow, careful. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Jan. 27, 1964: 49. JK1.U65, v. 56
- Why a plot was feared when Kennedy was shot. U.S. news and world report, v. 56, Jan. 6, 1964: 7. JK1.U65, v. 56
- Wilson, Richard. What happened to the Kennedy program. *Look*, v. 28, Nov. 17, 1964: 117-118, 120, 122. AP2.L79, v. 28
- Wise, Dan, and Marietta Maxfield. The day Kennedy died. San Antonio, Tx., Naylor Co. [1964] 137 p. E842.9.W5
- Wise, David. It will be many years... Good housekeeping, v. 158, Feb. 1964: 90-91, 150. TX1.G7, v. 158
- Wise, David, and Thomas Ross. The invisible government. New York, Random House, 1964. 375 p. JK468.L6.W5
- Worthington, Peter. The limelight: why Jack Ruby's first trial couldn't happen here. *Maclean's*, v. 77, Apr. 18, 1964: 3-4. AP5.M2, v. 77
- WQMR (Radio station). Four dark days in November [Phonodisc. Washington, Connie B. Gay Broadcasting Corp., 1964] Matrix no. PB1495-1496. R64-927
-
- 1965 Baker, Dean C. The assassination of President Kennedy; a study of the press coverage. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Dept. of Journalism [1965] 45 p. E842.9.B3
- Bonjean, Charles M., Richard J. Hill, and Harry W. Martin. Reactions to the assassination by sex and social class. Southwest Sociology Association, v. 15, 1965: 21-37. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Cushman, Robert F. Why the Warren Commission? New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 477-503. Law
- Death of a President; excerpt from the introduction to annual report of the Librarian of Congress for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1964. *Library journal*, v. 90, Aug. 1965: 3173-3176. Z671.L7, v. 90
- Death of a President: the established facts. *Atlantic monthly* v. 215, Mar. 1965: 112-118. AP2.A8, v. 215
- Dellinger, David. Editorial: the Warren report...? *Liberation*, v. 10, Mar. 1965: 3-5. E838.L5, v. 10
- The Warren report: the death of a President. *Liberation*, v. 9, Jan. 1965: 11-12. E838.L5, v. 9
- Fine, William M., ed. That day with God. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965. 213 p. E842.9.F5
- Ford, Gerald R., and John Stiles. Portrait of an assassin. New York, Simon and Shuster, 1965. 508 p. E842.9.F58
- Forkosch, Morris D. Presidential murder: constitutionality of a statute making it a Federal crime. *Southwest law journal*, v. 19, June 1965: 229-238. K23.O8, v. 19

- Fox, Sylvan. The unanswered questions about President Kennedy's assassination. New York, Award Books, 1965. 221 p.
E842.9.F64
- Freeman, Lucy, and Renatus Hartogs. The two assassins. New York, Crowell, 1965. 265 p.
E842.9.H3
- Freese, Paul L. The Warren Commission and the fourth shot: a reflection on the fundamentals of forensic fact finding. New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 424-465.
K14.E974, v. 40
- Goodhart, Arthur L. The Warren Commission from a procedural standpoint. New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 404-423.
K14.E974, v. 40
- Greenberg, Bradley S., and Edwin B. Parker, eds. The Kennedy assassination and the American public; social communication in crisis. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, 1965. 392 p.
E842.9.G7
- Greenstein, Fred I. Popular images of the President. American journal of psychiatry, v. 122, Aug. 1965: 523-529.
RC321.A52, v. 122
- Hartogs, Renatus, and Lucy Freeman. The two assassins. New York, Crowell, 1965. 264 p.
E842.9.H3
- Herman, M. and Flora Reta Schreiber. November, 22, 1963, a psychiatric evaluation. Science digest, v. 58, July 1965: 39-41.
Q1.S35, v. 58
- Hill, Richard J., Harry W. Martin, and Charles M. Bonjean. Reactions to the assassination by sex and social class. Southwest Sociology Association, v. 15, 1965: 21-37.
[Not in L.C. collection]
- Holmes, John Clellon. The silence of Oswald. Playboy, v. 12, Nov. 1965: 101-102, 222, 224.
AP2.P69, v. 12
- Jacobsen, Dan. Mean street. New statesman, v. 69, Jan. 15, 1965: 76-77.
AP4.N64, v. 69
- Jaffe, Louis L. Trial by newspaper. New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 504-524. Law
KF224.R8.K36
- Kaplan, John, and Jon R. Waltz. The trial of Jack Ruby. New York, MacMillan, 1965. 392 p.
KF224.R8.K36
- Macdonald, D. A critique of the Warren report. Esquire, v. 63, Mar. 1965: 59-63, 127-138.
AP2.E845, v. 63
- Martin, Harry W., Charles M. Bonjean, and Richard J. Hill. Reactions to the assassination by sex and social class. Southwest Sociology Association, v. 15, 1965: 21-37.
[Not in L.C. collection]
- Montgomery, R. Crystal ball: condensation from gift of prophecy. Reader's digest, v. 86, July 1965: 235-242.
AP2.R255, v. 86
- Morris, Wright. One day. 1st ed. New York, Atheneum, 1965. 433 p.
PZ3.M8346 On
- Parker, Edwin B., and Bradley S. Greenberg, eds. The Kennedy assassination and the American public; social communication in crisis. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1965. 392 p.
E842.9.G7

- Possony, S. T. Clearing the air. National review, v. 17, Feb. 9, 1965: 113-114. AP2.N3545, v. 17
- Recommendation no. 9. Journal of the American Medical Association, v. 191, Jan. 11, 1965: 143. R15.A48, v. 191
- Salandria, Vincent J. The Warren report? Liberation, v. 10, Mar. 1965: 14-32. E838.L5, v. 10
- Saltz, Eli, and John Wickey. Resolutions of the liberal dilemma in the assassination of President Kennedy. Journal of personality, v. 33, Dec. 1965: 636-648. BF1.J66, v. 33
- Sauvage, Leo. Oswald's case against the Warren Commission. New leader, v. 48, Dec. 20, 1965: 5-10. HX1.N37, v. 48
- The Warren Commission's case against Oswald. New leader, v. 48, Nov. 22, 1965: 16-21. HX1.N37, v. 48
- Schreiber, Flor Reta, and M. Herman. November 22, 1963, a psychiatric evaluation. Science digest, v. 58, July 1965: 39-41. Q1.S35, v. 58
- Scobey, Alfreda. A lawyer's notes on the Warren Commission report... American Bar Association journal, v. 51, Jan. 1965: 39-43. Law
- Snyder, Dr. LeMoyne. Lee Oswald's guilt: how science nailed Kennedy's killer. Popular science, v. 186, Apr. 1965: 68-73. AP2.P8, v. 186
- Sparrow, John Hanbury Anges. Making mysteries about Oswald. Atlas, v. 9, Mar. 1965: 173-174. AP1.A83, v. 9
- Spitzer, Stephen P., and Norman K. Denzin. Levels of knowledge in an emergent crisis. Social forces, v. 44, Dec. 1965: 234-237. HN51.S5, v. 44
- Stafford, Jean. The strange world of Marguerite Oswald. McCall's, v. 93, Oct. 1965: 112-113, 192-194, 196-200, 202-205. TT500, M 2, v. 93
- Stewart, Charles J. The pulpit in time of crisis: 1865 and 1963. Speech monographs, v. 32, Nov. 1965: 427-434. PN4077.S6, v. 32
- Stiles, John, and Gerald R. Ford. Portrait of an assassin. New York, Simon and Shuster, 1965. 508 p. E842.9.F28
- Symposium on the Warren Commission report. New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 404-524. K14.E974, v. 40
- Thoraley, Kerry W. Oswald. Chicago, New Classics House, 1965. 126 p. E842.9.T54
- Trevor-Roper, Hugh R. Slovenly Warren report. Atlas, v. 9, Feb. 1965: 115-118. AP1.A83, v. 9
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Preserving evidence pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy; report to accompany H.R. 9545. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965] 6 p. (89th Congress., 1st session. House. Report No. 813) E842.9.A52
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Preserving evidence pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy; report to accompany H.R. 9545. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 4 p. (89th Cong., 1st sess. Senate. Report no. 851) E842.9.A525

- The witnesses; the highlights of hearings before the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. [1st ed.] New York, McGraw-Hill [1965] 634 p. E842.9.A562
- Van Bremmelen, J.M. Did Lee Harvey Oswald act without help? New York University law review, v. 40, May 1965: 466-477.
K14.E974, v. 40
- Van Der Karr, Richard K. How Dallas TV stations covered Kennedy shooting. Journalism quarterly, v. 42, winter 1965: 646-649.
PN4700.J7, v. 42
- The Warren report: how to murder the medical evidence. Current medicine for attorneys, v. 12, Nov. 1965: 1-28.
[Not in L.C. collection]
- Weisberg, Harold. The report on the Warren report; or, the six wise men of Indus-tan. n.p. [1965] 188 p. E842.9.W4 1965a
- Wheeler, Keith. Cursed gun, the track of C2766. Life, v. 59, Aug. 27, 1965: 62-65.
AP2.L547, v. 59
- Wickey, John, and Eli Saltz. Resolutions of the liberal dilemma in the assassination of President Kennedy. Journal of personality, v. 33, Dec. 1965: 636-648. BF1.J66, v. 33
-
- 1966 Again the assassination. Newsweek, v. 68, Aug. 15, 1966: 30-33.
AP2.N6772, v. 68
- Ansbacher, Heinz, Rowena R. Ansbacher, David Shiverick, and Kathleen Shiverick. Lee Harvey Oswald: an Adlerian interpretation. Psychoanalytic review, v. 53, fall 1966: 55-68.
BF1.P5, v. 53
- Any number can play: question of whether the assassination was the work of one man. Newsweek, v. 68, Nov. 7, 1966: 37-38.
AP2.N6772, v. 68
- Appelbaum, Stephen A. The Kennedy assassination. Psychoanalytic review, v. 53, fall 1966: 69-80. BF1.P5, v. 53
- Assassination syndrome fits Lee Oswald. Science, v. 90, Sept. 24, 1966: 229.
Q1.S35, v. 90
- Banned in Moscow: Warren Commission report. Newsweek, v. 68, Sept. 12, 1966: 40.
AP2.N6772, v. 68
- Bickel, Alexander M. Leo Sauvage and the Warren Commission. New leader, v. 49, Nov. 21, 1966: 19-21.
HX1.N37, v. 49
- Bowser, Hallowell. The perils of hasty history. Saturday review, v. 49, Dec. 31, 1966: 14.
AP2.S273, v. 49
- Brooks, Steward M. Our murdered Presidents: the medical story. New York, Fredrick Fell, Inc., 1966. 234 p.
RD96.3.B7
- Butterfield, Roger. Assassination: some serious exceptions to the Warren report. Harper's, v. 233, Oct. 1966: 122, 124-126.
AP2.H3, v. 233
- Campbell, A. What happened in Dallas? Concerning H. Weisberg and E. J. Epstein's theories on the Warren report. New republic, v. 154, June 25, 1966: 23-25. AP2.N624, v. 154
- Cline, R. A. Warren in the dock. Who killed Kennedy? Spectator, v. 217, Sept. 23, 1966: 371-372.
AP4.S7, v. 217

- Cohen, Jacob. The Warren Commission report and its critics. Frontier, Nov. 1966: 5-20. F595.2.F7, v. 18
- Cohen, Jacob. What the Warren report omits: vital documents. Nation, v. 203, July 11, 1966: 43-49. AP2.N2, v. 203
- Cole, Alwyn. Assassin forger. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 11, July 1966, 272-288. RA1001.A57, v. 11
- Confusion compounded. National review, v. 18, Oct. 18, 1966: 1032-1033. AP2.N3545, v. 18
- Cook, Fred J. Warren Commission report; some unanswered questions. Nation, v. 202, June 13, 1966: 705-715. AP2.N2, v. 202
- Warren Commission report: testimony of the eyewitnesses. Nation, v. 202, June 20, 1966: 737-746. AP2.N2, v. 202
- Dallas: late casualty. Newsweek, v. 67, Feb. 28, 1966: 31-32. AP2.N6772, v. 67
- Deep and growing doubts questioning the verdict of the Warren Commission. Newsweek, v. 68, Oct. 10, 1966: 36, 41. AP2.N6772, v. 68
- Dulles, Allen. Allen Dulles answers Warren report critics; excerpts from statements, Dec. 4, 1966. U.S. news and world report, v. 61, Dec. 19, 1966: 20. JK1.U65, v. 61
- Durkin, Henry P. The climate of hate. New guard, v. 6, Nov. 1966: 13-15, 20-21. AP2.N6154, v. 6
- Epstein, Edward Jay. Inquest: the Warren Commission and the establishment of truth. New York, Viking Press, 1966. 224 p. E842.9.E6
- Who's afraid of the Warren report? Esquire, v. 66, Dec. 1966: 204, 330-332, 334. AP2.E845, v. 66
- Fairlie, H. No conspiracy but perhaps two assassins. New York times magazine, Sept. 11, 1966: 52-55. AP2.N6573
- Fateful two hours without a President: excerpts from testimonies. U.S. news and world report, v. 61, Nov. 14, 1966: 68-78. JK1.U65.U61
- Feldman, Harold. The Johnson murder charge. Minority of one, v. 8, Dec. 1966: 21-22. AP2.M55985, v. 8
- Fox, Sylvan. The hidden evidence about President Kennedy's assassination. Saga magazine, v. 33, Nov. 1966: 12-15, 78-84, 86. AP2.S127, v. 33
- Unanswered questions about President Kennedy's assassination. National review, v. 18, Jan. 11, 1966: 34-37. AP2.N3545, v. 18
- Gibbons, Russell W. The Warren Commission. Ave Maria, v. 104, Sept. 17, 1966: 16-17. AP2.A9, v. 104
- Goodall, Kenneth. Warren Commission: the critics and the law; beyond reasonable doubt? Reporter, v. 35, Dec. 15, 1966: 44-46. D839.R385
- Goodhart, Arthur L. Warren Commission: the critics and the law; legal ignorance and false logic. Reporter, v. 35, Dec. 15, 1966: 47-48, 50. D839.R385
- Gross, A. A. Shadows of doubt. Christian century, v. 83, Sept. 28, 1966: 1178. BR1.C45, v. 83

- Handlin, O. Warren Commission. Atlantic monthly, v. 218, Aug. 1966: 117-118. AP2.A8, v. 218
- Hastings, Michael. Lee Harley Oswald: a far mean streak of indepenence [sic] brought on by neglect [sic]. Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1966. 112 p. PR6058.A8.L4
- Howe, Irving. On the death of John F. Kennedy. In his steady work: essays in the politics of democratic radicalism, 1953-1966. New York, Harcourt Brace and World, 1966. 364 p. E743.H69
- Into the archives, X-rays and photographs of body of JFK. Time, v. 88, Nov. 11, 1966: 33. AP2.T37, v. 88
- Izakow, Boria. Echo of Dallas. New times (Moscow), no. 51, Dec. 21, 1966: 29-31. D839.N483
- JFK censored? Newsweek, v. 68, Oct. 3, 1966: 65-66. AP2.N6772, v. 68
- JFK: the death and the doubt. Newsweek, v. 68, Dec. 5, 1966: 25-26. AP2.N6772, v. 68
- Jones, Penn. Forgive my grief. Midlothian, Texas, Midlothian mirror [1966] 188 p. E842.9.J65, v. 1
- Kempton, Murray. Ruby, Oswald, and the State. Spectator, v. 217, Oct. 21, 1966: 506-507. AP4.S7, v. 217
- Kennedy assassination; question of a second investigation. New republic, v. 155, Nov. 12, 1966: 8. AP2.N624, v. 155
- Kerby, Phil. The assassination: a new inquiry appears warranted. Frontier, v. 18, Dec. 18, 1966: 3-4. F595.F7, v. 18
- Kliman, Gilbert W., and Martha Wolfenstein. Children and the death of a President; multidisciplinary studies. New York, Doubleday, 1966. 256 p. BF723.D3.W6
- Knebel, Fletcher. New wave of doubt; concerning Inquest by E.J. Epstein. Look, v. 30, July 12, 1966: 60-72. AP2.L79, v. 30
- Kopkind, Andrew. Kennedy mystery reopened. New statesman, v. 72, July 29, 1966: 153. AP4.N64, v. 72
- Lane, Mark. Rush to judgment. New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston [1966] 478 p. E842.9.L3
- Lane says JFK death is still unsolved murder. Publishers weekly, v. 190, Aug. 22, 1966: 58. Z1219.P98, v. 190
- Lattimer, John K. Factors in the death of President Kennedy. Journal of the American Medical Association, v. 198, Oct. 24, 1966: 327, 332-333. R15.A48, v. 198
- Lattimer, John K. Similarities in fatal wounds of John Wilkes Booth and Lee Harvey Oswald. Journal of medicine, v. 66, July 3, 1966: 1782-1794. R11.J73, v. 66
- Love, Ruth Leeds. Television and the Kennedy assassination. New society, v. 8, Oct. 13, 1966: 567-571. H1.N47, v. 8
- Marcus, Raymond. The bastard bullet; a search for legitimacy of Commission exhibit 399. Los Angeles, Rendell Publications, 1966. 77 p. E842.9.M34
- Matter of reasonable doubt. Life, v. 61, Nov. 25, 1966: 38-48B, 53. AP2.L547, v. 61

CRS - 22

- Meagher, Sylvia. How well did the 'non-driver' Oswald drive? *Minority of one*, v. 8, Sept. 1966: 19-21. AP2.M55985, v. 8
- Notes for a new investigation. *Esquire*, v. 66, Dec. 1966: 211, 335. AP2.E845, v. 66
- On closing the doors, not opening them; or the limit of the Warren investigation. *Minority of one*, v. 8, July-Aug. 1966: 29-32. AP2.M55985, v. 8
- Oswald and the State Department. *Minority of one*, v. 8, Oct. 1966: 22-27. AP2.M55985, v. 8
- A psychiatrist's retroactive 'clairvoyance'. *Minority of one*, v. 8, June 1966: 25-27. AP2.M55985, v. 8
- Subject index to the Warren report and hearings and exhibits. New York, Scarecrow Press, 1966. 150 p. E842.9.M4
- Mitgang, Herbert. New inquiry is needed: questions concerning the assassination. *New York times magazine*, Dec. 25, 1966: 14. AP2.N6573
- Muggeridge, Malcolm. New Kennedy theory. *New statesman*, v. 72, Nov. 18, 1966: 735. AP4.N64, v. 72
- Mythmakers; mysterious deaths of people involved in case. *Time*, v. 88, Nov. 11, 1966: 33-34. AP2.T37, v. 88
- National Broadcasting Company. Seven hours and thirty minutes, as broadcast on the NBC television network by NBC news. New York, Random House, 1966. 152 p. E842.9.N35
- New conflict over assassination. *U.S. news and world report*, v. 61, Dec. 5, 1966: 6, 8. JK1.U65, v. 61
- Now the U.S. gets JFK autopsy photos. *U.S. news and world report*, v. 61, Nov. 14, 1966: 81. JK1.U65, v. 61
- O'Brien, Conor Cruise. The life and death of Kennedy. *New statesman*, v. 71, Jan. 14, 1966: 50-51. AP4.N64, v. 71
- No one else but him. *New statesman*, v. 73, Sept. 30, 1966: 479-481. AP4.N64, v. 73
- Osterburg, James W. The Warren Commission: report and hearing. *Journal of forensic sciences*, v. 11, July 1966: 261-271. RA1001.A57, v. 11
- O'Toole, James K., Dr. Mourning a President. *Psychiatric quarterly*, v. 40, Oct. 1966: 737-755. RC321.N52, v. 40
- Phantasmagoria; who murdered Kennedy? *Time*, v. 88, Nov. 25, 1966: 34-35. AP2.T37, v. 88
- Plastrik, Stanley. The Oswald case should be reopened. *Dissent*, v. 13, Sept.-Oct. 1966: 469-470. HX1.D58, v. 13
- Popkin, Richard H. The second Oswald. New York, Avon Books, 1966. 174 p. E842.9.P6
- The second Oswald: the case for conspiracy theory. *New York review of books*, v. 7, July 28, 1966: 11-22. AP2.N655, v. 7
- Primer of assassination theories. *Esquire*, v. 66, Dec. 1966: 205-210. AP2.E845, v. 66
- Roberts, Charles. Eyewitness in Dallas. *Newsweek*, v. 68, Dec. 5, 1966: 26-29. AP2.N6772, v. 68
- Ruby and the king of torts. *Times literary supplement*, no. 3,342, Mar. 17, 1966: 221. AP4.T45

- Russell, Francis. Doubts about Dallas. National review, v. 18, Sept. 6, 1966: 887-888, 890-893. AP2.N3545, v. 18
- Salandria, Vincent J. The impossible tasks of one assassination bullet. Minority of one, v. 8, Mar. 1966: 12-18. AP2.M55985, v. 8
- The separate Connally shot. Minority of one, v. 8, Apr. 1966: 9-13. AP2.M55985, v. 8
- Salisbury, Harrison. Who killed President Kennedy? Progressive magazine, v. 30, Nov. 1966: 36-39. AP2.P8655, v. 30
- Sauvage, Leo. As I was saying. New leader, v. 49, Nov. 21, 1966: 21-22. HX1.N37, v. 49
- The case against Mr. X. New leader, v. 49, Jan. 3, 1966: 13-18. HX1.N37, v. 49
- The Oswald affair: an examination of the contradictions and omissions of the Warren report. Cleveland, World Publishing Co., 1966. 418 p. E842.9.S243
- Prof. Bickel and the Warren Commission. New leader, v. 49, Nov. 7, 1966: 16-19. HX1.N37, v. 49
- Schwartz, Jay. A legal demurrer to the report of the Warren Commission. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 11, July 1966: 318-329. RA1001.A57, v. 11
- The Second Oswald: an exchange of letters. New York review of books, v. 7, Oct. 6, 1966: 29-34. AP2.N655, v. 7
- Shannon, W. V. Enough is enough. Commonweal, v. 85, Nov. 18, 1966: 191-192. AP2.C6897, v. 85
- Shiverick, David, Kathleen Shiverick, Henry Ansbacher, and Rowena Ansbacher. Lee Harvey Oswald: an Adlerian interpretation. Psychoanalytic review, v. 53, fall 1966: 55-68. BFl.P5, v. 53
- Smith, R. H. Thinking the unthinkable: the Warren Commission books. Publishers weekly, v. 190, Oct. 10, 1966: 55. Z1219.P98, v. 190
- Smith, William Rochelle. Assassination by consensus: the story behind the Kennedy assassination. Washington, L'Avant Garde Publications [1966] 240 p. E842.9.S6
- Tastmona, Thothnu [pseud]. It is as if: a solution of the President Kennedy death mystery. New York, Exposition Press, 1966. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Those missing exhibits; photographs and X-rays turned over to National Archives. Nation, v. 203, Nov. 14, 1966: 500. AP2.N2, v. 203
- Truth about Kennedy assassination: questions raised and answered. U.S. news and world report, v. 61, Oct. 10, 1966: 44-50. JK1.U65, v. 61
- Tuchler, Maier. Psychiatric observation on the Warren Commission report. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 11, July 1966: 289-299. RA1001.A57, v. 11
- U.S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. The Kennedy assassination and the Warren report, selected references [by] Richard Malow. Washington [1966] 6 p.

- Wainwright, L. Warren report is not enough; voices speaking in contradiction of report; call for investigation. *Life*, v. 61, Oct. 7, 1966: 38. AP2.L547, v. 61
- Wecht, Cyril H. A critique of the medical aspects of the investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy. *Journal of forensic sciences*, v. 11, July 1966: 300-317. RA1001.A57, v. 11
- Weisberg, Harold. Whitewash: the report on the Warren report. [Hyattstown, Md., 1966, c1965] 224 p. E842.9.W4 1966ab
- Who killed Kennedy? Fact, v. 3, Nov.-Dec. 1966: 3-17. AP2.F142, v. 3
- Why has file no. 3106 not be publicized? *Human events*, v. 26, Dec. 17, 1966: 805. D410.H8, v. 26
- Wolfenstein, Martha, and Gilbert W. Kliman, eds. Children and the death of a President; multidisciplinary studies. New York, Doubleday, 1966. 256 p. BF723.D3.W6
-
- 1967 Agony relived; second installment of the death of a President. Time, v. 89, Jan. 27, 1967: 58. AP2.T37, v. 89
- Arnoni, M. S. Garrison and Warren, anything in common? *Minority of one*, v. 9, Oct. 1967: 11-12. AP2.M55985, v. 9
- As the book appears: a close look at the facts; concerning The death of a President by W. Manchester. *U.S. news and world report*, v. 62, Jan. 23, 1967: 50-52. JK1.U65, v. 62
- The Assassination: a nonentity for history. Time, v. 89, Jan. 13, 1967: 16-17. AP2.T37, v. 89
- Autry, James A. The Garrison investigation: how and why it began. New Orleans, v. 1, Apr. 1967: 8, 50-51. F399.N5, v. 1
- Aynesworth, Hugh. JFK conspiracy: J. Garrison's investigation of a plot to kill J. F. Kennedy. *Newsweek*, v. 69, May 15, 1967: 36, 38, 40. AP2.N6772, v. 69
- Back, Kurt, and Judith Saravay. From bright ideas to social research: the studies of the Kennedy assassination. *Public opinion quarterly*, v. 31, summer 1967: 253-264. HM261.A1.P8, v. 31
- Back to Dallas; theories of J. Thompson and J. Connally. Time, v. 90, Nov. 24, 1967: 54-55. AP2.T37, v. 90
- Berendt, John. -If they've found another assassin, let them name names and produce their evidence. *Esquire*, v. 68, Aug. 1967: 80-82. AP2.E845, v. 68
- Bickel, Alexander M. CBS on the Warren report. *New republic*, v. 157, July 15, 1967: 29-30. AP2.N624, v. 157
- Failure of the Warren report. *Commentary*, v. 43, Apr. 1967: 23-26. DS101.C63, v. 43
- Reexamining the Warren report. *New republic*, v. 156, Jan. 7, 1967: 25-28. AP2.N624, v. 156
- Return to Dallas. *New republic*, v. 157, Dec. 23, 1967: 34. AP2.N624, v. 157
- Bonsal, Philip. Cuba, Castro, and the United States. *Foreign affairs*, v. 45, Jan. 1967: 260-276. D410.F6, v. 45

- Bourbon street rococo; J. Garrison's investigation. Time, v. 89, Mar. 3, 1967: 26. AP2.T37, v. 89
- Callahan, Dr. John W. Did Jack Ruby kill the wrong man? Argosy, v. 365, Sept. 1967: 29, 96-101. AP2.A7, v. 365
- Carnival in New Orleans: Jim Garrison's investigation. Newsweek, v. 69, Mar. 6, 1967: 32. AP2.N6772, v. 69
- Chambliss, Sanford. Who killed Jack Ruby? Real magazine, Apr. 1967: 40-42. TL789.F57
[Not in L.C. collection]
- Chapman, Gil. Was Oswald alone? San Diego, Ca., Publishers Export Co., 1967. 160 p. E842.9.C47
- Charge of conspiracy. Newsweek, v. 69, Apr. 3, 1967: 36-37. AP2.N6772, v. 69
- Chriss, Nicholas C., and Jerry Cohen. New Orleans: act one. Reporter, v. 36, Apr. 6, 1967: 17-20. D839.R385, v. 36
- Cline, R. A. Postscript to Warren. Spectator, Jan. 27, 1967: 99. AP4.S7, v. 218
- Closing in; Garrison's unofficial chief investigator quits. Time, v. 90, July 7, 1967: 17. AP2.T37, v. 90
- Cohen, Jerry, and Nicholas C. Chriss. New Orleans: Act One. Reporter, v. 36, Apr. 6, 1967: 17-20. D839.R385, v. 36
- D.A. wins a round; Jim Garrison's investigation. Time, v. 89, Mar. 24, 1967: 17-18. AP2.T37, v. 89
- Dee, Jay. Lee Oswald did not kill President Kennedy alone. 1st ed. Canoga Park, Calif., N.P., c1967. 49 p. E842.9.D34
- Deighton, Len, Michael Rand, and Howard Loxton, comps. The Assassination of President Kennedy. London, Cape [1967] 1 v. E842.R32
- Demaris, Ovid, and Gary Willis. Disposal of Jack Ruby. Esquire, v. 67, June 1967: 131-135, 172-174, 176-178, 180-184. AP2.E845, v. 67
- Diehl, William F., Jr. The press: its actions and reactions. New Orleans, v. 1, Apr. 7, 1967: 12-13, 52-53. F379.N5, v. 1
- Dirix, B. Why was JFK shot? Atlas, v. 13, May 1967: 10-13. AP1.A83, v. 13
- Dugger, Ronnie. The last madness of Jack Ruby. New republic, v. 156, Feb. 11, 1967: 19-25. AP2.N624, v. 156
- Epstein, Edward Jay. Manchester unexpurgated. Commentary, v. 44, 1967: 25-31. DS101.C63, v. 44
- Fein, Arnold L. JFK in Dallas: the Warren report and its critics. Saturday review, v. 49, Jan. 21, 1967: 36. AP2.S273, v. 49
- Fonzi, Gaetano. Loose ends. Greater Philadelphia magazine, v. 58, Jan. 1967: 66-69, 88, 90, 106-108. HC108.P5G7, v. 58
- Frontek, T. An American view. Tablet, Apr. 8, 1967: 382-383. BX801.T3
[Not in L.C. collection]

- Garrison under fire. The economist, v. 22, Feb. 25, 1967: 730.
HG11.E2, v. 22
- Garson, Barbara. MacBird. New York, Grove Press, 1967. 109 p.
PS3557.A78.M3
[Not in L.C. collection]
- Gertz, Elmer, and Wayne B. Giampietro. The trial of 'State cases':
a postscript on the Ruby trial. DePaul law review, v. 16,
spring-summer 1967: 285-308. Law
- Giampietro, Wayne B., and Elmer Gertz. The trial of 'State cases':
a postscript on the Ruby trial. DePaul law review, v. 16,
spring-summer 1967: 285-308. Law
- Goodhart, Arthur L. The mysteries of the Kennedy assassination
and the English press. Law quarterly review, v. 83, Jan. 1967:
23-63. Law
- Graham, J. J. Acquittal for Oswald: concerning the movie Rush
to judgment. Commonweal, v. 86, Apr. 21, 1967: 149-151.
AP2.C6897, v. 86
- He was my brother: excerpts from Lee (R. L. Oswald and others).
Look, v. 31, Oct. 17, 1967: 62-66, 71-74.
AP2.L79, v. 31
- History or headlines? New Orleans investigation. Newsweek, v. 69,
Mar. 13, 1967: 44, 47. AP2.N6772, v. 69
- Houts, Marshall. Warren Commission one-bullet theory exploded.
Argosy, v. 365, July 1967: 108-116. AP2.A7, v. 365
- Where death delights; the story of Dr. Milton Helpern
and forensic medicine. New York, Coward-McCann [1967] 317 p.
RA1025.H4.H6
- Itek Corporation. Life-Itek Kennedy assassination film
analysis. Lexington, Ms., Itex Corporation [1967] 24 p.
E842.9.I8
- JFK death: a new investigation but... U.S. news and world
report, v. 62, Mar. 13, 1967: 16. JK1.U65, v. 62
- James, Rosemary, and Jack Wardlaw. Plot or politics. The
Garrison case and its cast. New Orleans, Pelican
Publishing House [1967] 167 p. E842.9.J3
- Joesten, Joachim. The case against Lyndon B. Johnson in the assas-
sination of President Kennedy. Munich, Dreschstr
[1967] 2 v. E842.9.J573
- The Garrison enquiry: truth and consequences.
London, Dawnay [1967] 158 p. E842.0.J58
- Marina Oswald. London, Dawnay [1967] 165 p.
E842.9.J59
- Oswald: the truth. London, Dawnay [1967] 372 p.
E812.9.J62
- Jones, Penn. Forgive my grief. Midlothian, Texas, Midlothian
mirror [1967] 193 p. E842.9.J65, v. 2
- Forgive my grief vol. 3. Midlothian, Texas,
the Midlothian mirror [1967] 88 p. E842.9.J65, v. 3
- Kaplan, John. Controversy: the assassins. American scholar,
v. 36, spring 1967: 271-308. AP2.A4572, v. 36

- Kempton, Murray. The disposable Jack Ruby. *Spectator*, v. 218, Jan. 13, 1967: 35. AP4.S7, v. 218
- Rage greater than grief. *Atlantic monthly*, v. 219, May 1967: 98-100. AP2.A8, v. 219
- Kennedy assassination: something rotten... *Saturday evening post*, v. 240, Dec. 2, 1967: 88. AP2.S2, v. 240
- Kilgallen, Dorothy. Murder one. New York, Random House, 1967. 304 p. HV6529.K5
- Lane, Mark. The man in the doorway. Film comment, v. 4, fall/winter 1967: 20-21. PN1993.F438, v. 4
- Playboy interview: Mark Lane. *Playboy*, v. 14, Feb. 1967: 41-42, 44-64, 66-68. AP2.P69, v. 14
- Who killed Kennedy? CBS is wrong. *True magazine*, v. 48, Dec. 1967: 34-36. AP2.T76127, v. 48
- Lawrence, Lincoln [pseud.] Were we controlled. New Hyde Park, N.Y., University Books [1967] 173 p. E842.9.L36
- Lewis, Richard Warren. The scavengers and critics of the Warren report; the endless paradox. New York, Delacorte Press [1967] 188 p.
- Logan, Andy. JFK: the stained-glass image. *American heritage*, v. 18, Oct. 1967: 4-7, 75-78. E171.E43, v. 18
- Loxton, Howard, Len Deighton, and Michael Rand, comp. The assassination of President Kennedy. London, Cape [1967] 1 v. E842.R32
Rare book collection
- MacCloskey, Monro. The American intelligence community. New York, Rosen Press, Inc., 1967. 190 p. JK468.16.M28
- Maddox, Henry. The plot according to Garrison. New Orleans, v. 1, July 1967: 18-19, 52-53. F379.N5, v. 1
- Marks, Stanley J. Murder most foul. The conspiracy that murdered President Kennedy: 975 questions and answers. Los Angeles, Bureau of International Affairs, 1967. 149 p. E842.9.M35
- Manchester, William R. The death of a President, November 20-November 25, 1963. New York, Harper's, 1967. 710 p. E842.9.M28
- Mayo, John B. Bulletin from Dallas: the President is dead; the story of John F. Kennedy's assassination as covered by radio and TV. [1st ed] New York, Exposition Press [1967] 157 p. E842.9.M37
- Meagher, Sylvia. After the battle, the book. *Minority of one*, v. 9, June 1967: 25-27. AP2.M55985, v. 9
- Post-assassination credibility chasm. *Minority of one*, v. 9, Mar. 1967: 21-22. AP2.M55985, v. 9
- Mills, Andrew. Who killed Kennedy? The Warren report is right. *True magazine*, v. 48, Dec. 1967: 32, 72, 75-77. AP2.T76127, v. 48
- More on the Kennedy assassination charges, concerning Jim Garrison's TV broadcast. *U.S. news and world report*, v. 62, June 12, 1967: 55-56. JK1.U65, v. 62

CRS - 28

- Mosk, Richard M. The Warren Commission and the legal process. Case and comment magazine, v. 72, May-June 1967: 13-20.
Law
- Mystery makers; J. Sparrow's evaluation of the Warren Commission report and its critics. Time, v. 90, Dec. 22, 1967: 21.
AP2.T37, v. 90
- New assassination theory: theory of J. Thompson. Newsweek, v. 70, Nov. 27, 1967: 29-30, 35.
AP2.N6772, v. 70
- New light on second assassin theory. U.S. news and world report, v. 62, May 29, 1967: 14.
JK1.U65, v. 62
- Nichols, John. President Kennedy's adrenals. Journal of the American Medical Association, v. 201, July 10, 1967: 129-130.
R15.A48, v. 201
- Norden, Eric. Jim Garrison: a candid conversation with the embattled district attorney of New Orleans. Playboy, v. 14, Oct. 1967: 59-60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 156-163, 165-168, 170-172, 174-176, 178.
AP2.P69, v. 14
- November 22, 1963, Dallas: photos by nine bystanders. Life, v. 63, Nov. 25, 1967: 87-97.
AP2.L547, v. 63
- O'Brien, Conor Cruise. Veto by assassination? Minority of one, v. 9, Dec. 1967: 16-18.
AP2.M55985, v. 9
- Odd company. Time, v. 89, Mar. 10, 1967: 24.
AP2.T37, v. 89
- Orren, Karen, and Paul Peterson. Kennedy assassination: case study in dynamics of political socialization. Journal of politics, v. 29, May 1967: 388-404.
JAL.J6, v. 29
- Oswald, Robert L. Lee: a portrait of Lee Harvey Oswald. New York, Coward-McCann, 1967. 246 p.
E842.9.O8
- Pathologist sleuth reopens Kennedy controversy; suggest JFK suffered from Addison's disease. Science news, v. 92, July 22, 1967: 79-80.
Q1.S76, v. 92
- Peterson, Paul, and Karen Orren. Presidential assassination: case study in dynamics of political socialization. Journal of politics, v. 29, May 1967: 388-404.
JAL.J6, v. 29
- Phelan, James. Plot to kill Kennedy? Rush to judgment in New Orleans. Saturday evening post, v. 240, May 6, 1967: 21-25.
AP2.S2, v. 240
- Popkin, Richard H. Garrison's case. New York review of books, v. 9, Sept. 14, 1967: 19-29.
AP2.N655, v. 9
- Powledge, Fred. Is Garrison faking? New republic, v. 156, June 17, 1967: 13-18.
AP2.N624, v. 156
- Rabasseire, Henri. Let's talk sense about Oswald. Dissent, v. 14, Mar.-Apr. 1967: 205-210.
HX1.D58, v. 14
- Rajski, Raymond B., comp. A nation grieved: the Kennedy assassination in editorial cartoon. Rutland, Vt., C. E. Tuttle Co., 1967. 134 p.
E842.9.R28
- Rand, Michael, Howard Loxton, and Len Deighton, comps. The assassination of President Kennedy. London, Cape [1967] 1 v. (various pagings)
E842.9.R32
- Raskin, Marcus. Rush to judgement. Yale law journal, v. 75, Jan. 1967: 581-597.
KF29.A4, v. 75

- Revere, Guy. Jack Ruby: the Mafia's man in Dallas. Saga, v. 33,
Mar. 1967: 28-31, 86-88, 90. AP2.S127, v. 33
- Reynolds, Ruth. The Oswald riddle. Coronet, v. 5, Mar. 1967:
122-127. AP2.C768, v. 5
- Roberts, Charles. The truth about the assassination. New York, Grosset
and Dunlap, 1967. 128 p. E842.9.R57
[Not in L.C. collection]
- Roberts, Gene. The case of Jim Garrison and Lee Oswald. New
York times magazine, May 21, 1967: 32-35. AP2.N6575
- Ross, Thomas, and David Wise. The espionage establishment. New
York, Random House, 1967. 308 p. JK468.I6.W5
- Ruddy, Jon. Did this man happen upon John Kennedy's assassins?
Maclean's magazine, v. 80, Nov. 1967: 2-3. AP5.M2, v. 80
- Rush to judgment: a conversation with Mark Lane and Emile de Antonio.
Film comment, v. 4, fall/winter 1967: 2-18. PN1993.F438, v. 4
- Stewart, Charles J. Catholic and Jewish pulpit reaction to the
Kennedy assassination. Western speech, v. 32, spring 1967:
131-139. PN4071.W45, v. 32
- Saravay, Judith, and Kurt Back. From bright ideas to social research:
The studies of the Kennedy assassination. Public opinion
quarterly, v. 31, summer 1967: 253-264. HM261.A1P8, v. 31
- Sauvage, Leo. A few questions for the Warren Commission. Dissent, v. 14,
Mar.-Apr. 1967: 200-205. HX1.D58, v. 14
- Scene of the crime. Newsweek, v. 70, Dec. 4, 1967: 31B-32.
AP2.N6772, v. 70
- Schiller, Lawrence. The controversy. [Phonodisc] Capitol
KAO2677 [1967] R67-300
- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. On writing of contemporary history.
Atlantic, v. 219, Mar. 1967: 69-74. AP2.A8, v. 219
- Second primer of assassination theories. Esquire, v. 67, May
1967: 104-107. AP2.E845, v. 67
- Shadow on a grassy knoll: photographic-analysis shows no new
evidence. Time, v. 89, May 26, 1967: 21. AP2.T37, v. 89
- Shayon, Robert Lewis. Persistent devils; CBS news inquiry: the
Warren report. Saturday review, v. 50, July 22, 1967: 46.
AP2.S273, v. 50
- Shutting up big mouth. Time, v. 90, Aug. 25, 1967: 48-51.
AP2.T37, v. 90
- Sifting fact from fantasy: use of truth drugs in Jim Garrison's
investigation. Time, v. 89, Mar. 31, 1967: 41. AP2.T37, v. 89
- Sites, Paul. Lee Harvey Oswald and the American dream. [1st ed.]
New York, Pageant Press, 1967. 261 p. E842.9.S5
- Sleight of hand: Jim Garrison's assassination investigation
extends to FBI and CIA. Newsweek, v. 69, May 22, 1967: 40, 42
AP2.N6772, v. 69

- Smith, Sandy. From a governor and a D.A. an offer of resignation. Life, v. 63, Sept. 29, 1967: 34-36. AP2.L547, v. 63
- Snider, Arthur J. Assassination, a new medical opinion. Science digest, v. 61, Feb. 1967: 35-36. Q1.S383, v. 61
- Solved: mystery of the missing frames. Newsweek, v. 69, Feb. 6, 1967: 17. AP2.N6772, v. 69
- Something of a shambles. Time, v. 89, June 30, 1967: 42. AP2.T37, v. 89
- Sparrow, John Hanbury Angas. After the assassination: a positive appraisal of the Warren report. New York, Chilmark Press, 1967. 77 p. E842.9.S65
- Syme, Anthony V. The assassins. London, Melbourne [etc.] Horwitz, [1967] 162 p. HV6278.S95
- Tales of Garrison. The economist, v. 222, Mar. 25, 1967: 1145. HG11.E2, v. 222
- Taste of conspiracy: European newsmen are leery of Garrison's investigation. Newsweek, v. 69, Mar. 20, 1967: 76. AP2.N6772, v. 69
- Theory of an Oswald conspiracy. Life, v. 62, Mar. 3, 1967: 33. AP2.L547, v. 62
- Thickening the plot: judges support Jim Garrison's plot theory. Newsweek, v. 69, Mar. 27, 1967: 37. A2.N6772, v. 69
- Thompson, Josiah. The cross fire that killed President Kennedy: excerpts from six seconds in Dallas. Saturday evening post, v. 240, Dec. 2, 1967: 27-31. AP2.S2, v. 240
- Tinder, Glenn. Death of a President and the problem of meaning. Review of politics, v. 29, July 1967: 407-415. JAL.R4, v. 29
- Tonahill, Joe H. Why Lee Harvey Oswald would have been acquitted for the murder of President John F. Kennedy. [n.p., 1967] 1 v. (various pagings) KF224.O8.T6
- Towne, Anthony. The assassination, the Warren Commission and the public interest. Notice, v. 27, Feb. 1967: 6-14. BV4531.A1.M76, v. 27
- Trillin, Calvin. Reporter at large; the buffs. New Yorker, v. 43, June 10, 1967: 41-46, 48, 50, 53-54, 56, 59-60, 62, 65-66, 68, 71. AP2.N6763, v. 43
- Truth vs. death; views of C. Roberts. Time, v. 89, Mar. 17, 1967: 26. AP2.T37, v. 89
- The inquest. Ramparts, v. 5, June 1967: 17-29. AP2.R19, v. 5
- Press vs. Garrison. Ramparts, v. 6, Sept. 1967: 8, 10, 12. AP2.R19, v. 6
- Two for the seesaw. Newsweek, v. 70, July 3, 1967: 82. AP2.N6772, v. 70
- Wardlaw, Jack, and Rosemary James. Plot or politics? The Garrison case and its cast. New Orleans, Pelican Pub. House, 1967. 167 p. E842.9.J3
- Warren report wrong. College teacher says. Los Angeles times, Nov. 17, 1967: 18. Newsp

- Weaver, John Downing. Warren: the man, the court, the era. Boston, Little Brown, 1967. 406 p. KF8745.W3W4
- Weisberg, Harold. Kennedy murder: buried proof of a conspiracy. Saga, v. 34, Apr. 1967: 28-31, 89-90, 92, 94-96. AP2.S127, v. 34
- Oswald in New Orleans; case of conspiracy with the CIA. New York, Canyon Books [1967] 404 p. E842.9.W38 1968
- Whalen, R. J. Kennedy assassination. Saturday evening post, v. 240, Jan. 14, 1967: 19-25. AP2.S2, v. 240
- Willis, Gary, and Ovid Demaris. Disposal of Jack Ruby. Esquire, v. 67, June 1967: 131-135, 172-174, 176-178, 180-182, 184. AP2.E845, v. 67
- Wise, David, and Thomas Ross. The espionage establishment. New York, Random House [1967] 308 p. UB270.W56
- Yarborough, Ralph. Sensory perception. Newsweek, v. 69, Jan. 16, 1967: 6. AP2.N6772, v. 69
- You all know me. I'm Jack Ruby. Esquire, v. 67, May 1967: 79-87, 153-164. AP2.E845, v. 67
- Young, Roger. The investigation: where it stands today. New Orleans v. 1, July 1967: 16-17, 54-59. F379.N5, v. 1
-
- 1968 Adler, Bill, comp. The weight of the evidence, the Warren report and its critics, edited by Jay David. New York, Meredith Press, 1968. 303 p. E842.9.A68
- An almanac of Jim Garrison's investigation into the assassination of John F. Kennedy; the crime of silence. Austin, Tex., Research Publications, 1968. 22 p. E842.9.A7
- Bishop, James Alonzo. The day Kennedy was shot. New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1968. 713 p. E842.9.B5
- Butler, Ed. The great assassin puzzle. The Westwood village square, v. 1, no. 2, 1968: 21-28; no. 1, 1969: 26-27, 37-41. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Cadden, Vivian, and Gerald Caplan. Lessons in bravery. McCall's, v. 95, Sept. 1968: 12, 85, 115. TT500.M2, v. 95
- Caplan, Gerald, and Vivian Cadden. Lessons in bravery. McCall's, v. 95, Sept. 1968: 12, 85, 115. TT500.M2, v. 95
- A Child's eye: November 22, 1963 (motion picture). Group VI Productions (released by Pathe Contemporary Films), 1968. 8 min. FIA68-671
- Cook, Fred J. Warren report and the irreconcilables: theories of Josiah Thompson and Sylvia Meagher. Nation, v. 206, Feb. 26, 1968: 227-281. AP2.N2, v. 206
- Crown, James T. The Kennedy literature: a bibliographical essay on John F. Kennedy. New York, New York University Press, 1968. 181 p. Z8462.8.C7
- David, Jay, ed. The weight of the evidence; the Warren report and its critics, comp. by Bill Adler. New York, Meredith Press, 1968. 303 p. E842.9.A68
- Day JFK died; excerpts from The day Kennedy was shot, by Jim Bishop. Ladies home journal, v. 85, Nov. 1968: 151-157. AP2.L135, v. 85

- Demaris, Ovid, and Garry Willis. Jack Ruby. New York, New American Library, 1968. 266 p. E842.9.W47
- Epstein, Edward Jay. Garrison. New Yorker, v. 44, July 13, 1968: 35-40, 42, 49-52, 54-56, 58-60, 62-76, 79-81. AP2.W6772, v. 44
- The usurpers. Boston, Western Islands, 1968. 249 p. E846.E9
- Ferrari, Alfred John. Kennedy assassinations and political detours. Minority of one, v. 10, Nov. 1968: 7-9. AP2.M55985, v. 10
- Garrison, Jim. New Orleans evidence; excerpts from statements. Reporter, v. 38, Feb. 8, 1968: 10. D839.R385, v. 38
- Gertz, Elmer. Moments of madness: people vs. Jack Ruby. Chicago, Follett Pub. Co., 1968. 564 p. KF224.R8.G4
- Goldberg, Arthur. Conspiracy interpretations of the assassination of President Kennedy: international and domestic. Los Angeles, University of California, 1968. 30 p. E842.9.G58
- Gordon, Bruce. One and one make two sometimes: the Kennedy assassination. Fullerton, Calif., N.P., 1968. 28 p. E842.9.G6
- Henderson, Bruce E. 1:33. 1st ed. New York, Cowles, 1968. 243 p. E842.9.H4
- Hepburn, James. Farewell America. Vaduz, Frontiers, 1968. 418 p. E842.H46
- Horowitz, Irving L. Kennedy's death, myths, and realities. Trans-action, v. 5, July-Aug. 1968: 3-5. H1.T72, v. 5
- Houts, Marshall. President Kennedy's autopsy was bungled. Medical economics, v. 45, Mar. 4, 1968: 248-249, 252-253, 257, 260-261, 264-266, 272-275, 278-279, 282-283, 286-287. R723.5.M4, v. 45
- Howard, Anthony. Logistics of the funeral. Esquire, v. 70, Nov. 1968: 119-122. AP2.E845, v. 70
- Inconceivable connivance. Time, v. 91, Jan. 12, 1968: 14. AP2.T37, v. 91
- Joesten, Joachim. The biggest lie ever told. The Kennedy murder fraud, and how I helped expose it. [Munich, Dreschstr. 5, Selbstverlag] 1968-69. 4 v. E.842.0.J57
- The dark side of Lyndon B. Johnson. London, Peter Dawnay [1968] 272 p. E847.J56
- How Kennedy was killed: the full appalling story. London, Dawnay; London, Tandem [1968] 192 p. E842.9.J583
- Trilogy of murder. Munich [1968-70?] N.P. E842.9.J63
- 5 v. Rare book collection
- Karp, Irwin. Debate over Dallas: theories of John Sparrow and Sylvia Meagher. Saturday review, v. 51, Mar. 9, 1968: 113-114. AP2.S273, v. 51

- Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr. The real CIA. New York, MacMillan, 1968. 312 p. JK468.I6.K5
- Lane, Mark. A citizen's dissent: Mark Lane replies. New York, Holt, Reinhart, and Winston [1968] 290 p. E842.9.L29
- Law unto himself. Newsweek, v. 71, Jan. 8, 1968: 25-26. AP2.N6772, v. 71
- Lincoln, Evelyn. Kennedy and Johnson. New York, Rinehart and Winston [1968] 207 p. E842.1.L47
- McDade, Thomas M. The assassination industry: a tentative checklist of publications on the murder of John F. Kennedy. American book collector, v. 18, no. 10, 1968: 8-14. Z990.A5, v. 18
- Mader, Julius. Who's who in the CIA. Berlin, West Germany, Mader, 1968. 604 p. JK468.I6.M323
- Meagher, Sylvia. Three assassinations. Minority of one, v. 10, Sept. 1968: 13-16. AP2.55985, v. 10
- Two assassinations. Minority of one, v. 10, June 1968: 9-10. AP2.M55985, v. 10
- Wheels with deals: how the Kennedy investigation was organized. Minority of one, v. 10, July-Aug. 1968: 23-27. AP2.M55985, v. 10
- Missing link: photos and X-rays of autopsy. Newsweek, v. 72, Nov. 14, 1968: 30-31. AP2.N6772, v. 72
- Morin, Reiman. Assassination: the death of President John F. Kennedy. New York, New American Library, 1968. 191 p. E842.9.M6
- Nierenberg, Harry H. Ego disturbance following a national trauma. Psychoanalytic review, v. 55, no. 1, 1968: 128-134. BF1.P5, v. 55
- Seth, Ronald. The executioners: the story of SMERSH. New York, Hawthorn Books, [1968, c1967] 199 p. DK266.3.S44 1968
- Smith, William Rochelle. A hog story from the aftermire of the Kennedy assassination. Washington, L'Avant Garde Publications, [1968] 55 p. E842.9.S62
- Thompson, Josiah. Six seconds in Dallas; a micro-study of the Kennedy assassination. [New York] B. Geis Associates, distributed by Random House, [1968, c1967] 323 p. E842.9.T49
- Thompson, William Clifton. A bibliography of literature relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Revised ed. San Antonio, Tx., [c1968] 40 p. Z8462.8.T45 1968b
- Turner, William W. Garrison commission on the assassination of President Kennedy. Ramparts, v. 6, Jan. 1968: 43-68. AP2.R19, v. 6
- Turner, William W. Some disturbing parallels: assassinations of M. L. King and J. F. Kennedy. Ramparts, v. 6, June 29, 1968: 33-46. AP2.R19, v. 6
- Weaver, John Downing. Warren: the man, the court, the era. London, Gollancz, 1968. 406 p. KF8745.W3W4 1968

- White, Stephen. Should we believe the Warren report? New York, MacMillan, [1968] 309 p. E842.9.W46
- Who killed Kennedy? National review, v. 20, July 2, 1968: 642. AP2.N3545, v. 20
- Jack Ruby. [New York] New American Library, [1968] 266 p. E842.9.W47
- Secret evidence on the Kennedy assassination. Saturday evening post, v. 241, Apr. 6, 1968: 70-73. AP2.S2, v. 241
- Wise, David, and Thomas Ross. The espionage establishment. London, Cape, 1968. 308 p. UB270.W56 1968
-
- 1969 All the elements. Newsweek, v. 73, Mar. 10, 1969: 364. AP2.N6772, v. 73
- Blumberg, Rae Lesser, Samuel A. Mueller, Suzanne E. Rocheleau, and Joyce A. Sween [Northwestern Assassination Research John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; a preliminary report. [Evanston, Ill.] Northwestern University, c1969. 1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.N67
- Bonner, Judy Whitson. Investigation of a homicide; the murder of John F. Kennedy. Anderson, S.C., Droke House, 1969. 367 p. E842.9.B6
- Brener, Milton E. The Garrison case; a study in the abuse of power. 1st ed. New York, C. N. Potter [1969] 278 p. E842.9.B7 1969
- Bringuier, Carlos. Red Friday, Nov. 22nd, 1963. Chicago, C. Hallberg [1969] 174 p. E842.9.B74
- Covering big Jim. Newsweek, v. 73, Mar. 17, 1969: 105. AP2.N6772, v. 73
- Curry, Jesse E. Retired Dallas police chief, Jesse Curry reveals his personal JFK assassination file. [Dallas, 1969] 133 p. E842.9.C78
- Curtains for the DA; physicians examine photographs and X-rays. Newsweek, v. 73, Jan. 27, 1969: 27. AP2.N6772, v. 73
- Cutler, Robert Bradley. The flight of CE399: evidence of conspiracy by R. B. Cutler. Beverly, Mass., printed by Omni-Print, 1969. E842.9.C8
- Dallas revisited. Time, v. 93, Feb. 21, 1969: 18-19. AP2.T37, v. 93
- Deadly iteration. Time, v. 93, Mar. 7, 1969: 22-23. AP2.T37, v. 93
- Defiant defendant. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 24, 1969: 33. AP2.N6772, v. 73
- Epstein, Edward Jay. Counterplot. New York, Viking Press, 1969. 182 p. E842.9.E59
- Final chapter in the assassination controversy. New York times magazine, Apr. 20, 1969: 30-31, 115-120. AP2.N6573 1969
- The Fateful trip to Texas: the assassination of a President, 1963 (motion picture) ed. by Fred Israel. Chelsea House Educational Communications, 1969.

CRS - 35

- Flammonde, Paris. The Kennedy conspiracy; an uncommissioned report on the Jim Garrison investigation. New York, Meredith Press, 1969. 348 p. E842.9.F54
- Garrison under pressure. Newsweek, v. 74, Oct. 27, 1969: 42. AP2.N6772, v. 74
- Garrison vs. the people. Time, v. 93, Mar. 14, 1969: 29. AP2.T37, v. 93
- Garrison's last gasp. Time, v. 93, Mar. 7, 1969: 23. AP2.T37, v. 93
- Ginsparg, Sylvia L., and Alice E. Moriarty. Reactions of young people to the Kennedy assassination: the significance of characteristic patterns of individual responses. Menninger Clinic bulletin, v. 33, no. 5, 1969: 295-309. RC321.M4
- Hanson, William H. The shooting of John F. Kennedy; one assassin, three shots, three hits, no misses. San Antonio, Tx., The Naylor Company, 1969. 203 p. E842.9.H28
- Heaps, Willard Allison. Assassination; a special kind of murder. New York, Meredith Press, 1969. 218 p. HV6278.H38
- JFK assassination; Justice Department publishes a report by doctors. New republic, v. 160, Feb. 1, 1969: 9-10. AP2.N624, v. 160
- JFK killing: new findings. U.S. news and world report, v. 66, Jan. 27, 1969: 4. JK1.U65, v. 66
- Levy, Sheldon G. How population subgroups differed in knowledge of six assassinations. Journalism quarterly, v. 46, winter, 1969: 685-698. K10.U27, v. 46
- The Man who loved Kennedy. Time, v. 93, Feb. 21, 1969: 18. AP2.T37, v. 93
- Mardi Gras season. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 3, 1969: 34. AP2.N6772, v. 73
- Marks, Stanley, J. Two days of infamy: November 22, 1963 and September 28, 1964. [1st U.S. ed. Los Angeles, Bureau of International Affairs] 1969. 178 p. E842.9.M353 1969
- More than a man in the dock. Time, v. 93, Feb. 14, 1969: 26-29. AP2.T37, v. 93
- Moriarty, Alice E., and Sylvia Ginsparg. Reactions of young people to the Kennedy assassination: the significance of characteristic patterns of individual responses. Menninger Clinic bulletin, v. 33, no. 5, 1969: 295-309. RC321.M4, v. 33
- Mueller, Samuel A., Suzanne E. Rocheleau, Joyce A. Sween, and Rae Lesser Blumberg [Northwestern Assassination Research Group] Reactions to the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; a preliminary report. [Evanston, Ill.] Northwestern University, c1969. 1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.N67
- Olds, Greg. In my opinion: the Zapruder film. Texas observer, v. 61, Nov. 21, 1969: 16. F381.T368, v. 61

- Roucheleau, Suzanne E., Joyce A. Sween, Samuel A. Mueller, and
Rae Lesser Blumberg [Northwestern Assassination Research Group]
Reactions to the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy
and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; a preliminary report. [Evanston,
Ill.] Northwestern University, c1969. 1 v. (various pagings)
E842.9.N67
- Rogers, Warren. Persecution of Clay Shaw. Look, v. 33, Aug. 26, 1969:
53-56, 58-60. AP2.L79, v. 33
- Round one. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 3, 1969: 33. AP2.N6772, v. 73
- Sicinski, A. Dallas and Warsaw: impact of a major national
political event on public opinion abroad. Public opinion
quarterly, v. 33, summer 1969: 190-196. HM261.A1.P8, v. 33
- Sideshow in New Orleans. Time, v. 93, Jan. 31, 1969: 40. AP2.T37, v. 93
- Smiling through. Newsweek, v. 73, Jan. 27, 1969: 27-28. AP2.N6772, v. 73
- Smith, L. Dealey plaza. Holiday, v. 46, Nov. 1969: 78-79. AP2.H592, v. 46
- Stop the press. Front page coverage of the Kennedy assassinations
(Filmstrip). Visual Education Consultants, 1969.
- Sween, Joyce A., Rae Lesser Blumberg, Samuel A. Mueller, and
Suzanne E. Rocheleau [Northwestern Assassination Research
Group] Reactions to the assassinations of President John
F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; a preliminary
report. [Evanston, Ill.] Northwestern University, c1969.
1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.N67
- Thompson, T. In Texas a policeman and an assassin are laid to rest too.
Life, v. 55, Dec. 6, 1969: 52B-52E. AP2.L547, v. 55
- Turner, W., and D. Welsh. In the shadow of Dallas. Ramparts, v. 7,
Jan. 25, 1969: 61-71. AP2.R19, v. 7
- Verdict in New Orleans. Nation, v. 208, Mar. 17, 1969: 324.
AP2.N2, v. 208
- Weisberg, Harold. Post-mortem; suppressed Kennedy autopsy.
Frederick, Md., n.p., 1969. 650 p. E842.9.W393
- Post-mortem; suppressed Kennedy autopsy. [Frederick, Md.,
1969] 144 p. E842.9.W39
- Post-mortem III; secrets of the Kennedy autopsy. Frederick,
Md., n.p., [1969] 1 v. (various pagings) E842.9.W4 1969a
- Welsh, D., and W. Turner. In the shadow of Dallas. Ramparts, v. 7,
Jan. 25, 1969: 61-71. AP2.R19, v. 7
- What conspiracy? Testimony of Perry Russo. Newsweek, v. 73, Feb. 24,
1969: 33. AP2.N6772, v. 73
- What Garrison proved. New republic, v. 160, Mar. 15, 1969: 9.
AP2.N624, v. 160
- Wolfenstein, Martha, and Gilbert W. Kliman, eds. Children and
the death of a President; multidisciplinary studies. Gloucester,
Mass., P. Smith, 1969 [c1965] 288 p. BF723.D3W6
-
- 1970 Garrison, Jim. A heritage of stone. New York, Putnam, [1970]
253 p. E842.9.G34

CRS - 37

- Goranoff, Kyrill. Why did you kill your President? Berlin, N.F., 1970. 1544 p. D24.G75
- Kirkwood, James. American grotesque; an account of the Clay Shaw-Jim Garrison affair in the city of New Orleans. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1970. 669 p. KF224.S45.K5
- LEJ on the assassination. Newsweek, v. 75, May 11, 1970: 41. AP2.N6772, v. 75
- MacDonald, Neil. Confidential and secret documents of the Warren Commission deposited in the U.S. Archives. Computers and automation, v. 19, Nov. 1970: 44-47. TJ212.C58, v. 19
- Marks, Stanley J. Coup d'etat: November 22, 1963; the conspiracies that murdered President John F. Kennedy, the Rev. Martin Luther King, and Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Los Angeles, Bureau of International Affairs, 1970. 201 p. E842.9.M348
- Meagher, Sylvia. Johnnies-come-lately to Dealey Plaza. Texas observer, v. 62, July 24, 1970: 11-13. F381.T368, v. 62
- Newman, Albert H. The assassination of John F. Kennedy: the reasons why. New York, C. N. Potter, 1970. 622 p. E842.9.N46 1970
- Olds, Greg. The official doubters. Texas observer, v. 62, Feb. 6, 1970: 9-11. F381.T368, v. 62
- Payne, Darwin. The press corps and the Kennedy assassination. Lexington, Ky., Association for Education in Journalism, 1970, cl969. 53 p. PN4722.J6 no. 15/E842.9
- Ransom, Harry H. The intelligence establishment. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970. 309 p. JK468.I6.R3 1970
- Sprague, Richard E. The assassination of President John F. Kennedy: the application of computers to the photographic evidence. Computers and automation, v. 19, May 1970: 29-60. TJ212.C58, v. 19
- Stephens, Eve. The assassin. [1st Amer. ed.] New York, Coward-McCann [1970] 253 p. PZ4.S832.A53
- Zwart, Jacques. Invitation to hairsplitting; a hypercritical investigation into the true function of the Warren Commission and the true nature of the Warren report. Amsterdam, Paris. [1970] 40 p. E842.9.Z9
-
- 1971 Assassination of John F. Kennedy. (Motion Picture) Thorne Films, 1971. E842.9
- Belin, David W. Truth was my only goal. Texas observer, v. 63, Aug. 13, 1971: 13-15. F381.T368, v. 63
- Berkeley, Edmund C. The assassination of President Kennedy: the pattern of coup d'etat and public deception. Computers and automation, v. 20, Nov. 1971: 24-26, 29-30, 48. TJ212.C58, v. 20
- Cook, Fred J. Irregulars take the field. Nation, v. 213, July 19, 1971: 40-46. AP2.N2, v. 213
- Fensterwald, Bernard, Jr. Jim Garrison, District Attorney, Orleans Parish vs. the Federal Government. Computers and automation, v. 20, Aug. 1971: 37-42. TJ212.C58, v. 20

- Knight, Janet M., ed. Three assassinations: the deaths of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King. New York, Facts on File, 1971. 266 p. E842.9.K55
- Kubicek, Earl C. The legend of John F. Kennedy. American book collector, v. 22, no. 1, 1971: 25. Z990.A5, v. 22
- Marks, Stanley J. American dream; American nightmare. Los Angeles Bureau of International Affairs, 1971. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Watch what we do, not what we say. Los Angeles, Bureau of International Affairs, 1971. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Meagher, Sylvia. The curious testimony of Mr. Given. Texas observer, v. 63, August 1971: 11-12. F381.T368, v. 63
- Olson, Don, and Ralph Turner. Photographic evidence and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 16, Oct. 1971: 399-419. RA1001.A57, v. 16
- Sprague, Richard E. The assassination of President Kennedy—declassification of relevant documents from the National Archives. Computers and automation, v. 20, Oct. 1971: 41-45. TJ212.C58, v. 20
- Thompson, William Clifton. A bibliography of literature relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; 1971 Suppl. San Antonio Tex., distributed by W.C. Thompson & Son, 1971. Z8462.8.T45 1968b Suppl.
- Turner, Ralph F., and Don Olson. Photographic evidence and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Journal of forensic sciences, v. 16, Oct. 1971: 399-419. RA1001.A57, v. 16
-
- 1972 Gareth, Jenkins. Who shot President Kennedy—or fact and fable in history. Computers and automation, v. 21, Feb. 1972: 43-46. TJ212.C58, v. 21
- Joesten, Joachim. Cuba, Vietnam, oil; three reasons why President John F. Kennedy had to die. Gutenberg uber Waldshut, Joesten [1972, c1971] 1 p. E842.9.J575
- Kubicek, Earl C. Bibliography of books, brochures and magazines dealing with events prior and subsequent to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. American book collector, v. 22, no. 1, 2 and 3, 1971: 26-27, 23-26, and 23-25; and v. 22, no. 4, 1972: 21-29. Z990.A5, v. 22
- Sagatelyan, Mikhail. Dallas: who, how, why?—Part I. Computers and automation, v. 21, Mar. 1972: 28-32, 34-36. TJ212.C58, v. 21
- Dallas: who, how, why?—Part II. Computers and automation, v. 21, Apr. 1972: 37-43. TJ212.C58, v. 21
- Dallas: who, how, why?—Part III. Computers and automation, v. 21, May 1972: 34-40. TJ212.C58, v. 21
- Dallas: who, how, why?—Part IV: conclusion. Computers and automation, v. 21, June 1972: 34-43. TJ212.C58, v. 21
- Smirnova, L. I was hired to assassinate him. New times (Moscow), no. 46, Nov. 1972: 27. E169.12.N45

Wecht, Cyril H. Pathologist's view of JFK autopsy: an unsolved case. *Modern medicine*, v. 40, Nov. 27, 1972: 28-32.

R11.M85, v. 40

Wrone, David R. The assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy: an annotated bibliography. *Wisconsin magazine of history*, v. 56, no. 1, 1972: 21-36.

F576.W7, v. 56

-
- 1973 Asbell, B. 10 years later: a legacy of torment haunts those closest to the JFK assassination. *Today's health*, v. 51, Oct. 1973: 56-60, 62-63, 65. RA421.T6, v. 51
- Belin, David W. Nov. 22, 1963; you are the jury. *New York, Quadrangle*, 1973. 521 p. E842.9.B44
- Berkeley, Edmund C., and Richard E. Sprague. The attempted framing of Jim Garrison. *Computers and automation*, v. 22, Dec. 1973: 23-29. TJ212.C58, v. 22
- Bernert, Phillippe, and Camille Gilles. The Frenchman who was to kill Kennedy. *Computers and automation*, v. 22, Jan. 1973: 37-40. TJ212.C58, v. 22
- Bishop, James Alonzo. The end of Camelot. *Ladies home journal*, v. 90, Nov. 1973: 77. AP2.L135, v. 90
- Clinch, Nancy Gager. The Kennedy neurosis - a psychological portrait of an American dynasty. *New York, Grosset & Dunlap*, 1973. 433 p. E843.C54 1963
- Committee to Investigate Assassinations. American political assassinations: a bibliography of works published 1963-1970 related to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King [and] Robert F. Kennedy. *Washington*, 1973. 26 p. Z8462.8.C65 1973
- Decade of unanswered questions. *Ramparts*, v. 12, Dec. 1973: 42-44. AP2.R19, v. 12
- Dimona, Joseph. Last man at Arlington. *New York, Arthur Fields Books* [1973] 315 p. PZ4.D5835
- Dymond, F. Irving. The New Orleans portion of the conspiracy to assassinate President John F. Kennedy-II. *Computers and automation*, v. 22, May 1973: 30-32. TJ212.C58, v. 22
- Fensterwald, Bernard, Jr. A legacy of suspicion. *Esquire*, v. 80, Nov. 1973: 141, 143, 265. AP2.E845, v. 80
- Freed, Donald, and Mark Lane. Executive action. *New York, Dell Publishing Co., inc.*, [1973]. 251 p. No. 2348
- Rare book collection
- From Dallas to Watergate: the longest cover-up. *Ramparts*, v. 12, Nov. 1973: 12-17, 20, 53-54. AP2.R19, v. 12
- Gillers, Stephen, and Pat Watters, eds. Investigating the FBI. *New York, Doubleday*, 1973. 518 p. HV8138.I58
- Hammer, Richard. Organized crime: part I: the American dream. *Playboy*, v. 20, Aug. 1973: 89-94, 166-174. AP2.P69, v. 20
- Hinckle, Warren, III. The mystery of the black books. *Esquire*, v. 79, Apr. 1973: 128-131, 170, 172, 174. AP2.E845, v. 79
- Hopkins, Robert S. The killer elite. *New York, Delacorte Press*, 1973. 234 p. P24.H7955 K1

CRS - 40

- Kirkpatrick, Lynman B., Jr. The U.S. intelligence community: foreign policy and domestic activities. New York, Hill & Wang, 1973. 212 p. JK468.I6.K53
- Kurland, Gerald. The assassination of John F. Kennedy. Charlottesville, N.Y., SamMar Press, 1973. 31 p. E842.9.K87
- Lane, Mark, and Donald Freed. Executive action. New York, Dell Publishing Co., Inc. [1973] 251 p. No. 2348
Rare book collection
- Manchester, William. Then. New York times magazine, Nov. 4, 1973: 36-37, 123-124, 126-130, 132-136. AP2.N6573
- Martin, William C. Welcome to the Lee Harvey Oswald Memorial Library and Research Institute, Marguerite C. Oswald, director. Esquire, v. 79, Jan. 1973: 142-143, 160. AP2.E845, v. 79
- Noyes, Peter. Legacy of doubt. New York, Pinnacle Books, 1973. 249 p. E842.9.N69
- O'Toole, George. Assassination tapes. Penthouse, v. 4, July 1973: 44-47, 112-114, 124-126. AP2.P413, v. 4
- Prouty, L. Fletcher. The secret team: the CIA and its allies in control of the United States and the world. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice Hall, 1973. 496 p. JK468.I6.P76
- Rosenbaum, Ron. The assassination labyrinth. The Village voice, v. 72, Mar. 8, 1973: 5, 5, 8, 10, 24. microfilm
- Rothstein, David A. Reflections on a contagion of assassination. Life-threatening behavior, v. 3, summer 1973: 105-130. RC574.L54, v. 3
- Scott, Peter Dale. From Dallas to Watergate: the longest cover-up. Ram-parts, v. 12, Nov. 1973: 12-17, 20, 53-54. AP2.R19, v. 12
- Sprague, Richard E. The American news media and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy: accessories after the fact-- conclusion. Computers and automation, v. 22, July 1973: 31-38. TJ212.C58, v. 22
- The framing of Lee Harvey Oswald. Computers and automation, v. 22, Oct. 1973: 21-24, 34-36. TJ212.C58, v. 22
- Stolley, Richard B. What happened next; film of John Kennedy's assassination. Esquire, v. 80, Nov. 1973: 134-135, 262-263. AP2.E845, v. 80
- Tackwood, Louis E. The glass house tapes. New York, Avon Books, 1973 284 p. HV8148.L552C65 1973
- U.S. National Archives. Inventory of the records of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Comp. by Marion Johnson, Record Group 272. Washington, [1973]
- Watters, Pat, and Stephen Gillers, eds. Investigating the FBI. New York, Doubleday and Co., 1973. 518 p. HV8138.I58
- Willis, Gary. Ten years after. Playboy, v. 20, Nov. 1973: 169, 212. AP2.P69, v. 20
-
- 1974 Adams, Perry, and Fred T. Newcomb. Murder from within. Santa Barbara, Cal., Probe, 1974. 423 p. E842.9.N44

CRS - 41

- Condon, Richard. Winter kills. New York, Dail Press, 1974.
304 p. PZ4.C746W1
- Dryer, Ivan. The framing of Jim Garrison, Pt. 3. Computers
and people, v. 23, Jan. 1974: 33-38. TJ212.C58, v. 23
- Evans, Medford. Fit to kill; the Presidency and political assass-
ination. American opinion, v. 17, May 1974: 35-37, 39, 41,
43, 45, 47-48. AP2.O4732, v. 17
- Hammer, Richard. Playboy's history of organized crime, part XI: attack on
a hoodlum empire. Playboy, v. 21, June 1974: 133-136, 173-
175, 178-185. AP2.P69, v. 21
- Playboy's history of organized crime presents part XII:
the American nightmare. Playboy, v. 21, July 1974: 123-126,
148, 204-215. AP2.P69, v. 21
- Hinckle, Warren, III. If you have a lemon, make lemonade. New York,
Putnam Son, 1974. 370 p. PN4874.H49.A34
- Hougan, Jim. Surfeit of spies. Harper's, v. 249, Dec. 1974:
51-54, 58, 63-64, 66-67. AP2.H3, v. 249
- Joesten, Joachim. Gerald Ford: coverup artist par excellence: how he
misused his power and prestige to shield the assassins
of President John F. Kennedy and cover up the Dallas
coup d'etat: a public indictment before the high court
of world opinion. Bobins uber weilheim, Joesten
[1974] 18 p. E842.9.J583
- Jones, Penn. Forgive my grief vol. 4. Midlothian, Texas: the
Midlothian mirror. [1974] E842.9.J65, v. 4
- Lillard, Richard G. Confrontation and innovation on the
campus: and eventful decade for western universities.
American west, v. 11, no. 1, 1974: 10-17, 62-64.
F591.A4, v. 11
- McCarry, Charles. The tears of autumn. New York, Saturday Review
Press, 1974. 276 p. PZ4.M12265Te
- MacParlane, Ian Colin A. The assassination of John F. Kennedy:
a new review. Koogons, Vic., I. C. A. MacParlane, 1974. 60 p.
E842.9.M25
Rare book collection
- Marchetti, Victor, and John D. Marks. The CIA and the cult of
intelligence. New York, Knopf, 1974. 398 p.
JK468.I6.M37
- Marks, John D., and Victor Marchetti. The CIA and the cult of
intelligence. New York, Knopf, 1974. 398 p.
JK468.I6.M37
- Newcomb, Fred T., and Perry Adams. Murder from within. Santa
Barbara, Calif., Probe, c1974. 423 p. E842.9.N44
- Fabst, Ralph M. Plodding toward terror: a personal look at the
Jack Ruby case. New York, Vantage Press, c1974. 174 p.
E842.9.P32
- Prouty, L. Fletcher. Dallas Watergate connection. Genesis,
Aug. 1974: 27-29. AP2.G33
[Not in L.C. collection]

- The greatest coverup. Genesis, Oct. 1974: 25-28.
AP2.G33
[Not in L.C. collection]
- The shadow of Dallas. Genesis, Jan. 1974: 25-27.
AP2.G33
[Not in L.C. collection]
- Smith, R. P., and Cyril Wecht. The medical evidence in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Forensic science, v. 3, Apr. 1974: 105-128. RA1001.F65, v. 3
- Teutsch, Joel M., and Champion K. Teutsch. Victimology: an effect of consciousness, interpersonal dynamics and human physics. International journal of criminology and penology, v. 2, Aug. 1974: 249-274. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Tuteur, Werner. Dialogue in Dallas: psychiatric examination of Jack Ruby. Mental health, v. 58, spring 1974: 6-10.
[Not in L.C. collection]
- Wecht, Cyril H. New evidence rekindles old doubts--JFK assassination: 'a prolonged and willful cover-up.' Modern medicine, v. 42, Oct. 28, 1974: 40X-40Z. R11.M85, v. 42
- Wecht, Cyril, and R.P. Smith. The medical evidence in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Forensic science, v. 3, Apr. 1974: 105-128. RA1001.F65, v. 3
- Weisberg, Harold, and Jim Lesser. Whitewash IV: top secret JFK assassination transcript. Frederick, Md., Weisberg [1974] 224 p. E842.9.W415
-
- 1975 Agee, Phillip. Inside the company--CIA diary. New York, Stonehill Publishing Co., 1975. 639 p. JK468.I6.A75 1975b
- Anson, Robert Sam. The greatest cover-up of all. New times (New York), v. 4, Apr. 18, 1975: 16-29. E169.12.N45, v. 4
- Anson, Robert Sam. The man who never was. New times (New York), v. 5, Sept. 19, 1975: 14-16, 21-25. E169.12.N45, v. 5
- They've killed the President: the search for the murderers of John F. Kennedy. New York, Bantam Books, 1975. 408 p.
- Ashman, Charles. The CIA-mafia link. New York, Manor Books, Inc., 1975. Registration no. A679827
Copyright Office
- Assassination-behind moves to reopen JFK case. U.S. news and world report, v. 78, Jan. 2, 1975: 30-33. JK1.U65, v. 78
- Behind the move to reopen JFK case. U.S. news and world report, v. 79, Sept. 15, 1975: 21. JK1.U65, v. 79
- Bethell, Tom. Was Sirhan Sirhan on the grassy knoll. Washington monthly, v. 7, Mar. 1975: 31-39. E838.W37, v. 7
- Bloomgarden Henry S. The gun: a biography of the gun that killed John F. Kennedy. New York, Grossman Publishers, 1975. 152 p. HV8059.B55 1975
- Blumenthal, Sid, and R. D. Rosen. The politics of conspiracy, the conspiracy of politics. Computers and people, v. 24, Apr. 1975: 24-26, 31. TJ212.C58, v. 24

- Braden, Tom. What's wrong with the CIA. Saturday review, v. 2, Apr. 5, 1975: 14-18. AP2.S273, v. 2
- Branch, Taylor, and George Crile, III. Kennedy vendetta. Harper's, v. 251, Aug. 1975: 49-63. AP2.H3, v. 251
- Campbell, Earl Vendryes. Kennedy's thoughts after he was shot. Bigfork, Minn., Northwoods, c1975. 44 p. C842.1.C35
- Canfield, Michael, and Allan Weberman. Coup d'etat in America: the CIA and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. New York, The Third Press, Joseph Okpaky Publishing Co., Inc., 1975. 314 p. E842.9.C36
- Cartwright, Gary. Who was Jack Ruby? Texas monthly, v. 3, Nov. 1975: 82-86, 129-130, 132-134. F381T84, v. 3
- The CIA and the man who was not Oswald. New York review of books, v. 22, Apr. 3, 1975: 24-25. AP2.N655, v. 22
- The Cloak comes off. Newsweek, v. 85, June 23, 1975: 16-27. AP2.N6772, v. 85
- Cohen, Jacob. Conspiracy fever. Commentary, v. 60, Oct. 1975: 33-42. DS101.C63, v. 60
- Cohen, Jeff. The Oswald tapes. Crawdaddy, Aug. 1975: 40-43. ML1.C926
- Cutler, Robert Bradley. Crossfire: evidence of conspiracy. Danvers, Mass. Betts's and Mirror Press, 1975. 99 p. E842.9.C74
- Dahlin, Robert. Fresh wave of JFK assassination titles suggest a host of new theories. Publisher's weekly, v. 208, Dec. 1975: 50, 52. Z1219.P98, v. 208
- Dallas: new questions and answers. Newsweek, v. 85, Apr. 28, 1975: 36-38. AP2.N6772, v. 85
- Did Church panel cover up for JFK? Human events, 1975: 6. D410.H8, v. 35
- Disclose the evidence: call for new investigation. Nation, v. 221, Dec. 13, 1975: 611-612. AP2.N2, v. 221
- The Documents. New republic, v. 173, Sept. 27, 1975: 12-48. AP2.N624, v. 173
- Dreifus, Claudia. Who stole John Kennedy's brains and other questions on the assassination of the President; an interview with Mark Lane. Playgirl, v. 3, Aug. 1975: 50-51, 58-59, 80-81, 92, 100-101, 140-141. AP2.P695, v. 3
- Farrell, Barry. Running with Dick Gregory. Ramparts, v. 13, Aug.-Sept. 1975: 26-28, 56-58. AP2.R19, v. 13
- Fensterwald, Bernard, and George O'Toole. The CIA and the man who was not Oswald. New York review of books, v. 22, Apr. 3, 1975: 24-25. AP2.N655, v. 22
- Fresh doubts on JFK assassination: forensic experts call for a new investigation of all the evidence. Medical world news, v. 16, June 2, 1975: 25-28. R11.M864, v. 16
- The Ghost will not rest. New republic, v. 173, Sept. 27, 1975: 7. AP2.N624, v. 173
- Goldman, P., and J. J. Lindsay. Dallas: new questions and answers. Newsweek, v. 85, Apr. 28, 1975: 36-38. AP2.N6772, v. 85

- Goulden, Joseph C. Gun barrel politics. *Washingtonian*, v. 10, Feb. 1975: 46-52. F191.W37, v. 10
- Groden, Robert. A new look at the Zapruder film. *Rolling stone*, no. 185, Apr. 24, 1975: 35-36. ML1.R65
- Hale, Hazel, and Thomas Henry Irwin. A bibliography of books, newspaper and magazine articles, published in English outside the United States of America, related to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Belfast, the authors, 1975. 19 p. Z8462.8.I79
- Irwin, Thomas Henry, and Hazel Hale. A bibliography of books, newspaper and magazine articles, published in English outside the United States of America, related to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Belfast, the authors, 1975. 19 p. Z8462.8.I79
- Joling, R. J. JFK assassination still an unsolved murder mystery. *Saturday evening post*, v. 247, Dec. 1975: 44-46. AP2.S2, v. 247
- Kaiser, Robert Blair. The JFK assassination: why Congress should reopen the investigation. *Rolling stone*, no. 185, Apr. 24, 1975: 27-28, 30-31, 33, 37-38. ML1.R65
- Leaf, Jesse James. The war inside the CIA. *Genesis*, Dec. 5, 1975: 22-24, 40, 44. AP2.G33
- Lindsay, J. J., and P. Goldman. Dallas: new questions and answers. *Newsweek*, v. 85, Apr. 28, 1975: 36-38. AP2.N6772, v. 85
- McDonald, Hugh C. Appointment in Dallas: the final solution to the assassination of JFK. New York, The Hugh McDonald Publishing Corporation, 1975. 211 p. E842.9.M23
- MacDonald, Neil. The assassination of President Kennedy. The 'Oswald window'. People and the pursuit of truth, May 1975: 7. [Not in L.C. collection]
- MacParlane, Ian Colin A. Proof of conspiracy in the assassination of President Kennedy. Melbourne, Book Distributors, 1975. 160 p. E842.9.M26
Rare book collection
- Marks, John. A Kafka story, but its true. *Playboy*, v. 22, Aug. 1975: 59. AP2.P69, v. 22
- Marshall, Eliot. Aftermath; how the survivors feel now. *New republic*, v. 173, Sept. 27, 1975: 48-51. AP2.N624, v. 173
- Model, F. Peter. Killing the Kennedy's: the case for conspiracy. *Argosy*, v. 382, July 1975: 34-41, 64-66. AP2.A7, v. 382
- Murphy, Charles J. V. Assassination plot that failed. *Time*, v. 105, June 30, 1975: 28. AP2.T37, v. 105
- New JFK evidence unearthed. *Guardian*, v. 28, Nov. 26, 1975: 7. AP8.G78, v. 28
- Osborn, Kenneth. The CIA scalpel cut deep. *Playboy*, v. 22, Aug. 1975: 58. AP2.P69, v. 22
- Oswald cover-up: accusing the FBI of concealing Oswald's visit to Dallas headquarters. *Time*, v. 106, Sept. 15, 1975: 19. AP2.T37, v. 106

CRS - 45

- O'Toole, George. The assassination probe. Saturday evening post, v. 247, Nov. 1975: 45-48, 112. AP2.S2, v. 247
- The assassination tapes: an electronic probe into the murder of John F. Kennedy and the Dallas cover-up. New York, Penthouse Press, 1975. 265 p. E842.9.082
- Lee Harvey Oswald was innocent. Penthouse, v. 6, Apr. 1975: 45-46, 124-129, 132. AP2.P413, v. 6
- The Oswald-FBI coverup. Penthouse, v. 6, Aug. 1975: 48-51, 62, 89-90, 123. AP2.P413, v. 6
- O'Toole, George, and Bernard Fensterwald. The CIA and the man who was not Oswald. New York review of books, v. 22, Apr. 3, 1975: 24-25. AP2.N655, v. 22
- O'Toole, George, and others. Unsolved JFK murder mystery: special issue. Saturday evening post, v. 247, Sept. 1975: 44-53. AP2.S2, v. 247
- Penthouse interview: Victor Marchetti. Penthouse, v. 6, Jan. 1975: 60-62, 91-98. AP2.P413, v. 6
- Phelan, James. The assassination that will not die. New York times magazine, Nov. 23, 1975: 27-28, 109-111, 119-123, 126, 132-133. AP2.N6575
- Polioff, Jerry. The media and the murder of John Kennedy. New times (New York), v. 5, Aug. 8, 1975: 29-32, 34-36. E169.12.N45, v. 5
- Pomerance, Jo. Some questions to be answered. Nation, v. 220, Feb. 22, 1975: 204-205. AP2.N2, v. 220
- Prouty, L. Fletcher. An introduction to the assassination business. Gallery, Sept. 1975: 73-74, 86-87. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Questions that won't go away. Saturday evening post, v. 247, Dec. 1975: 38-39. AP2.S2, v. 247
- Ralston, Ross F. History's verdict: the acquittal of Lee Harvey Oswald. N.P., Ralston, c1975. 269 p. E842.9.R286
- Rice, William R., comp. John F. Kennedy-Robert F. Kennedy: assassination bibliography. Orangevale, Calif., Rice, 1975. 62 p. Z8462.8.R53.E842.9
- Richler, Mordecai. It's a plot. Playboy, v. 22, May 1975: 132-133, 179-185, 188-190. AP2.P69, v. 22
- Rosen, R. D. and Sid Blumenthal. The politics of conspiracy, the conspiracy of politics. Computers and people, v. 24, Apr. 1975: 24-26, 31. TJ212.C58, v. 24
- Rosenbaum, Ron. Turning point for the assassination buffs. The Village voice, v. 20, May 5, 1975: 46, 50, 52. microfilm
- Russell, Richard. CBS leaves a skeptic skeptical. The Village voice, v. 20, Dec. 8, 1975: 156-157. microfilm
- The finger points to Fidel, but should it? The Village voice, v. 20, Dec. 15, 1975: 29-37. microfilm
- Salisbury, Harrison. The gentlemen killers of the CIA. Penthouse, v. 6, May 1975: 46-48, 51, 144-156. AP2.P413, v. 6
- Sanford, David. The death of Trujillo: Kennedy complicity? New republic, v. 172, June 28, 1975: 7-8. AP2.N624, v. 172

- Scaduto, Tony. Blood money scandal: President Ford's assassination coverup. Genesis, Oct. 1975: 24-27, 33. AP2.G33
[Not in L.C. collection]
- Schonfeld, Maurice W. The shadow of a gunman. Columbia Journalism review, v. 14, July-Aug. 1975: 46-50. PN4700.C64, v. 14
- Smith, Eliot Fremont. Who killed Kennedy? Oswald did. The Village voice, v. 20, Dec. 8, 1975: 57-58. microfilm
- Sprague, Richard E. The assassination of President John F. Kennedy: in the plans and the coverup. People and the pursuit of truth, May 1975: 3-5, 7. [Not in L.C. collection]
- Nixon, Ford, and the political assassinations in the United States. Computers and people, v. 24, Jan. 1975: 27-31. TJ212.C58, v. 24
- Szulc, Ted. Murder by proxy. Penthouse, v. 6, Aug. 1975: 44-46, 124-132. AP2.P413, v. 6
- The spy among us. Penthouse, v. 6, July 1975: 44-46, 92-93, 123-125, 132-135. AP2.P413, v. 6
- The Warren Commission in its own words. New republic, v. 173, Sept. 27, 1975: 9-48. AP2.N624, v. 173
- Taylor, Henry J. Facts belie 'plot' charges in JFK assassination. Human events, v. 35, Apr. 12, 1975: 9. D410.H8, v. 35
- U.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States. Allegations concerning the assassination of President Kennedy. In its Report to the President [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1975: 251, 269. JK458.I6.U54 1975
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights. National Archives--security classification problems involving Warren Commission files and other records. Hearing, 94th Congress, 1st session. Nov. 11, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 98 p. KF27.G6628 1975d
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. FBI oversight. Hearings, 94th Congress., 1st and 2d sessions. Parts 1-3. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975-1976. 628 p. KF27.J847 1975
- Viorst, Milton. The Mafia, the CIA, and the Kennedy assassination. Washingtonian, v. 11, Nov. 1975: 113-118. F1191.W3, v. 11
- Weberman, Alan, and Michael Canfield. Coup d'etat in America: the CIA and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. New York, Third Press, 1975. 314 p. E842.9.C36
- Weisberg, Harold. Post mortem: JFK assassination cover-up smashed. Frederick, Md., Weisberg, c1975. 650 p. E842.9.W393
- Who killed JFK? Skeptic, no. 9, Sept.-Oct. 1975: whole issue. D1.S485, 1975
- Who killed JFK? Just one assassin. Time, v. 106, Nov. 24, 1975: 32-34, 37-38. AP2.T37, v. 106
-
- 1976 Acoca, Miguel, and Robert Brown. The Bayo-Pawley affair--a plot to destroy JFK and invade Cuba. Soldier of fortune, spring 1976: 12-22, 60-61. [Not in L.C. collection]

- Anson, Robert Sam. Jack, Judy Sam and Johnny...and Frank, Fidel, Edgar...
New times (New York), v. 6, Jan. 23, 1976: 21-23, 27-30,
32-33. E169.12.N45, v. 6
- Baskerville, Donald A., comp. The assassination of President
John F. Kennedy: moves to reopen the investigation; a selected
list of references. Library of Congress information bulletin,
v. 35, Dec. 3, 1976: 752-757. Z733.V57.16, v. 35
- Belin, David W. They've killed the President. National review,
v. 28, Feb. 6, 1976: 81-85, 88-90. AP2.N3545, v. 28
- Bethell, Tom. Earl Warren: on the mob's payroll? Washington
monthly, v. 8, Mar. 1976: 35-46. E838.W37, v. 8
- Biskind, Peter. The FBI's secret soldiers. New times (New York),
v. 6, Jan. 9, 1976: 18, 21-25. E169.12.N45, v. 6
- Blumenthal, Sid, and Harvey Yazijian, eds. Government by gunplay:
assassination conspiracy theories from Dallas to today.
New York, New American Library, 1976. 266 p.
E842.9.G65
- Broyles, William. The man who saw too much. Texas monthly,
v. 4, Mar. 1976: 86, 88-89, 114-122. F381.T84, v. 4
- Charged: a cover-up in Kennedy killing. U.S. news and world
report, v. 81, July 5, 1976: 21. JK1.U65, v. 81
- DuBois, Larry, and Laurence Gonzales. The puppet...uncovering the
secret world of Nixon, Hughes, and the CIA. Playboy, v. 23,
Sept. 1976: 74-77, 82, 112, 180-190. AP2.P69, v. 23
- Eddowes, Michael. November 22: how they killed Kennedy. St.
Helier, Jersey, N. Spearman (Jersey) Ltd., London, distributed
by N. Spearman, 1976. 352 p. E842.9.E32
- The End of Camelot. Playboy, v. 23, Apr. 1976: 125, 127-130,
142, 193, 196, 198-200, 202-204, 206, 208.
AP2.P69, v. 23
- Ephron, N. Twelve years on the assassination beat. Esquire,
v. 85, Feb. 1976: 58. AP2.E844, v. 85
- Evans, M. Stanton. Coverup proved in JFK murder probe. Human
events, v. 36, July 24, 1976: 13, 15. D410.H8, v. 36
- Fraker, S., and S. Leshner. Back to square one. Newsweek, v. 88,
Dec. 6, 1976: 32, 35. AP2.N6772, v. 88
- Gatti, Arthur. The Kennedy curse. Chicago, Regnery, c1976.
264 p. BF1728.K46.G37
- Gonzales, Laurence, and Larry DuBois. The puppet...uncovering
the secret world of Nixon, Hughes, and the CIA. Playboy,
v. 23, Sept. 1976: 74-77, 82, 112, 180-190.
AP2.P69, v. 23
- Guidry, Vernon A., Jr. Coverup in slaying of JFK. Washington
post, June 24, 1976: A-3. News
- Harris, Irving. Little brother. Psychology today, v. 10, Oct.
1976: 48-51, 103. BF1.P855, v. 10
- Harris Larry R., and J. Gary Shaw. Cover-up: the governmental
conspiracy to conceal the facts about the public execution
of John Kennedy. Cleburne, Tex., Shaw, 1976. 227 p.
E842.9.S44

CRS - 48

- Hoch, Paul, and George O'Toole. Dallas: the Cuban connection. Saturday evening post, v. 248, Mar. 1976: 44-45, 96.
AP2.S2, v. 248
- Hoch, Paul L., Peter Dale Scott, and Russell Stetler, eds. The assassinations: Dallas and beyond: a guide to cover-ups and investigations. 1st ed. New York, Random House, c1976. 552 p.
E842.9.A8
- JFK: clean bill for CIA. Newsweek, v. 87, June 23, 1976: 21.
AP2.N6772, v. 87
- Jones, K. Unlikely assassin; question of F. Castro's involvement. New republic, v. 175, July 3, 1976: 5-6.
AP2.N624, v. 175
- Leshner, S. and S. Fraker. Back to square one. Newsweek, v. 88, Dec. 6, 1976: 32, 35.
AP2.N6772, v. 88
- Lowenstein, Allard. The Kennedy killings. Argosy, v. 383, Feb. 1976: 28-33, 86.
AP2.A7, v. 383
- McKinley, James. Cries of conspiracy. Playboy, v. 23, May 1976: 122-127, 130, 132, 200-208.
AP2.P69, v. 23
- The end of Camelot. Playboy, v. 23, Apr. 1976: 125, 127-130, 142, 193, 196, 198-200, 202-204, 206, 208.
AP2.P69, v. 23
- Meagher, Sylvia. Accessories after the fact; the Warren Commission, the authorities, and the report. New York, Vintage Books [1976, c1967] 477 p.
E842.9.M36 1976
[Not in L.C. collection]
- Meunier, Robert F. Shadows of doubt: the Warren Commission cover-up. Hicksville, N.Y., Exposition Press, c1976. 165 p.
E842.9.M45
- Model, F. Peter. The assassinationist business--an investigation of the investigators. Oui, v. 5, Feb. 1976: 17-18, 123-124.
AP2.O63, v. 5
- Morrow, Robert. Betrayal: a reconstruction of certain clandestine events from the Bay of Pigs to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1976. 229 p.
E842.9.N44
- Nobile, Phillip and Ron Rosenbaum. The curious aftermath of JFK's best and brightest affair. New times (New York), v. 8, July 9, 1976: 22-34.
E169.12.N45, v. 8
- Oglesby, Carl. The yankee and cowboy war: conspiracies from Dallas to Watergate. Mission, Kan., Sheed Andrews and McMeel, c1976. 355 p.
E842.9.O34
- On the trail of the rogue. Saturday evening post, v. 248, Dec. 1976: 74.
AP2.S2, v. 248
- Orth, Maureen. Memoirs of a CIA psychologist. New York times magazine, June 25, 1976: 18-24.
AP2.N6575
- O'Toole, George, and Paul Hoch. Dallas: the Cuban connection. Saturday evening post, v. 248, Mar. 1976: 44-45, 96.
AP2.S2, v. 248
- Prouty, L. Fletcher. The guns of Dallas: update. Gallery, May 1976: 19-22.
[Not in L.C. collection]

- Roffman, Howard. Presumed guilty: Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. South Brunswick, N.J. A.S. Barnes, 1976. 299 p. E842.9.R58 1976
- Rosenbaum, Ron, and Phillip Nobile. The curious aftermath of JFK's best and brightest affair. New times (New York), v. 8, July 9, 1976: 22-34. E169.12.W45, v. 8
- Russell, Richard. Interview with Gerry Hemming: An ex-CIA man's stunning revelations on 'the company,' JFK's murder and the plot to kill Richard Nixon. Argosy, v. 383, Apr. 1976: 25-28, 52-54. AP2.A7, v. 383
- What was in the CIA's declassified JFK file? The Village voice, v. 21, Apr. 26, 1976: 17-20. microfilm
- Schulz, Donald E. Kennedy and the Cuban connection. Newsweek, v. 88, Sept. 6, 1976: 9. AP2.N6772, v. 88
- Scott, Peter Dale, Paul L. Hoch, and Russell Stetler, eds. The assassinations: Dallas and beyond: a guide to cover-ups and investigations. 1st ed. New York, Random House, c1976. 552 p. E842.9.A8 1976
- Shales, Tom. When good assassinationists get together...they seldom get together. Oui, v. 5, Feb. 1976: 78-79, 121-122. AP2.063, v. 5
- Shaw, J. Gary, and Larry R. Harris. Cover-up: the governmental conspiracy to conceal the facts about the public execution of John Kennedy. 1st ed. Cleburne, Tex., Shaw, 1976. 227 p. E842.9.S44
- Stang, Alan. They killed the President. American opinion, v. 19, Feb. 1976: 1-8, 59-61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71-72. AP2.04732, v. 19
- Stetler, Russel, Peter Dale Scott, and Paul L. Hoch. The assassinations: Dallas and beyond: a guide to cover-ups and investigations. 1st ed. New York, Random House, c1976. 552 p. E842.9.A8
- Szulc, Ted. Death of JFK; CIA and FBI failure to report anti-Castro conspiracies. New republic, v. 174, June 5, 1976: 6-8. AP2.N624, v. 174
- They've killed the President. National review, v. 28, Feb. 6, 1976: 81-85, 88-90. AP2.N3545, v. 28
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Administration. Providing funds for the expenses of the investigations and studies to be conducted by the Select Committee on Assassinations; report to accompany H. Res. 1557. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1976. 3 p. (94th Congress., 2d session. House. Report no. 94-1685)
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Creating a select committee to conduct an investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the death of John F. Kennedy and the death of Martin Luther King, Junior, and of any others the select committee shall determine; report to accompany H. Res. 1540. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1976. 2 p. (94th Congress., 2d session. House. Report no. 94-1566)

U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Assassinations. Report together with additional and supplemental views, of the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 18 p. 94th Congress., 2d session. House. Report no. 94-1781)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy: performance of the intelligence agencies. Final report; Book V. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 106 p. (94th Congress., 2d session. Senate. Report no. 94-755)

Yazijian, Harvey, and Sid Blumenthal, eds. Government by gunplay: assassination conspiracy theories from Dallas to today. New York, New American Library, 1976. 266 p. E842.9.G65

-
- 1977 Andronov, Iona. On the trail of a President's killer. New times (Moscow), v. 1, Jan. 1977: 27-30; v. 2, Jan. 1977: 26-30; v. 3 Jan. 1977: 27-30. D839.N483 1977
- Are there new leads? Newsweek, v. 89, Apr. 11, 1977: 32-33. AP2.N6772, v. 89
- Assassination: now a suicide talks. Time, v. 109, Apr. 11, 1977: 20. AP2.T37, v. 109
- Billar, Owen A. Suicide related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Suicide and life threatening behavior, v. 7, spring 1977: 40-44. RC574.L54, v. 7
- Boeth, R., and others. JFK: what the FBI found. Newsweek, v. 90, Dec. 19, 1977: 28. AP2.N6772, v. 90
- Bonventre, P., and others. Opening the JFK file: FBI file. Newsweek, v. 90, Dec. 12, 1977: 34-35. AP2.N6772, v. 90
- Eddowes, Michael. The Oswald file. New York, C. N. Potter, distributed by Crown Publishers, c1977. 240 p. E842.9.E32 1977
- FBI story on JFK's death: with report by H. Gorey. Time, v. 110, Dec. 19, 1977: 18. AP2.T37, v. 110
- Gallup [Poll] Inc. (American Institute of Public Opinion). Were Kennedy, King conspiracy victims? Gallup opinion index, report no. 139, Feb. 1977: 1-4. HM261.A1G34
- Hager, Barry. House move reflects questions on cost of assassination probe. CQ weekly report, v. 35, Jan. 8, 1977: 46-48. JK1.C15, v. 35
- JFK killing: FBI files raise questions, give no answers. U.S. news and world report, v. 83, Dec. 19, 1977: 15. JK1.U65, v. 83
- JFK: what the FBI found. Newsweek, v. 90, Dec. 19, 1977: 28-29. AP2.N6772, v. 90
- Johnston, Edmund. The key to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, plus the Seiberling letters. Akron, Ohio, Hamilton Publishing House [c1977] 30 p. E842.9.J643
- Karmin, Jacob. Myth, fantasy, or fact? New York, Vantage Press, c1977. 159 p. E842.9.K33

CRS - 51

- Kohn, Howard. Execution for the witnesses: the deadly Kennedy probe. Rolling stone, no. 240, June 2, 1977: 42-44.
ML1.R65
- Lardner, George Jr. Congress and the assassinations: the curious politics of the House inquiry into the murders of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. Saturday review, v. 4, Feb. 19, 1977: 14-18.
AP2.S273, v. 4
- Latin letter: Haiti. Latin America political report (London), v. 11, May 1977: 131. HC121.L27, v. 11
- Lowther, William. The evidence be damned. (Who killed JFK?) Macleans, v. 90, Dec. 26, 1977: 35-36.
AP5.M2, v. 90
- McMillan, Priscilla Johnson. Marina and Lee. New York, Harper and Row, c1977. 527 p. CT275.0737.M32 1977
- Why Oswald really killed Kennedy: part 2. Ladies home journal, v. 94, Nov. 1977: 122-143. AP2.L135, v. 94
- Mallowe, Mike. Who killed Kennedy? The Philadelphia connection. Philadelphia magazine, v. 68, Sept. 1977: 135-142, 230-239.
AP2.A2.P45, v. 68
- Miller, Tom. The assassination please almanac. Chicago, Regnery, Co., c1977. 284 p. E842.9.M53 1977
- Oltmans, Willem. New mysteries in Kennedy assassination? Atlas world press review, v. 24, May 1977: 13-15.
AP1.A83, v. 24
- Opening the JFK file. Newsweek, v. 90, Dec. 12, 1977: 34-35.
AP2.N6772, v. 90
- Russell, Richard. Three witnesses. New times (New York), v. 8, June 24, 1977: 31-35. E169.N45, v. 8
- Schorr, Daniel. The assassins. New York review of books, v. 24, Oct. 3, 1977: 14-22. AP2.N655, v. 24
- Schulz, Donald E. Kennedy and the Cuban connection. Foreign policy, no. 26, spring 1977: 57-64, 121-139. E744.F75
- Scott, Peter Dale. Crime and cover-up: the CIA, the Mafia, and the Dallas-Watergate connection. Berkeley, Calif., Westworks, 1977. 80 p. E842.9.S34
- Ungar, Sanford J. A new man on two old cases. Atlantic, v. 239, Feb. 1977: 8, 12, 14. AP2.A8, v. 239
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Authorizing the Select Committee on Assassinations or any subcommittee thereof to make applications to courts; and to bring and defend lawsuits arising out of subpoenas, orders immunizing witnesses and compelling them to testify, testimony or the production of evidence, and the failure to testify or produce evidence; report to accompany H. Res. 760. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 3 p. (956h Congress., 1st session. House. Report no. 95-606)
- Creating a Select Committee on Assassinations; report to accompany H. Res. 222. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1977. 3 p. (95th Congress., 1st session. House. Report no. 95-3)

CRS - 52

- U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Assassinations. Committee meetings. Hearings, 95th Congress., 1st session. March 9...23, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 60 p. KF27.5.A8 1977
- Report. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 14 p. (95th Congress., 1st session. House. Report no. 95-119)
- Why is the Assassinations Committee killing itself?; anatomy of a murder inquest. Rolling stone, no. 184, Apr. 7, 1977: 42-45. ML1.R65
- Why the JFK case is coming back to life. U.S. news and world report, v. 82, Jan. 17, 1977: 28-30. JKL.U65, v. 82
-
- 1978 Epstein, Edward Jay. Legend: the secret world of Lee Harvey Oswald. [New York] Reader's Digest Press, c1978. 382 p. E842.9.E63
- Gans, Herbert J. Why was Kennedy killed. Trans-action, v. 5, July-Aug. 1978: 5-6. H1.T72, v. 5
- House Assassination Committee: internecine bitterness seen. New times (New York), v. 10, Feb. 20, 1978: 18. E169.12.N45, v. 10
- Krassner, Paul. The mind of Mae Brussell. Oui, v. 7, May 1978: 106-112. AP2.063, v. 7
- Malone, William Scott. The secret life of Jack Ruby. New times (New York), v. 10, Jan. 23, 1978: 46-51. E169.12.N45, v. 10
- Sidey, Hugh. Jackie Onassis' memory fragments on tape. Time, vol. 111, Apr. 24, 1978: 30. AP2.T37, v. 111
- Summers, Anthony. The Kennedy assassination: why doubts persist. Atlas world review, v. 25, July 1978: 20-22. AP1.A83, v. 25
- Ultimate assassination book: a story to make your eyes roll. New times (New York), v. 10, Feb. 6, 1978: 16. E169.12.N45, v. 10
- Wire services appeal FBI denial of refund. Editor and publisher, v. 111, Feb. 25, 1978: 17. PN4700.E4, v. 111



THE CASE

U.S. Government, subject, defendant, in the case of the United States vs. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Zip].

On the 17th day of [Month], 1947, the undersigned, [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Zip],

do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the [Document],

as the same appears from the records of the [Agency], [City], [State], [Zip].

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and the seal of the [Agency],

this [Day] of [Month], 1947.

[Signature]

[Title]

[Address]

[City]

[State]

[Zip]

[Additional Information]

[Closing]



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 00124 079 3

Boston Public Library

Copley Square

GENERAL LIBRARY

KF27

.5

.A8

1978A

9800164648

The Date Due Card in the pocket indicates the date on or before which this book should be returned to the Library. Please do not remove cards from this pocket.

